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Preface
Patients at work
5, 7997. "With all these uncertainties about the therapeutic effect of interferon
beta I can not prevent from feeling like a potential guinea-pig." These are the words of a
multiple sclerosis patient attending the meeting 'Choosing for interferon?'.
The scene of action: the 'Doctor Soer' auditorium of 'Sunny Home' in Zwolle, the Netherlands.
At the right hand side of the entrance is a provisional podium flanked by two big billboards
with promotion posters of the Multiple Sclerosis (MS) Society. The slogan 'Diagnosis MS,
what next?' immediately strikes the eye.
The local meeting is organized by the Dutch MS Society in collaboration with the
Foundation for Appropriate Drug Use (DGV) as part of a national campaign to inform MS
patients of the pro's and con's of treating MS with the newly registered therapeutic drug,
interferon beta. Among those present are MS patients in various stages of the disease—from
experienced wheelchair individuals, to less disabled 'stick' people, to the seemingly healthy
group of 'greenies' who are still in the early stages of the disease. They are accompanied by
their relatives and friends. In one way or another all are trying to cope with a chronic
degenerative nervous disease for which there is no effective treatment available yet, other than
a few drugs that provide symptomatic relief.
The speaker is a doctor representing the DGV. We learn that the DGV is an
independent non-governmental organization. It aims to promote the safe and appropriate use
of therapeutic drugs through interactive group meetings with clinicians and pharmacists as well
as patients. In an effort to make contact with the audience the DGV representative addresses
the ambiguous feelings that might have risen after reading the critical information leaflet. "Our
pamphlet might have dashed your high hopes but it is not our aim to sell promises today, but to
present a realistic picture of what this new therapeutic drug has to offer to you as MS
patients". The DGV doctor emphasizes the problem of judging the effectiveness of therapeutic
drugs in a poorly defined disease like MS. It is a therapy that is claimed to produce therapeutic
effects with a less than 50% response rate. Those prepared to seize the opportunity have to
accept an reduction of their quality of life, with no immediate benefits. Using interferon means
coping with side-effects ranging from flu-like symptoms, painful swellings at the side of
injection, up to suicidal tendencies, and learning how to fit in the storage, preparation and
injection procedures into one's daily life.
"Summarizing, it might be said that while in the short-term interferon users are worse
off than fellow-patients who decide not to use interferon, in the long-term the user group as a
whole will be better off. However we have to keep in mind that the actual benefits will differ
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from one person to another, with a relatively large number of users who will not experience
any beneficial effects at all. It certainly is not the wonder drug that the media have tried to
make of it. Are there any questions so far?"
The audience seizes the opportunity to pose questions with both hands. What should I
make of your rather negative image of interferon treatment with less than 10% positive and
90% negative news"? "There seem to exist two different types of beta interferon, beta-la and
beta-lb. Are we talking about one and the same therapeutic drug or should we regard them as
two closely related but different drugs?" "Why is there a difference in dosaging between the
various hospitals?" " If the history of MS is punctuated with false-dawn cures, what guarantee
is there that interferon will not turn out to be the next false-hope on the list?"
In one of the last remarks before the end of the meeting the MS-patient—quoted at the
beginning of my talk—indicates that with more questions than answers about the application of
interferon-beta she feels subjected to medical experimentation. "In principle interferon-beta is
not any different in this respect from any other therapeutic drug currently in use in clinical
practice", claims the doctor in response. "The problem is that certain side-effects will not show
up in the limited clinical studies which are required to qualify for a therapeutic drug license but
will make themselves felt only after widespread and long-term use. For the sake of future users
it is of utmost importance that clinicians as well as patients cooperate in closely monitoring the
effects of therapeutic drugs, in particular the newly introduced ones. "His comments invite
support from an MS patient who justifies her decision to take part in an interferon trial by
pointing out the possible benefits that may result from these kind of studies for future
generations of MS patients. She feels she can make a contribution, however small, to the
progress of medicine.
At times the nature of the discussion between the patients and the doctor on the
platform—both parties discussing similarities and differences in research results and
questioning the credibility of and rationale behind claims as well as procedures—makes me feel
that I am attending a scientific congress. As such this open-information evening questions the
self-evident certainty, with which we think we know we can pinpoint who is a scientist and
who is a layperson. Speaking the language of medical science clearly enables MS-patients to
redraw the boundaries between the entities 'science' and the 'public' and to reconstitute the
expert/lay divide. In other words this capacity empowers patients in relation to medical and
scientific professionals."
See. for a historical analysis of development and change in the relations between 'science' and 'the public': S.
Shapin. 'Science and the Public', in R. C. Olby, G.N. Cantor, J. R. Christie and M.J. Hodge (eds.).
Companion ro rne W/j/ory o/Morfern S< (>«<•«• (London: Routledge, 1990).
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Most important, the example of the MS-patients shows us that there is more to the
introduction of prospective consumers to a new therapeutic drug than the transfer of ready-
made knowledge. The questions of quality, safety, research, evaluation and professional
control are raised by prospective consumers in such a manner as to suggest that the
organization of the treatment setting is negotiable. The prescription and consumption of
interferon-beta appear to require the patient's belief and trust in its efficacy. Achieving this
requires hard work by all the parties involved—doctors, researchers, patients, company
executives and regulators. This interactive process involves not just molding the therapy
routines of interferon-beta, but also the therapeutic and social context in which it is
administered. The molding, however, is constrained in major ways by the cumulative impact of
years of work between bench and bedside, on which the therapeutic profile of interferon-beta
basically draws.
At least there is more room for negotiation about the everyday 'do's and don'ts' of
interferon therapy than might have been gathered from the stringent official regulatory and
delivery arrangements. The MS-patients do not seem to take for granted the official efficacy
data and therapy routines of interferon-beta resulting from years of testing in the laboratory
and the clinic. As such they seem to be willing to take considerably more responsibility for
managing their own treatment than they are currently allowed to do.
But this book is about more than patients. It attempts to lay out the historical journey
among a variety of actors—e.g. virologists, biochemists, molecular biologists, immunologists,
pharmaceutical companies, journalists, regulators, doctors and patients—involved in shaping a
family of therapeutic proteins, the interferons. In making manifest the inner workings of the
practices by which the biomedical sciences produce and evaluate new knowledge claims and
therapeutic tools, this study exposes the reader to the uncertainty and value choices involved in
scientific work. It shows us that effective participation in the process of knowledge production
in biomedicine not only requires the capacity to speak the technical language of the journal
article and of the scientific conference, but also achieving the competence to use that language.
My claim is that a thorough understanding of the practice and culture of the biomedical
sciences is a sine qua non for effective public participation in biomedicine.
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Introduction
The making of a therapeutic drug; the case of interferon
Interferon immediately caught my imagination when first reading Mike Edelhart's popular
account //jfer/<?rort: 77JC Atew //ope/or Cancer in the early 1980's.' I, along with a whole
generation of students in the life sciences had been brought up believing that developing drugs
was a difficult but relatively straight-forward industrial activity with the almighty chemists in
the driver's seat. Here, however, you had a therapeutic substance that seemed different in every
respect. First, chemists were of marginal importance in the development of interferon, while
biomedical scientists played the leading part. Second, the greater part of the research work was
done in academic settings or in small genetic engineering companies, many of which were
founded in the late 1970s. Until the early 1980's the large pharmaceutical companies that have
traditionally dominated modern drug research showed little interest in work on interferon.
Surprisingly some of the major drug companies stepped up their efforts to develop interferon
as a drug while intense public disappointment in its healing power became manifest. What was
the rationale behind this seemingly odd course of industrial action? And more generally, what
made interferon follow a different developmental trajectory from most other therapeutic drugs?
Was it perhaps due to the fact that it lasted more than thirty years before the first interferon
molecule had been isolated and chemically identified?
During my pharmacology training I had become familiar with working with substances
of unknown chemical composition: in most cases identification was a question of hours or days
of hard labor in a biochemical laboratory. In general when chemical analysis was not achieved
within a fortnight we were commissioned to proceed with another task. I could hardly imagine
scientists working for years in a row, with little more at their disposal than a biological assay,
measuring the biological activity of what was only believed to be a substance of protein nature.
How did they manage to cope with this rather uncertain and, in my eyes, trying situation? Of
course I was aware that in the case of insulin and penicillin researchers had had similar
difficulties. But wasn't that regarded the 'prehistory' of modern drug development?
Years later I came across Sandra Panem's book 77ie /nter/<?row CVM.KK/«'.* However
interesting in its description of the political and economical aspects of interferon's history and
development, it did not answer most of these questions. She had little more to say about the
scientific development of interferon than what could already be found in Edelhart's account or
M. Edelhart, /nrer/eron: 77ie Atew / /ope/or Cancer (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1981).
S. Panem, 77ie /n/er/eron Crusade (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984).
1
in scientific reviews. Moreover, by the time I read Panem's study interferon had just succeeded
in finding a niche in clinical practice as a supplement to the armamentarium of antiviral and
cancer drugs, and I was curious to find out how interferon managed to become naturalized and
legitimized as part of medical practice. This appeared to be yet another question that warranted
investigation. In starting to collect the published literature concerning interferon, I came to
realize that the story was even more complex than I could ever have imagined.
Interferon's "biography' appears to contain many stories in one: both success stories and
failures. Unlike most other therapeutic agents in the history of medicine interferon survived
successive cycles of promise and disappointment. As such it offers an ideal opportunity to do a
parallel study of success and failure and to analyze what went into choices that did and did not
lead into blind alleys. Furthermore, as a product of long-term work between "bench and
bedside' it sheds light on experimental practices in twentieth century biomedicine, and on how
these practices, the practitioners and their products are influenced by and constitutive of social
and physical environments. Moreover, the interferon story provides a historical perspective on
the development, testing and use of a new generation of biosynthetic 'therapeutic molecules' in
modern medicine. Finally, it may serve as a show-case of the growing interference between
molecular biology and the health sciences—in an experimental world where biology meets
drug development.
In describing the fascinating history of a family of 'therapeutic' proteins, this study will
neither credit the current clinical usefulness of the Interferons to specific individuals nor explain
the more than twenty-five year delay in using these therapeutic molecules in medical practice
by pointing to other individuals. Rather, the primary goal is to throw a more general light on
the evolution of twentieth century biomedical practices, and on how these practices come to
produce data, technologies and goods which may eventually be embedded in our modern
healing culture. In addition this study seeks to present the often messy events by which the
scientific and therapeutic value and use of the interferons unfolded—a process that involved
conflicts and resistances as well as enrolment and acquiescence. Naturalizing interferon as part
of medical practice involved establishing links and commitments between many different
individuals and crganizations, including laboratory researchers, doctors, drug companies,
patients and their families, and regulators. I will demonstrate how the current profile of interfe-
ron as a family of therapeutics can be regarded as a dynamic product of the history here
described.
Studying the biomedical sciences as practice a/»/ culture -,,;
More than any other product of scientific medicine, therapeutic drugs form highly sensitive
tools at the frontiers of modern biomedical research and at the same time pervade daily life
and clinical practice. By often providing a relatively easy, convenient, and personal means to
help control health problems, they enhance the status of medicine. Drugs have acquired a
special symbolic significance as an icon of the increasing healing power of modern scientific
medicine, which continues to capture the public imagination. Moreover, as the 'wondrous'
products of the pharmaceutical industry, they provide a promising public face for the
continuing research efforts of the drug companies.
The pharmaceutical industry chose, long ago already, to let people believe that most of
the twentieth century's therapeutic breakthroughs owe their origin to the industry's systematic
and limitless research efforts.' This vision of drug companies committed to research, which
provide us with one innovative pill after the other to solve our health problems ranging from
headaches, to infections and male impotence, has been articulated over and again in popular
fiction and non-fiction literature, and in films and soap operas.* The development of
therapeutic drugs is presented as a simple and unqualified success story.
If we move from the pharmaceutical industry's image makers to social science it is
surprising to see that until the 1980's, most historical and social studies of science and
medicine have refrained from questioning the inadequacy of this traditional model of drug
innovation—according to which the making and use of therapeutic drugs proceed linearly from
bench to bedside. They either confined to describing modern medicines as products of
imaginative biomedical research or decided to focus on social, policy and regulatory issues and
steer away from the scientific, technological and industrial aspects.' The notable exceptions to
Most recently Jordan Goodman shows in his study of the anticancer drug taxol how the pharmaceutical
company Bristol-Myers Squibb, which obtained exclusive rights from the NCI (the original patent holder) to
develop taxol for the commercial market, gradually managed to rewrite the history of taxol in company
publications as a means to claim novelty and originality over the now profitable corporate product Taxol(R):
J. Goodman and Vivien Walsh, The Billion-Dollar Molecule: Tales of Taxol from the United States. France
and Holland'. Unpublished paper presented during the Anglo-Dutch Workshop on Remedies and Healing
Cultures in Britain and the Netherlands in the Twentieth Century, London. June 1998.
In the case of the Dutch soap opera 'Medisch Centrum West' the pharmaceutical company Glaxo succeeded in
getting advertising text for their migraine medicine, Imigran, into the script: Interview with Heiko Top who
works as a doctor with the Dutch Foundation for Appropriate Drug use (DGV); See for a comprehensive
examination of the media's reporting of health and medicine: A. Karpf, Dw/onn^ //if A/edia: 77ie /teporting
o/Hea/fn am/ Medicine (London: Routledge. 1988).
See, for studies confined to describing modem drug development as an autonomous industrial process
governed by the logic of cumulative scientific and technological advance: J. T. Mahoney, 77ie Afe/r/ia/i« o/
Li/e. ,4n /Ifcoun/ o/f/ie American P/iarmaceurica/ /ndwjfrv (New York: Harper. 1959); D. Wilson, /Vni<i//in
in Pers/wc/ive (London: Faber& Faber. 1976): D. Schwanzman. /nnova/ion in l/ie P/iarmaceu/ica/ Wuj/ry
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); W. Sneader. Dru# Discovery: /Ae £vo/u/ion o/Modern
this apparent separation between social and scientific investigations are studies by Gladys
Hobby, John Swann and Jonathan Liebenau.® These detailed and sensitive historical accounts,
have given us some idea about the intricate relations that have emerged in this century between
medicine, academic research, industry, and health politics.
Hobby brings a new perspective to the history of penicillin, presenting it as one of the
first major ventures in group pharmaceutical research which played an important role in the
emergence of modern corporate Research&Development organizations in the drug industry. In
his study of the rise of university-industry relationships, Swann focuses on the growing
importance of collaborative research between academic institutions and industry as a source of
drug innovation. Liebenau, in turn, takes a broader approach by studying not only the growing
cooperation between science and industry, but also the emerging links between the drug
companies and the medical community.
However important their contribution to the historiography of pharmaceutical research
and development in the twentieth century, these scholars have not been overly successful in
opening the 'black box' of industrial and government science to critical scrutiny. For the greater
part they regarded the content of drug research and development as self-explanatory without
questioning the self-serving and unproblematic images of drug research and testing that have
been in circulation for decades.
In the 1980's, inspired by a fast growing body of social constructivist and ethnographic
approaches to the study of science and technology, some sociologists, historians and
philosophers began to carve their way into the intricacies of a laboratory supported scientific
medicine.' However different their individual approach, they shared a constructivist
(Chichester: John Wiley&Sons, 1985); M. Weatherall, /n Searc/i o/ a Cure (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990); R.P.T. DavenPort Hines and Judy Slinn. G/OJTO: 4 History to /962 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992); H.C. Peyer, ÄocAc- A Company History (Basel: Editiones Roche. 1996);
A critical view of the process of drug testing and evaluation is rarely taken in these studies. At the same time
more politically-challenging studies with an emphasis on controversial social and political issues related to
therapeutic drug development and use. the neglect of the content and context of research within the drug
companies is striking; M. Silverrnann and P.R. Lee, Pi//.s Pro/J/j <t Po/mcj (Berkely: California Press, 1974);
and P. Temin, rafting Kour Mediane: Drug Äegu/a/ion in fn« C/nifed State (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1980).
See, G. L. Hobby, Penicillin: Meeting the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1985); J. Liebenau,
Medico/ Science and Medico/ /ndu.s(rv (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); J. P. Swann,
Academic jcienfis/s and rne pnarmaceufica/ mdiurry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1988).
See. O. Amsterdamska, Medical and Biological Constraints: Early Research on Variation in Bacteriology,
Sociu/ 5/udiei o/ Science. 17 (1987), 657-87; The following studies are regarded as exemplary social
constructivist accounts of science and technology: D. A. Mackenzie, Statistics in Britain: /S65-/9J0 (Eden-
burgh: Edenburgh University Press. 1981); A. Pickering, Conj/ruc/ing öuarrib: A socio/ogica/ History o/
PartiWe rVivsir.v (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984); H.M. Collins. C/mnging Order (London: Sage
Publications. 1985); T. Pinch, Con/ronting Afofure: rne Socio/ogy o/Sofar-/Veu/rino Defection (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986); W. Bijker. T. P. Hughes and T. J. Pinch (eds), 77ie Socia/ Co/wfrucri-
perspective on medical work which served as a conceptual tool to open up the 'black box' of
medical knowledge—previously seen as an authoritative system of knowledge that developed
independently of its social and cultural contexts.'" Within this constructivist perspective
science, medicine and technology are to be treated as historically situated and social activities
which can only be understood in relation to the contexts in which they occur. Experimental
data in this view are just one resource among many used in social negotiations over what the
correct outcome of an experiment will be—which is potentially open ended. Key assumptions
are the 'theory-laden' nature of fact-statements and the underdetermination of empirical judge-
ments by evidence, with the consequence that claims about the reality of what experiments
disclose are based in consensus.
Such a position entails a form of methodological relativism that can be described in the
following terms: "scientific knowledge has to be seen, not as the transparent representation of
nature, but rather as knowledge relative to a particular culture"." In my view this does not
imply that all claims to knowledge are to be judged equally valid. It does mean, however, that
all our understandings of 'nature' are products of human labor which have been shaped within
specific cultural contexts. Insofar as scientists attribute properties to nature, it is as a
consequence of scientific practice; those properties can not count as the explanation of the
order of scientific work. In other words, in scientific practice distinctions between nature and
society are continuously being made, unmade and remade. Empirical studies carried out within
this methodological perspective have been successful in opening the 'black-box' of science,
technology and medicine to examination. They have succeeded in providing us with detailed
and illuminating accounts through linking social and cultural commitments of the scientific
community to the content of scientific ideas, methods and procedures. Furthermore, they have
on o/ 7>c/!/io/osica/ Sv-s/emj (Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1987); and W. Bijker. Of Bicycles,
ßaiWito andßu/fej: 7bu'ar</a 77ieorv o/Sociotec/inica/ C/ionjje (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1995); See,
for important examples of ethnomethodological studies of science, which are based on the methodological
principle of following scientists around and examine their working practices by using the notion of
'antropological strangeness'—treating scientists at work, as if they were a sort of exotic tribe with strange and
puzzling customs: B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory £»/? (London: Sage Publications. 1979); K. Knorr-
Cetina. 77ie Afanu/acrure o/ Knoivfcdge (Oxford: Pergamon Press. 1981); M. Lynch, 4 « and /Irfi/ar/ in
Lafrora/orv Science: /\ S/udy o/S/iop Wont and 7a/* in a /?ejearc/i Lafcora/ory (London: Routledge and
KeganPaul, 1985).
See for comprehensive reviews of recent approaches, trends and debates in the social and cultural studies of
science, medicine and technology; S. JasanolT. G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen and T. Pinch, //anrfboo/t o/
SciVnoe and 7Vrnno/oj?v Sfudies (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage. 1995); M. Casper and M. Berg, Con-
structivist Perspectives on Medical Work: Medical Practices and Science and Technology Studies, SriVnc*,
7ec/ino/o#v ci //union Va/ues, 20 (1995), 395-407; J. H. Fujimura, Oa/fing Science: .4 SwionM/ory o///ie
Ques//or //«• Genef/cr o/ Cancer (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1996), 237-43; and, J.
Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998)
A. Pickering, 'From Science as Knowledge to Science as Practice', in A. Pickering (ed) Science as Prac/ice
and Cu/(ure (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 5.
demonstrated the importance of credibility—understood as a system of authority combining
aspects of legitimation, dependence, trust and persuasion—as the backbone of the cognitive
and moral order in modern scientific inquiry.''
Applied to the biomedical sciences this has shown us the important point that
experimental design and results cannot be dissociated from the interests and commitments of
those who frame and evaluate laboratory as well as clinical experiments." In addition, science
and technology "not only shape the social and cultural characteristics of medicine, but are also
shaped by them—redefined and transformed in their actual use in particular settings and
circumstances".''' In other words one should study the development of medical practices
without treating scientific and technical issues as independent of the social and cultural
contexts of work. Moreover, several scholars have articulated the importance of investigating
the question of how scientific practices and medical practices mutually shape and transform
each other as a prerequisite for understanding scientific medicine."
In his pioneering book Drugs LooA/ng /or Disease.? Rein Vos successfully uses the
constructivist perspective as a heuristic tool to study drug development practices."' He was
able to show that the origin of new medicines—in his case the discovery of the beta blockers
and calcium antagonists—lies in the interface between the worlds of the laboratory and the
clinic. The exchange of information between bench and bedside is argued to play a central role
in the generation of medical scientific knowledge that serves as a valuable input to the drug
discovery process. Nelly Oudshoorn and Louis Galambos followed suit with their
constructivist case-studies on twentieth-century pharmaceutical research and development—
respectively concentrating on the development of the sex-hormones and vaccine
development."
See. for an extensive discussion of the credibility argument: H. Collins, and T. Pinch, 77ie Go/cm: Wfcaf
f (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
See. S. L. Star, Äegions o/fne MiW: Brain /tesearcn and f/ie ßuesf/or Srierm/ic Ortoinry (Stanford (CA):
Stanford University Press, 1989); and, E. Richards, Vitamin C a/id Cancer: Medicw or Po/iricr (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1991).
O. Amsterdamska, 'Social Studies of Medicine'. Paper presented at the 1999 WTMC Conference, Rolduc,
The Netherlands.
See, M. Casper and M. Berg, Constructivist Perspectives on Medical Work: Medical Practices and Science
and Technology Studies. SWfncf, 7>c/mo/ogv <S Human Va/ues, 20 (1995), 395-407, p. 396.
R. Vos, Dru#.v Looiing /»r Dijea.se5. /nnovanVe Dru£ r«\v«iwn anrf //if deve/o/>menr o/7/ie ßeto ß/octere
and fne Ca/rium Anlago/iuK (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1991).
N. Oudshoom. fievond r/ie Na/ura/ Bodv: /In /4rc/iaeo/o#v o/Sejc Hormones (London: Routledge. 1994);
and, L. Galambos and J. E. Sewell, Afcrwwfa o/ innoia/ion: Vaccine Deve/opmenf /!/ Mercit. S/iar/> <4
Do/ime. «/id AfH//or</ /S95-/995 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and. L. Galambos and J.
L. Sturchi. The Transformation of the Pharmaceutical Industry in the Twentieth Century'. In J. Krige and D.
Pestre (eds.) Science in f/ie 7H'enfiern Cemury (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997).
They both take the concept of 'actor-network'—focusing on the strategies of those
actively involved in the shaping of therapeutic drugs: laboratory scientists, clinicians,
pharmaceutical entrepreneurs and regulators, for building networks of linkages between these
heterogeneous actors—as a model for understanding change and development of inter-
relationships between biomedical research, government institutions and pharmaceutical
companies. Whereas Oudshoorn's major interest is to understand how a specific group of
therapeutic drugs became restricted in their clinical utility (directed almost exclusively to
women) during the developmental process, Galambos concentrates on how the interaction of
ideas, individuals and institutions influences innovation in a science-based industry.
Unlike most other constructivist scholars both authors manage to extend the scope of
analysis to include the macro-sociological dimensions of science, medicine and technology."* In
working across various social levels simultaneously—local laboratory and clinical practices,
private and public organizations, and the broader national and international context of these
practices—they have succeeded in broadening our understanding of the dynamics of
pharmaceutical research and development. Given this outcome I decided to approach the
subject-matter from a similar angle, although without adopting the 'actor-network' concept as a
heuristic frame-work. I developed a constructivist perspective that does not give up 'causes'
and interests' as explanatory categories and which treats the pharmaceutical playing field as
more than "a field of battle where the "fact" that proves more "factual" depends on which
actors succeed in enrolling allies, much as leaders enroll armies and armories and politicians
enroll sponsors".''' In my view a constructivist study of biomedicine in the making—whether in
the past or in the present—should explain why those involved make the choices they do.
Moreover it should account for the practical successes and failures of scientific medicine, as
part of a long-term process of development and change.
This book therefore focuses on the following kinds of questions: What gets studied and
why; and what does not get studied and why not? What makes scientists discriminate between
specific experimental features, ideas, methods or claims? What meanings are given to a
research object like interferon and how do these change over time? Why do some products of
See, for other constructivist studies of science, medicine and technology which succeed in establishing in
their accounts connections between the dynamic of scientific and technological practices and the broader
context of social practices; S. Shapin and S. Schaffer. LfviorAan ana" //if /tir/>ump; ffofc/jf .5, Äov/e on</ //if
Er/»rrim«ita/ ZJ/<? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); D. Mackenzie, /nven/ing /Icci/ruc}*: -4
/rtrforira/ Sorio/o&v o/Afac/eor Afiwi/e GuiaTince (Cambridge: The MIT Press. 1990); J. Sapp, Wfterf //if
7>urh Z J « : Fran: Afofwus and /Af Origiru o/Mo/fcu/ar Bio/o^y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990); S. Wright. Mo/fru/ar Po/iricr: Deve/o/wig /Imfnca/t and ßn/i'.v/i Aegu/atory Po/icy /or Genefi'r
fhgineering /972-/9S2 (Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1994); and, T. M. Porter, 7>IM» IU /Vumfrfriv
77ie ft/rrai/ o/Ofc/ecfivi'ry in Science and /V>/ic Lj/e (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1995).
J.H. Fujimura, Oa//mj> Science: A Sociohistory of the Quest for the Genetics of Cancer (Cambridge (MA):
Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 239.
research flourish and spread around the world while others seem to languish in local obscurity?
Who are involved in the evaluative processes between bench and bedside? How do biomedical
scientists over time succeed (or fail) in expanding the private space of their workplaces to
universalize the products of their scientific work: in other words, how do they extend their
authority so as to create new kinds of therapeutic practices and life forms?'"
In my reconstruction of 'the biography of a miracle drug, the interferons' the focus is
on the evolution of material and working practices, as well as on the living and feeling people
who participate in the creation of new horizons in biomedicine. To learn more about how the
products of 'laboratory life' may or may not succeed in proliferating to other areas of human
activity, I will account for how the biomedical sciences as practice and culture develop in
symbiosis with society at large. This will be done by alternately zooming in on scientists in
their workplaces and zooming out to the broader social and political context in which they
operate.
Following the sociologist of science Andrew Pickering, I shall use the word 'practice' in
a generic sense, around which all that follows is organized in science and medicine. In this
sense it refers to the realm of realtime efforts to engineer workable and stable configurations of
instrumental and interpretational procedures, phenomena, instruments and theoretical
considerations through a dialectical process of "resistance and accommodation"."' The term
'culture' in turn refers to the heterogenous nature of doing science that involves establishing
productive relations between the 'social' world of researchers, physicians, funding agencies,
industry and medicine, and the 'material' world of facts, phenomena, laboratory tools and
instruments."
The ultimate goal of my project is to tell an accessible and informative story about
interferon, explaining a variety of issues in its wake. In producing a reconstruction,
interpretation and explanation of interferon's biography I will use as little theoretical
vocabulary as possible. However, the lack of theoretical terms should not be misread as
I fially agree with Robert Proctor that questions such as these deserve priority over the epistemologically
outdated and inproductive, but ever angrier realism/positivism versus relativism/post-modemism debates.
Unfortunately, in the early 1990's both parties have decided to turn their costly skills "to raising their own
exclusive fortresses, from where they rain down erudition and abuse one another" instead of joining forces
and try to understand the complex enterprise science and how it succeeds in changing the 'world' around us.
They even used their wisdom to start the so-called 'science wars' which have already taken their first casu-
alties. The waiting is still for a peace agreement which acknowledges that the history of science reduces
neither to the sum of the facts nor to the sum of the texts or the sum of the interests; R. Proctor, Cancer Wars:
Hou PO/I / I« S/uj/>e.9 VWiaf Wf Afmw * Don'f Know/^ouJ Cancer (New York: Basic Books. 1995), pp. 8-9 ;
Editorial, 'You Can't Follow the Science Wars Without a Battle Map', 77i<> Economic/, 13 December, 1997;
C. Macilwain, 'Science Wars' Blamed for Loss of Post', Wafure, 387 (1997), 325.
"' See, A. Pickering, 77ie Mang/e o/Pracft'ce (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 4.
See, for similar use of the term culture: J.H. Fujimura. Cra/Wng Science: A Sociohistory of the Quest for the
Genetics of Cancer (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1996).
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indicating that this research has not been theoretically informed. The constructivist perspective
as presented above, thoroughly shaped the empirical focus as well as the analytical layers in my
story.
Whilst the specific socio-historical study presented in this book focuses on the interfe-
ron case, I see it as having wider relevance. It aims at furthering the understanding of the
complex processes through which new remedies are created and made to work at the
intersection between science, state and industry in the second half of the twentieth century. As
such this historical narrative might be of interest not only to historians and sociologists of
science and medicine, but also to the larger audience of scientists, doctors, patients and other
interested public groups. They are all in different ways grappling with the new capabilities that
'molecular medicine' continues to yield. For instance, this book can help doctors and regulators
to come to terms with the post-interferon framework for developing and evaluating new
remedies. At the same time, patients and their organizations may be able to distill from the
'interferon story' pieces of information that can help them to use their growing influence in the
medical arena in a more effective way.
The historian's toolbox on display"
My aim is to provide a fine-grained chronological reconstruction of the interferon story that
does justice to the twists and turns of the experimental practices under survey. With most of
the early work on interferon now being dismissed as "much second class research that was
carried out with third class preparations slightly contaminated with interferon", it is the
historian's task to recover the ways in which interferon researchers acted within a specific
historical context."'' However, I have to emphasize that the historian's ambition to tell the story
"how it really was' is here subservient to the ethnographic approach of following the historical
The following studies helped me to compose the third part of the introduction: M.J.S. Rudwick. 77ie Gr«i/
Devonian Con/roversv (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 7-9; D. Mackenzie, /nven/mg
Accuracy; A nutorira/ Socio/ogv o/M/c/ear Afu»7e Guidance (Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1990),
pp. 12-14; E. Richards. Vitamin C and Cancer (New York. St. Martin's Press, 1991). p.12. L. Star. 'Power,
Technology and the Phenomenology of Conventions: On Being Allergic to Onions.' In J. Law (ed.) /I 5oc/-
o/ogv o/Afonj/er.?: Eways on Power, 7Vc/zno/ogv. and Do/mna/ion (London: Routledge. 1993), 26-56; R.
Kohler, Lords o/ r/ie F/y: Droiopni/a Gene/ics and //ie fjrperimema/ £j/e (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1994), 13-5; and, G. L. Geison, 77ie Priva/e Science o/touw ftmeur (Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 1995). 11-6.
See, R. Oldham. 'Interferon a Model'. In I. Gresser (ed.) /n/er/eron 6 (London: Academic Press, 1985), p.
128.
actors as they themselves explore and discuss every aspect of the knowledge-making process.**
In particular I focus on how these biomedical scientists went about experimenting and on how
they managed to transform nebulous problems at the bench into understandable molecular
entities which promised to serve the public interest. By attempting empirically to view the
world in the actors' own terms, I highlight their multiple visions and means of achieving them.
An important challenge posed by the rich source materials on the evolution of interferon is not
only to encompass what transpired at a particular level of analysis [for example, biomedical
researchers versus private and state institutions] but also to address the relations among actors
and to reveal the processes that linked the various social worlds at different levels of analysis.
As a historian of twentieth century life sciences I have been able to make use of the
sociologist's classic form of evidence, the 'in-depth' interview. However informative and
exciting oral sources in general appear to be, oral history as a source is however inherently
problematic. Recollections of scientists are as subjective and unreliable as all recollections are.
This is an inevitable consequence of the continuous retrospective changes in meaning and
interpretation of historical events and also of the interview as a social interaction.
In the obvious weakness of oral memory as a subjective interpretation of the past lies
also its special strength.** Interviews, even about events being recalled decades later, provided
me with valuable information about issues which were hardly mentioned in written sources
(with the exception of personal letters). Among other things I got to know more about driving
forces, influences, the nature of relationships, 'tacit knowledge', working procedures and
techniques, the character of buildings and the atmosphere in a working place, personal
tragedies, even about what retrospectively are called 'mistaken' beliefs that shaped practices.
Moreover, I discovered important documents like the laboratory notebooks of Alick Isaacs and
Lindenmann's correspondence with Isaacs, that would have been difficult to trace otherwise.
Written or printed documents like personal letters, minutes of meetings, scientific
papers, internal reports are neither trouble-free of course. They not only served specific
purposes but quite often were meant to conceal rather than to reveal the twists and turns
between bench and bedside. Even laboratory notebooks are incomplete traces of the laboratory
work under survey; and however neatly written they often proved difficult to decipher and
interpret.
In general, all information must be evaluated both in terms of internal consistency and
in comparison with other sources: whether photo, film, printed or written documents, or
interviews. Whenever persistent contradictions between the recollections of the participants
See, for a classical and best read example of studying scientific practice by using the notion of "antropological
strangeness"—treating scientists at work, as if they were a sort of exotic tribe with strange and puzzling
customs: B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Zj/e (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
See, for a systematical treatment of the use of oral history in historical research; P. Thompson. 77i€ Voice o/
r/if ftm (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988).
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and documentary evidence in the form of letters, notebooks and manuscripts occurs I will
indicate why a certain type of source has been given priority.
However rich and accessible the source materials might look at face value to historians
used to study pre-modern periods and subjects, the task of historical reconstruction and
analysis of events and developments in twentieth century biomedicine provides the researcher
with new and genuine challenges. First of all I met with specific problems in collecting
contemporaneous interferon-related documentary material. For example, institutional and
governmental records in various countries have limitations on access: in the UK public records
are in general subject to a privacy law that keeps them closed for at least thirty years. More
significant than formal restrictions, however, is the fact that only part of the institutional or
personal records make the journey into archives. Because of space constraints and frequent
relocations of both individuals and institutions, loads of papers had been discarded before I
could study them. Furthermore, from the 1980's onwards collections of letters between
scientists, who switched to other forms of communication (telephone, fax), become a scarce
commodity." In addition to these practical problems there is a systematic bias in the
documentation, in that the fullest records are mostly those of the major actors. Since the very
same 'elite group' of interferon researchers accounted for almost 75% of the production of
publications and other scientific products I took this bias for granted. Having said this I have
taken great care to prevent a so-called 'executive approach' by including the voices of those
outside the inner-circle of 'interferonologists'.
Another difficulty that manifests itself when studying twentieth century history of
science, in particular in the case of very recent developments, is that the historian is dealing
with history in the making. With most of the dramaf« perro/iae of the study, their allies and
opponents included, still alive and in some cases professionally active, the historian may get
caught up in on-going struggles over scientific and technical knowledge claims. In principle, all
participants have something at stake in the historian's interpretation and presentation of the
subject matter, but for some the stakes are higher than for others. However determined to keep
a safe distance from the "battle scene', the historian cannot avoid being affected by it, if only
through a lack of cooperation in obtaining access to documents and participants. Undoubtedly
this will have influenced my reconstruction of the interferon story, but is this problematic in
itself? My answer is 'no', as long as the historian acknowledges that the goal of achieving
strictly neutral and symmetrical historical accounts "is as mythical in actual practice as the
scientist's goal of neutral evaluation of competing therapies"." In fact, in writing about interfe-
Despite the fact that the records available to me were not perfect and that there might be some gaps I have
long since reached the point of diminishing returns. In other words I think it most unlikely that studying yet
another box of documents might lead to any major change in my reconstruction of the development of the
interferons.
See. E. Richards, V;'ramm C and Canr<r (New York. St. Martin's Press, 1991). p. 12.
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ron in terms of retrospect and prospect I have become part—albeit a tiny part—of the history I
write about.
The biography of a'miracle drug' '
• • ' * & • " • • ' . i ' * i ' K : . U " > r l i ' . 6 " : ; - ? . t 4 t f . • • • • • • •
The interferon story has all the ingredients that can be found in successful Hollywood movie
scripts; the heroic struggle of individual scientists to get recognition for their work, the high
hopes and disappointments, the dramatic illness of one of the protagonists that brings him in an
asylum and leads to an untimely death, the 'miraculous' effects of a seemingly forgotten
biological compound and the hysteria surrounding interferon as a miracle drug against cancer.
This biography of a therapeutic drug, however is less interested in exploiting the dramatic
qualities of the story than in exploring how interferon managed to play many different roles as
an evolving family of biological agents. Interferons have been regarded as research objects,
miracle cures, research tools, medical commodities, conceptual part of the cellular immune
system, genetically engineered proteins and patentable biological inventions. By concentrating
on interferon as it proliferates in three mutually overlapping realms—laboratory science,
medicine and the public domain—I tried to sort out, how, through complex lines of interaction
both interferon and its 'environments' were modified. However this was far from easy. The
moment I started following the things called interferon 'I lost them'; they had changed and they
would continue to change during my research journey. .
In the face of the complexity of the interferon story the most useful narrative thread is
still a chronologically one. Each chapter deals with another episode in the biography of
interferon from the 1930's up to the present. In order to do justice to the idea of scientific
work as skilled craftsmanship, practiced within a shared tradition and field of research, I will
start my account with a brief sketch of the historical development of the intellectual and
material framework within which the new biological factor, named 'interferon', would
ultimately be shaped. In this prelude, that constitutes chapter 1, I will make explicit, as far as
possible, what for the dramaf/s personal in chapter 2 remained largely tacit and taken for
granted. The way is then free for the rest of the narrative to unfold without repeated
interruption for the explanations of procedures and concepts that would otherwise be
necessary.
Chapter 2 accounts for the experimental events, whereby 'interferon' as a current
matter-of-fact was shaped at the National Institute of Medical Research in London between
1956 and 1957. The emphasis is on studying and analyzing how the researchers Alick Isaacs
and Jeanne Lindenmann in experimenting at the laboratory bench, built and manipulated an
experimental system. By the time the fleeting products of laboratory practice achieved a certain
form of consistency that met with local standards, research papers were written up for
publication. However publishable, the significance of the experimental claims concerning the
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new virus inhibitory factor named 'interferon' had yet to be determined.
Chapter 3 discusses 'the fierce fight' involved in transforming interferon from an
obscure biological factor at the margins of viral research into a laboratory phenomenon that
legitimized the 'blossoming' of a new field of research. Another point of interest is how the
perceived role of medicines like penicillin as 'new wonders for the doctor's bag', as well as a
national so-called 'American penicillin syndrome', triggered interest in developing interferon as
a therapeutic drug in Britain.
Chapter 4 addresses the factors shaping the first successful postwar initiative to
secure a formal collaboration between the British government and the drug industry, as a
means to develop interferon as a therapeutic drug. The main focus is on how the various
parties tried to cooperate across the domains which those involved routinely demarcated as
'science', 'policy' and 'industry'. I will describe how interferon as a product of biological
research increasingly met with resistance from a chemistry-dominated pharmaceutical industry
and how this gradually drove the various parties involved in the British Interferon Collaborati-
on apart. By paying attention to the preparations for, and conduct of clinical trials with
interferon, I will show that if anything is evident it is the lack of self-evidence in evaluating
experimental results.
Chapter 5 studies in detail the role biological standardization played in the manage-
ment of differences in interferon research. A central issue for researchers in the embryonic field
of interferon research was the uncertainty resulting from the non-compliant character of re-
search materials and organisms. This chapter is concerned with the accountability strategies
used by interferon researchers to facilitate the circulation of research results and materials. I
shall show, how among other factors, the intrusion of powerful spheres, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, into the relatively private domain of 'laboratory life' played an
important role in creating a demand for biological standardization.
Chapter 6 describes the emergence of interferon as an anticancer agent in the 1970's.
Focus will be on the ways in which the major collective or individual actors—ranging from
doctors, journalists, laboratory researchers, patients, politicians, regulators to drug company
executives—left their mark and influenced the ways in which interferon was portrayed and
perceived, primarily in the American public arena. Special attention will be payed to the role
the mass media played in what has become known as the 'interferon crusade'.
Chapter 7 examines the question what ultimately constituted therapeutic success in the
case of interferon. Despite having failed to live up to its public promise as a therapeutic break-
through, interferon succeeded in finding a niche in clinical practice. The primary focus of this
chapter will be the interaction between interferon and the existing biomedical culture—how
this interaction both modifies the potential medical innovation and its 'environment'. Special
attention will be paid to the role clinical trials have played in naturalizing the interferons as part
of medical practice.
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Finally, chapter 8 is meant as an extended commentary on this biography of a 'miracle'
drug. It will analyze how through the mangle of practice and culture interferon continued to
change shape in its twisted existence as an evolving family of biological molecules.
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Chapter 1
Setting the scene: (re-)modelling a set of biological phenomena.
1.0 Introduction
/« ffte sH/wner o/ 7956 a/ f/ze /Variona/ /ntf/fure / o r A/e</ica/ Äeicarc/i a/ A//// ///'//
London, a v/s/tt'ng 5wiw .scze/jfz.sr', 7ea« Lz'na'enwza/zn, was z'/ifroaWea' to A/ic/: /ÄHICS, owe o /
ßriVam's /easing virus reiearc/ieri. AccoraVng /o Lmde/zma/z/z, /saacs fcegaw fo s/iow rea/
zVzfe re J7 //if momenf zTie /orwzer /ne«//onerf /i/s ye/ z/zzpz/Ms/ied' eArperz'me«/s ^ a / / n g HVZ7I a
/abora/ory p/zenomenon co/Zed" 'v/ra/ i/zrer/erence'—c/iarac7en'ze</ a5 f/ie m/»"W/or>' fjQtc/ by
one v/'rMi' wpo« r/ie propagaf/on o / anor/ier in a /ios/ organism. S/Vict / s a a « Ziarf a/reacfy
a 5eri>5 o/ paperi on viVa/ in/ei/ere/ice, /ze was eager /o Ziear more aoo«/ //zeie
i. Among o///er r/iingj i7 appeared //iar »n £ru</ying v/ro/ in/er/ere/ice L/nrfenmann
a somew/iar .y//n(7ar eAper/mento/ je/-wp as /.saacs, w/7/j /erti/e /ie/i'.v egg.v a/ia*
i/i/7ue/iza vz'rMses. Ar f/ie ena" o/ f/ie/r //ve/y conversa//o/i /saacs iMgges/ea" //lev m/g/zf yo/n
/orces ana" stor/ a co//ai>oran've i/MO^ o« iomer/i/'ng re/a/erf fo //ze p/zenome/io/i o / vz'ra/
z'/zrer/erence...
The previous paragraph could have been the opening lines of a history of interferon
research. It describes the very beginning of a collaboration which resulted in the shaping of a
new laboratory factor named 'interferon'. To start a history in this way, however, would be like
starting a play without having set the scene properly, thereby preventing the audience from
grasping the structure and dynamics of the story-line. For instance, from what perspective
should one look at Isaacs's metaphorical phrase—"Interferon was born 9 years ago of parents
whose family name is viral interference and who are now 30 years old"—in the first handbook
on interferons?' Was there, indeed, a parental relationship between 'development' of viral
interference and the 'birth' of interferon, and in what way was interferon the fruition of the old
and the beginning of the new? To shed some preliminary light on these question, I decided to
write a 'prelude', which sketches the historical development of research materials, procedures
and theoretical concepts that were available to Isaacs and Lindenmann in 1956.
In setting the scene for the interferon case, this chapter follows the transformation of
viral antagonism among animal viruses or what became later known under the heading 'viral
interference', from an object of laboratory study to a standardized laboratory tool employed in
A. Isaacs, 'Introduction', in N. Finter (ed.) /n/er/Vro/ij (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company,
1966), p. X.
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viral research.* At the same time I will explore how, by means of scientific articles, the
biomedical researchers under survey communicated new knowledge claims about experimental
techniques, phenomena and theoretical concepts and at the same time re-ordered and
transformed already existing claims. As such, it is an attempt to trace several aspects of the
process by which biomedical knowledge evolves in academic journals.
The next section deals with observations and hypotheses concerning viral antagonism
in laboratory animals in European and American laboratories, and the emerging notion that the
different observations of viral antagonism in animal models might be related. I shall then
describe and analyze how the application of new research techniques helped to transform the
study of what by the late 1940's was generally referred to as 'viral interference'.
1.1 About rabbits, viruses, monkeys, mice and viral antagonism.
It was the Italian bacteriologist Flaviano Magrassi, who presented one of the first inves-
tigations leading to definite recognition of interference phenomena. In the early 1930's
Magrassi had been engaged in laboratory studies dealing with herpes virus infections in rabbits
at the Institute of Microbiology (7/ygiCTiiJcÄe/i /MS/I'/M?') of the University of Basel, led by the
bacteriologist Robert Doerr.' By the time Magrassi started his viral research work in Basel,
various strains of herpes virus had been isolated and tested for their pathogenic activity in
pathology and bacteriology laboratories worldwide. These experiments were performed in
v/vo, in the rabbit/ Over the years it had been noted by various researchers that strains of
In searching for relevant literature to set the scene for Isaacs's and Lindenmann's joint research efforts, I
followed the route a novice to the subject of virus interference between animal viruses would have chosen in
the mid-1950's. The most recent review article was often regarded as a useful starting point. Hence. I
retrieved the review article 'Interference phenomena between animal viruses', published by the American
physician and virus researcher Werner Henle in 1950. In the 1950's this particular review was widely
considered as mandatory reading for anyone interested in research dealing with interference between animal
viruses. Besides providing a comprehensive listing of published reports dealing with instances of viral
antagonism among animal, plant and bacterial viruses Henle pointed out that the first laboratory investigati-
ons leading to a definite recognition of interference between animal viruses were published in 1935. On the
assumption that the literature listed by Henle is exhaustive and representative enough to mirror the total
output of literature. I decided to base this chapter on literature items from Henle's review paper which were
published between 1935 and 1949; W. Henle, 'Interference Phenomena Between Animal Viruses: a Review',
7. tawl. 64 (1950), 203-35.
My reconstruction of Magrassi's research work is largely based on the following articles and book: F.
Magrassi, 'Studii sull'Infezione e sull'Immunita da Virus Erpetico. Nota I', Bo//, /if. Si>ro/er. Afi7an., 14
(1935). 773-821; F. Magrassi. 'Studii sull'Infezione e sull'Immunita da Virus Erpetico. Nota II and HI', Z
Hv#.. 117 (1936). 501-28 and 573-620; and A. Grafe, -4 History o/£tperimen/a/ Vi>o/o£y (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 1991), pp. 63-84.
In the 1920's and 1930's bacteriologists mainly depended on laboratory animals forculturing and studying
animal viruses. Since the successful transmission of a herpes virus to the cornea of a rabbit in a German
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herpes virus could be differentiated according to their pathogenic (disease inducing) behavior.'
Two groups of herpes viruses were distinguished: highly pathogenic or so-called
'encephalitogenic' strains, and weakly pathogenic or so-called 'non-encephalitogenic' strains. If
rabbits were inoculated with an encephalitogenic strain they typically developed
'encephalomyelitis' [i.e. an acute inflammation of the brain] and eventually died, regardless of
the route of inoculation—via the skin ('intradermally'), onto the transparent membrane
covering the circular part of the front of the eyeball ('onto the cornea or corneally') or into the
principal part of the brain ('intracerebrally').*
Inoculation with non-encephalitogenic strains, however, was generally followed by
minor disease symptoms, such as peripheral lesions of the skin and the cornea, but not by
encephalomyelitis, unless the virus preparation was injected intracerebrally. In addition it was
common knowledge that rabbits which recovered from the disease in most cases were immune
against subsequent reinfection with herpes virus. In other words, the rabbits did not develop
any disease symptoms. This protection or immunity in rabbits, which in most cases did not last
very long, was thought to result from the presence of specific, circulating, neutralizing
antibodies against herpes virus.
In the course of his experiments Magrassi found that if he inoculated rabbits
laboratory in 1912, the rabbit had established itself as a suitable laboratory animal for both culturing and
studying herpes viruses. In Magrassi's laboratory herpes viruses were cultured by inoculating the comea of
rabbits. Basically one started by treating the eyes of one or two healthy rabbits with a virus strain, that had
been freshly isolated from its original host ('first passage'). Subsequently about 3 days later the virus was col-
lected from the eyes of the infected rabbits and passed onto the cornea of healthy rabbits ('second passage').
This procedure was repeated every three to four days for as long as the passage was successful: See. A. Grafe,
A ///.story o/Erper/mema/ Vi'ro/ogv (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991). pp. 63-84.
Ever since the word 'virus' appeared in Latin writings, the connotation of the word has undergone changes.
The reasons for the gradual shift in meaning fall outside the scope of this book. Whenever necessary I shall
give the contemporary meaning of the word virus. In the early decades of the twentieth century the word
'virus' or what in most cases was referred to by the term 'filterable virus' was used to denote any 'filterable
infectious agent' which could pass through an ultrafilter that was known to retain in a reliable way bacteria.
By the 1920's there was growing dissatisfaction with the significance and standardization of the procedure of
fillerabilily which was used as the main criterion for classifying infectious agents as viruses. As a result, the
criterion of filtrability was no longer thought to be sufficient in itself and was supplemented with criteria like
invisibility in the light microscope and non-cultivability on inert nutrient media. Viruses then became widely
regarded as disease-causing agents, microscopically invisible, which could pass through an ultrafilter and
were dependent on living host cells for their propagation. At the same time there was a growing tendency to
use the word 'virus' in an unmodified fashion. Furthermore, researching viruses was generally considered an
integral part of bacteriology, though most bacteriologists felt that the study of viruses was an esoteric and
difficult subject, to be left well alone by all but a few specialists. Not until the 1950's would virology be
regarded as an independent field of research. Hence, like Sally Hughes. I shall use in this chapter the term
'viral research' in referring to research work dealing with viruses. See. S. Hughes. 77i? Virus: /I //«wry o///i?
Concfpf (New York: Science History Publications. 1977), p. XI and pp. 109-114; T. van Helvoort, 'History of
Virus Research in the Twentieth Century: The Problem of Conceptual Continuity, / / i«. Sei., xxxii (1994),
185-235.
In cases where author(s) did not provide further information about the kind of animal strain that was used, i.e.
whether or not it was a special bred of laboratory rabbit. I will use the species name.
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intradermally or corneally with a non-encephalitogenic strain of herpes virus, which was not
supposed to affect the brain, after four to five days the animals appeared to be immune against
a second, normally fatal injection of the same virus into the principal part of the brain. This was
quite peculiar, since neither virus nor antibodies against the virus could be detected in the brain
of these animals at that point in time.
Unable to explain the antagonistic phenomenon in terms of a normal immune
response—the production and presence in the host of specific antibodies against the
virus—Magrassi put forward the hypothesis of a special form of tissue immunity: "Lo s/afo
nwi i«/i?«fln/f-immunf <fe/ c?rv«7/o" (The non-infectious immune state of the brain). He
thought this special kind of tissue immunity—for which there was no precedent and which
would need further research—was responsible for what he called the "immunifa verso /a
SM/jenw/ez/one" (immunity against superinfection).'
After Magrassi had left Basel for Milan, the head of the 'Hygienischen Institut', Doerr,
and a co-worker, Seidenberg, followed up on what they called "P/iano/wen VOM F/. A/agrassf"
(Phenomenon of R. Magrassi) or "AfonJfcM/r«tjpAä/io/n«t" (Competition phenomenon)/ Doerr
and Seidenberg regarded Magrassi's phenomenon and its variations as being a competition
between two successive virus infections. They ascribed the experimental phenomenon to some
kind of infection-related immunity, but for which no satisfying theoretical explanation seemed
to be available yet. In a further comment on the competition phenomenon, Doerr drew an
analogy with a study performed by Meredith Hoskins, an American bacteriologist working at
the Yellow Fever Laboratory of the Rockefeller Foundation in Brasil.'*
Almost simultaneously with Magrassi, Hoskins had published the following
experimental results. After inoculating rhesus monkeys with a so-called viscerotropic yellow
fever virus, in most cases the animals succumbed within 10 days.'" However, rhesus monkeys
which had been inoculated with a mixture of the viscerotropic strain and a relatively harmless
See, F. Magrassi, 'Studii sull'Infezione e sull'Immunita da Virus Erpetico. Nota I', Bo//. /.?/. Si'eroter. Mi/an.,
14 (1936). 773-821, p. 774.; and F. Magrassi, 'Studii sull'Infezione e sull'Immunita da Virus Erpetico. Nota
III'. Z «vg.. 117 (1936). 573-620. p. 617.
"In der Absicht, die ursprüngliche Versuche nachzuprüfen und zu ergänzen": See, R. Doerr and S. Sei-
denberg, 'Die Konkurrenz von Virusinfektionen im Zentralnervensystem (Phänomen von Fl. Magrassi)', Z
Hv.?.. 119 (1937a). 135-65. p. 139.
See, R. Doerr and M. Kon, 'Schieneninfektion, Schienenimmunisierung und Konkurrenz der Infektionen im
Zentralnervensystem beim Herpesvirus', Z //>•£.. 119 (1937). 679-705, pp. 702-4.
The term "viscerotropic virus" was used to designate a strain of yellow fever virus which was cultured or
carried in the rhesus monkey ever since its isolation from a human patient. It was known to be a highly fatal
strain producing lesions in the internal organs of rhesus monkeys. See. M. Hoskins. 'A Protective Action of
Neurotropic Against Viscerotropic Yellow Fever Virus in Macasus Rhesus', Amtr. 7. 7>op. Afc<£ am/ Wyg. •
15 (1935). 675-80, p. 675.
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neurotropic strain of yellow fever virus survived." Subsequently, it also appeared that when
monkeys were inoculated successively with preparations of viscerotropic and neurotropic
virus, the animals stayed alive, provided the neurotropic strain was given within 20 hours of
the viscerotropic strain. Hoskins indicated that she had no adequate explanation for this appa-
rently 'protective action' of the neurotropic virus against the viscerotropic yellow fever virus,
as tests for the presence of protective substances in the virus preparations had been negative.
According to Doerr, Hoskins's studies seemed to deal with a competition phenomenon
between virus infections. However, he emphasized the fact that it was rather difficult to judge
whether the 'phenomenon of Fl. Magrassi' bore more than superficial resemblance to the one
described by Hoskins.'- Thus, Doerr did not regard either of these biological phenomena in
terms of interference between viruses, or as similar phenomena.
In fact the term 'interference phenomenon' was first used by the British scientists
Findlay and MacCallum, early in 1937. Upon reading Hoskins's studies in the /t/nencan
yo«77ia/ o/ 7Vop/ca/ Merf/'cme, both researchers, who had been involved in yellow fever virus
research themselves, became seriously interested in Hoskins's so-called "curious phenomenon".
Thus they decided to initiate studies in their London laboratory "to confirm the findings related
by Hoskins and if possible throw some light on their causation"."
Findlay and MacCallum first made an attempt to see whether the 'protective effect' in
rhesus monkeys of the neurotropic against the viscerotropic, or what they called 'pantropic'
strain of yellow fever virus, would materialize in their laboratory. In doing so, they were able
to confirm Hoskins's observations that monkeys inoculated successively with a pantropic and
neurotropic virus preparation survived, whereas all monkeys injected with pantropic virus died.
They also noted that while the neurotropic virus apparently protected monkeys against the
pantropic virus, the reverse did not hold true. Subsequently, further efforts were launched to
replicate the results with other laboratory animals like mice and hedgehogs. In all species under
investigation they were able to show that the neurotropic virus protected against the pantropic
strain, but not vice versa.
Findlay and MacCallum suggested two possible hypotheses for the observed protective
The term "neurotropic virus" was used to designate a strain of yellow fever virus which had been isolated
from a human patient in Dakar and cultured in white mice. This strain no longer produced fatal internal
lesions when inoculated in rhesus monkeys. See. M. Hoskins, 'A Protective Action of Neurotropic Against
Viscerotropic Yellow Fever Virus in Macasus Rhesus'. /*mtr. J. 7rop. Mcrf. and Wv#.. 15 (1935). 675-80,
pp. 675-6.
R. Doerr and M. Kon. 'Schieneninfektion. Schienenimmunisierung und Konkurrenz der Infektionen im Zen-
tralnervensystem beim Herpesvirus', Z tfyg.. 119 (1937), 679-705, pp. 702-4.
G.M. Findlay and F.O. MacCallum, 'An Interference Phenomenon in Relation to Yellow Fever and Other
Viruses', 7. ftuft. and ßac(„ 44 (1937) 405-24, p. 405.
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effect.''' First, they speculated that a rapid immune response produced by the neurotropic virus
through the formation of specific antibodies would neutralize the action of the highly
pathogenic pantropic strain. Second, they also thought that a blockade of the host cells by the
neurotropic virus might prevent the pantropic strain from entering cells and inducing a fatal
virus infection. I will label this latter mechanism the blockade hypothesis'.
In spite of extensive testing in different experimental set-ups—varying, for instance, the
mode of injection and the type of laboratory animal—they did not manage to obtain
experimental data in support of either of the two hypotheses. Findlay and MacCallum
characterized the phenomenon, for which no definite explanation was yet available, as the
interference of one virus with the pathogenic action of another virus, hence giving it the name
'interference phenomenon'."
By the time Findlay and MacCallum paper had reached the shelves of American and
European university libraries, researchers at the Department of Bacteriology of Columbia
University in New York had initiated experiments to see whether it would be possible to
transmit poliomyelitis to laboratory mice. In the past, similar efforts had been launched in other
bacteriology laboratories but all attempts to transmit the disease to laboratory animals other
than monkeys had either failed or produced inconclusive results. This failure to infect animals
other than monkeys had even become a standard identification test for poliomyelitis virus.
However, the bacteriologists Claus Jungeblut and Murray Sanders from Columbia University
had noted that a fellow scientist had recently published a report claiming that he had succeeded
in performing a passage of a fresh human strain of poliomyelitis virus ('Lansing strain') from
the monkey to so-called 'cotton rats', a particular rodent species." Apart from establishing the
disease in cotton rats, he also claimed to have accomplished a subsequent successful passage to
white mice.
Upon initiating efforts to replicate these results Jungeblut and Sanders made the
following observations. First, the experimental data indicated that their poliomyelitis virus
strain ('SK New Haven strain or SK virus') could, indeed, be transmitted from monkeys ('SK
monkey vims') to mice ('SK mouse virus') by intermediary passage through cotton rats. In
addition, the pathogenic nature of the SK virus appeared to change after continued passage
CM. Findlay and F.O. MacCallum. 'An interference phenomenon in relation to yellow fever and other
viruses', 7. ft«/i. <mr/ S<«7.. 44 (1937), 405-24. p. 410.
They also indicated thai analogous phenomena could be observed between viruses in plants and bacteria:
G.M. Findlay and F.O. MacCallum, 'An interference phenomenon in relation to yellow fever and other
viruses', 7./>a//i and Bart, 44 (1937), 405-24, p. 420.
See. for the report on the successful monkey/rat passage of poliomyelitis virus: C. Armstrong. 'Passage of a
Fresh Human Strain of Poliomyelitis Virus (Lansing Strain) from the Monkey to Eastern Cotton Rats
(Sigmodon hispidus hispidus)'. Pub. HraWi «<?/>.. t/.S.P.H.S., 54 (1939). 1719-29.
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through rats and mice." Whereas SK monkey virus was highly pathogenic to rhesus monkeys
in producing a fatal paralysis after intracerebral inoculation, SK mouse virus, which was highly
pathogenic to mice and rats, induced rather mild, non-fatal, disease symptoms in monkeys.
Since both viruses had been observed to invade the central nervous system of the monkeys an
experiment was run to see what would happen if monkeys were inoculated intracerebrally with
both SK mouse and SK monkey virus at close intervals. The subsequent experimental data
showed that all monkeys which received an injection with both the poliomyelitis mouse and
monkey virus, survived without producing any symptoms of paralysis.
Jungeblut and Sanders argued that the experimental design did not allow "the
development of any immunity principles in the orthodox sense of the word".'* In other words,
they thought the time between both inoculations far too short for activating the production of
specific neutralizing antibodies against the viral agent. In their opinion the protective effect was
more likely due to some kind of interference between the mode of propagation of the murine
virus and the monkey virus. In spite of additional series of experiments, however, they did not
succeed in giving an unambiguous explanation for their 'interference phenomenon', for the fact
that the presence of the mouse virus in the monkey proved antagonistic to the propagation of
the monkey virus."
According to Jungeblut and Sanders, various analogous manifestations of viral antago-
nism had been reported in the literature and 'which, for want of a better term, have been
loosely brought together under the name 'interference', thereby referring to Magrassi, Doerr,
Hoskins, and Findlay and MacCallum.-" With regard to the modi« operand;, Jungeblut and
Sanders believed that these phenomena formed a rather heterogeneous group. Most likely the
basic mechanism of their own interference phenomenon was very similar to those cases of
interference, in which the competing viruses represented pathogenic and non-pathogenic
variants of the same virus strain, or were otherwise related. Hence, it was thought to be similar
to Hoskins' and Findlay and MacCallum's interference phenomena, but different to the resistan-
ce to superinfection described by Magrassi and Doerr.
By the term SK monkey virus the authors basically referred to a monkey poliomyelitis virus preparation or a
suspension of grinded spinal cords of monkeys suffering from a fatal paralysis after inoculation intracere-
brally with a fresh human SK strain of poliomyeltis virus. SK mouse virus in tum referred to a suspension of
minced brains of mice, which had been inoculated intracerebrally with SK virus, which had been harvested
from cotton rats after initial passage from monkeys to rats.
' C. Jungeblut and M. Sanders, 'Studies of Murine Strain of Poliomyelitis Virus in Cotton Rats and White
Mice'. 7. £tp. Mfrf.. 72 (1940). 407-36, p.434.
C. Jungeblut and M. Sanders, 'Studies in Rodent Poliomyelitis; V. Interference between Murine and Monkey
Poliomyelitis Virus',/ £rp. Mfd. 76(1942), 127-42.
"" C. Jungeblut and M. Sanders. 'Studies in Rodent Poliomyelitis; V. Interference between Murine and Monkey
Poliomyelitis Virus', ,/.£*p.Aterf. 76 (1942), 127-42, p. 140.
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Jungeblut and Sanders speculated about the possibility of an exhaustion of essential
growth factors—I will label this mechanism the 'exhaustion hypothesis'—as being responsible
for the interference phenomenon in their laboratory. They thought this hypothesis most
plausible, though part of the experimental results seemed to suggest a another option. When
the SK mouse virus was exposed to ultraviolet light, it appeared that its infective capacity was
more reduced than its ability to interfere with the SK monkey virus or with one of the other
poliomyelitis virus strains in rhesus monkeys. For this reason, Jungeblut and Sanders put up for
discussion their original idea of the interfering principle in murine virus being identical with the
infectious unit itself. Interference, so they argued, might as well be brought about by a non-
infectious substance, "existing as an integral part of this unit or occurring separately in soluble
form"."' According to Jungeblut and Sanders this seemed to indicate that something different
from the actual infectious virus unit, one or the other inhibitory substance, might be
responsible for inducing the interference. I will label this mechanism the 'inhibitor hypothesis'.
Without discussing in detail Jungeblut's subsequent research work, which he performed
without the assistance of Sanders, I will show how he translated the aforementioned research
problem into a new set of experiments. In order to test whether the infectious and interfering
effects of the mouse virus preparation were one and the same, Jungeblut subjected the inter-
fering SK mouse virus preparation to physical and chemical manipulations aimed at disso-
ciating the interfering principle from the infectious virus particle." Among other things,
Jungeblut used state of the art methods of physical separation such as the newly introduced
centrifuge technique, which was performed in a so-called 'ultracentrifuge'. This sophisticated
high speed spinning instrument was known to have the effect of sedimenting virus particles in a
fluid at a certain speed/time ratio and was used to sort and weigh macromolecules as large as
viruses.*'
However, in spite of extensive testing Jungeblut claimed that he could find no evidence
for the presence in the virus material of an additional non-infectious, interfering agent. "On the
contrary much of the evidence can be interpreted, that there is but a single entity", i.e. the
C. Jungeblut and M. Sanders. 'Studies in Rodent Poliomyelitis; V. Interference between Murine and Monkey
Poliomyelitis Vims', J.Erp.Mft/. 76 (1942). 127-42. p. 141.
For a detailed description of these manipulations; see, C. Jungeblut. 'Studies in Rodent Poliomyelitis; VI.
Further Observations on Interference between Murine and Simian Strains of Poliomyelitis Virus', 7. £jrp.
Wfd.. 81 (1945), 275-94, pp. 276-83.
"' The ultracentrifuge technique had been developed in the 1920's by the professor of colloid chemistry. Theodor
Svedberg. at the University of Upsala in Sweden. Up to 1937 Svedberg's research group had been the only
one in the world which owned an analytical ultracentrifuge, thereby dominating the molecular study of
macromolecules like proteins. Not until the late 1930's the ultracentrifuge became available to American and
British researchers; see. B. Elzen. Srienn'.sw anrf Rotors: 77if DfcWo/wtrnr <>/ Siorftemira/ l///rarfn/i/ugM
(Enschede: PhD-Thesis, 1988), pp. 13-133; and L. Kay. 77ic Mo/pri/tor VüiYw o/ i-i/e (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993). pp. 112-5.
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experimental data seemed to leave him no other option than to conclude that the interfering
and infectious effect were induced by one and the same virus.*''
In August 1944, just three months before Jungeblut submitted his latest research results
for publication to the 7OU/TIÜ/ O/ E.v/?enme«/a/ Af«/ici>ie. the editors of Är/a A/ed/«i
Sca/ii/»iav/ta received an article entitled. Tissue immunity in mouse poliomyelitis' from the
Swedish bacteriologist Sven Gard for publication. In his paper Gard questioned Jungeblut and
Sanders's earlier studies on what he called "a phenomenon interpreted by them as interferen-
ce"."* Gard, who also was involved in poliomyelitis vims research, indicated that he himself
had observed a similar kind of phenomenon but he could not however share the Americans'
view on the mechanism of the protective effect.-* Doubtless the phenomenon of interference
had been operative in analogous experiments such as performed by Magrassi, Hoskins and
Findlay and MacCallum, but Gard was convinced that both his and Jungeblut and Sanders's
virus inhibition phenomenon was different in nature.
Upon inoculating laboratory mice intracerebrally with a clarified extract of a highly
pathogenic poliomyelitis virus strain, the animals developed symptoms of paralysis within a
period of a week. However, if mice were inoculated with a mixture of the highly pathogenic
virus probe and a crude brain suspension containing a rather harmless ('low virulent')
poliomyelitis virus strain, Gard could not observe the usual symptoms of paralysis.
Subsequently he figured out that if he used a purified rather than a crude brain suspension of
the low virulent virus strain and repeated the experiment, no inhibition of paralysis symptoms
could be detected. In Gard's view, this suggested the possibility that the inhibitory effect was
not induced by the low virulent virus but by one or more specific inhibitors in the crude brain
suspension.
In order to test this assumption, Gard then subjected the crude brain suspension of the
low virulent virus to centrifugation in the ultracentrifuge as a means to separate virus and
possible inhibitors. Next, the different centrifugal fractions were examined for their virus
content and subsequently injected intracerebrally into the mice, together with the highly patho-
genic strain, as before. The resulting animal data, as presented by Gard, indicate that mice
inoculated with the centrifugal fraction that was considered to be virtually virus-free,
developed substantially less paralysis symptoms after infection with the highly pathogenic
strain than mice which had not been inoculated before. In Gard's opinion, the fact that the
C. Jungeblut. 'Studies in Rodent Poliomyelitis; VI. Further Observations on Interference between Murine and
Simian Strains of Poliomyelitis Vims'. 7. £»/>. Ate/.. 81 (1945), 275-94, p. 292.
" S. Gard. Tissue Immunity in Mouse Poliomyelitis'. Art. Ated. Scan*/.. 119 (1944), 27-46, p. 29.
*' S. Gard. Tissue Immunity in Mouse Poliomyelitis", Ac/. AY«/. S rW. . 119 (1944).27-46, p. 43.
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virus-free fraction showed an inhibitory effect strongly suggested that the inhibitory activity
was rather independent of the actual virus content of the preparations under survey. He
claimed that as a result of the interaction between the first virus and the host, a specific
inhibitor attached to the tissue developed which inhibited the growth of the second virus. In
being distinct from the circulating antibodies of the blood this inhibitor was believed to be a
demonstration in vitro of f/s.«/e iffimi/nirv."' Gard thought this tissue immunity phenomenon
particularly interesting since it might offer possibilities for the development of a prophylactic
therapy against poliomyelitis, a virus disease for which no cure existed as yet.**
Gard's report about Jungeblut and Sanders's presumable misinterpretation of the nature
of their inhibition phenomenon was obviously taken into consideration by Jungeblut, when in
1948 he reported again on the protective phenomenon between two different viruses in
monkeys—or interference as he still called it. In referring to his and Gard's earlier publications
he stated: "The mechanism of this antagonism is not known even though several hypotheses
have been advanced as possible explanations"."
If we analyze the first series of laboratory investigations in which viruses were largely studied
at their macroscopical effect level through the notion of virus disease or virus infection, what
strikes one first is the heterogeneity in terminology regarding viral antagonism: from immunity
against superinfection, the phenomenon of Fl. Magrassi, competition phenomenon, protective
effect, interference phenomenon to tissue immunity. This variation in terminology is easily
matched by a diversity in hypotheses and explanations. Different as the explanatory
ideas—from the blockade and exhaustion hypothesis up to the inhibitor hypothesis—may
appear, they have in common a reference to something new and special. All the researchers
involved emphasized that they were dealing with a novel host response mechanism that clearly
distinguished itself from the orthodox and conventional mechanisms of humoral immunity—the
production of specific neutralizing antibodies against the virus disease that circulate in the
bloodstream of the host. This was instrumental in accentuating historical discontinuity.
The first series of studies under survey reveal also a rather fundamental shift in
translating experimental (animal) data into textual arguments over time. Whereas Magrassi and
Doerr discussed the phenomena at the level of the virus infection or disease, gradually the
behavior of the virus unit in the host organism became more central to the argument. This shift
is in line with Van Helvoort's proposition that the 1930's and 1940's should be considered a
"' S. Gard, Tissue Immunity in Mouse Poliomyelitis', i4cr. A/«/. Scam/., 119 (1944), 27-46. p. 43.
C. Jungeblut, 'Active und Inactive Murine Poliomyelitis Virus as Interfering Agents against Poliomyelitis
S. Gard. Tissue Immunity in Mouse Poliomyelitis', /tcf. Afed. Scant/., 119 (1944), 27-46.
Infection in Monkey's', Proc. Soc. Er/wr. Bio/, am/ M«/., 68 (1948), 19-22, 19.
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transition period in viral research, between what he calls the 'traditional concept of filterable
virus' and the 'modern concept of virus'.™ Within the filtrable virus concept, viruses were
essentially characterized in physical terms such as filterability and invisibility. In the 1930's this
concept was increasingly criticized for its dependence on the state of the art of filtration and
optical techniques, and could only be maintained because virus researchers developed their
arguments at the macroscopical effect level through the notion of 'virus disease'." While the
filtrable virus concept became the target of criticism, an alternative concept with its focus on
functional properties of the virus unit emerged, which van Helvoort labeled the 'modern
concept of virus'.'" This development accompanied the introduction of new analytical in-
struments like the electron microscope and the ultracentrifuge.
Apart from the diversity in terminology, hypotheses and arguments, I call attention to
the continuous (re-)structuring of knowledge claims. With each additional account, the links
and cross-overs between the laboratory studies under survey changed. Doerr was first in
drawing an analogy between the phenomenon of Fl. Magrassi or competition phenomenon,
which was under investigation in his laboratory, and laboratory phenomena reported by other
researchers. Reasoning by analogy to other laboratory studies was a means to the end of
producing order out of an obviously perplexing array of experimental results. Though, in each
case the nature of the analogous features was different. For instance, in the case of Jungeblut
and Sanders it was a matter of ordering the phenomena by simultaneously grouping and
differentiating. Upon establishing particular knowledge connections they managed to
accentuate a certain sense of continuity in research. In Gard's case, however, I argue that
ordering the experimental results in relation to analogous manifestations of viral antagonism
emphasized discontinuity. This clearly enabled Gard to separate both his and Jungeblut and
Sanders's studies, which were considered exemplary for the phenomenon of tissue immunity,
from the phenomenon of interference that had been operative in studies such as performed by
See. T. van Helvoort. History of Virus Research in the Twentieth Century: The Problem of Conceptual Conti-
nuity'. Hi.?/. 5ci-, xxxii (1994), 185-235. pp. 186.
With regard to the criterion of filterability it became more and more apparent that beside the problematic fact
that filterability depended greatly on the filtration techniques used, the criterion applied to a continually
growing range of infectious agents with diverse properties. In addition, with the introduction of new optical
instrumental techniques such as UV-microscopy in the early thirties and electron microscopy in the late
thirties it became possible to visualize viruses, thereby undermining the criterion of invisibility. While the
relevance of these physical criteria was put up for debate, the criterion of non-cultivability became increasing-
ly important for the characterisation of viruses. In the 1950's. the latter would make way in turn for structural
criteria based on studies with the electron microscope and ultra-centrifuge; See, S. Hughes. 77i<" Wru.v. ^
Wi'.vwn- «//ftp CwireyM, (New York: Science History Publications. 1977). p. 113; and Ton van Hclvoort,
Äe.M'arc/? Sfv/e.v in Vi'rw.s S/uJirc /H //«• T«r/i/i>//i Cralunv Owi/roic r.viVs ant/ //if funna/jon «/ CWI.«'/I.VH.V
(Maastricht: Ph.D. diss. Univ. Limburg. 1993). pp. 189-91.
'" See, T. van Helvoort. 'History of Virus Research in the Twentieth Century: The Problem of Conceptual Conti-
nuity', //«/. Sei., xxxii (1994), 185-235, p. 186.
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Hoskins, Findlay and MacCallum and Magrassi.
In the next section we will continue to follow the evolution of this rather dynamic
ground of investigations into viral antagonism phenomena, which for the greater part were
performed in practice oriented public health laboratories.
1.2 Toward viral interference
Up to the 1940's most research regarding animal viruses had been performed in W vo, in labora-
tory animals. Viruses were generally known for their inability to grow on artificial media, such
as agar plates, that made such comfortable homes for bacteria and molds. Animal viruses just
would not grow outside the living cell. Initially, the most convenient place for growing them
seemed to be live animals, such as particular strains of mice, rats, guinea-pigs or monkeys.
However, the intact animal gradually lost its dominance to novel experimental models based on
either 'chick embryo' or 'tissue culture' techniques.
Both kind of laboratory techniques had been introduced into the field of microbiology
in the early decades of the twentieth century in an attempt to find new ways for growing or
cultivating viruses. One of the reasons to search for alternatives to the use of experimental ani-
mals was that quite often viral research with laboratory animals had been hampered by ready
mixing ('cross-infection') with other infectious agents which happened to be present in the host
animal. The risk of cross-infection was generally considered the 'bug-bear' of the study of virus
diseases in experimental animals/" Furthermore, maintaining sick animals as a source of viruses
for laboratory study was neither pleasant nor convenient, and rather time consuming and
expensive.
The search for alternative experimental models based on chick embryo or tissue culture
techniques was in line with a more general tendency within biology to seek less complex,
uniform experimental biological systems. These were thought to enable scientists to investigate
fundamentally vital phenomena at their most minimal levels. Studying animal viruses in fertile
hen's eggs—or what were referred to as 'embryonated eggs' or simply as 'eggs'—and tissue
cultures instead of laboratory animals was claimed to allow for more detailed study of viruses
in their specific cellular environment. This in turn would help to achieve the ultimate goal of
F. M. Bumet. 77if l/w o/rte Deve/opi/ig Egg in Vinu /fcsrarrn. Special Report Series, No. 220 of
the Medical Research Council (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), p. 4.
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understanding the process of viral infection and multiplication."
In this section I will focus primarily on how the deployment of experimental models
based on chick embryo or tissue culture techniques was instrumental in transforming and
articulating work on viral antagonism between animal viruses from the 1940's onwards. : .
1.2.1 The new'experimental animal'
By the end of the 1930's techniques for growing and studying viruses in fertile hen's eggs had
been adopted in most experimental laboratories involved in viral research." The British virus
researcher Christopher Andrewes called the fertile hen's egg "the new 'experimental animal'
which has yielded by far the best dividends"."' By the term 'dividends' Andrewes referred to the
successful exploitation of chick embryo techniques both in viral research and in the large-scale
production of vaccines against certain virus diseases to be used in the British and American
armies." In particular, work on influenza virus and the development of an influenza vaccine,
which largely centered around the use of chick embryo techniques, was eagerly supported by
the armed forces during World War II. The senior health officers of the British and American
armies were all old enough to remember the devastating 1918 influenza pandemic, which killed
thousands of soldiers awaiting discharge or transport home from the battlefields of World War
I.»
Two of the protagonists of American influenza research were 'the Henles'. who worked
at The Joseph Stokes Jr. Research Institute that was part of the School of Medicine of the
University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. In the early 1940's the German war refugees
Gertrude and Werner Henle started research on culturing influenza viruses in fertile hens' eggs
as a means to develop an influenza vaccine for humans. The chick embryo technique as it was
See. for the development of in vitro systems in viral research: L. Kay, TVif Mo/rru/ar Vision O/ZJ/F (Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 1993), p. 4; and S. Hughes. 77ie V/n«; /I //wfoir »/ //if Com-«/»/ (London:
Heinemann Educational Books, 1977), pp. 92-3.
' For the purpose of this chapter it would carry to far to describe in detail the historical development of chick
embryo models as laboratory devices in viral research. See. for a detailed account; A. Grafe, /I Wi'j/ory »/
Ev/KT/'mfnro/ Viro/ogv (Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 1991). pp. 65-70.
" C. Andrewes, 'Virus Diseases of Man: A Review of Recent Progress', flr». Me</. flu//., 2 (1944), 265-9, p.
265.
For instance, in the case of influenza virus much higher virus yields were obtained by the use of chick embryo
techniques than in the pig or ferret.
38
W. Beveridge and F. Bumet, 77if Cu/ftYaf/on o/ V/rascs an</ /fr'dtf rtaiae in /n<" Cnidt Emiryo, Special Report
Series, No. 256 of the Medical Research Council (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), p. iii; and
A. Grafe. -4 tfij/orv o/Eir/wimen/a/ Viro/ogv (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, I99I), pp. 120-2.
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employed in their laboratory was basically performed as follows.
Freshly laid fertilized white Leghorn eggs were obtained from a nearby poultry farm
and kept in an incubator for about 10 days at 38-39°C. The embryonated eggs were then
transilluminated in a special viewing box containing an electric light to see if the embryo had
properly developed. A properly developed egg at this stage showed a large dark area
representing the embryo and the yolk sac (see Fig 1). Beyond this area the lighter part was
seen to be traversed by blood vessels. Subsequently the selected eggs were inoculated with
influenza virus by the so-called allantoic route. The first stage of this inoculation was to cut a
small groove into the egg shells with a dental drill (see Fig 2). The sterile virus preparation was
then injected into the allantoic cavity with a fine needle (see Fig 3). Subsequently the groove
was covered and the eggs incubated anew for varying periods of time (see Fig 4 and 5).
Thereafter the eggs were opened (see Fig 6) and the allantoic fluid collected or 'harvested' both
for passage to a fresh set of eggs and quantitative study of the virus content. The latter was
measured either by inoculating mice with dilutions of allantoic fluid and monitoring the
occurrence of pathological effects (/w v/Vo assay) or by a particular in Wfro assay, a so-called
'haemagglutination assay'—a specific quantitative biological test Cbioassay') for determining
the relative rate of influenza virus multiplication."
While figuring out the optimal conditions for culturing various strains of influenza virus
in the allantoic cavity of embryonated eggs, the Henles made a chance observation early 1943.
In passing allantoic fluid from embryonated eggs, which had been infected with a so-called
influenza B virus strain, to a fresh set of embryonated eggs, the subsequent virus yields turned
out to be unusually low. In an attempt to increase the virus yield the protocol was slightly
altered, using a more concentrated virus preparation and harvesting the fluids after 4 instead of
2 days. However, far from having the intended effect, the changes in the protocol resulted in
even lower virus yields. Upon initiating further trials by varying the dilution steps and incuba-
tion periods, it was noted that somehow concentrated virus preparations would give yields of
virus distinctly lower than more dilute preparations, in other words the larger the dose of virus
injected the less the yield of virus. Furthermore, the Henles gained the impression that the
paradoxical phenomenon was more likely to be found in the case of preparations of virus infec-
ted allantoic fluids, which were harvested after prolonged incubation of the
virus-infected eggs. That was after the titer of active, infectious influenza B vims and with it
My description of the chick embryo technique as it was essentially practised in the laboratory of the Henles
was based on: W. Henle and G. Henle. 'Interference Between Inactive and Active Viruses of Influenza; I. The
Incidental Occurrence and Artificial Induction of the Phenomenon,' Am. 7. W. Sri., 207 (1944), 705-17, pp.
706-8; W. Beveridge and F. Bumet. 77ie Cu/fiva/ion <>/ ViriM« anrf /to-fcftt/af in I/if Oiirit £md™, Special
Report Series. No. 256 of the Medical Research Council (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1946);
and G. Buddingh. 'Chick-Embryo Technics', in T. Rivers (ed.) Vira/ and Rifltf/Mia/ /n/?rri<»u o/ Wan
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1952) pp. 109-25.
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Fig. 1. Candling for allantoic inoculation ai day 10. Fig. 2. Drawing illustrating method of cutting window
in eggshell with dental drill. •, >• i
Fig. 3 . The sterile virus preparation is injected into
the allantoic cavity.
Fig. 4. Drawing illustrating closure of opening in
eggshell by a cover-slip after inoculation
of chick-embryo.
Fig. 5. Diagram of embryonated egg of 11 days" incubation
showing the important structures involved
in the chick-embryo technics.
Fig. 6. Drawing illustrating the opened egg before
harvesting of the allantoic fluid.
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the infectivity of the allantoic fluid was known to decrease. As a possible explanation for this
'paradoxical behavior' of the influenza B virus the Henles suggested that part of the virus
particles became inactivated, in a state of non-infectivity, during prolonged incubation in
embryonated eggs. On passage of the allantoic fluid to a fresh set of eggs the inactivated, non-
infectious virus units were then thought to in/erf<?re with the propagation of the active,
infectious virus particles. In other words, the active virus, the 'challenging virus', was hindered
in its multiplication by the inactivated, the 'interfering virus'.*"
In order to test this possibility, the Henles started efforts to artificially increase the
amount of inactive virus in infected allantoic fluids. First they inoculated different dilutions of
virus-infected allantoic fluid preparations, which had been inactivated by artificial means
[through heating or ultra-violet radiation], into the allantoic cavity of embryonated eggs, and
they then incubated them for a certain period of time. In accordance with previous findings the
chick embryos inoculated with undiluted preparations of this partially inactivated virus showed
a poor propagation rate, while normal virus multiplication rates were observed with diluted
preparations. This indicated that artificially inactivated virus indeed interfered with the
propagation of active virus. Subsequently, they injected active virus, either simultaneously with
or shortly after inoculation of the eggs, with the inactivated virus preparations. However, even
this secondary injection of active virus did not seem to affect the inhibitory effect that was
claimed to be induced by inactivated virus/'
The following excerpt from the second publication dealing with these series of experi-
ments in the A/wenVan ./«i/ma/ o/ M?<//ra/ SCKTICPS, conveys the impression that the Henles
believed they were on the verge of making a rather substantial contribution to influenza
research:
...il becomes at once apparent that this interference by inacriv« virus may offer a new means of protection of
susceptible cells against infection by the viruses of influenza. Not only for this reason is it worth while to
study the phenomenon further, but it may offer, in addition, insight into the mechanism of infection by these
agents. The use of the chick embryo for these studies is of added advantage in view of their lacking
Immunologie response to infection with influenza virus/-
The message to the reader seems to be that judging by the power of the inhibitory effect on
W. Henle, and G. Henle, 'Interference of Inactive Virus with the Propagation of Virus of Influenza'. Science,
98 (1943), 87-9, p. 88; and W. Henle and G. Henle, The Road to Interferon: Interference by Inactivated
Influenza Virus', in A. Billiau and N. Finter (eds.) /n/er/ipron /; Ge/ifra/ a/«/ App/;«/ A.f/7ecto (Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 1984). pp. 5-6.
W.Henle and G. Henle, 'Interference Between Inactive and Active Viruses of Influenza; I. The Incidental
Occurrence and Artificial Induction of the Phenomenon', Am. 7. M. Sei.. 207 (1944), 705-17, p. 709.
•*" W.Henle and G. Henle. "Interference Between Inactive and Active Viruses of Influenza: I. The Incidental
Occurrence and artificial Induction of the Phenomenon' Am. / A/. Sei., 207 (1944), 705-17, p. 716.
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viral multiplication, the significance of this laboratory phenomenon might in fact be far greater
than its initial incidental and local occurrence in the embryonated egg would lead one to
suspect. Further study of the phenomenon not only seemed to offer a promising lead towards
developing influenza vaccines but might also contribute to a better understanding of the
process of viral infection.
The significance and non-local character of their phenomenon was further emphasized
in the same scientific article by locating it as a new aspect of the phenomenon of
interference—which was defined as the interference of one virus, the interfering virus, with the
propagation of another, the challenging virus. According to the Henles this phenomenon had
been described repeatedly in the literature. Subsequently, the reader is presented with a short
history of interference studies.
It is worth mentioning bits and parts of this historical section as it shows us once again
the ongoing transformation process of a body of laboratory studies dealing with viral
antagonism phenomena, which by then was generally referred to as interference research.
Among other things it shows us that by 1944 the term 'interference' had lost its provisional
character.
The Henles claimed that the first instances of interference between animal viruses had
"clearly" been demonstrated by Hoskins, Magrassi and Doerr, swiftly followed by Jungeblut
and Sanders. In addition Findlay and MacCallum's study was referred to as an example of
interference between quite unrelated viruses. The apparent non-specificity of the interference
phenomenon together with the rapidity with which the protective effect was obtained was
thought to set this laboratory phenomena apart from immunological reactions/' In other
words, the Henles considered viral interference to be distinct from the conventional immunolo-
gical phenomena, hence requiring alternative explanations.
As possible explanations of interference among active viruses the Henles put forward
the blockade, exhaustion and inhibitor hypotheses, as suggested in the literature. They also
speculated about additional possibilities such as 'virucidal properties' of the interfering virus or
inhibition of the growth of the challenging virus owing to pathological changes in the host
caused by the interfering virus. Far from showing a preference for one or the other option to
explain instances of interference among active viruses, the Henles indicated in accordance with
Jungeblut and Sanders that, possibly, "interference may be caused by different mechanisms in
the various instances".**
Whatever the reason behind maintaining the multiple mechanism argument, it served
W. Henle and G. Henle, "Interference Between Inactive and Active Viruses of Influenza; I. The Incidental
Occurence and artificial Induction of the Phenomenon," Am. / W. Sri., 1944, 207:705-17, p. 705.
W. Henle and G. Henle. "Interference Between Inactive and Active Viruses of Influenza; I. The Incidental
Occurence and artificial Induction of the Phenomenon," Am. / M. Sri., 1944, 207:705-17, p. 706.
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well to present their experimental results as a new aspect of the interference phenomenon: the
interference of inactive virus with the growth of active virus. It is worth noting that in
discussing this aspect of interference, they referred rather extensively to what they believed to
be analogical phenomena in studies with bacterial viruses, which were generally referred to as
"bacteriophages' or simply as 'phages'. These were published two years earlier by the life
scientists and former physicists. Max Delbriick and Salvador Luria, who like the Herdes were
war refugees. Both men had established themselves as phage researchers respectively at Van-
derbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee and at Colombia University in New York.
Upon meeting at the 1941 Cold Spring Harbor Symposium on genes and chromo-
somes, Delbriick and Luria had decided to work together and to spend that summer at Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory on Long Island, New York.*" They both regarded the picturesque
research compound on Long Island's north shore, which occupied a few ramshackle houses, as
being perfect for collaborative work on phages, for which a few petri dishes and a primitive
incubator were the main equipment. Thus, while initiating phage work aimed at gaining more
insight into intracellular processes of virus growth, Delbriick and Luria became involved in
studies dealing with interference among bacterial viruses.'** They considered the study of inter-
ference with bacteriophages in bacterial cell cultures might be helpful for clarifying cases of
interference previously described with animal and with plant viruses.
From the results of their first series of interference experiments, Delbriick and Luria
concluded among other things that the interference between bacteriophages was most likely
due to competition for a 'key-enzyme', which was necessary for virus reproduction and present
in limited amounts in the cell. I label this mechanism the key-enzyme hypothesis."" In their
second joint publication Delbriick and Luria claimed that bacterial virus treated with a certain
dose of ultra-violet irradiation lost its ability to reproduce, but was still able to produce interfe-
rence with another strain of active virus.""* This experimental result not only was in line with
their key-enzyme hypothesis but also suggested the possibility of rendering a host insensitive to
viruses by treatment with ultraviolet irradiated virus. They firmly believed that by extending
Delbriick and Luria made up the "social nucleus" of what would become known as the 'Phage School' with an
annual phage course at Cold Spring Harbor, see, L. Kay. 77if Afo/ecu/nr Vision o/ Li/e (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), p. 244; and E. Fleissner, 'Salvador Luria', in L. Levidow (ed.) Science ax Po/i/ics,
Radical Science Series, no. 20 (London: Free Association Books, 1986). p. 156.
According to Lily Kay the physicist and biological researcher Delbriick considered the experimental model
based on the growth of bacteriophage in the bacterial cell as the most simple and efficient model to do studies
of growth and replication with the ultimate aim to break what he called the "riddle of life"; see L. Kay, 77ie
M o W u f Vision o/Zj/e (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993) pp. 135-36.
M. Delbriick and S. Luria, 'Interference Between Bacterial Viruses'. Aren, ßioenem.. l (1943). 111-41.
S. Luria and M. Delbriick. 'Interference Between Inactivated Bacterial Virus and Active Virus of the Same
Strain and of a Different Strain', A/r/i. BioWi«n., 1 (1943), 207-218.
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this possibility to the field of animal viruses it might provide a serious lead towards the
development of vaccines against virus diseases.
The Henles indicated that their research results should be regarded as an extension to
the influenza viruses of Luria's and Delbriick's observations with inactivated bacterial viruses,
as a more or less similar example of the interference between inactivated and active virus.
However, they had far more reservations than Delbriick as to what extent these bacterial virus
data might be applicable to animal viruses. The Henles regarded the key-enzyme hypothesis as
just another suitable option for the explanation of their laboratory phenomenon: "As to the
mechanism of this interference phenomenon, no definite explanation can be given at the mo-
ment. It is obvious that the inactivated virus is responsible for this effect"."" Thus, while leaving
a specific explanation for the mechanism of action aside for the moment, they made it clear that
the interfering principle was to be associated with the inactive virus particle in their case.
1.2.2 Studying viral interference in tubes
As I indicated in the introduction of this section, virus researchers also employed so-called
'tissue' or 'cell cultures' as a means of studying animal viruses besides experimental animals and
chicken eggs. Among the first publications dealing with viral antagonism phenomena between
animal viruses in tissue cultures, was Christopher Andrewes's 1942 article on interference
between a so-called W.S. strain of influenza A virus ('W.S. virus') and its neurotropic variant.
The latter influenza virus strain went by the name 'neuroflu' at Andrewes's Division of Bacte-
riology and Virus Research at the National Institute for Medical Research in London.'*'
Andrewes employed the following procedure for growing influenza viruses in tissue
culture. Tissue fragments from embryonated eggs were obtained and minced. Subsequently
minced tissue was placed in special round flat-bottomed laboratory flasks (see Fig. 7a and 7b)
), so-called 'Carrel flasks', which contained a shallow layer of liquid medium consisting of a
standard salt solution, a so-called Tyrode solution'. In addition, the vims material was added
to these tissue cultures and the flasks were put in the incubator at 37°C. Every two to four
days part of the virus containing fluid was transferred to fresh tissue cultures. Finally the
presence of virus in the tissue cultures was tested for by inoculating mice intracerebrally with
W. Henle and G. Henle. 'Interference Between Inactive and Active Viruses of Influenza; II. Factors
Influencing the Phenomenon'. -4m. V. Af 5c/., 207 (1944). 717-33. p. 731.
C. Andrewes. 'Interference by one Virus with the Growth of Another in Tissue-culture', BnV. / £ip. Part., 23
(1942), 214-20, p. 214.
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Fig. 7a. Carrel culture flasks were sometimes (A) closed temporarily
with rubber caps to allow excess carbon dioxide
to escape by diffusion; otherwise (B), they
were closed with rubber stoppers and
hermetically sealed with waterproof cement.
Courtesy of Paul B. Hoeber. Inc.
Fig. 7b. Meial rack for the accomodation of Carrel culture flasks.
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Fig. 8. Working wilh tissue cultures under a hood
which can be sterilised by ultra-violet light
when not in use. Courtesy of MRC.
tissue culture material, which was grinded up for the occasion, and monitoring the animals for
the development of the corresponding disease symptoms. Since tissue cultures were known to
be extremely sensitive to contamination with bacteria and other toxic agents, which disturbed
both cell growth and virus multiplication, all manipulations had to be carried out under special
physical conditions to prevent failures. Among other things special cleansing and sterilization
procedures for laboratory equipments, and sterile working facilities were required. In
Andrewes' case the manipulations were carried out in a special sterile hood ( see Fig. 8) ."
While studying possible interactions of W.S. virus and neuroflu in tissue-cultures,
Andrewes claimed the following observations: When he inoculated laboratory mice intra-
The sensitivity to contamination and the relatively high costs of creating and maintaining the proper working
conditions for successful tissue culture work, were considered a major impediment to applying tissue culture
techniques by quite a few virus researchers. It was only after antibiotics like penicillin became generally
available in the 1950's that this particular technology became widely adopted in viral research. Upon
preventing bacterial contamination, the antibiotics made it possible to do effective tissue culture work with
nothing more elaborate than a few feet of general-purpose bench space and the sort of equipment that was
usually available in any microbiology laboratory. The description of the tissue culture technique as it was
basically practised in Andrewes's laboratory is based on: C. Andrewes. 'Interference by one Virus with the
Growth of Another in Tissue-culture. Bnr. 7. £rp. ftrtA., 23 (1942), 214-20, pp. 214-5; C. Andrewes, "Virus
Diseases of Man: A Review of Recent Progress'. Br/r. Mf</. B»//., 2 (1944). 265-69, p. 265; and F. Robbins,
J. Enders. Tissue Culture Techniques in the Study of Animal Viruses'. Am. 7. Afcrf. SW.. 220(1950). 316-38,
pp. 316-21; R. Parker. AffrW.T o/77«iif Cw/tare (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1950); and, R. Parker,
Ato/iods o/7i»ue Cu/rure (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1962).
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cerebrally with tissue culture containing W.S. virus, the animals did not show disease
symptoms and had a survival rate of almost 100% over a 12 day period. A similar inoculation
with tissue culture containing neuroflu killed all mice within a 5 day period. However, if he
used for the inoculation tissue cultures to which was added first W.S. virus and 24 hours later
neuroflu,
the mice had a survival rate of almost 90%. According to Andrewes the latter result indicated
that multiplication of neuroflu was practically inhibited in cultures in which W.S. virus was
already growing. In other words, the latter interfered with the growth of the former. Andrewes
also found out that if he added neuroflu to cultures in which the Tyrode solution was replaced
by a presumed virus-free ultrafiltrate of a 24-hour W.S. virus tissue culture, the neuroflu grew
normally." The latter result was thought to show that probably no inhibitory agent other than
the virus was responsible for the inhibitory effect on virus growth, though further trials were
required."
Apart from studying interactions between two strains of the same virus, Andrewes also
started looking for evidence of the occurrence of interference between viruses which were
unrelated. His first data directed attention to the fact that these unrelated viruses did not
interfere with the propagation of the other. However, through pressure of other research work
in progress in his laboratory, Andrewes had to postpone further research efforts. Subsequently,
in discussing his experimental data Andrewes suggested two possible explanations for what he
called "interference by one virus with the growth of another in tissue-culture" or an "in vitro
interference phenomenon":
The most obvious explanation of the phenomenon is probably the correct one—that the vims first upon the
scene uses up some essential foodstuff in the cells—... An alternative would be, of course, the generation
within the cell of some poorly diffusible inhibitory substance.**
Obviously Andrewes preferred a kind of exhaustion hypothesis over an inhibitor hypothesis,
though he excluded neither. In both cases the phenomenon was associated with a virus/cell
interaction. Andrewes added to this that by using the terms 'interference' and 'in vitro interfe-
rence phenomenon', he did not wish to imply that the 'in vivo interference' of Hoskins and
By a virus-free ultrafiltrate of a 24-hour W.S. virus tissue culture Andrewes meant a suspension of tissue
culture, which upon infection with W.S. virus, incubation for 24 hours and removal from the flasks, was
passed through an ultrafilier (diameter of about I2mu). The latter was generally believed to block both
bacteria and influenza virus particles.
C. Andrewes, interference by one Virus with the Growth of Another in Tissue-culture', Bri/. 7. £tp. Pa/A., 23
(1942), 214-20, p. 216.
C. Andrewes, interference by one Virus with the Growth of Another in Tissue-culture', Br/7. 7. £rp. Pa;/i., 23
(1942). 214-20. p. 219.
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other researchers necessarily had to be explained in a similar way. The question of whether or
not there was a close parallel between interference in tissue cultures (/n vi'rro) and interference
in experimental animals (m v/vo), would be for future research to answer. No mention was
made of differences between the various instances of in vivo interference on record, which
were referred to as "Hoskins and others", and therefore it seems likely that Andrewes regarded
these instances of in vivo interference as more or less similar.
The feasibility of using tissue cultures for the demonstration and study of antagonism
phenomena between animal viruses was investigated further in the early 1940's by the Ameri-
can virus researchers Edwin Lennette and Hilary Koprowski, who were temporarily stationed
at the 5erv/cf/or StadiVs and fiesea/r/i j'n frW/ow Fewr in Rio de Janeiro.'' Upon studying in
v/7ro the interaction between a number of viruses in several combinations, unlike Andrewes,
Lennette and Koprowski claimed the occurrence of interference both in the case of related
viruses and in the case of unrelated viruses. The diverse nature of the viruses indicated that a
fundamental mechanism common to all the systems studied was responsible for the interference
phenomenon. They argued that with relatively harmless viruses inducing rapid protection
against highly pathogenic, unrelated agents, the interference phenomenon might at least be of
practical importance in the prevention of debilitating or deadly veterinary viral diseases.
As in the case of Andrewes, interference was presented as a more or less unproblematic
and undifferentiated notion: "The existence of interference between animal viruses was
reported in 1935 by Hoskins and Magrassi...Similar antagonistic effects in animal hosts have
since been described between the viruses of...", thereby referring to Findlay and MacCallum,
and Jungeblut and Sanders." Obviously, Lennette and Koprowski refer to all instances of anta-
gonistic action between two viruses in a similar manner, as interference or antagonistic effects.
I argue that their portrayal of the history of virus interference research in animals as a
rather unproblematical continuity of research events served to justify their argument about the
existence of a fundamental mechanism common to all systems studied. Ordering in the case of
Lennette and Koprowski meant accentuating historical continuity in a particular body of
investigations with the aim to locate and mark their own research position.
With regard to the mechanism of action of interference, Lennette and Koprowski
thought it rather unlikely that either a conventional immune response or an inhibitory agent
other than the virus unit was involved in the interference phenomenon. They emphasized that
whatever the nature and mechanism of this rather 'obscure' phenomenon of interference, most
The Service /or 5/udiV.s <md Äpveorc/i /n »//OM' /•>v*r in Rio de Janeiro. Brasil was jointly supported by the
Brazilian government and the Rockefeller Foundation; see. E. Lennette and H. Koprowski, 'Interference Be-
tween Viruses in Tissue Culture', /. £rp. M«/., 83 (1945), 195-219, p. 195.
E. Lennette and H. Koprowski, Interference Between Viruses in Tissue Culture", 7. £r/». Werf., 83 (1945),
195-219. p. 196.
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likely the phenomenon was in one way or the other associated with an interaction between
virus and host cells.
In following the deployment of experimental models based on tissue culture or chick
embryo techniques I have shown how their use was instrumental in transforming and articula-
ting work on virus interference. Basically, the change in experimental work allowed for a more
detailed study of the growth of animal viruses in their specific cellular environment. This in
turn induced a further shift towards describing knowledge claims regarding viral antagonism
phenomena in terms of the functional properties and behavior of both virus unit and host cell.
However, there was a difference in idiom between the ones who employed chick embryo
techniques and those who adopted the tissue culture technology. Whereas in the former case
the functional properties of the interfering virus became more central to the argument, in the
latter the emphasis was on the virus-cell interaction as such. The distinction became evident in
the relative difference in status of the inhibitor hypothesis: on the one hand, this hypothesis was
frequently tested by the 'tissue culture people'; on other hand, it received little interest from
'chick embryo people' such as the Herdes.
1.3 A standard laboratory tool for studying viruses
In Werner Henle's review paper, which was published in 1950 and aimed at summarizing and
analyzing the literature on interference among animal viruses, the inhibitor hypothesis indeed
hardly received any attention. Actually, it was written off the list of suitable hypotheses for the
explanation of interference." In this review, which will be discussed next, the term 'interferen-
ce' denoted the antagonistic or inhibitory effect produced by one virus or components thereof
upon the propagation of another. As on previous occasions Henle dealt separately with interfe-
rence between a pair of active viruses and interference between inactivated and active viruses.
However, I claim that the reason for distinguishing the two subject matters had changed over
time. Drawing a basic distinction between the two types of interference, this time, no longer
served to accentuate the different nature of interference involving inactivated and active virus
but to emphasize that this type of interference was a more promising way to gain an under-
standing of the mechanism of interference. In the opinion of Henle, the chick embryo-influenza
system—involving inactivated and active influenza viruses in fertilized hen's eggs—provided a
W, Henle. interference Phenomena Between Animal Viruses: a Review'. / /mmuno/.. 64 (1950). 203-35,
p.204.
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superior laboratory tool for studying interference among animal viruses, which could be readily
standardized.'*
: Henle pointed out that through use of the virus influenza-chick embryo system and
state-of-the-art chemical and physical separation techniques, it now seemed definite that the
interfering property was closely linked with the virus particle. In addition, the latest experi-
mental data from his laboratory strongly suggested that the interfering activity was associated
with what he called 'particular groupings within the virus particles' which were thought to be
different from those responsible for the multiplication and toxicity of the virus. Furthermore, it
appeared that for interference to occur it was necessary that the interfering agent be in direct
contact with the host organism.
In contrast to his earlier publications, Henle took at this point a clear stand on the
mechanism of interference, still regarding it as being entirely different from specific immunity
mediated by antibodies. Basically, Henle believed that upon entrance of both the interfering
and challenging virus into the cell some kind of competition for or blockade of a key element in
the viral multiplication process followed, thereby inducing the interference phenomenon. This
meant that he regarded the key-enzyme hypothesis as the most plausible working hypothesis
for the mechanism of viral interference between animal viruses.
In discussing the practical implications of interference in the final part of his review
paper Henle clearly set the agenda for further research:
The most significant contributions one might expect from continued studies of interference phenomena
concern more academic problems, an increased understanding of host-virus interactions and of the nature of
viral multiplication..."
Obviously there was less incentive to study the possibility of exploiting the interference mecha-
nism for opening up an additional way for protection against viral disease—imparting a virus
protective effect to animals and humans through infection with a live virus. That shouldn't
cause any surprise since by the late 1940's several virus vaccines for humans had been tested
with great success or were in the process of being tested. Moreover, the Henles had bad
The chick embryo-influenza system was claimed to offer the following advantages. Employing inactivated
virus instead of active virus as the interfering agent was thought to stimulate fewer complicating reactions in
the hast organism. In addition, the chick embryo-influenza system seemed to offer advantages such as the
absence of antibody formation, the ready accessibility of the host cells and the availability of simple and
sensitive methods for the detection of virus. Furthermore, throughout the years this particular experimental
system had provided the virology community with a wealth of information on the nature of the interfering
principle and the mechanism of interference.
W, Henle, 'Interference Phenomena Between Animal Viruses: a Review", 7. /mmuno/. 64 (1950), 203-35, p.
230.
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experiences with testing viral interference in the clinic as a means to fight viral disease. In
1945, due to intolerable side effects they had to abort a clinical trial in which volunteers were
exposed to influenza virus in the hope that this would protect them against more severe
infection.** Furthermore, after the war part of the virus researchers redirected their attention
from the practicalities of the war-effort to a more academic type of work. Within this post-war
academic field of virus research the process of viral multiplication or reproduction emerged as
one of the central research topics. This being the case it is understandable that Henle, like most
other virus researchers, no longer regarded the study of interference as an aim in itself, but as a
useful vehicle for investigating the mechanism of virus multiplication.
In this respect, the phenomenon of interference in the chick embryo-influenza system
meant to Henle what the interference in the bacterium-bacteriophage system was to Delbriick,
a simple and efficient laboratory tool for researching host-virus interactions and the process of
viral multiplication. In the years following Henle's review paper—which became widely
considered as mandatory reading for anyone interested in this particular subject—the study of
virus interference per se was indeed relegated to the limbo of research items of little interest to
the scientific community. At the same time the phenomenon of interference became adopted as
a standard tool for studying the multiplication of viruses.
1.4 Conclusion
Retrospectively, Henle's review paper marks a period of relative stabilization of the concept of
virus interference. The phenomenon of interference became generally known as a laboratory
event which could be produced regularly under definite circumstances and was instrumental in
researching host-virus interactions. In order to arrive at Henle's review paper, which was
regarded mandatory reading by the protagonists of the next chapter, the virus researchers
Alick Isaacs and Jean Lindenmann, much hard (paper-) work was required. I traced several
aspects of the process by which this specific body of biomedical knowledge evolved in
academic journals.
It was a dynamic "battle-ground' of mutually interfering laboratory practices. In the
process hypotheses originally defended as universal were refuted or defended as particular and
the other way around. In a similar manner the labeling of phenomena underwent transforma-
tions. For instance, what was initially considered different, for example m vifro interference
versus in v/'vo interference or interference between active viruses versus interference between
inactive and active viruses, was later on presented as similar or even as one of a kind and the
W. Henle. G. Henle. J. Stokes and E. Maris. 'Experimental Exposure of Human Subjects to the Viruses of
Influenza, J. //nmuno/., 52 (1946). 145-65.
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other way round. f «<*^™-* i
The various authors often took creative liberties, superimposing their own
interpretations on the work of others in order to make convincing arguments. Far from
disinterested attempts to recognize the contributions of others, the practice of citing others
was instrumental in supporting a particular view. Through (re-)establishing links and cross-
overs between investigations researchers located and justified individual research positions.
Ordering experimental results in relation to other laboratory investigations served to accentua-
te either novelty and historical discontinuity or coherence and historical continuity. In the
process we saw how the practice of communicating knowledge claims at the level of individual
investigations played an important role in the very constitution of scientific knowledge at the
communal level of a subfield of research which by the 1950's was generally referred to as the
study of 'virus interference'.
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Chapter 2 , r -
Interferon's Birth.'
2.0 Introduction
Twenty years after Findlay and MacCallum had described virus interference its mechanism was still a
mystery. How did infection of a cell by one virus prevent infection by a second?...In 1957 Jean Lindenmann
and I, working at the National Institute for Medical Research in England, were investigating the action of
heat-killed influenza virus when we found an unexpected handle on the problem. We found that a few hours
after we had treated a cell culture with killed virus the cell-free culture medium had acquired a surprising
property. When the medium was mixed with fresh cells, it made them resistant to virus infection. This
resistance had all the earmarks of virus interference, since the fresh cells proved resistant not just to one virus
but to many different viruses. We were soon able to isolate the active substance responsible for conferring
resistance, and we named it interferon.*
Reading this 1961 portrait of what the author, the British virologist Alick Isaacs referred to as
the 'discovery' of interferon, brings up several questions concerning the process of 'discovery'
of interferon. What kind of research problem did Isaacs and Lindenmann start working on in
the first place? Did the research problem involve elucidating the mechanism of the
phenomenon of viral interference, or were Isaacs's and Lindenmann's original research
questions of a different nature? How did they arrive at an "unexpected handle on their
problem", and in what way was this related to the "isolation of the active substance" named
"interferon"?
This chapter unravels the process whereby interferon as a current matter-of-fact was
shaped in a British laboratory around 1956/'57. The emphasis will be on how Isaacs and
Lindenmann continually (re-)shuffled their resources in order to establish and maintain experi-
mental systems and generate new data of some sort. The term 'experimental system' will be
used to designate the manipulable aggregate of techniques, research materials, concepts,
assumptions, and skills, which was shaped, reshaped or maintained by these laboratory
workers at the frontier of biomedical science. With Reck and Rheinberger, I regard an
experimental system as the smallest functional unit of science which simultaneously shapes
A preliminary version of chapter 2 was published in 5/urfi>.? in //wfory on</ /Vii/o.vop/iv o/5ci>ncf; T.Pieters,
'Shaping a New Biological Factor, 'The Interferon', in Room 215 of the National Institute for Medical
Research. 1956/57', S/i«/. Hi*/. Pni7. 5<i., 28 (1997). 27-73.
* A. Isaacs, 'Interferon', Scien/i/ic American, 204 (1961). 51 -7. p. 51.
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questions and generates answers.' The notion of 'system' emphasizes the interdependence of
the constituent elements and the heterogeneous engineering involved in the evolution of
experimental systems.'*
After describing in the next section some of the elements that constituted the laboratory
situation in which Isaacs and Lindenmann were to start their collaboration, I will then consider
in detail the first two months of joint experimentation in Isaacs's laboratory. This part of the
chapter pictures the intimate interplay between thought and action that took place in shaping a
particular experimental system at the bench in Isaacs's laboratory. Finally in section 4 the focus
will be on how Isaacs and Lindenmann came to terms with brought under surveillance a new
laboratory phenomenon.
2.1 The beginning of a British/Swiss collaboration in a London laboratory.
On an early Monday morning in June 1956, Jean Lindenmann arrived at the gates of the
National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) at Mill Hill, London, for the first time. The
Institute's enormous main entrance and seven-storeyed building, which overlooked both
London's northern suburbs and the adjacent country side, made a profound impact on the
young medical researcher from Switzerland (see Fig. 9). On his way to the Division of
Bacteriology and Virus Research on the second floor, Lindenmann became even more im-
pressed when he glimpsed at the interior of some of the laboratories. All imaginable equipment
seemed to be available. This was confirmed later on when Lindenmann was shown around the
Institute by the head of the Division of Bacteriology and Virus Research, and Deputy Director
of the NIMR, Christopher Andrewes.
Andrewes belonged to the group of "big names' in bio-medical research, which was
accommodated at the NIMR, and formed part of a staff of approximately one hundred doctoral
and post-doctoral workers, and an auxiliary workforce of about three hundred technicians,
secretaries and others. The Institute ranked among the world's best centers for bio-medical
However interesting, Rheinberger's recent attempts to elaborate on Fleck's analysis of biomedical experimental
practice, fail with respect to granting no priority to whatever aspect of experimental life. By overemphasizing the
internal dynamics of experimental systems and their products, inscriptions or what he calls graphemes, Rheinberger
unjustly minimizes the role in 'experimental life'of human agency and of structural constraints in departments,
institutes and fields of research. See, L Fleck, Genet« a/«/ Devr/o/wirn/ »/a Sci>nfiyjc Far/ (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press. 1979). pp. 84-98: and H. J. Rheinberger. 'Experiment, Difference, and Writing: I. Tracing Protein
Synthesis', 5/urf. HIM. P/II7. &/., 23 (1992), 305-31. p. 309.
D. Turnbull and T. Stokes, 'Manipulable Systems and Laboratory Strategies in a Biomedical Institute', in HE.
LeGrand (ed.), Ct/vrinuTira/Eruyu/ViVs:Hürorira/. Pni/aso/j/iiai/andSociVj/Srud'i«o/fo/vri/wn/afion inSri>ncf
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1990). pp. 169-170; and J. Law, 'On the Social Explanation of Technical
Change: The Case of the Portugese Maritime Expansion', 7Vc/ino/0gv am/ Cu/rure 28 (1987), 227-52.
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research. As a result there was great interest in doing research work at the NIMR. The regular
influx of visiting scientists was officially encouraged by the Director of the Institute, Sir
Charles Harington. Harington believed that the resulting exchange of ideas would avoid
scientific inbreeding, maintain a steady influx of new methods and techniques and keep
researchers flexible in respect to incorporating new projects into their division's research
repertoire. Like most other Anglo-Saxon biomedical research centers, NIMR's research agenda
was primarily driven by motivations of scientific significance and impact, thereby favoring
fundamental rather than applied research. At the same time the research agenda was often
justified towards funding agencies for its potential medical therapeutic spin-off.*
Fig. 9. From view of the NIMR.
Courtesy of NIMR
J. Austoker und L. Bryder. The National Institute for Medical Research and Related Activities of the MRC, in
J. Ausuiker and L. Bryder (eds.) His/orica/ ftrjpec/iv« on //if Äo/f o/r/tf MRC (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1989). pp. 56-7.
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Lindenmann had never seen such a collection of sophisticated equipment like
ultracentrifuges, freeze dryers, electric incubators and deepfreezes, phase contrast micros-
copes, and an electron microscope. The NIMR also had a special wing with large animal
breeding facilities. This assured a standardized supply of healthy laboratory animals such as
dogs, ferrets, rabbits, rats and mice. Furthermore there was a well organized kitchen at the
heart of the Institute on the lower ground floor, which was primarily responsible for cleaning
and sterilizing glassworks and preparing various standard solutions and culture media for the
various research departments. The kitchen also produced special batches of media and
solutions on request. This gave researchers a certain freedom to tinker with media and fluids
during their experimental work.* The kitchen was thus as much a central organ of the NIMR as
the library on the fourth floor. This central storage for scientific paperwork was the last stop
on their tour through the Institute.
In comparison with the rest of the Institute, the Division of Bacteriology and Virus
Research had relatively few highly sophisticated laboratory instruments and facilities to their
immediate disposal. However, Andrewes—or 'Cha', as he was informally known in his
department—was not at all bothered by this state of affairs. On the contrary, since his research
group was mainly interested in the qualitative, phenomenological aspects of virus research,
there simply was not that much need for high-tech equipment. With a regular supply of fertile
eggs, laboratory animals, nutritive media and glassworks, and facilities for cold and warm
storage (hot and cold rooms, an electric deep freeze for biological specimens, incubators for
eggs and tubes) and for sterile work (a hood for handling tissue-cultures and viruses), the
division was thought to provide the standard equipment and materials for work on animal
viruses and bacteria. If on occasion one needed to do some work which required facilities and
equipment for complicated procedures, such as ultracentrifuges, an electron microscope, or an
arrangement for electrophoresis, one could always ask the divisions of Chemistry and,
Biophysics and Optics, for help. Quite often researchers in Andrewes's division would joke
about their servants over there, who were so skillful in carrying out the quantitative jobs.
Andrewes made no secret about the fact that he did not think a training in science of any help
Together with the 'melting away' of the basically selfsupporting 'nature' of biomedical institutes the role of the
kitchen in biomedical laboratories has changed over the past three decades. From a major producer of laboratory
materials for the greater part it has become a distributory centre for ready-made and standardized laboratory materials.
Media, solutions, both chemical and biological substances, plastic disposables (which have displaced part of the
glassworks) are purchased from commercial firms. Whenever a laboratory worker is in need of one or the other
material he or she first consults one of the catalogues to see whether or not it is commercially available. Only in
cases where the item is not available or appears too costly does one have to figure out a way to make it in one's
own laboratory. For instance, the common laboratory practice of producing media from animal organs purchased
from one of the slaughterhouses nearby is no longer common practice, apart from cases in which no standardized
media are available. Hence, last minute requests for special batches of otherwise standardized materials are in
general not feasible anymore. According toa number of senior laboratory workers this has diminished the impetus
to tinker with media and solutions; interviews with Joseph Sonnabend, Jean Lindenmann, and Norman Finter..
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for members of his division, who were predominantly graduates in medicine or veterinary
medicine.'
Lindenmann had been working under quite different conditions in Hermann Mooser's
laboratory that was part of the small institute of microbiology of the University of Zurich. The
'/fygie/ie-/«.vr/7«f', as it was called, lagged years behind its counterparts in England with its
rather old-fashioned laboratories and kitchen and no access to electronmicroscopes,
ultracentrifuges and the like. In a way this is remarkable, since both Swiss and English science
had come through the war relatively unharmed—without being cut off from a regular supply of
American journals and without a dramatic drop in research activities. According to
Lindenmann, Medical Microbiology was one of the sciences which remained ossified at a pre-
war level until the fifties, mainly due to the intellectual isolation of the leading scientists
involved."
Unlike the Division of Bacteriology and Virus Research at the NIMR, the 7/vg/«ie
//IJT///M/' did not have a virology section, as it was dominated by old-fashioned bacteriologists.
They still regarded viruses as ultramicrobes: living, autonomous infectious entities, which, like
bacteria, multiplied autonomically by a process of binary fission.' As such, viruses were
thought to belong to the domain of bacteriology, thereby ignoring the international trend which
recognized virology as an independent field of research. For the most part, the scientific staff at
the 7/ygi>ne /«5///M/' seemed to have missed the emerging consensus concerning the nature of
viruses among American, British and French microbiologists. Viruses no longer were regarded
as ultramicrobes but as infectious, potentially pathogenic, nucleic acid-containing entities of
protein nature, which were reproduced from their genetic material, i« «KM the nucleic acid that
was thought to encode the hereditary information of the virus. Unlike bacteria, viruses were
considered to be dependent upon the host cell for their reproduction."
This impressionistic account of NIMR's interior is based on: A. Landsborough Thomson, Ha/fa Cen/urv o/
Afn/i'c-a/ /tesrarr* VW / ( London. Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 1973), pp. 108-133: D. Tyrrell. 'Personal
memories of the early days'. 7. /n«>r/?r»ri /fcs., 7 (1987). 443-444; D. Burke. 'Early Days with Interferon'. ./.
feifr/mm /fc.v.. 7 (1987). 441-3: David Tyrrell, interview. Salisbury, U.K.. 21 May. 1990; J. Lindenmann.
The National Institute for Medical Research, Mill Hill: Personal Recollections from 1956/57'. drr*. V/ra/.
140 (1995). 1687-91; J. Lindenmann to Schweiz. Akademie der Mediz. Wissenschaften, erster Semesterbe-
richt dated December 1956. Jean Lindenmann correspondence, personal archives; interviews with Derick
Burke, Jean Undenmann and Joseph Sonnabend; and. personal visits to the NIMR in September 1991.
See. J. undenmann. The National Institute for Medical Research, Mill Hill: Personal Recollections from
1956/57'./Irr*. Wro/. 140(1995). 1687-91.
T. van Helvoorl, Äe.sfrtrr/i iVv/cs m V/Vw.v Sfu<//Vs m f/ie 7\trnf/V/* CVnfwrv: CYwfrwwrwVs am/ f/if
Form«fi<»ri <i/"GwiJfm«J (Maastricht: Ph.D. diss., Univ. Limburg. 1993). p. 186; and interview with Jean
Lindenmann.
This characterization of viruses is more or less comparable to that given today, although the notion that the
nucleic acid of the virus encoded the hereditary information of the virus was rather vague. The mechanism of
virus reproduction or replication had yet to be explored. At least there was cautious consensus that viruses
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These were anything but favorable circumstances for a young biomedical researcher
with a vivid interest in the relatively new and dynamic field of animal virology—the study of
viruses that prey on animals and human beings. So, after some unsatisfactory virus experiments
in Zürich, Lindenmann asked permission to pursue his virus studies somewhere abroad. The
head of the laboratory, the preeminent bacteriologist Mooser, was well aware of the limited
possibilities for advanced virus study in the 'Hygiene Institut' and agreed to contact some
British virologists whom he had met at an international microbiology meeting. One of the
pioneers in the field of animal virology, Christopher Andrewes, who had acquired world-wide
reputation for innovative studies of animal viruses, agreed to let Lindenmann join his research
group as a 'visiting worker' for a period of one year. Subsequently, with Andrewes's letter of
intent and Mooser's references, he was able to obtain a fellowship from the Swiss Academy of
Medical Sciences and could start with preparations for his passage to England."
With the intent to leam as much about animal viruses as possible, Lindenmann started
working in Andrewes's division at the NIMR (see Fig. 10).'" As a relative novice to the field of
virology, he was assigned to a rather low-key research job which would give him the
opportunity to leam a variety of viral techniques and at the same time make a contribution to
one of the division's research projects. Andrewes wanted him to work in his laboratory and do
a series of experiments on the growth of polio virus in cultures of mouse and rabbit tissue."
In quite a number of laboratories around the world polio virus was produced on a daily
basis in human and monkey tissue cultures for the large scale production of vaccines and
forresearch purposes.''' Since polio virus had been shown to be host-specific and not
went through an eclipse.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
Before starting his research work Lindenman had to sign an official document relinquishing in perpetuity all
patent rights to whatever he might find during his stay at the NIMR to Britain's Medical Research Council;
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
As I already indicated in the previous chapter the practice of tissue culture technique had been plagued for
years by bacterial contamination. It was not until the arrival of antibiotics like penicillin in the late fourties,
that the ;n Wrro culture of viruses in vessels with growing tissue embedded in suitable media, evolved as a
major tool in viral research. By the mid-fifties this technology was known to virologists as a relatively simple
and reliable means to grow a sheer endless number of viruses in their laboratories: see, F. C. Robbins and J.
F. Enders. Tissue Culture Techniques in the Study of Animal Viruses', /4m<"ncon Vouraa/ »/ (/IF AfrJira/
SC/VMC-M. 220 (1950), 316-38.
Polio virus causes poliomyelitis, an infectious, pathogenic disease that induces paralysis, mostly in infants.
Until mass vaccination against polio was made possible by the advent of the Salk-vaccin in 1954, a number
of devastating epidemics swept through Europe and America from the 1930's onwards, leaving a trail of
paralysed and even dead people. Among those affected was president Roosevelt. He was mainly responsible
for the attention that was focussed in the USA on polio as a major health threat, which after the second world
war sparkled off the 'war on polio'. During this publicly led search for a cure against poliomyeltis, large sums
of money were poured into virus research, boosting the newly emerging field of virology; see A. J. Levine,
Vifiu« (New York: Scientific American Library, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992) pp. 62-5.
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transmittable to mice or rabbits it had long been taken for granted that it would not grow in
rabbit or mouse tissue culture either. However, with Donna Chaproniere, Andrewes had been
able to demonstrate that myxomatosis virus did grow in guinea pig tissue cultures." in spite of
the fact that the virus was known to be not transmittable to guinea pigs. Andrewes had picked
information up at a recent meeting of the Society for General Microbiology on successful
experiments concerning the growth of polio virus in cultures of rabbit tissue, despite the fact
that rabbits were not prone to the disease. This suggested the possibility that the specificity of
viruses for particular hosts might be lost in tissue culture. Andrewes became interested in whe-
ther polio could indeed be grown in animals not prone to the disease. As a novice scientist at
the frontier of virus research, Lindenmann was asked to show that polio virus would multiply
in cultures of rabbit and mouse tissue. Lindenmann's education as an M.D. and his training as a
postgraduate student in diagnostic bacteriology was believed to provide him with enough
resources and previous experience to tackle this new research problem."
Fig 10. Jean Lindenmann( 1937).
CounesyofNIMR
Myxomatosis virus was considered to be closely related to smallpox virus. In rabbits it had been shown to produce
myxomatosis, a highly contagious and fatal disease, which was characterized by warts and skin tumors; see A.
J. Levine. V/ru.sc.?, (New York: Scientific American Library, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992) pp. 209-10;
and J. Lindenmann, The National Institute for Medical Research. Mill Hill: Personal Recollections from 1956/57',
/trrA. Vim/. 140(1995). 1687-91.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann..
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Lindenmann's first two months in Mill Hill were taken up by learning through hands-on
apprenticeship ('learning by doing') the craft of working with viruses as it was being practised
by workers in Andrewes's division. At the same time, he initiated efforts to grow polio virus in
nonspecific tissue cultures. Despite frequent changes of experimental conditions and proce-
dures, Lindenmann was unable to find any evidence showing that polio virus multiplied in these
tissues. In a first report to the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences he stated rather optimis-
tically:
Negative results in those experiments don't mean a lot, as only small changes in the experimental conditions
can make the difference between success and failure."
However, to the best of Lindenmann's memory the research project became increasingly
frustrating. Despite numerous follow-up experiments, he still didn't manage to produce any
positive results: he could only show that polio virus did not multiply in his experimental
system. Andrewes strongly believed that Lindenmann's unsuccessful attempts to replicate the
claimed results regarding polio virus losing its host specificity in tissue cultures were due to an
as-yet undetected artifact or some uncontrolled aspect of Lindenmann's experimental set-up."
Andrewes therefore did not think much of the idea of abandoning the project in the face of the
repeated negative results. As a visitor to the Institute and novice to the field of virology,
Lindenmann found it difficult to oppose Andrewes and to ask him to end the project.
Sometime during this period he was introduced to Alick Isaacs, a neighbouring
researcher who had just returned from holidays. Only slightly older than Lindenmann, Isaacs at
the age of thirty-five was already a distinguished virologist and an expert in influenza viruses
who, like Lindenmann, had started his research career in a bacteriology department after being
trained as a physician. Isaacs was in charge of the World Influenza Centre in room 215 which
consisted of a large laboratory workspace with a rather small office corner for the necessary
paperwork (see Fig. 11). The World Influenza Centre had been set up in 1947 by
" J. Lindenmann. 'Erster Semesterbericht' dated December. 1956. Jean Lindenmann correspondence, personal
archives
By the term 'artifacts' I do not mean material objects which are related to conditions of human use. such as
archaeological findings, machines, designs or technical processes. In laboratory research the word 'artifact'
has a different connotation. Artifacts are described by most laboratory scientists as troublesome and
unintentional events, which are to distort or confuse the idenlifiability of 'natural' phenomena in their
experimental arrangements. Such artifacts are usually attributed to flaws or inefficacies in experimental
procedures. They are likely to present tricky situations and cause a great deal of uncertainty in the sense that
one never knows whether an apparent artifact is a mere distortion in the observability of a 'natural' phenome-
non, due to some sort of procedural flaw -a 'real' artifact or a noise-, or whether it might be a lead towards
some 'hidden' phenomenon -a 'pseudo' artifact or a signal. For an analysis of artifact accounts in laboratory
research, see M. Lynch, .4/7 a/«/ /Ir/f/atf in Lafcorafon 5ci>ncf (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1985),
pp. 81-139
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Andrewes in collaboration with the United Nations' World Health Organisation (WHO) as the
center of a global 'early warning' network of collaborating laboratories to study and monitor
outbreaks of influenza ('flu') epidemics throughout the world. The main task of the World
Influenza Centre was to gather influenza virus specimens from all over the world and collect all
sorts of data concerning the outbreak and spread of flu epidemics with the aim to study the
nature and epidemiology of influenza. Ultimately, the research efforts of Isaacs and his
collaborators were aimed at controlling the outbreak of flu epidemics, thereby preventing a
recurrence of the influenza pandemic of 1918 in which more than twenty million people had
died worldwide."
Fig. 11. Aiick Isaacs al work in
his laboratory (1957).
Courtesy of Dr. S.Isaacs-Elmhirst.
C. H. Andrewes.'Alick Isaacs'. Biographic-a/ memoirs qf/W/owj o/ffe- Rova/SociWy, 13 (1967) 205-221; J. Austoker
and L. Bryder. 'The National Institute for Medical Research and related activities of the MRC, in //rsforica/
/•«•re/wc/ivM (»i r/i<" /to/e o/r/if MAC, ed. J. Austoker and L. Bryder (Oxford University Press. 1989), p.43.
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During their first encounter, Isaacs asked Lindenmann about his research work in Zürich.
Apparently, Isaacs began to show real interest the moment Lindenmann mentioned his yet
unpublished virus interference experiments.™ Isaacs had studied for a number of years the viral
interference phenomenon, which was defined as the inhibitory effect by one virus upon the
propagation of another, and had published a series of papers on the subject. So he was eager to
hear more about these experiments. Isaacs probably then asked Lindenmann to have lunch
together. Since most researchers worked mainly within the confines of their laboratory and
division, the lunch haU at the top floor was a prime market place for the exchange of
information. Here researchers from all laboratories and research divisions mingled quite freely
while communicating the latest shop talk and the Institute's news."'
Lindenmann told Isaacs that in May or June 1955 his boss in Zürich, Hermann Mooser,
had seen a paper on the interference between strains of rickettsia, indicating that interference
of one strain with the propagation or reproduction of the other was not brought about by a
competition for or blockade of a receptor." Mooser thought it conceivable that the
interference phenomenon between rickettsia might be rather similar to the interference between
influenza viruses. However, to the best of his knowledge, the viral interference phenomenon
was still explained in the literature as a competition for or a blockade of a cellular receptor. In
the context of this view of the phenomenon of interference it seemed interesting to consider an
interference experiment with influenza virus in fertile hens' eggs, mostly designated as
'embryonated eggs' or just 'eggs', which would put this 'receptor hypothesis' to a test. If
Mooser had been more familiar with the viral interference literature, he would have known that
by 1955 most scientists in the field had already abandoned the 'receptor hypothesis'.
In discussing his idea with Lindenmann, Mooser had proposed the following
experiments: starting with the standard procedure of growing influenza virus in embryonated
eggs, Mooser and Lindenmann would first try to reproduce the interference experiment
between heat-inactivated, the interfering virus, and live influenza virus, the challenging virus,
as described in the materials and methods section of an article in the Aws/rcr/jan ./OM/TM/ O/
The experiments were to be submitted for publication in January 1957. See, H. Mooser und J. Lindenmann,
'Homologe Interferenz Durch Hitzeinaktiviertes, an Erythrozyten Absorbiertes Influenza-B-virus', Ei/wnVnfi-
o. XIII (1957), 147-8.
D. Tyrrell, 'Personal memories of the early days', 7. /n/er/eron Ä«.. 7 (1987), 443-4. p. 443.
Rickettsia were considered to be insect-bome infectious agents, which at least were thought to be different
from both bacteria and viruses. See. S. Smith Hughes, 77IF Virus: <i //«wry o/ i/ic Con«/« (London:
Heinemann Educational Books, Science History Publications, 1977). pp. 93-7;and H. Mooser und J.
Lindenmann, 'Homologe Interferenz Durch Hitzeinaktiviertes, an Erythrozyten Absorbiertes Influenza-B-
virus', £tp«Ti<>nria, XIII (1957), 148.
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Ä/'o/ogy that Mooser had come across." Subsequently, they would change the
experimental procedure slightly and perform a second series of experiments. They would now
use heat-inactivated influenza virus stuck to red blood cells in order to see whether these virus-
coated red blood cells would also be able to interfere with the reproduction of live influenza
virus in eggs. Mooser believed that by sticking the inactivated virus to red blood cells, it would
not be able to interact with live influenza virus. If they would be able to show that despite the
physical impediment, virus-coated red blood cells inhibited the growth of live influenza virus,
they could make a case for refuting the 'receptor hypothesis'.
Mooser left the work at the laboratory bench to Lindenmann, while he travelled to
Africa for his annual holidays. Upon his return, Lindenmann had managed to do a number of
experiments showing that inactivated influenza virus interfered with the growth of live
influenza virus in the egg, even when stuck to the surface of red blood cells. Lindenmann
thought that he had done a fairly good job and that the results were ready for publication.
When talking over the series of experiments with the rigorous and imperious Mooser, he
gradually lost his confidence. Basically, Mooser told him that the experiments had too many
flaws. The most important problem was that Lindenmann could not make sure that no virus
became disentangled from the red blood cells during his experiments. If virus would have got
unstuck during the experiments it would imply that the interfering virus had not been fully
hindered from interacting with the challenging virus and that they were most likely dealing with
an artifact, in other words in that case the experiments had gone wrong. In principle it would
be possible to do additional experiments but this would require state of the art instruments
which were not available in the Institute. Mooser therefore decided to abandon the project and
not to publish their existing results.
Lindenmann must have presented a somewhat similar account of his work at the '//yg/-
*7i? /nrf/7ur' to Isaacs, who according to Lindenmann, remarked that he knew the authors of
that Australian article quite well. In fact, he had published it himself in collaboration with
Margaret Edney during his two-year fellowship as a visiting researcher in MacFarlane Burnet's
laboratory at the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute in Melbourne."'' Isaacs had spent a great deal
of his time over there extensively studying the interference phenomenon with heat-inactivated
influenza virus as the interfering virus and live influenza virus as the challenging virus. In these
studies, he and Edney had ascribed the interference phenomenon to the competition between
In this case the term heat-inactivated virus' refers to the process of heating the virus at 56 °C for an hour in a
buffer solution, whereupon it lost its infectious and cell destructive properties while retaining its capacity to
induce viral interference in the host cell. Moreover, in the Australian paper heat-inactivated influenza virus
had been shown to have superior interfering properties, while lacking enzymatic activity that would elute the
virus panicles from the surface of the red blood cells. For further details of the technical procedures see, A.
Isaacs and M. Edney. '1. Quantitative Aspects of Interference', /liis/r. / £y>. Bio/.. 2$ (1950), 219-30.
Lindenmann to Mooser, letter dated August 8. 1958, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal archives.
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the interfering and the challenging virus for some key constituent within the cell, while
rejecting a possible competition for or blockade of cellular receptors. However, he had neither
been able to produce convincing experimental data in support of this hypothesis in Burnet's
laboratory, nor could he on his return to the World Influenza Centre at the NIMR."'
In response to Lindenmann's reconstruction of the interference experiments performed
in Mooser's laboratory, Isaacs suggested two possible explanations for Lindenmann's observa-
tion that inactivated influenza virus absorbed on red blood cells was a good interfering agent.
First, in accordance with Mooser's ideas, the virus might have become detached from the red
blood cells during the experiment so that it could induce interference by entering the cell as a
whole. The second and rather novel assumption was that the virus coat, the 'virus
haemagglutinin', might have remained firmly attached to the red cells, while only the virus
content, the 'virus nucleic acid', had entered the cell and induced interference."*' Isaacs told
Lindenmann that this idea was based on a rather well-known American study, which was
presented at the prestigious Cold Spring Harbour Symposium, in 1952, the year before Francis
Crick and James Watson published their famous /Vafure papers on the structure and function of
DNA." Upon conducting a study with radioactively labeled bacterial viruses the Americans
Alfred Hershey and Martha Chase claimed that during bacterial virus infection only the virus
nucleic acid entered the bacterial cell, while the protein coat, the 'virus envelope', remained at
the cell surface. This study provided a most compelling argument that virus nucleic acid, which
could be either DNA or RNA, directed viral reproduction within the host cell.'*
Within the field of virology there was cautious consensus about bacterial virus
infections as a useful and simple experimental model for studying viral reproduction as a
possible key to the elucidation of other virus-host systems. By suggesting with his second
explanation that animal virus infections proceeded in a way similar to bacterial virus
infections—the virus unit attached to the cell and injected its genetic information into the cell,
leaving an empty protein envelope attached to the cell wall—Isaacs carried the analogy
S. Fazekas de Si. Groth, A. Isaacs, and M. Edney, 'Multiplication of Influenza Virus under Conditions of
Interference', Mwure. 170 (1952), 573-4; and interview with Jean lindenmann..
A. Isaacs, 'Viral interference', Symp. Soc. G<>n. M/crofcio/., 9 (1959) 102-21, p. 108; J. Lindenmann. 'Neuere
Aspekte der Virus-Interferenz', Z //>#. /n/ffrton.sJtraniüi., 146 (1960) 369-97, p. 383; J. Lindenmann,
'Induction of Chick Interferon: Procedures of the Original Experiments', Aferfa»/s m £nj>mo/«x>', 78 (1981)
181-88. p.182.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
S. Smith Hughes, T/if Wraj: ^ History o/ f/w Conrepf (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Science
History Publications, 1977) p.101; A. Grafe, M ///.story o/fopfr/mfn/a/ V/ro/ogy (Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1991). p.145; L. Kay, 77K> Moferu/ar Vision o/ü/i- (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.270; and
interview with Jean Lindenmann.
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between animal viruses and bacterial viruses quite a bit further. This idea was rather
controversial and hotly debated within the field of virology.-'
Lindenmann's and Mooser's experimental system somehow seemed to provide a
starting point to test Isaacs's assumption that during interference with inactivated influenza
virus only the virus nucleic acid entered the host cell, while the virus coat remained outside.
Most likely, this played a major role in Isaacs's decision to ask Lindenmann whether he would
like to collaborate in work on viral interference, in particular, to help him figure out whether
this idea, what I will label the 'nucleic acid' hypothesis, made any sense. As his poliomyelitis
work was as yet far from promising, Lindenmann was pleased to hear Isaacs's research propo-
sal. After some more talking and with Andrewes's permission, they began working together at
the beginning of September 1956.**
In the meantime, Lindenmann would continue with his poliomyelitis work, and Isaacs
had to make sure that the World Influenza Laboratory was properly run and fulfilled its
research obligations towards the WHO. In addition, Isaacs had to pay regular visits to the
division of Biophysics and Optics, where he collaborated with the electron microscopist, Robin
Valentine, in studies on the structure of influenza viruses/'
Isaacs's decision to collaborate with Lindenmann did not seem to be spurred by
interests of political nature. Collaboration with the latter would bring Isaacs neither greater
credibility nor would he be eligible for resources that would otherwise be missed. Furthermore,
compared to Isaacs, the established influenza virus expert, Lindenmann was a relative novice at
the frontier of virus research with little expertise to offer. Apparently, recruiting Lindenmann
to work as a 'co-laborer' toward a common purpose was motivated by a common research
interest in the phenomenon of virus interference and by the fact that Lindenmann had worked
with an experimental system that seemed to offer a lead towards testing a then hotly debated
idea: namely that infection by influenza virus was initiated by injection of the viral nucleic acid
T. van Helvoon. 'History of Virus Research in the Twentieth Century: The Problem of Conceptual Continui-
ty'. Wi.tf. 5<7.. xxii (1994). 185-235, pp 213-8; and interview with Jean Lindenmann.
Lindenmann interview; Alick Isaacs to Prof. Mooser. letter dated 18 November, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspon-
dence, personal archives.
Isaacs and Valentine had just produced a series of electron microscopic images of virus preparations, which were
said to show virus particles with ring-like structures inside, a kind of micro'railway-lines' which disappeared after
treatment with an RNA destroying enzyme (ribonuclease) and was believed to be RNA; see. C. H. Andrewes,
'Alick Isaacs'. fi(<>,i;ra/>/i/ra/mem<>/>.v<>//f//<>iv.vo/r/!f R«ya/SwiVry. 13 (1967). 205-21, p. 215; and, A. Isaacs
and R. Valentine. The Structure oflntluenza Virus Filaments and Spheres', J. G«i. WicroWo/.. 16 (1957), 195-204,
p. 195.
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into the cell, leaving an empty virus envelope attached to the cell wall."
2.2 Building and manipulating an experimental system in Room 215."
What actions and decisions were involved in building and manipulating an experimental system
in Isaacs' laboratory? How did Isaacs and Lindenmann cope with unexpected events resulting
from the non-compliant nature of their experimental system? Was Isaacs's and Lindenmann's
work at the laboratory bench governed by making things work in an all-or-none effort to
confirm or disconfirm the 'nucleic acid' hypothesis—or—were the research questions with
which the experiments were associated secondary to the events at the bench?
In attempting to answer these questions and further our understanding of the dynamics
of laboratory practices I will now follow in detail the first two months of joint experimen-
tation in Isaacs's laboratory.^ Part of the series of experiments are mapped in diagram forms.
However, the reader should be aware that my retrospective experimental maps are principally
meant to serve as a guide and therefore fail to capture the essentially non-linear sequences of
actions and thoughts that constituted Isaacs's and Lindenmann's collaborative research work.
Isaacs's notebook has an entry for 4 September, 1956 where he and Lindenmann are
said to have started with an experiment to see whether virus coated red blood cells can induce
The notion of co-laboring or collaborating in the sense of minimally working together toward a common
product, was borrowed from Griesemer and Gerson; see, J. Griesemer and E. M. Gerson. 'Colloboration in the
Museum of Vertebrate Zoology. 7ourna/ o///ie //iitory o/Ao/ogy. 26 (1993), 185-203, pp. 196-203.
This section is largely based on the following letters, articles, notebook and interview: Alick Isaacs to Herman
Mooser. letter dated 18 November. 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal archives; Jean Lindenmann
to Herman Mooser. letter dated 7 August, 1958. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal archives. Zürich;
Jean Lindenmann to Herman Mooser. letter dated 13 August, 1958. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal
archives; J. Lindenmann. 'Induction of chick interferon: procedures of the original experiments', M<7n«/.s in &i;wifl/«£v,
78 (1981), 181-88; J. Lindenmann. 'From interference to interferon: abrief historical introduction'. Wn7. 7><ni.s.
/?. &><•. k W . , series B 299 (1982), 3-5: A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks. 1946-65. National Library of Medicine
(Bethesda), Film number: reel 91-28, Lab Note Book, S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, "Alick Isaacs Interference
Expts. V".; and interview with Jean Lindenmann.
Thanks to Isaacs's carefully recorded laboratory notebooks, and Lindenmann's correspondence and retrospective
descriptions of his work in Isaacs' laboratory, a day-to-day account of the laboratory work can be reconstructed.
Holmes has convincingly shown that combining laboratory notebooks and other unpublished documents with published
papers can yield fairly plausible accounts of investigative pathways through which researchers arrive at the knowledge
which they ultimately report in published papers; See. On scienti fie discovery, investigative pathways and historical
reconstructions, see F. Holmes. lai»isi>r and //if CVm/s/rv o/ii/i" (Madison: Wisconsin Press, 1985); and F.
Holmes, 'Scientific writing and scientific discover/, fa«, 78 (1987), 220-35.
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interference in the test-tube." Technically, this first collaborative experiment differed substanti-
ally from Lindenmann's experiments at the '//ygiene /ns/ifM/'. During a meeting to discuss both
planning of the course of investigation and design of the first experiment, Isaacs proposed a
number of changes to Lindenmann's original set-up. Instead of doing the experiment in v/vo,
inoculating embryonated eggs with influenza virus by the allantoic route, Isaacs preferred to
employ a relatively novel in v/7ro technique.
This technique required the following manipulations.'* Fertile hens' eggs containing
embryos 10-11 days old (but all of the same age for a particular experiment) were opened and
the embryos tipped out and discarded. In addition the part of the chicken embryo membrane
adhering to the egg shell was removed, cleaned ('washed') and cut up with scissors into six or
seven pieces. These pieces were then pooled in a dish containing an aqueous solution and
added, one at a time, to a test-tube filled with a special nutrient fluid (see Fig. 12, 13).
Fig. 12. Pieces of chicken embryo membrane
in a petri-dish.
Courtesy of Dr D. Tyrrell
Fig. 13. Piece of chicken embryo
membrane in test-tube
A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda), Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book, S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V, 4 September, 1956.
For a detailed description of this in vi'fro technique see, F. Fulton and P. Armitrage. 'Surviving Tissue Suspensions
for Influenza Virus Titration', J. Hv«. 49 (1951), 247-63, pp. 251-2.
56
Fig. 14. Roller-tube incubator with rotator
and motor assembly (!950's).
Courtesy of the N1MR).
This could be done very fast by a laboratory technician. Subsequently, the virus or the controls
were injected into the test-tubes, whereupon the tubes were stored and kept in controlled
conditions, at 37°C for 24 hours ('incubated' or 'incubation') in slowly rotating tube-containers,
so-called 'roller-drums': Previous experimentation had shown that through rotation or rolling
of the tubes ('roller-tube method') virus multiplication could be stimulated (see Fig. 14). The
next day the fluid could be taken out of the tube and the amount of virus quantified
Isaacs had applied this experimental technique successfully in studies of virus interference,
which he had done together with Forrest Fulton, a fellow-virologist working at the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine." According to Isaacs it had decisive advantages
over the egg. The in vitro technique required roughly one-sixth of the usual amount of
fertilized eggs, thus saving both money and space. In addition, experiments in eggs required far
more skill and time than handling the pieces of membrane in the test tube.
An important incentive for the development of this in vitro technique had been the limited supply of fertilized eggs
in Europe after World War II; F. Fulton and A. Isaacs. 'Influenza Virus Multiplication in the Chick Chorioallantoic
Membrane'. V. G«i. WicroWo/., 9 (1953). 119-131; W. Henle and G. Henle. The Road to Interferon: Interference
by inactivated Influenza Virus', In A. Billeau and N. Finter (eds.) /nf<>r/.eran / : Genera
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1984) pp. 3-18; Interviews with Jean Lindenmann and David Tyrrell..
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Further, he argued that this in vi/ro model could be more readily quantified and manipulated."
A second change in the procedure of the 'original' experiment would be to stick the
inactivated influenza virus to haemolysed red blood cells, so-called 'red cell ghosts', instead of
normal blood cells." By attaching influenza virus particles to red cell ghosts, Isaacs and a
researcher from the Biophysics and Optics Group, Heather Donald, had managed some years
before to visualize influenza virus through the use of the electron microscope (see Fig. 15).*
Fig. 15. Eleclron-microscopisl al work (195O's). Courtesy of (he NIMR.
.18 D. Tyrrell and I. Tamm, 'Prevention of Virus Interference by 2,5-Dimethylbenzimidazole'. / /m/nun.. 75 (1955),
43-9. p. 43; interview with Jean Lindenmann.
The plasma membrane of these cells had been ruptured by chemical treatment and, consequently, these red blood
cells had lost their haemoglobin content (pigment).
H. Donald and A. Isaacs. 'Counts of Influenza Virus Particles'. 7. s«""- Afi'rrotoo/., 10 (1954). 457-64. p. 459.
58
They had made a series of electron micrographs of influenza virus preparations (see Fig. 16),
which were said to show red cell ghosts with distinctive little round structures on them,
representing virus particles. This interpretation is clearly an accomplishment of two experts
familiar with interpreting electron microscopic images of virus samples. Without Donald's and
Isaacs's guidance these pictures look rather more like exotic art photographs, showing
intriguing patterns of lines and dots/'
Fig. 16. Electronmicroscopic images of counts of influenza vims particles. H.B. Donald and A. Isaacs
(1954). Courtesy of the Jouma/o/Grnfru/ M
Isaacs thought that by sticking inactivated influenza virus to red cell ghosts it would
also be possible to visualize influenza virus particles in his experiment with Lindenmann. If,
Isaacs's assumption that during interference only the virus nucleic acid entered the host cell
while the virus coat remained firmly attached to the red cell ghosts, was correct, then they
should be able to see full round virus structures before, and collapsed structures after,
interference had been induced. Furthermore, Isaacs proposed to use the same strain of
influenza virus and the same method of viral inactivation, which he had used successfully in
previous interference experiments. Isaacs's infectious enthusiasm made his proposals sound
more than convincing and Lindenmann accepted the changes without much discussion.
Michael Lynch noted that the circumstantial character of the interpretative enterprise in laboratory science is a
fortiori true for electron microscopy. See, M. Lynch, Art amM/fe/ac» in Lafcora/ory Science (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 10-2.
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'''••• Standing face-to-face at the laboratory bench in room 215, Lindenmann, Isaacs and a
laboratory technician began by opening a batch of embryonated eggs, removing and washing
the chicken embryo membranes, cutting them up into pieces, heat-inactivating batches of
influenza virus, preparing red cell ghosts, and sticking part of the inactivated virus to these
ghosts, which were now designated as 'virus-coated ghosts'. After this preparatory work, they
did a first experiment to see whether they could induce viral interference with these virus
coated ghosts in wi7ro. One by one, pieces of membrane were put in test-tubes together with
nutrient fluid and either inactivated virus stuck to red cell ghosts (group 1) or free inactivated
virus (group 2) and in tubes containing nutrient fluid only (group 3) or in tubes containing
nutrient fluid plus normal red cell ghosts (group 4)/- Most likely, Group 3 and 4 were to serve
as 'controls'. By including 'controls' with nutrient fluid and nutrient fluid plus red cell ghosts
only, Lindenmann and Isaacs wanted to check for possible unanticipated effects on the virus
growth due to the nutrient fluid or the ghosts. (For a diagram of this type of experiment see
Fig. 17)
With the aim to control the output of data in an experimental system, biomedical
researchers routinely include tests from which one or more elements are omitted and which are
to be performed simultaneously with the 'main' test. They call these specific biological
comparison tests which aim at controlling the experimental background 'controls'. The use of
controls as a means to eliminate "background' and to provide an experimental baseline which is
instrumental in making sense of the experimental output is inextricably bound up with
manipulating an experimental system. In Isaacs's and Lindenmann's experiment the controls
were meant to be used both as a point of reference for normal virus reproduction and as a
means to exclude errors due to experimental artifacts or "background noise'.
The groups of test-tubes were then rotated in the roller apparatus. After 24 hours in the
roller-drum the test-tube fluids were discarded, while the membranes were transferred to
dishes containing an aqueous solution in order to wash off the 'old' fluid ('washing the
membranes'). Subsequently, these membranes were put in test-tubes one by one together with
live virus and fresh nutrient fluid, and incubated for another 24 hours in the roller-drum.
Halfway through the first week, after collecting the tubes from the roller-drum, they subjected
the tube fluids to a so-called 'haemagglutination titration', a specific quantitative biological test
or bioassay for determining the relative rate of influenza virus multiplication.
Haemagglutination titration involved the following procedure. A series of dilutions of
each tube fluid were made in cups on plastic trays and to each dilution a constant volume of
fowl red blood cells was added. Upon storage of the trays at 4°C visible clumps were formed
in some of the cups. As the haemagglutination assay was routinely performed in Isaacs's
In the original experiment, as reproduced in Isaacs's notebook, an additional four groups were included each containing
different concentrations of free inactivated vims or virus coated ghosts.
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laboratory, Isaacs knew by experience that red blood cells stuck together or agglutinated
proportionately to the number of influenza virus particles present. By convention, the highest
dilution at which the formation of visible clumps or 'agglutination' occurred, the
'haemagglutinin titer', was taken as a relative measure for the influenza virus content of a
biological fluid.'" For agglutination to occur it took hours, leaving time for discussions or other
research work (see Fig. 18).
The experiments took hours to titrate....and this left time to talk. Alick was the leader in conversation, and
ideas for new experiments, political discussion, or identification of snatches of opera that he would sing made
the time pass quickly. Alick, too, was adept at determining where the end point was, with the aid of a hand
lens, long before the rest of us could do it, and he had often planned the next experiment before the red cells
had really settled."
Fig. 18. Agglutination (lower row) is
characterized by the formation of a pattern on the bottom of the tube. Non
agglutinated blood
cells settle down to a small dot (upper row).
Courtesy of Dr. D. Tyrrell.
A. Isaacs. 'Laboratory Methods Used in Investigating Influenza', G/<w,?. Ated. / . (29) 1948, 357-61, p.359.
In retrospect. Derek Burke, who was to join Isaacs's and Lindenmann's researches early in 1957, gave this
impressionistic account of the performance of haemagglutination titrations or tests; see, D. Burke. 'Early Days
with Interferon'. 7. /«ffr/iron AM., 7 (1987). 441-2. p. 442.
62
The operation of this haemagglutination assay involved both the transformation of matter from
one state to another—the sticking together of red blood cells—and the production of data, the
highest dilution at which visible clumps were formed. Laboratory configurations such as the
haemagglutination assay, electron microscope, ultracentrifuge, or spectro-photometer, all
produce data of some sort. The black and white shadows on an electron micrograph, the
pattern of bands in a centrifugation tube, the traces in petri dishes with virus infected cell
cultures or the lines on a spectrogram, are the entities of interpretation and representation.'"
In the case of Isaacs and Lindenmann, it was the ordering of the data stemming from
the electron microscope or the haemagglutination assay which constituted the readings in
Isaacs' notebook. These readings played a major role in structuring subsequent research
activities—reshaping the experimental system—thereby themselves being worked on and
transformed.
The readings in the table (see Fig. 19) are given as series of dilutions, named
'haemagglutinin titers'. These were the entities of interpreting and representing the degree of
virus multiplication. If the end point of agglutination occurred at a 1/1 dilution the reading was
taken as 1 and a 1/48 dilution as 48. The more dilutions were needed the more virus particles
were present and the higher the relative rate of virus multiplication.
The data output of the first experiment was encouraging. The experimental results
were similar to the results Lindenmann had obtained in Zürich: both free inactivated virus, and
inactivated virus stuck to red cell ghosts ('virus coated ghosts') were able to induce viral
interference and inhibit the multiplication of live virus in their 'test-tube arrangement'. After
another three weeks of repeated trials to fine tune their experimental system—setting the
optimal experimental conditions for the induction of interference with virus coated
ghosts—Isaacs and Lindenmann decided to start efforts to visualize the virus by electron
microscopy. Before and after the induction of interference in their experimental system,
samples would be taken and sent to the electron microscopist who would be asked to produce
electron microscopic images of red cell ghosts and virus particles. Again, if Isaacs's assumption
that during interference only the virus nucleic acid entered the host cell while the virus coat
remained firmly attached to the red cell ghosts was correct, then they should be able to see full
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar call these data-generating configurations 'inscription devices'. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
has argued that Bruno Latour's and Steve Woolgar's clearcut distinction between items of apparatus thai "transform
matter between one state and another" and "inscription devices" that "transform pieces of matter into wr itten documents"
is too simple. There are indeed experimental configurations like the haemagglutinin test, which are hybrids in
the sense that they transform both matter between one state and another, and matter into data, thus opening a space
of representation. Moreover, Latour and Woolgar oversimplify the complex transformation process of pieces of
matter into written documents. The visual display of any sort in a laboratory notebook and subsequently in a scientific
paper is at the far end of a complex transformation process that starts with manipulating an inscription device
in order to generate data of some kind; see. Rheinberger, 'Experiment. Difference, and Writing: II. The Laboratory
Production of Transfer RNA'. SW. tf«i. ffiiV. Sri., 23 (1992), 389^22, p. 393; and Latour and Woolgar,
ZJ/<?: 77IC Co/«/r«(7ion o/5ci>nri/ic FacM (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 51.
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round virus structures before, and collapsed structures after the induction of interference.
Haemagglutinin Titers
sample
No. 1
2
3
4
5
6
groep
8
8
4
4
2
8
groep2
3
<2
4
8
3
6
groep 3
96
128
64
160
64
32
groep 4
192
80
128
80
160
128
Fig. 19. Haemagglulinin tilers from Isaacs's notebook
They then prepared four groups of test-tube fluids. Group 1 contained only nutrient fluid;
group 2 tubes contained nutrient fluid plus virus coated red cell ghosts. Group 3 was identical
to group 2, and group 4 contained nutrient fluid plus a mixture of virus coated ghosts and
empty ghosts (control 3). (For a diagram of this experiment see Fig.20)
Most likely, the groups 1, 3 and 4 were to serve as internal controls. Group 3-and 4 were
apparently included to verify whether or not the virus became disentangled throughout the
experiment, whereas group 1 was meant to be used as a point of reference for a 'normal' rate
of virus multiplication, thereby checking the induction of interference by the virus coated red
cell ghosts. Thus, like before, the experiment was embedded in a series of controls in order to
make sense of the data, which would hardly mean anything on their own, and to help exclude
artifacts.
Samples from these four groups were taken and sent to the electron microscopist
Valentine in the Division of Biophysics and Optics. Subsequently, pieces of membrane were
added to group 1 and 2 test-tubes, whereupon overnight all the tubes were rolled in the roller-
drum. The next day, half way through the interference experiment, group 3 and 4 tubes
together with samples from group 1 and 2 were sent to Valentine.
By special request, Valentine immediately processed electron microscopic images of
the samples from Isaacs's laboratory. The pictures of the first samples, which were taken at the
start of the experiment, looked promising. Clearly visible structures of red cell ghosts with
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Fig. 20. Diagram of the series of experiments performed in Isaacs's
laboratory between 25 September
and 21 October 1956.
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virus particles attached to them could be distinguished, and Isaacs enthusiastically showed
Lindenmann that it was even possible to count the number of particles per ghost. However, the
electron micrographs of the other samples taken after the induction of interference were disap-
pointing. The red cell ghosts looked rather smudgy with no more than a blurry outline of virus
particles. This made the photographs hard to interpret. Neither Isaacs nor Valentine could tell
the difference in structure between virus particles before and after induction of interference
(half way the experiment). Furthermore, on the basis of Valentine's electron micrographs it was
impossible to figure out whether in the 'control' groups without membranes (group 3 and 4),
which contained either virus coated ghosts or a mixture of virus coated ghosts and empty
ghosts, virus particles had become disentangled and were transferred to the empty ghosts. In
Isaacs's notebook two question marks serve to emphasize the problems of interpreting the
electron microscopic images.''*
In the meantime, in Isaacs' laboratory, group 1 and 2 test-tube fluids were discarded,
while the membranes were put in a petri dish containing an aqueous solution in order to wash
off the 'old' fluid and virus coated ghosts. Next, they put these membranes in test-tubes one by
one together with fresh solutions containing live virus, and, after sealing the tubes, the
technician placed them in the roller-drum, which was preset at 37°C and 24 hours rotation-
time as usual. Thereafter the tubes were collected from the roller-drum and the fluids subjected
to the haemagglutination assay. In accordance with previous experiments the group of tube
fluids which had contained virus coated ghosts (group 2) showed much lower rates of virus
multiplication than the group without virus coated ghosts (('control') group 1). This indicated
that at least they had been able to induce viral interference with the virus coated ghosts.
The kind of experiment just described was performed a couple of times, without much
success. The electron microscopic images of the samples—which were taken half way through
the experiment after the fluid samples with virus coated ghosts had come out of the roller-
drum—remained difficult to interpret. Analyzing the electron micrographs became a rather
frustrating activity. However little, eventually they did get something out of these efforts.
According to Valentine there were at least hints that in the mixture of virus coated ghosts and
empty ghosts a transfer of virus particles from one to the other had taken place.
Following the successive efforts to visualize the virus-coated ghosts and the failure to
produce any workable results except for the indication, albeit vague, that virus could become
detached from the ghosts during the experiment, resulted in a first demonstrable reshaping of
their experimental system.
In discussing the recent disappointing experimental events Isaacs and Lindenmann
agreed that if they would take the hints seriously that some virus particles had gotten
•*" A. Isaacs. Laboratory Notebooks. 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda). Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book. S.O. Book 135. Code 28-72-0. 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V'., 25 September, 1956.
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disentangled during the experiment, it would undermine their efforts to test Isaacs's idea—that
only the virus nucleic acid entered the cell and induced interference, leaving the empty virus
envelope outside. Without dropping this 'nucleic acid' hypothesis though, an additional
research question was raised. Could the interference induced by virus coated red cell ghosts be
due to virus units which became detached from the ghosts during the experiment? It was the
same kind of question that had bothered Lindenmann in Zürich. They subsequently developed
the following argument: 'let us assume this to be the case and suppose that the few virus
particles that become disentangled really suffice to induce interference, then it might be
possible to induce interference with the same virus coated ghosts more than once.' • ,
In order to test for this possibility too, they did the following experiment, which
differed slightly from the preceding series of experiments. Four groups of test-tube prepara-
tions were prepared and incubated in the roller-drum overnight (stage I) ." Group A contained
nutrient fluid with virus coated ghosts ('control'), group B contained a tenfold dilution of group
A ('control'), group C was composed of nutrient fluid, virus coated ghosts and a piece of
membrane, and group D contained fluid plus a piece of membrane ('control'). (For a diagram of
this experiment see Fig. 21)
Since only group C contained membranes plus virus coated ghosts, I assume that these
were the only tubes in which interference was meant to occur. Apparently, group A and B
were included to verify whether virus became disentangled throughout the experiment,
whereas group D was meant to be used as a point of reference for 'normal' virus multiplication,
thereby checking the induction of interference by the virus coated red cell ghosts.
The next day Isaacs sent samples from group A, B and C to Valentine, in a further
attempt to visualize virus coated ghosts and to see whether or not virus had become
disentangled during the 24 hours period in the roller-drum. In addition, fresh pieces of
membrane were added to group A and B tubes ('controls'). At the same time the 'old'
membranes were removed from group C tubes, washed and transferred to fresh test-tube fluids
(group E), while fresh membrane fragments were added to the 'old' group C test-tube fluids.
Group D was left unchanged, while a new group F with fresh nutrient fluid plus membrane was
included ('control'). Once again all tubes were stored in the roller-drum overnight (stage 2).
It is highly likely that during this second stage of the experiment they intended to check
whether or not the interfering power of the virus coated ghosts had become exhausted after the
first interference attempt. Now, group A and B tubes were meant to serve as a point of
reference for 'normal' viral interference, while group D and F would be used as a measure
The notion of stage 1,2 and 3 is introduced as a didactic aid and has no significance at all with regard to the actual
research process.
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Fig. 21. Diagram of experiments performed in Isaacs's laboratory
between 24 and 29 October 1956
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for'normal'virus multiplication.
After 24 hours in the roller-drum all fluids were discarded, while the membranes were
washed and put in tubes filled with fresh solutions containing live virus. Once more the tubes
were transferred to the roller-drum and incubated for another 24 hours (stage 3). Finally all
tube fluids were subjected to a haemagglutination test to measure the relative rate of virus
multiplication in each tube. The data were listed in Isaacs's notebook (see Fig. 22);**
The measurements indicated that it was possible to induce interference with the virus
ghost solution twice (stage 1 and stage 2), with no loss of interfering activity. Furthermore,
there were additional hints from Valentine's photographs, which once again were difficult to
interpret, that possibly some virus particles had become disentangled during the experiment.
Thus, while once more failing to produce any workable experimental data with respect to the
'nucleic acid' hypothesis, their latest experiment seemed to lend support to the idea that the
viral interference in their experimental arrangement was due to virus particles that became
detached from the ghosts. - V •
Haemagglutin in Titers
Sample
No. 1
2
3
4
5
6
group a
1
2
3
32
4
3
group b
32
48
40
128
32
24
group c
< 1
1
< 1
2
< 1
< 1
group d
96
48
128
128
128
128
group e
4
3
2
< 1
2
1
group f
128
32
32
128
64
128
Fig. 22. Haemagglulinin titers from Isaacs's notebook.
However, there was more. After reading over the experimental data in his laboratory
notebook for a second time, Isaacs got the feeling that there was something unusual about the
figures. Isaacs knew by experience from his previous interference studies, that during
incubation at 37°C (the temperature at which they incubated the tubes in the roller-drum) the
interfering activity of inactivated influenza virus (the same virus strain as was employed in their
current experiment) decreased with time. Thus, Isaacs expected to see at least a slight drop in
48
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interfering activity, while reusing the virus coated ghost fluid in a second interference attempt
(stage 2). But, surprisingly, the interfering capacity of the virus coated ghost fluid remained
virtually unchanged (group C versus group E). He discussed the matter at length with
Lindenmann. Were they dealing with an artifact due to, for instance, the large excess of
interfering power which was associated with the ghosts or was there more to say about the fact
that the expected drop in interfering activity failed to occur? They decided that most likely they
were dealing with an artifact. According to Lindenmann, up to this point neither Isaacs nor he
made any suggestions relating to the notion that a factor different from the virus might be
involved in interference.
In a further effort both to check for the possibility that the inhibition of virus growth
was due to virus particles that became detached from the red cell ghosts and to visualize the
virus coated ghost after induction of interference, yet another experiment was performed. (For
a diagram of part of this experiment see Fig. 23) This time, after the first interference attempt
(stage 1) and removal of the membranes, the tubes with virus coated ghosts containing fluid
were transferred to the centrifuge and spinned at high speed to bring down the ghosts in the
tubes, thereby separating ghosts from fluid. This separation procedure was included to find out
whether or not there was any interfering activity left in the nutrient fluid due to inactivated
virus particles, which were believed to have become detached from the ghosts in stage 1.
Thereupon fresh nutrient fluid was added to the debris of virus coated ghosts together
with a freshly prepared membrane fragment, and the tubes were incubated anew in the roller-
drum. Simultaneously, they transferred the supernatant fluids to a new batch of test-tubes,
added fresh pieces of membrane and stored them in the roller-drum for a second interference
attempt as well (stage 2).'"
Next, in stage 3 the membranes were routinely washed, put in tubes containing fresh
nutrient fluid and live virus, where after the whole was incubated in the roller-drum. The
subsequent measurement of the relative rate of virus multiplication in the tubes showed them
once again that virtually no interfering activity was lost when re-using the virus coated ghosts
in a second interference attempt. However, upon thoroughly analyzing the tables in his
laboratory notebook Isaacs came up with a far more intriguing experimental feature.
The residual interfering activity in the supernatant fluid that had been separated from
the virus coated ghosts, was far higher than Isaacs would have expected, judging by his exten-
sive research experience with inactivated influenza virus as an interfering agent. Without the
A. Isaacs. Laboratory Notebooks. 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda), Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book. S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V, 30-1 October. 1 -2 November
1965.
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STAGE 1 STAGE 2
3 1
Si
large excess of interfering power that was believed to be associated with the ghosts, the super-
natant should have lost its interfering capacity more rapidly with time. Even more surprising
observation that a sample of the supernatant fluid, which was taken off immediately after the
separation procedure and tested for its virus content—inactivated virus that had become
disentangled—seemed to contain only minute amounts of virus. The following question must
have racked their brains: how could the inhibition of virus growth have come about if the
inactivated virus as the interfering agent had apparently been absent?
While discussing the readings in his notebook with Lindenmann, Isaacs apparently
suggested the possibility that somehow new interfering activity had been generated. According
to Lindenmann Isaacs was the first to admit that the observed effect could just as well be due
to a change in pH or to the exhaustion of nutrients in the test tube fluid, as suggested by
Lindenmann. Isaacs also indicated that he knew by experience that the presence of virus in the
supernatant fluid could easily have been masked by a certain membrane substance, which was
known to interfere with the type of virus measurement they had used. Eventually, they had to
concede that on the whole their experiments had produced more questions than they had
resolved.
However, despite the fact that both researchers seemed to agree that the data present
were not much to go on, each judged the experimental situation differently. Apparently, it was
a perplexing experience.'" Whereas Isaacs, primarily, became fascinated by the idea that, some-
how, new interfering activity had been produced in their experimental system, Lindenmann had
a more cautious attitude and thought more in terms of possible artifacts that might have dis-
turbed the expected course of events. Once again they would bring the matter up for
discussion. As a joke, during one of these sessions, Lindenmann started calling Isaacs's
mysterious interfering activity by the name of 'interferon'. 'Before studying medicine, I had
studied physics for a while. Of course in physics terms ending in '-on' were very popular, like
electron, positron, muon etc. Because of this old love for physics I believe I invented the term
'interferon'...It was not to be taken serious'."
The unexpected handle on their initial research problem or what I would designate an
'experimental anomaly', resulted recognizably from a repeated contradiction of expectations. In
other words, the anomaly was an accomplishment that had to be achieved. The relative
robustness of the anomaly was going to change the order of events in Isaacs's laboratory by
sparking a new line of research, thereby rendering the situation different for later data
production.
In principle it is impossible to recapture the irreproducable 'initial' observation which was constitutive in
rendering the events anomalous.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
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2.3 Writing'interferon' '" ' , .";•--• -;
Isaacs's notebook has an entry for 6 November, 1956, starting with the sentence: 'In search of
an interferon'.'" Probably, these words marked the decision to putting to a test Isaacs's vague
idea about some sort of new interfering activity that was generated in their experimental
system. This did not mean that the starting point of the first series of experiments, the question
whether or not the virus injected its nucleic acid content into the cell ('nucleic acid' hypothesis)
during virus infection was abandoned. Simultaneously they pursued the electron microscopy
work. This could be easily organized because research on the question whether and how new
interfering activity was generated could be done while waiting for their turn on the microscope
and for pictures to be developed.
In order to find out whether or not the experimental anomaly was due to the red cell
ghosts only, they decided to include test-tubes with free inactivated virus and pieces of
membrane, but without ghosts. (For a diagram form of the newly included part of this experi-
ment see Fig. 24) After they had rolled the tubes overnight in a first interference attempt, the
membranes were removed and a second interference trial was carried out with the test-tube
fluids and fresh membrane fragments. In order to determine the degree of viral interference
that had been induced both times, the first and second set of membranes were routinely
incubated with live virus, followed by a haemagglutination titration to determine the relative
rate of virus multiplication. The readings in Isaacs's laboratory notebook indicate that after the
first interference attempt (stage 1) the interfering activity had only been slightly reduced, both
in fluids with free inactivated virus and in tubes with inactivated virus stuck to red cell ghosts."
Apparently, the expected fall in interfering activity due to thermal degradation or
adsorption of virus by the membranes had also failed to materialize in the case of tubes
containing free inactivated virus instead of virus coated ghosts. Most likely Isaacs and
Lindenmann then decided that in their search for new interfering activity that was possibly
generated during the experiment, they might just as well leave out the red cell ghosts.
Presumably the decision was motivated by a pragmatic desire to reduce the complexity of their
experimental system: 'It was difficult to analyze the situation with virus absorbed on red
cells'."
A. Isaacs. Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda). Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book. S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference ExpLs. V, 6 November. 1956.
A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda), Film number reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book, S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V . 10 November, 1965.
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Alick Isaacs to Herman Mooser, letter dated 18 November 1957, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal
archives, Zurich.
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Hg. 24. Diagram of part of experiment performed in Isaacs*!
laboratory between 6 and 10 November 1956.
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In their next experiment they in fact dropped the red cell ghosts as constitutive
elements of their experimental system. Initially, they intended to compare the interfering
capacity between, on the one hand, fluids with free inactivated virus to be incubated twice with
two sets of membranes in succession, and on the other hand fluids with free inactivated virus
also to be rolled twice but the first time without adding a piece of membrane. However, the
deletions in Isaacs's laboratory notebook suggest that Isaacs and Lindenmann made a last
minute change with regard to the design of the experiment." In this concrete situation, there
was clearly an ad-hoc manner in which the experiment was assembled.
Instead of rolling all tubes twice at 37°C for 24 hours in the roller-drum in the standard
way, a small group of tubes was to be treated differently (For a diagram of this part of the
experiment see Fig.25). A number of test-tube fluids containing inactivated virus and
membrane would be incubated for two hours, after which the tubes would be taken out of the
roller-drum, the membranes routinely washed and transferred to tubes with fresh nutrient fluid
and put back in the roller-drum for another 22 hours. Subsequently, this group was to be
treated in the usual way, removing the membranes and rolling the fluids with a second set of
membranes for another 24 hours. Finally, both sets of membranes would be put into tubes
containing live influenza virus, incubated and thereupon subjected to the haemagglutination
assay to determine the relative rate of virus multiplication.
I do not know what made them change the procedure, but Isaacs noted that the experi-
ment had got them 'nearer to the interferon'."' In accordance with previous experiments, the
readings in Isaacs's notebook show that the interfering capacity of the fluids had only reduced
slightly after bathing the first set of membranes. Furthermore, it made almost no difference
whether two sets of membranes were added, or only one after the first incubation period. In
itself that would have been nothing new, had it not been for the small number of tubes that
were treated differently. In this additional test group, the first set of membranes had been
transferred after 2 hours to tubes with fresh nutrient fluid. Despite the initial absence of
inactivated virus as an interfering principle in these fluids, roughly the same degree of
interference was induced in this test group as in comparable test groups with no transfer
procedure.
The researchers agreed that somehow interfering activity must have been released in
A. Isaacs. Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda), Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book, S.O. Book 135, Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V. November, 1956.
* A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda), Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book. S.O. Book 135. Code 28-72-0, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. V, 13 November, 1956.
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Fig 25. Diagram of pan of experiments performed in Isaacs's
laboratory between 13 and 17 November 1956.
76
the additional test group between hours 2 and 24, after transfer of the first set of membranes to
tubes with fresh nutrient fluid and during the subsequent incubation in the roller-drum and, at
least, before the second set of membranes was added. Isaacs was strongly in favour of the idea
that one way or the other new interfering activity had been generated. However, Lindenmann
remained more sceptical and played the devil's advocate by arguing that it could just as well be
due to inactivated virus, which had been taken up by the membrane the first two hours and
resecreted into the test tube fluid after the transfer procedure. For a further investigation and
interpretation of the phenomenon it was agreed that they would need to elaborate on the
transfer procedure, thereby reshaping their experimental system once again.
It is difficult to make sense of the subsequent series of experiments. Isaacs and
Lindenmann varied their experimental set-up in an attempt to eliminate all possible background
effects they could think of. One of the things they did was to check for the possibility that the
'new' interfering activity was due to the presence of inactivated virus that might be resecreted
into the tubes, as Lindenmann had suggested. Thus, membranes were incubated with
inactivated virus for 2 hours, washed and transferred to a fresh medium. After another 22
hours in the roller-drum, the first set of membranes was removed and before the second set of
membranes was added, some tube fluids were processed in the ultra-centrifuge—this high-
speed spinning instrument was known to have the effect of sedimenting the influenza virus in
the tube at a certain speed/time ratio. Despite this rigorous virus separation step, the
supernatant fluid, supposedly cleared of inactivated virus, turned out to contain only slightly
less interfering activity than fluid samples which had not been centrifuged. According to
Lindenmann, in the process they became more and more convinced that there was something,
some factor in the biological soup that was responsible for the phenomenon, but they did not
know what it was.
Most likely, the apparent consistency of the phenomenon made them believe that
Isaacs's interferon' might indeed be an interesting new experimental feature, a signal instead of
a noise, which was worth pursuing. In an attempt to characterize their elusive factor, they then
initiated a series of 'properties of interferon' experiments, leaving their experimental system
largely unchanged. It may look as if it was a rather straightforward and unproblematic series of
experimental trials but again and again experiments went wrong for no decernible reasons and
Isaacs and Lindenmann had a difficult time in making the experimental system work in a
reproducible way, in other words, to produce workable amounts of the viral interference
activity containing fluids which they referred to as 'interferon preparations'.
They basically employed the following procedure. Freshly prepared chicken embryo
membranes were cut into pieces and these were put in bulk in a bottle together with inactivated
virus and nutrient fluid, and incubated in a roller-drum for 2 hours. Subsequently the membra-
nes were removed from the fluid and washed, and then each membrane placed in a separate
test-tube containing fresh fluid, and rolled for another 22 hours. Thereafter the membranes
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were discarded and the remaining biological soup was referred to as 'interferon preparation'."
Subsequently these crude preparations were subjected to a similar series of physical and
biochemical manipulations as Isaacs had used some years before to identify the inactivated
influenza virus as interfering agent.'*
Isaacs and Lindenmann tested the stability of their interferon preparations at different
temperatures, by heating at 60°C for one hour (result: the interfering capacity decreased
sharply) or at 37°C for 24 hours (result: the interfering capacity remained stable) and by sto-
ring at 2°C (result: the interfering activity remained stable for at least 14 days). They made
dilutions and subsequently compared the interfering activity of these dilutions (result: the
activity decreased with dilution), or subjected interferon preparations to haemagglutination
tests to see whether their putative factor would be able to agglutinate red blood cells like
inactivated influenza virus did (result: no agglutination could be observed).
In addition they tried to neutralize the interfering activity with specific viral antiserum,
which was to dissolve the interfering capacity of inactivated influenza virus (result: the
interferon fluids turned out to be resistant against this viral antiserum). The researchers also
ran filtration and centrifugation trials (result: the interfering activity of an inactivated virus
preparation completely settled down in the test-tube after centrifugation, whereas the activity
of an interferon preparation did not; there was no clear-cut difference with regard to filtration
behaviour).''* Furthermore the viral interfering activity of interferon preparations was tested
with a number of different viruses, which had also been shown to be susceptible to inactivated
influenza vims as interfering agent (result: the interferon preparations showed an inhibitory
activity against all viruses tested, such as the pox virus, 'vaccinia')).
It is worth noting that in between these series of in Wfro trials an isolated attempt was
made to see if the viral inhibitory effect of interferon preparations on influenza virus could also
be demonstrated in mice (/« vivo). However, no inhibitory effect could be observed.
Unfortunately Isaacs's notebook does not give any hint with regard to the motives behind this
A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine (Bethesda). Film number: reel 91-28,
Lab Note Book. S.O. Book 321. Code 28-321. "Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. VI," 10-12-1956/21-2-1957.
A. Isaacs and M. Edney, 'I. Quantitative aspects of interference', Aiwfr. 7. £ip. Bio/., 28 (1950), 219-230.
About half a year later Isaacs would write to Lindenmann that their filtration experiments had gone wrong. " I
have a shock for you. Ernst Fulton told me our filtration results were of no value since we had not used Broth.
1 had forgotten that Elford always insisted on Broth. We repeated nitrations in Broth and it goes through a 0.1
u membrane and an 0.048 u membrane!!! (previously both the virus and interferon activity had been held back
by a 0.6 u membrane) Results are being confirmed at the moment but I am afraid we will have to publish a disclaimer
soon. Of course this now Fits with the centrifugation results but I feel rather foolish and very sorry to have misled
you"; Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 9 December 1957. Lindenmann Correspondence. Personal
Archives.
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ad hoc in vivo trial." nt
These kinds of experimental trials were performed over a two month period. They
involved the most practical kind of skilled laboratory craftsmanship, a sort of cookbook bench-
work, using various recipes for identifying interfering agents. As such it was part of a slow and
laborious process of gaining experience and learning to read the data concerning a new
laboratory factor. Despite attempts to reproduce experiments in detail, a certain variability in
results was common. At times when experiments had produced no workable data, they would
sit down and discuss the possibility that after all it was not the presence of something but the
lack of something that kept them busy. Maybe a nutrient was being used up, thus preventing
viruses from growing.
However, through the steady accumulation and superposition of data stemming from
the physical and biochemical manipulations at the bench, the idea that the 'interferon' was a
transitory factor, an artifact or noise, disappeared. Instead, interferon as a signal, a new kind of
interfering agent, was articulated in accommodation to a series of non-trivial, data generating
experimental events. These were regarded as direct indicators of the factor under study. In
particular, the consistency of the interferon phenomenon in the face of widely differing physical
conditions was instrumental in solidifying their sense of having found a novel biological factor.
The anomaly' became increasingly transparent and self-evident and in the process a primary
profile of Isaacs's and Lindenmann's elusive factor or activity was shaped. Apparently a kind of
'soluble interfering factor' was produced in their experimental set-up, which displayed proper-
ties different from other interfering agents such as the inactivated influenza vims. In a way they
had ordered chaos by acquiring skills in the manipulation, interpretation and representation of a
phenomenon which in November had still been perplexing.
By the end of February 1957, in consultation with Andrewes, it was decided that the
experimental data looked consistent enough to argue against the interpretation of their 'interfe-
ron' as an artifact and to warrant writing up their research work for publication.''' Andrewes
offered his support as a Fellow of the Royal Society in submitting the final papers to the highly
prestigious /Vora>edi/ig.s o/ r/jf /?ovo/ SociVry." In this series of two articles, which were
published in October 1957, Isaacs and Lindenmann claimed to have found a new interference-
This list of trials and results is based on the following documents: A. Isaacs, Laboratory Notebooks. 1946-65.
National Library of Medicine (Bethesda). Film number: reel 91-28, Lab Note Book. S.O. Book 321. Code 28-
321, 'Alick Isaacs Interference Expts. VI'. 10-12-1956/21-2-1957; and A. Isaacs, J. Lindenmann and R.
Valentine, 'Virus interference. II. Some properties of interferon'. Pror. /?. Soc, 147 (1957), 268-73.
Since Alick Isaacs's personal laboratory archives were destroyed after his death in 1967,1 was unable to
recapture the process of drafting the early interferon papers and follow in detail the way both part of the
continuous web of investigations was sealed off and ideas concerning this new interfering factor, 'interferon',
further evolved.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
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inducing factor named 'interferon' during a study of the interference phenomenon." The
interference-inducing factor was said to be released in a test-tube fluid following the incubation
of inactivated influenza virus with a piece of chicken embryo membrane. The presence of
interferon in the fluid could be recognized by its ability to induce an inhibitory effect upon the
growth of a number of different viruses. In addition, 'interferon proved stable at 2°C for 2
weeks. Marked inactivation took place after 1 h at 60°C. Interferon was not measurably
sedimented by centrifugation at 100000 g for 1/2 h. It was held back by gradocol filters ..'."
With reference to these properties they discussed the possible nature of their factor. Since the
data 'did not allow even the crudest guess as to interferon's nature—whether it should be
regarded a part of the inactivated virus, a reaction-product of the cell or an abortive product of
virus multiplication—they resorted to reasoning by means of comparisons and analogies. They
argued that because of observed analogies between interferon and virus production they would
provisionally consider interferon as an abortive product of virus multiplication which was to
block the synthesis of live virus and had many different properties from those of the inactivated
influenza virus - the other interfering agent present in their arrangement.
Interferon cannot be identical with the original heated virus, the most conspicuous differences between the
two being the interferon's inability to agglutinate red (blood) cells, its resistance to the neutralizing action of
viral antiserum and its lower sedimentation rate...A /f/np/i'ng ÄvporAffu is the following: the heat-degraded
virus feeds into the cell insufficient information for orderly virus synthesis to proceed, but sufficient for some
kind of ill-organized reaction chain to start, leading sooner or later to...piling up of distorted virus
intermediates...It is conceivable that large amounts of such swfesfancei - in/e//eron - could block synthesis of
infective virus (live influenza virus)." (Italics are mine)
The authors' description reflects the intricate packaging of material conditions and the
emerging scientific object, 'interferon'. At the same time the description meant a divorce from
the phenomenon's laborious production process at the laboratory bench. Laboratory tools and
techniques, and human agency (to the extent that it was discernible) are presented as practical
means to the end of claiming the finding of a new biological factor. Thus the significance and
identity of materials and methods had changed retrospectively in the presence of a solution: the
discovery of the substance named 'interferon'.
*•' A. Isaacs and J. Lindenmann, 'Virus Interference. I. The Interferon', Proc. /?. 5oc, 147 (1957). 258-267: and A.
Isaacs, J. Lindenmann and R. Valentine, 'Virus Interference. II. Some Properties of Interferon', Proc. R. 5oc, 147
(1957). 268-73.
A. Isaacs, J. Lindenmann and R. Valentine, 'Virus interference. II. Some properties of interferon', Proc. /?. Soc
147(1957). 268-73, p. 268.
A. Isaacs. J. Lindenmann and R. Valentine, 'Virus Interference. II. Some Properties of Interferon', Pror. Ä. Soc.,
147(1957). 268-73, pp. 272-3.
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2.4 Isaacs's interferon kitchen ; • . ' 't: c *
Around the time when final drafts of the first two papers on interferon were being submitted to
the /Yocm/ingj o/ //ie /?oya/ Soc/>fy, Isaacs was approached by Derek Burke a post-doctoral
worker from the Chemistry Division, two floors down on the ground floor of the NIMR.
Isaacs had known Burke for nearly two years as an assistant to James Walker, a senior organic
chemist with whom Isaacs had been working on the possible effects of various synthetic
organic compounds on influenza viruses. Burke, who had spent two years as a post-doctoral
fellow at Yale University doing 'natural products chemistry', was responsible for studying the
possible effects of the chemical agents, synthesized by Walker, on the nucleic acids of influenza
viruses." Upon getting familiar with the basic techniques used in experimental virology, such
as growing and harvesting influenza viruses in fertile hen's eggs and determining virus titers,
and testing the first series of chemical agents, Burke had become seriously interested in
studying the biochemistry of viruses. At the same time he gradually began to lose interest in
Walker's and Isaacs's collaborative research project.
For some time, Burke had had an idea for a project involving the biochemistry of the
influenza virus infection, and he wanted to talk it over with Isaacs. However, when asked for
his opinion Isaacs did not seem much interested, and, instead of carefully listening to Burke's
proposals, he started talking about his favorite research project. Together with Lindenmann he
had been working for some time on a rather new and interesting viral interfering agent, which
they were in the process of characterizing. However, he and Lindenmann were rather amateurs
when it came to the task of identifying, purifying and isolating biological substances.
Both Isaacs and Lindenmann had been trained in medicine rather than in science with a
rather basic knowledge of chemistry. Moreover, neither of them thought much of the chemical
work, which they considered a necessary evil to characterize their putative biological factor:
such work, they felt, kept them from working on the more interesting and rewarding funda-
mental biological research questions such as the elucidation of the mechanism of action. They
would be far better off, they reasoned, if they handed over the chemical work to one of the
PhD's in the NIMR's divisions of Chemistry or Biochemistry."
This in mind Isaacs asked Burke to help with the biochemical work. Despite the poor
hearing he had had from Isaacs for his own plans, the young scientist Burke considered it an
honour to be asked for help by a highly regarded senior researcher like Isaacs.''* Thus, by the
end of March 1957 the biochemist Burke joined Isaacs's and Lindenmann's investigations into
Interviews with Derek Burke,.Norman Finter and Joseph Sonnabend
" Ibid.
" Ibid
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the 'interference inducing factor', named 'interferon'. Burke's laboratory records indicate that he
mainly worked on the characterization of interferon, subjecting interferon preparations to
various chemical manipulations. Most of these were routine in biochemistry to identify natural
substances—for example, testing the effect of organic solvents like ether, testing the effect of
protein degrading and nucleic acid degrading compounds or testing the pH-stability, i.e. acid
and base stability.*' First, however, Burke enlisted the help of Isaacs's laboratory technician to
familiarize himself with the production of interferon through replicating the material
realization, or performance, of the interferon system.™
With the help of Burke's biochemical toolkit the list of biochemical and physical
properties ascribed to interferon grew steadily. 7nte>rf<?ron was s/afc/e in /a/r/v srrawg acid
VVI7/J an e^«a/ vo/wra^ 0/ e/ner cau.9«/ compete /oss o/ac/iv/rv...7Vy/«in
reduce/ ite ac//vify.'^ ' According to Burke the sensitivity to the protein-
degrading enzyme, trypsin, suggested that interferon might contain protein, but the other
experimental properties did not allow any further conclusions regarding interferon's chemical
nature." It seemed unlikely that they would learn much more about its chemical composition
until interferon could be prepared in a purified form. Burke also helped scaling up the
experimental system in order to prepare interferon in bulk, as the production of interferon was
lagging behind the increased research demand.
Isaacs and Lindenmann—who coined Burke the name 'Calamity Joe' because whenever
he handled glass-ware, there was a fair chance that he would break it—in turn, shifted their
attention to the phenomenological aspects of interferon research, such as the mode of
production and the mode of action of interferon m i'i7ro, in test-tubes each containing at least
one piece of chick embryo membrane." Through this research work unexpected differences
emerged between interferon and virus. For example, membrane preparations could be induced
repeatedly to produce the same amounts of interferon, whereas at the same time the
preparations showed a greatly reduced ability to support virus multiplication. These
D. Burke. Laboratory Nocebook. S.O. Book 321. Code 28-321. 'Interferon Book I'. 4-3/26-9-1957, Personal Archives.
In order forthe replication of the material realization of an experiment successful tobe called successful it is required
that "the same actions are performed and the same experimental situations produced from the point of view of
the daily language description of the material realization of the experiment". See, H. Radder, 'Experimental
Reproducibility and the Experimenter's Regress', in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruklik (eds.) PS/1, Vo/um? /
(East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, 1992). p. 65.
J. Lindenmann. D. Burke and A. Isaacs, 'Studies on the Production, Mode of Action and Properties of Interferon',
Brit. J. exp. Path.. 38 (1957), 551-62, p. 559.
Interview with Derek Burke.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
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experimental results were thought to suggest that only part of the 'complex machinery' that
was required for viral synthesis was required for the production of interferon." The results
strengthened Isaacs's and Lindenmann's beliefs that interferon was most likely an abortive
product of virus multiplication, which passed through only part of the viral reproductive
process. As such, interferon was regarded as an abnormal viral entity that played a major role
in mediating viral interference."
Apart from studying the mode of action of interferon /« vi/ro, Isaacs also initiated a
series of experiments to test the effect of interferon preparations in vivo. According to
Lindenmann as soon as Isaacs learned that interferon preparations were capable of inducing
viral interference against vaccinia virus, in vi'rro, in the test-tube, he began suggesting plans to
test interferon's action on vaccinia in vivo, on laboratory rabbits. Such experiments were
argued to be perfectly in line with trials Isaacs had performed in his laboratory about three
years earlier. In the autumn of 1953, he succeeded in showing that inactivated influenza virus
interfered with the development of vaccinia virus not only in ovo, in fertile hen's eggs, but also
in laboratory rabbits. He figured out that if he injected rabbits intradermally—into the
skin—with inactivated influenza virus preparations, and one day later made injections with
vaccinia virus preparations in the same areas, the development of skin lesions, normally expec-
ted after a single vaccinia virus inoculation, was inhibited significantly.™ Since interferon was
considered to be an interfering agent with a viral interfering activity similar to inactivated
influenza virus, Isaacs expected to see a similar effect when substituting inactivated influenza
virus for interferon in aforementioned rabbit experiment." However, substituting inactivated
influenza virus for interferon did not initially meet with Isaacs's expectations. Unlike inactiva-
ted influenza virus preparations, interferon fluids did not seem to have any effect on the
development of vaccinial lesions in the rabbit skin. Only after many unsuccessful trials,
changing the experimental conditions a number of times, did Isaacs finally manage to observe a
minor inhibition of lesions with one of his laboratory rabbits. Subsequently a number of other
test series were required to substantiate the observed effect, though the overall inhibitory effect
of interferon appeared to be far less significant compared with similar experiments using inacti-
vated influenza virus. Isaacs was somewhat puzzled by the apparent difference in the
J. Lindenmann, D. Burke and A. Isaacs, Studies on the Production, Mode of Action and Properties of Inter-
feron'. Am. / c.v/7. ftjr/i., 38 (1957). 551-62, pp. 561.
Interview with Jean Lindenmann.
™ R. Depoux and A. Isaacs, 'Interference between Influenza and Vaccinia Viruses'. Br/7. 7. cjrp. ftj//i. , 35
(1954), 415-18. p. 418.
J. Lindenmann, D. Burke and A. Isaacs, " Studies on the Production. Mode of Action and Properties of
Interferon," Bnr. 7. <•.*/>. ftw/i., 38 (1957), 551-62, p.558.
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protective effect between interferon and inactivated influenza virus. After all, the viral
interfering effect of the latter was thought to be mediated through interferon, which was
thought to be released as a result of the virus-host interaction. Isaacs and Lindenmann
discussed the rabbit experiments over and over again, but they could not think of an explanati-
on other than that far more interferon was present in the skin of rabbits treated with inactivated
influenza virus.'*
The persistency with which the animal experiments were performed suggests that the
idea of the practical medical application of interferon preparations to virus disease must have
crossed Isaacs's and Lindenmann's medically trained minds. In principle the laboratory rabbit is
as much a model of the 'real' situation as the test-tube, but biomedical researchers have a
'natural' propensity for linking the experimental output of m v/vo experiments, more easily than
in vifro experiments, to practical medical applications."
Most likely the ;'w v/Vo experiments with laboratory rabbits were the first instances in
which interferon's effects were translated into practical medical terms. As I will show in the
next chapter medical concerns would continue to play a role in structuring interferon research,
exploring the interferon phenomenon in terms of its possible value as a tool to be used in
clinical practice. The fact that animal virology was institutionalized predominantly as part of
the medical field of microbiology, whose major professional goal was the prevention, diagnosis
and treatment of viral diseases, played an important role in this respect.""
2.5 Conclusion
In following the evolution of particular passages of experimental work in room 215 of the
NIMR between June 1956 and June 1957, this chapter addressed several aspects of the process
of scientific inquiry that are not visible in scientific communications to learned journals. First,
my reconstruction of the investigative pathways which led to the production of a new
laboratory factor, 'the interferon'. reveals how the research setting of the NIMR was strongly
See the annual report from the Bacteriology and Virus Research Group of the NIMR. 10, 1956/"57. held at the
NIMR Library Archives; and A. Isaacs. Laboratory Notebooks, 1946-65. National Library of Medicine
(Bethesda). Film number: reel 91-28, Lab Note Book, S.O. Book 321, Code 28-321, "Alick Isaacs Interferen-
ce Expts. VI," 21-3-/1O-7-1957; and interview with Jean Lindenmann.
The 'real' in vivo situation is a chimaera or something one cannot gain access to via the artificial and
constructive nature of laboratory practice.
This observation is in line with Olga Amsterdamska's claim that "the selection and formulation of problems
in mission-oriented sciences must be considered within the wider contexts of their disciplinary goals, which
are closely linked to the social contexts of practice"; O. Amsterdamska, 'Medical and Biological Constraints:
Early Research on Variation in Bacteriology', Sw. SW. Sti., 17 (1987), 657-87. p. 659.
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conducive to innovative collaboration between the two biomedical researchers, Isaacs and
Lindenmann. I pointed out that the NIMR provided a state-of-the-art research environment
aimed at stimulating internationally competitive research projects at the frontier of fundamental
biomedical sciences. The distribution of and access to material and conceptual resources in
these surroundings served as relatively fixed points of laboratory practice which affected the
actions and decisions at the bench—but without necessarily determining courses of action.
We then saw how, on the basis of Isaacs's and Lindenmann's common objective to test
a particular hypothesis and produce specific kinds of data, an experimental system was set up.
The net result was an experimental system made up of elements stemming from the local
context of the division and institute, from research projects Isaacs and Lindenmann had
worked on in the past and from simultaneous projects. Manipulating their experimental system
and performing the series of experiments under survey in this chapter involved a continuous
interplay between researchers' assumptions and expectations, material procedures, and data
production.
In principle any particular run of an experiment was a unique accomplishment, an event
that created a situation that was different from the one before it."' At the same time every
second run depended on an experimental system encompassing earlier trials, decisions and
expectations. Repeated failure to fit the 'old' and the 'new'—when the data repeatedly failed to
meet prior assumptions and expectations due to resistances arising from the non-compliant
nature of the instruments or materials at hand—was instrumental in inducing changes in the
experimental system. The repeated failure to visualize the virus coated ghosts and the
unexpected stability of the interfering activity in their arrangement, are all examples of series of
inconsistent experimental events that made Isaacs and Lindenmann reshape their experimental
system.
As a result certain research problems, ideas, materials and procedures were relegated to
being peripheral whereas there was a growing commitment toward other ones. I will illustrate
this argument on the basis of the events following Isaacs's remarks regarding an unexpected
stability of interfering activity in their experimental set-up. Initially the unexpected data output
did not change the course of actions and was explained away by associating it with one of the
material elements they had relatively little experience with, the virus coated ghosts. However,
when the expected fall in interfering activity failed to materialize repeatedly, the phenomenon
acquired anomalous status. Incorporating the resulting 'experimental anomaly', as I called it,
into their experimental system created a perplexing situation which was accommodated by ad
/zoc changes in the experimental system. The starting point of the first series of experiments,
See, Bruno Latour, The Force and Reason of Experiment', In H. E. Le Grand (ed.), £jperim«tta/ &i^«/n«: W/j/orica/,
/"/ii/ojop/uca/ant/Soaa/SftidiVjo/Ec/Jerimenwrionm Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990)
p.65.
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the 'nucleic acid' hypothesis, which had neither been falsified nor corroborated, was
marginalized. Instead there was a growing commitment to the question whether or not the
anomaly was related to some sort of new biological activity that was generated in their system
as part of the phenomenon of viral interference. This refocusing also applied to the physical
elements of the experimental system. Gradually the electron microscope and the virus coated
ghosts also lost their position as constitutive elements of the experimental system.
The actions and decisions involved in adding yet another line of research clearly show
that the work at the laboratory bench was far from an all or nothing effort to confirm or refute
hypotheses. Isaacs and Lindenmann did not change course because one hypothesis seemed to
make more sense than the other. Instead, the range and priority of hypotheses and research
questions with which the experiments were associated was subsidiary to and dependent on the
events at the laboratory bench. The thing that turned the biological researchers on was the
prospect of experimenting with some kind of novel biological activity that would increase the
range of manipulative options at their bench.
At the time of Lindenmann's introduction of the name 'interferon' neither he nor Isaacs
had the slightest idea about the nature of this phenomenon they called 'interferon'. Something
was involved in the experimental anomaly, but what was it? Another viral interfering factor or
factors, or something quite different? It was a slow and laborious process of gaining
experience and learning to read the data with regard to this 'interferon' thing. The indicators of
the experiments were far from clear, and time and again Isaacs and Lindenmann discussed the
dangers of 'chasing a red herring', an anomaly of artifactual nature.
Within this experimental situation, their status of novice and expert were relative to
eachother. 1 initially called Lindenmann a 'scientist novice at the frontier of viral research', and
Isaacs, who was widely known as a distinguished virus researcher, a 'scientist expert'.
However, we saw that when exploring and manipulating their experimental system, both Isaacs
and Lindenmann were, in a certain sense, novices. The two men had yet to discover how to go
about experimenting and what experimental success meant in their case. In modeling the
experimental system on a permanent basis they accumulated manipulative skills that would
bring the new and unexpected under control."" As such, both Isaacs and Lindenmann were
'tinkering' craftsmen, who, through building and manipulating an experimental system, were
constantly engaged in producing, mastering ('domesticating as it were') and communicating
new procedures, ideas and phenomena.*'
On the relative nature of expertise in science see also: T. Nickles. 'Justification and Experiment', in D. Gooding,
T. Pinch and S. Schaffer (eds.) 77if Ifa« o/Er/wrimpn/ (Cambridge University Press. 1989) pp. 300-301; and
D. Gooding. Eipm'm«»/ and »/i<- Mating o/Mf anmg (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990). pp. 29-69.
The use of the term tinkering was not to connote unskilled work but to emphasize the essential contingent nature
of work at the frontier of science; see, K. D. Knorr-Cetina, 77ie Wanu/acmrc o/ /fruni'/ftfee: /In Eua v on r/ip
Co/mrurfi'Wjf and Confc-.vrua/ Mi/ure o/SnVnce (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981) pp. 34; and F. L. Holmes.
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I called, their subsequent attempts to characterize the elusive laboratory factor, a most
practical kind of skilled laboratory craftsmanship, a sort of 'cookbook' benchwork. Through
the steady accumulation and superposition of data the idea of 'interferon' as a transitory factor,
an artifact or noise, faded. Gradually a primary profile of Isaacs's and Lindenmann's elusive
factor was shaped.
The main upshot of the series of data-generating and data-transforming events were a
couple of scientific articles in highly prestigious journals. Ends and means had been reversed, in
these papers, taking the phenomenon of interference and interferon as the explanatory ground
for the collaborative research work. Apart from the intricate packaging of material conditions
and the object of study 'interferon', the knowledge claims in the resulting scientific articles bear
relatively few marks of their generative production process. The twists and turns at the bench
in Isaacs's laboratory and the flaws the researchers had experienced in manipulating their
experimental system were omitted from the final papers. Instead, the occurrence of what was
called, alternately, the factor or substance 'interferon' had been caught in a web of mostly post-
hoc reasonings. This is in line with a change in meaning of the novel object under study: from
interferon as a transitory factor, a 'mysterious' kind of biological activity, to interferon as a new
interference inducing factor, possibly of practical medical significance. In the next chapter we
will see that the meanings attributed to interferon continued to change over time.
Manometers, Tissue Slices, and Intermediary Metabolism', in A. Clarke and J. Fujimura (eds.) 77if ftig/ir 7Vx>/s
/or ;/ic 7ofc (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992). pp. 169-70
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Chapter 3. *
Shaping a new field of research: investigating interferon(s).
3.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter I outlined how the virus researchers Isaacs and Lindenmann working
on a particular problem, built and manipulated a specific experimental system. In attempting to
forge a problem-related set of data they stumbled across an intriguing but separate problem
which made them produce and bring under surveillance a new biological phenomenon. My
analysis focused primarily on how explanatory ideas and hypotheses and the objects with which
they were concerned, as well as those materials used to elaborate them, were 'co-produced'.
However, by concentrating on the evolution of an experimental system and the dynamics of
shaping 'the interferon' in NIMR's room 215, I have illuminated only part of the generative
processes of knowledge production. Relatively little has been said about the great diversity of
knowledge-making activities displayed in biomedical laboratory practices. Apart from establis-
hing and maintaining experimental systems, and elaborating representations of the 'phenomena'
under investigation, laboratory researchers also communicate, negotiate and modify knowledge
claims, interfere with each others' experimental work, and seek funding in order to proceed
with a particular research project. None of these aspects have been discussed in detail thus far.
At the end of the previous chapter I indicated how work on interferon gradually
extended beyond the physical space of Isaacs's laboratory. I showed how the operations at the
laboratory bench began to interact with the job of mobilizing local interest and support, writing
up the experimental data for publication and getting the papers published in a major scientific
journal. In this chapter, I shall describe how interferon evolved from an obscure biological
phenomenon at the margins of viral research to a phenomenon that legitimized the 'blossoming'
of a new subfield of research—depicting the evolution of interferon in time and space. To this
end I shall investigate the ways in which work on interferon was constituted and modified th-
rough actions inside and out of Isaacs's laboratory exploring both the private spaces of
laboratories and the public spaces in which interferon met its audiences.
A first point of interest is how interferon shaped the expectations and interests of the
various human agents both as individuals and as social groups and directed both their activities
and those of the institutions they represented. I shall show how different sets of expectations
about interferon came into being and developed in the adjudicating community. In shaping
judgements about, for instance, the novelty, validity and possible practical implications
('utility') of knowledge claims, these varying expectations were again open to change. In this
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process of transformation, the meanings attributed to interferon in terms of what it signified
and what its biomedical significance was, altered and multiplied. vt^-i ; .^. . ; ;;<•; ,di-^!Ki!
r • A second point of interest concerns the modes of interchange and influence between
various researchers working on interferon: between those who claimed to have command of a
novel laboratory procedure enabling them to produce a hitherto unknown experimental feature,
and those who still had to include and integrate the new feature into their laboratory practices.
This shows that the process of validating interferon and forming it into a basis for consensus
involved not only evaluating claims in light of the perceived research opportunities and of
negotiating consensus, but also a collective process of communicating, manipulating,
interpreting and elaborating a common assembly of research objects.
In order to grasp these various issues, the chapter begins with a description of how
Isaacs and Lindenmann communicated the discovery of interferon to various audiences,
thereby gradually extending expectations regarding interferon beyond the walls of the NIMR.
In analyzing this extension process I will consider the material, social and cognitive conditions
that were instrumental in shaping expectations. I shall then examine the ways in which other
research groups arrived at similar claims about the characterization of interferon-like factors.
The emerging cross-links between these 'others' and Isaacs's research group, I will show, mark
a turning point, as work on interferon no longer exclusively meant activity in Isaacs's
'interferon kitchen'. The latter part of this chapter portrays how interferon, upon changing the
order of events in a growing body of laboratory practices, came to embody a network of
practices with researchers, who shared a common set of research problems, materials, and
objectives.
3.1 Interferon going public ,
Early in June 1957 Lindenmann's term as a visiting researcher came to an end and he returned
to Switzerland. Before resuming work in Mooser's laboratory at the 'Hygiene Institut' in
Zürich, Lindenmann was expected to present a paper on his foreign research work at the
annual meeting of the Swiss Society of Microbiology. It was interferon's first official and
extramural appearance.
In his paper presentation entitled 'trials on virus-interference' Lindenmann claimed to
have found a product of influenza viral interference, named 'interferon', which induced an
interfering effect upon the multiplication of live influenza virus in the test-tube. He indicated
that little was known about the mode of production and action of interferon and about its
chemical composition. His lecture gave rise to a rather lively debate among the members of the
audience. Prof. Hallauer, one of Switzerland's leading bacteriologists and virus experts, started
the discussion by asking Lindenmann: 'What kind of theoretical interpretation should we give
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to this experimental feature? and 'Do we have to question the fact that viral interference is
induced by the virus itself? Lindenmann replied that it was the virus that was at the centre of
their experimentation too, and that he believed interferon to be an intermediary product of the
virus interference reaction.' This answer did not satisfy Hallauer, who retorted that 'as this
[interferon] was utterly new and contrary to all he had read, it must be rubbish'." Hallauer's
fierce critique met the approval of most of the scientists present. They all considered viral
interference an inter-viral competition phenomenon, due to the competition between interfering
and challenging virus for a key element of the viral reproductive process, which was present in
limited amounts in the host cell. This was in general agreement with the concept of interference
as presented in the latest international viral handbook.' The idea of an autonomous viral inter-
fering factor, whether or not of viral origin, just did not seem to fit into the textbook-concept
of viral interference, and it was therefore rejected.
One of the few people who did not share the general negative verdict on Lindenmann's
paper presentation was the virologist Dr. Kradolfer from the drug company Ciba. In March
1957, Ciba observers in London had sent a promising report to Ciba's headquarters in Basel,
which associated interferon's workings in the laboratory with potential therapeutic effects in
the clinic. Upon assessment of the report Kradolfer was assigned to the job of exploring
interferon's therapeutic potential. Kradolfer's interferon project was a product of Ciba's firm
belief in their own strategical observation and screening system, which aimed to signal and
establish links between fundamental biomedical research and clinical problems as early as
possible, as a means to the end of bridging the gap between the laboratory and the clinic.'*
In a corridor chat with Lindenmann during the Swiss meeting, Kradolfer indicated that
he had been working on interferon for about three months and that he wanted to exchange
information with Lindenmann on this possible lead toward antiviral therapy. Lindenmann
expressed his willingness to do so, though he was far from impressed by Kradolfer's research
efforts. According to Lindenmann, Kradolfer could confirm the appearance of new interfering
activity by using a similar experimental system that he and Isaacs had used, but only as a trans-
ient phenomenon.' Lindenmann, in turn, suggested the possibility that the transient nature of
' J. Lindenmann und A. Isaacs. 'Versuche über Virus-Interferenz', 5r/iwW;. Z A2//1. SaA/., 20 (1957), 640-6, p.
646.
Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 28 June, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal
Archives.
' F. M. Burnet, ftincip/« o/A/iima/ Viro/ogv (New York, Academic Press, 1955)
Interview with John Beale.
Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 28 June, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal
Archives.
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the phenomenon might be due to a difference in the strain of virus, which was employed in
Kradolfer's experiment. In a letter to Isaacs, Lindenmann wrote about his contacts with the
Ciba researcher and asked him whether he was against exchanging information with
Kradolfer.' Isaacs's reply was quite explicit: 'I think it is a very bad idea to show our
manuscript to anyone in a commercial firm. I would be very much against your doing so in
future'.' On first thoughts this answer seems to reflect a general tendency amongst British
academic workers in the 1940's and 1950's to view collaborative research with an industrial
firm as an intrusion upon their scientific work. But there was more to it, as the following
excerpt from Isaacs's next letter illustrates:*
In this country we are all very sensitive about the fact that penicillin is a British discovery, but that
we have to pay royalties to American commercial firms for every gram of penicillin we use. I am not
suggesting that interferon is in the same class as penicillin but on general grounds I don't think it is
a good thing to deal with commercial firms. It is much bener that they should wait until our
information is published and then they can compete on even terms.''
The way Isaacs associated interferon with penicillin in this second response to Lindenmann not
only shows rather high hopes for interferon's possible medical applications, but also reveals a
cultural condition that was instrumental in shaping Isaacs's policy toward interferon. There was
a general feeling amongst government and academic workers in Britain that, because of an
inability to control the patents, penicillin had been given free of charge to commercial drug
houses and, in particular, American commercial firms. Even worse, royalties or licensing fees
had to be paid to American drug companies for using penicillin in British medical practice,
while Britain's dollar deficit was a constant source of political concern and irritation.'" To
Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 28 June, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal
Archives.
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 1 July, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence. Personal
Archives.
According to a 1941 article on pharmaceutical research there was a "tendency amongst academic workers to
view with apprehension whole-hearted alliance with the research of any one firm". See, J. Liebenau, The
British Success with Penicillin', S<*\ Sfurf. Sri.. 17 (1987), 69-86. p. 72.
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenman. letter dated 7 July, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal
Archives.
See, for a detailed analysis of how the story of penicillin was intertwined with great issues in post-WOII
British culture: "Pride over technological prowess, resentment over the loss of opportunity, jealousy of
American Success, The national Health Service and the emergence of the modern pharmaceutical industry":
R. Bud, 'Penicillin and the new Elizabethans', ßr. / Huf. Sri., 31 (1998), 305-33; In 1957 Britain was still
recovering from its third major payments crisis after the Second World War; see, D, Cantor, Cortisone and
the Politics of Drama. 1949-55, in J.V. Pickstone (Ed.), Afedira/ /nnova/io/u in //«»orica/
(Hampshire: Macmillan Distribution, 1992). pp. 175-6.
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avoid another penicillin-like 'patents affair', novel scientific findings were handled, at least
within Britain's national research institutes, with exceptional caution until results had been
published and patents had been filed. In particular within the field of bio-medicine, develop-
ments were closely monitored by government officials and taken up actively at the very first
sign of a potential application in practical medicine. Moreover, as an additional and legal
safeguard to secure the development of inventions resulting from public research in Britain, an
entirely new type of government agency, the National Research Development Corporation
(NRDC). had been established under the British Industries Act of 1948. The NRDC's task was
to help to obtain patents and to provide financial support for the development of inventions up
to the stage where industry was prepared to support the project completely. In facilitating the
commercial development of state-aided research, the new agency tried to meet everyone's
wishes to make better use of patenting in the medical field."
Almost simultaneously with interferon's public appearance in Switzerland, Isaacs's
laboratory was visited by a group of senior officers from the Medical Research Council
(MRC), who were on their yearly inspection visit to the NIMR.'~ On these occasions
researchers were expected to give information about the current state of research affairs."
Isaacs had prepared a demonstration of interferon's effects to convince the official visitors that
he and Lindenmann had recently discovered a biological substance with distinctive antiviral
properties. Several experimental set-ups were on display to show that interferon preparations
had an inhibitory effect on a number of viruses both I'/I v/'/ro and in vivo. While showing the
MRC officers around, Isaacs enthusiastically speculated about the possibility that this
interferon might offer a potential new approach to the medical treatment of virus infections.'"'
Most likely, Isaacs's speculation about interferon's clinical potential was more than a
mere expression of his professional interest as a medical doctor in practical problem-solving.
He must have been aware of the fact that within the MRC there was a tendency to favor
research projects with practical medical promise, even though MRC's official policies were
' ' D. Wilson, /Vnici7/in in P<rip«-riir (London: Faber&Faber, 1976), p.245; and L. G. Matthews, //«/orv o/
P/iarmacv in BnVuin (London: E.& S. Livingstone. 1962), pp. 330-3.
'* The publicly funded Medical Research Council played and still plays an important role in supporting and
undertaking biomedical and clinical research in Britain. The NIMR was set up as the MRC's central institute
for medical research in 1914. In 1960 up to twenty percent of its research funds were allocated to finance the
NIMR and the rest to finance research projects throughout the country. See. for the role of the MRC in
shaping a national system of Medical research in Britain: J. Austoker and L. Bryder (eds.)
/Vrspec/i'vM on f/i<? Ro/<? o/f/if MRC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Interview with John Porterfield.
'* Interview with Derek Burke.
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directed more to basic than applied research." It seems that the Secretary of the MRC, Sir
Harold Himsworth, as a former practicing clinician, emphasized the need to link basic research
to clinical problems. The penicillin story was Himsworth's favorite case to convince his staff of
the necessity to be on alert for claims linking fundamental research with practical medicine."
The subsequent news of Ciba's interest in interferon as a lead towards antiviral therapy
undoubtedly must have strengthened Isaacs's feeling that, however premature, he was justified
in making the claim to the MRC that interferon could have therapeutic potential. In one of his
letters to Lindenmann Isaacs emphasized the fact that the MRC had been very impressed with
the demonstration." Thus, while keeping the Swiss drugmaker at a distance, Isaacs actively
tried to draw the MRC into the interferon project. Obviously Isaacs was concerned to
safeguard British interests and at the same time win wider interest in and public support for
further research on interferon.
In the meantime Lindenmann was defending his scientific existence. From the first
moment he resumed work at the '/fyg/erce /nsh'/Mf' his boss, Mooser began behaving in a
peculiar way. On the one hand, Mooser emphasized the fact that he did not think much of
Lindenmann's efforts to continue research on interferon by saddling him with so much other
work that Lindenmann had to conduct his interferon research in the evening. Furthermore, he
told Lindenmann right away that if he intended to use large numbers of laboratory eggs on a
regular basis he had to pay the expenses out of his own pocket." On the other hand, Mooser
repeatedly entered the laboratory and asked Lindenmann to give yet another detailed account
of his interferon experiments with Isaacs at the NIMR. The fact that Lindenmann had difficulty
in repeating the interferon experiments he had worked on in London only complicated matters.
The situation took a turn for the worse after the reprints of the f roce«/irt£.s o/ //ie
/toya/ Sociefy papers arrived. Mooser immediately sent for Lindenmann and asked him why he
was not quoted in either of the two publications. Mooser had taken great offence as he firmly
believed that the idea of an interference inducing factor had originated from his experiments
with Lindenmann in 1955. He indicated that he deserved at least as much credit for his
pioneering laboratory work as Lindenmann himself. In a way, he even believed he was a co-
discoverer of this 'interferon', and despite Lindenmann's efforts to provide evidence to the con-
L Bryder, 'Public Health Research and the MRC. in J. Austoker and L. Bryder (eds.) //«forica/ /Vrspecft'v»
on rfie Ro/e o/f/i* MRC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 81.
C. C. Booth. 'Clinical Research', in J. Austoker and L. Bryder (eds.) tfis/orica/ fVrjprrft'v« on f/ie Ro/r o /
f/ie MRC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 234-9.
Alick Isaacs to Jean Undenman, letter dated 26 June, 1957. Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal
Archives.
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Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 28 June 1957, Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal Ar-
chives; and interview with Jean Lindenmann.
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trary. Mooser persisted in this belief. Eventually the situation became unbearable and
Lindenmann had to leave his position at the '//ygiene /HSMM/' and accept a job as a
microbiologist at the Federal Health Department in Berne."
3.1.1 The anti-viral penicillin
While Lindenmann was fighting a losing battle to keep his university position, most of Isaacs's
time was consumed by running the World Influenza Centre.-" Nevertheless, with Andrewes's
support and with both Burke and a technician at his side, Isaacs managed both to keep
research on interferon going and to involve himself in operations to raise the factual status of
interferon in- and outside the walls of the NIMR. He organized an Institute colloquium on
interferon, was responsible for submitting another two articles dealing with studies on
interferon, and he also sent out reprints of interferon publications to all influential virologists
he could think of."' Furthermore Isaacs prepared a short paper on the discovery of the
substance 'interferon' for the Af/fC <4wiwa/ /teport, in agreement with the demonstration for
MRC officers.
In this report attention was primarily focused on interferon's effects against viruses
both in the test-tube and the rabbit model. Furthermore, interferon's workings in the laboratory
were associated with potential therapeutic effects in the clinic: interferon was presented as a
possible new approach to the problem of finding suitable remedies against virus diseases. It
was emphasized that hitherto all chemotherapeutic substances which had been found to inhibit
virus growth had been toxic to the host, thus implying that this new biological substance,
interferon, might offer a non-toxic alternative. In the test-tube, at least, it had been shown to
be innocuous."
In 1964 Lindenmann would return to the University of Zurich as an associate professor at the Institute for
medical Microbiology. By then he had already left the field of interferon research. See, Jean Lindenmann to
Alick Isaacs, letter dated 19 May 1964. Lindenmann Correspondence. Personal Archives; and interview with
Jean Lindenmann.
Together with other WHO centres Isaacs's laboratory was tied up with characterizing an apparently new
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Archives; and Alfred Grafe. <4 Wufory o/ Ev/vrimf/ito/ Wro/ogv (Berlin, Springer-Verlag. 1991), p. 252.
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letters dated 17 October and 9 December 1957, Lindenmann Correspon-
dence, Personal Archives; J. Lindenmann. D.C. Burke and A. Isaacs. 'Studies on the Production, Mode of
Action and Properties of Interferon', ßri/. / e.t/>. /Wi., 38 (1957), 551-62; and, D.C. Burke and A. Isaacs,
•Further Studies on Interferon'. ßri7. 7. «p . Par/i., 39 (1958), 78-84.
See the annual report from the Bacteriology and Virus Research Group of the NIMR. 10, 1956/57, held at the
NIMR Library Archives.
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The M/?CMnm/a/ /te/w/t, together with the series of two articles in the Proc?«/m#.s 0/
f/i? /Jova/ Soc/>rv and further annotations in the Lance/ and Brir/jA Af«/i'c«/ 7o///7iö/, drew the
attention of the science correspondent of the Da/'/v Express."' The latter immediately phoned
Isaacs with a request for additional information. Despite Isaacs's refusal to provide the extra
information an article was published at the end of October 1957 in the Da/7y £xpr«j on the
isolation of an antiviral substance, named 'interferon'.-'' Following this newspaper article, the
pharmaceutical companies Glaxo and Benger Laboratories wrote to the MRC, urging for a
change of name of Isaacs's substance. Since both had got Registered Trade Marks for products
with names similar to interferon, they anticipated difficulties if it was to be developed as a drug
in the future.-' However, far from leading to a change of name, these minor events led the
MRC, which had been impressed by Isaacs's private demonstration and were closely following
the latest developments on interferon, to consider more urgently the patentability of Isaacs's
discovery in order to protect the Council's interests."' As I argued before, the MRC was on the
alert to actively take up research projects with potential links to practical medicine in order to
prevent missing out on a penicillin-like medical breakthrough. Furthermore, the MRC wanted
to keep up a high profile toward the Treasury, and as a means to this end the MRC was always
looking for promising research results produced by one of its research units which would make
for a big story."'
The MRC consulted their patent adviser at the NRDC to see whether or not the
subject-matter was patentable, with the result that in May 1958, applications were made for
patents in the United States, Canada and Germany. However, they were told by the NRDC
that it was impossible to obtain a British patent because more than six months had elapsed
since the first public report on interferon had been published. Obviously the MRC had little
experience in patent matters."*
" See, Editorials, 'A lead towards virus chemotherapy?, Z^nm, i (1957), 931-2; and 'Interferon', ßr. Wed. 7., i
(1957), 1102.
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 23 October 1957, Lindenmann Correspondence, Personal
Archives.
" Glaxo to MRC. letter dated 1 November, 1957, MRC Archives, File No. A814/17; and Benger Laboratories
to MRC. letter dated 28 November, 1957, MRC Archives, File No. A814/17.
** MRC to Sir Charles Harrington, letters dated 6, 29 November. 5 December, 1957, MRC Archives, File No.
A814/17; and Sir Charles Harrington to MRC. letters dated 13 November. 7, 10 December, 1957, MRC
Archives, File No. A814/17.
Statement of a senior MRC-official during the discussion following the presentation of a preliminary version
of this chapterto the Twentieth Medical History Group of the Wellcome Trust, held at the Royal College of
Physicians. 11 February. 1992.
NRDC to MRC. letter dated June 24, 1958: " ...applications covering the inlerferon invention have been filed
in Germany under under NO.J14535 on March 11, 1958, in Canada under No.750330 on April 28, 1958 and
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At about the same time that the MRC and NRDC began to regard interferon as a
patentable commodity and started to file patent applications, Isaacs and Burke gave a public
demonstration of interferon's workings at the Annual Conversazione of the Royal Society.
Probably a similar kind of experimental set-up to the one shown earlier to MRC officers was
on display at the Royal Society in London on 15 May 1958 - thereby extending Isaacs's labora-
tory space beyond the doors of the NIMR. The catalogue of the exhibits to be seen at the
Royal Society contained the following description:
INTERFERON: AN INHIBITOR OF VIRUS GROWTH
It has been known for many years that one virus may interfere with the growth of a second. Recently
it was found that this interference is mediated through a substance which has been named
'interferon'. Active preparations of interferon can be easily produced by the liter without special
equipment, and the activity can be readily concentrated. Such preparations are potent inhibitors of
the growth of influenza and related viruses m vi'rro, and preparations which have been concentrated
10-fold inhibit the growth of vaccinia virus on the chick chorioallantoic membrane or in the rabbit
skin.»
According to a correspondent of the Da/fy 7Wegrap/i, a Fellow of the Royal Society had said
at a press preview: 'I find enormous excitement in the promise of interferon'.'" The next day,
the Da/7y 7Wegra/?/i, among other newspapers, reported the discovery of a substance named
interferon which might one day play an important part in the fight against viruses. In a
comment on the exhibits at the Royal Society by the ßr/f/s/t A/erf/ca/ yoMrrca/ 'interferon' was
said to break new grounds in medicine as a revolutionary therapeutic tool against viral disease
appropriate to the satellite age, 'while the latest and largest sputnik made its first orbit over
Great Britain'." Isaacs was even asked to repeat the demonstration on television, in the pro-
gram 'Eye on Research'.'"
The sudden national press coverage of interferon as a kind of new 'antiviral penicillin' in
newspapers, magazines, in the scientific press, and on British television had an impact (see Fig
26.). Translating interferon's viral inhibitory effect at the laboratory bench into therapeutic
in the U.S.A. under No.734106 on May 9, 1958.", MRC Archives. File No. A8I3/1O4; Elkington and Fife,
consulting chemists and chartered patent agents, to the MRC. letter dated 20 December, 1957, MRC
Archives, File No. A813/104.
See the invitation to the Annual Conversazione of the Royal Society on 15 May 1958, 77K /tnna/j o//he
flora/ Sorierv,1 (1958), p. 10.
'" See newspaper article, "Interferon' May Aid Fight Against Flu', 77i* Dai/v 7>/egrapA, 16 May 1958.
" Anonymous, 'Royal Society Conversazione', ßr. Afetf. 7., i (1958), 1229.
•* Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 5 June 1958, lindenman Correspondence, Personal Archives.
96
Fig. 26. The first human trial of Interferon was 'performed' in this
Flash Gordon strip (dated early I960).
terms brought interferon to the public stage. Penicillin served as a powerful cultural symbol for
interferon's legitimacy as a promising lead toward antiviral therapy. The introduction of 'mira-
cle-drugs' like penicillin and cortisone in the 1940's had provided physicians with a curing
power never seen before. Their spectacular clinical potential of specific and truly curative
drugs, so-called 'magic bullets', and the often dramatic portrayals of beneficial effects in the
clinic, had raised hopes regarding scientific medicine's ability to come up with yet another
'wonder' for the doctor's bag." It effected a firm belief among doctors, administrators and the
public in therapeutic breakthroughs as a dominant feature of a laboratory-supported scientific
medicine.^ Together with the British 'penicillin trauma', or what was generally referred to as
'the American penicillin syndrome', this set the stage for interferon's dramatic reception in
Britain and the subsequent efforts to develop interferon as a drug."
34
D. Cantor, 'Cortisone and the Politics of Drama, 1949-55', in J. V. Pickstone (ed.) Af«/i'ca/ /nsiovaft'oru m
Wis/orica/ Peripecrive (Hampshire: Macmillan Distribution, 1992), p. 173.
H. M. Marks, 'Cortisone, 1949: A Year in the Political Life of a Drug, fiu«. HIM. Wei, 66 (1992), 419-439.
The same 'penicillin syndrome' played a most vital pan in the concurrent British efforts to develop
cephalosporin C as a drug; see, D. Wilson, />eniri7/i/i (London, Faber&Faber, 1976), pp. 252-253.
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3.1.2 Misinterpreton " •.----
Interferon mattered in a rather different way to the international audience of animal virologists,
thereby yielding a different set of expectations. Instead of immediately assessing interferon's
potential benefits to practical medicine, virus researchers judged Isaacs's and Lindenmann's
knowledge claims in a different light: firstly, the association of those claims with the
predominant theoretical framework concerning viral interference; secondly, the expected
relevance for research programs that figured high on national research agendas; thirdly, the
practicality of integrating Isaacs's and Lindenmann's experimental features in existing
experimental systems in other laboratories; and fourthly, the success or failure of replicating
these experimental features.
The international virology community was far less receptive than Isaacs had hoped.
Despite a series of articles in highly prestigious British journals and the established reputation
of both Isaacs and the NIMR, Isaacs nevertheless had to engage in a quest for scientific
interest and credibility regarding interferon. In particular, the cool reception within the
powerful community of animal virologists in America concerned Isaacs. Although claiming the
existence of a factor associated with viral interference, supposedly of viral origin, did no harm
to the basic premise that interference was mediated by a virus, some researchers argued that it
*//</ infringe upon the consensus of viral interference as an interviral competition phenomenon.
For others, the mere association with a laboratory phenomenon that had been relegated to the
shadows of phenomena with relatively little research priority prevented them from becoming
interested: viral interference was just not 'sexy' enough to capture their 'imagination'.'* In
addition, Isaacs's and Lindenmann's publications were criticized for their vagueness as to the
nature and mode of production of the novel factor. Moreover, those who tried to implement
Isaacs's and Lindenmann's experimental features in their own experimental systems, found it
extremely difficult to reproduce even part of the material results reported in Isaacs's and
Lindenmann's publications. Whatever viral inhibitory activity was present in their experimental
systems, it could not be linked with the experimental features claimed to be specific to
interferon. A growing number of animal virologists in America began to question the validity
of Isaacs's and Lindenmann's interferon claims, and a rumor spread that interferon was most
likely a noise due to small amounts of inactivated virus coming through during the experiment.
For this reason, influential American virus researchers like Harry Rubin and Howard Temin
'** Mure rewarding and fashionable research topics for animal virologists in America in the late 1950's were the
study of the biochemistry and genetics of animal viruses, quantitative tissue-culture studies and the characte-
rization of new viruses, and the study of animal tumor viruses in conjunction with the possible virus etiology
of human cancer; A. Grafe. <4 Huron- o/£<r/>rrimfn/<i/ Viro/o&v (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991). pp. 164-97;
M. Pollard (ed.) Pmpwfiv« in Wro/o&v: /I Syni/xwium, (Texas: The University of Texas Medical Branch,
1958).
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started nicknaming interferon 'misinterpreton'. •"
With the great expectations building up over interferon in Britain and at the same time
the 'misinterpreton' rumours coming in from the USA, Burke witnessed how during the
summer of 1958 Isaacs began to appear increasingly stressed. Gradually Isaacs fell victim to
doubts about the validity of the interferon findings himself. Part of the assumptions and
practices that had been buried in the process of publishing the claims were opened to criticism
in the open again. This continued to the point that the claims about interferon as a product and
mediator of viral interference were threatened with complete dissolution.
More and more frequently, Isaacs would come into his laboratory in a depressive mood
and do nothing but talk with Burke about the possibility that the observed antiviral effects of
interferon might after all be due to the presence of traces of inactivated virus or to the absence
of one or the other nutrient that prevented the virus from multiplying. Would they not be better
off by adding interferon to the list of noteworthy laboratory artifacts? The situation had a
paralysing influence on interferon research and a damaging effect on Isaacs's mental health. In
the fall of 1958 Isaacs had a nervous breakdown and went on sick leave, suffering from a
severe bout of depression which lasted several months. Thus Burke was left in the laboratory
on his own."
With technical advice from a protein chemist in the Biochemistry Division on the third
floor of the NIMR, Burke had been working for more than half a year on the purification of
interferon preparations with the aim to isolate interferon, which he and Isaacs believed to be
protein in nature. Just about the time of Isaacs's mental breakdown Burke had the feeling that
he was on the verge of a major breakthrough in his purification studies. However, confronted
with the 'credibility crisis' - the factual status of interferon being seriously called into question -
Burke decided to put his purification studies on the backburner and instead concentrate on the
'misinterpreton' issue.
Eventually Burke thought it necessary to invest his resources in the activity of replica-
ting a great deal of the experimental results as obtained by Isaacs and Lindenmann during their
original series of interferon experiments. It was not a matter of exactly reproducing the original
experiments, as Burke performed a principally different set of experiments. In order to check
The researchers Temin and Rubin were closely associated with one of the protagonists of American animal
virology. Renato Dulbecco. See, Grafe. /I His/ory o/£rpfrim?n/a/ ViVo/ogy (Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 1991).
pp. 164-197; M. Pollard (ed.) Perqwcfiv« in Viro/ogy: J4 Symposium. (Texas, The University of Texas
Medical Branch, 1958); Interviews with Sam Baron, Robert Wagner, Norman Rnter, David Tyrrell, Derek
Burke.
I agree with Stephen hall that it is impossible to reconstruct the story of interferon without taking into account
Isaacs' manic-depressive disorder that manifested itself for the first time in the fall of 1958; S. S. Hall, A
Com/no/ion in f/w ß/ood: Li/«?. Dear/i and r/i€ tamimf Syi/em (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1997).
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for the presence of virus and to prevent virus from coming through and 'contaminating' the
interferon preparations, he built in all kinds of additional procedures. What he basically did was
to try to replicate a particular number of material results which were claimed to be characte-
ristic for the presence of interferon under experimental conditions that were thought to exclude
specific sources of artifacts." It was principally a matter of producing a new series of experi-
mental events in order to check for the reproducibility of an 'old' set of experimental results
and, as such, of linking the past to the future.'"'
The crisis of faith in interferon in Isaacs's 'interferon kitchen' and the American 'misin-
terpreton' rumors do not seem to have affected the high expectations in Britain with regard to
interferon as a possible new 'antiviral penicillin'. At about the same time the MRC decided to
start efforts to develop interferon as a drug and seek collaboration with British drug
companies. In addition, drug companies had begun to approach the MRC about interferon.'"
These circumstances which involved the high hopes regarding interferon as a potential
therapeutic breakthrough widely shared in British society, made MRC's development plans
relatively immune to both the late developments in Isaacs's laboratory and the misinterpreton
rumours. They were instrumental in creating a niche, in other words a relatively stable and safe
environment, for subsequent efforts to develop interferon as an antiviral drug in Britain/"
The notion of 'material realization' of an experiment was borrowed from Hans Radder. See, H. Radder,
'Experimental Reproducibility and the Experimenter's Regress', in D. Hull, M. Forbes and K. Okruklik (eds.)
/•SA, Vo/ume / (East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, 1992), 63-73, p. 64.
D. Burke. Laboratory Notebooks, S.O. Book 321. Code 28-321, 'Interferon Book III'. March/Sept 1958 and
'Interferon Book IV, Sept 1958/March 1959, Personal Archives.
Christopher Andrewes to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 10 November. 1958. Jean Lindenmann Correspon-
dence, Personal Archives: interviews with Susanna Isaacs-Elmhirst. Derick Burke, and David Tyrrell.
See, for an in-depth analysis of the role of expectations and niches in technological developments H. van
Lente. Promising 7W-nno/o&v: 77i? Dynamics o/ £jrpec/afton.r in 7>cAno/ogica/ DevWopmenW (Delft, Ph.D.
diss.. Eburon. 1993).
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3.2 From the Brink to Revival: Meeting The Others u
The second part of this chapter chronicles a gradual reversal of the balance of forces in Isaacs's
quest for scientific credibility and interest regarding interferon. The events in John Enders's
laboratory at American's East-coast were key to this reversal and the subsequent formation of
an international body of laboratory practices with shared commitments in the pursuit of a
common set of research problems and objects. As it was exemplary for the changing relation
between interferon and 'room 215', the growing interference between Isaacs's 'interferon
kitchen'and Enders's laboratory deserves further attention. ... », . , , . -
3.2.1 Viral Inhibitory Factor (VIF) vis-ä-vis Interferon
By the time Isaacs returned to work in the course of January 1959. Burke had finished his
series of 'virus trials'. The data in Burke's laboratory notebook convinced Isaacs that despite
extensive testing, his collaborator had not been able to find any indications for the alleged
presence of virus particles in their interferon preparation. At least within the confines of Isaa-
cs's laboratory the factual status of interferon was no longer up for discussion and, Isaacs
concluded, the interferon studies were to be pursued with renewed effort. The very procedure
of replicating the original set of experimental results by means of a different set of experiments
not only was instrumental in regaining control and restoring belief in the validity of the original
experimental results but also added to the robustness of interferon as a new biological entity
and promising object for research.
Burke recalled the day that Isaacs received a letter from the American virologist John
Enders, sometime around June 1957, as one of euphoria. Isaacs immediately showed the letter
to Burke. Apart from requesting a sample of interferon. Enders informed Isaacs of the fact that
together with one of his postdocs, Monto Ho, they had been working for some time now on a
so-called 'viral inhibitory factor (VIF)' which seemed to have properties similar to interferon.
Here, finally, were American researchers who had found what seemed to be interferon.'" We
shall now leave Isaacs's laboratory and the substance interferon, and instead zoom in on John
Enders and his postdoctoral fellow, Monto Ho, and closely follow how they found their way to
their so-called 'viral inhibitory factor'.
One day, early in 1957 in Boston's Chinatown, Monto Ho was having dinner with his friend
Bob Chang, who worked as a microbiologist at the Harvard School of Public Health. As usual
they informed each other of the ongoing research activities over dinner. Ho might have told
Interview with Derek Burke.
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him his latest experimental findings with regard to the observed protective effect of some
components of rat blood against the lethal action of bacterial endotoxins, i.e. toxins retained
within certain bacteria. According to Ho, the conversation turned to future plans for research.
Ho was about to finish a fellowship year as a researcher in the Bacteriology Division of the
Thorndike Memorial Laboratory in Boston. He told his friend that he was not sure yet what to
do next, but that he would like to pursue his endotoxin research. Chang argued that further
endotoxin research did not seem to pay off much and suggested another more promising
option. It might be worthwhile, he suggested, to consider the possibility of entering the
relatively new and promising field of animal virology - the study of viruses that prey on animals
and human beings. After all, one of the most prominent animal virologists and recent Noble
Prize winner, John Enders, was working almost next-door as the head of a small research
group at Boston Children's Hospital.
At first Ho was surprised at this proposal. The thought had never entered my mind, as
the study of virology was thought to be a quixotic pursuit of a few pediatricians and I was
trained in adult medicine'."" According to Ho it must have been the attraction of the unknown
and the close vicinity of a rather famous virologist like Enders that made him decide to set up
an appointment with the latter. The subsequent interview made such an impact on Ho that
almost immediately afterwards he applied for a job as a research fellow with Enders's research
group/' Ho got the job and by the end of September 1957 he started work in Enders's
department. As a novice to the field of animal virology, he first had to acquire basic skill in
working with viruses. While being shown around by one of Enders's assistants he learned that
tissue cultures, particularly so-called 'monolayer cultures', represented the favorite system for
growing and studying viruses in Enders's laboratory. As the name implies, these monolayer
cultures consisted of a single layer of cells growing on the glass surface of closed containers,
such as test tubes with screw top, or flatsided flasks or bottles (see Fig. 27 a, b, c)/* It
appeared to be work on the multiplication of poliomyelitis virus in v/7ro in this type of tissue
culture, which had proven crucial for the development of a polio-vaccine, that had earned
Monto Ho. 'An Early Interferon: "Viral Inhibitory Factor"'. 7. /ntfrfrron Ä«., 7 (1987), 455-7, p. 455; Up to
the 1950's American medical training programs did not seem to pay much attention to virology. Of course
polio was a big issue but in general virus diseases hardly featured at all in medical school; Monto Ho,
interview; Sam Baron, interview; and Ion Gresser. interview.
Monto Ho, interview.
See, for the method for preparing monolayer culture as it was basically practiced in Enders's laboratory; R. C.
Parker. Mrt/iwfr <>/77.v.ra<> CU//M/V (New York: Hoeber Medical Division. Harper & Row. Publishers. 1950);
T. M. Bell. /4n /nfrmfarrion '<> Gemra/ Viro/ogv (London: William Heinemann Medical Books. 1965) pp.
26-36; J. M. Hoskins, VWogic-a/ Prorfrfur« (London: Butterworths, 1967) pp. 3-73, 120-31; D. Balducci
and G. Penso. Tisjue Cu/mr« in Bio/ogira/ R«earc/i (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1963) pp.
29-138.
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Enders the Nobel Prize in 1954/"
The enormous effort put in the meticulous cleaning and sterilizing of the glasswork and
other laboratory tools in the glassware section, which was referred to as the 'kitchen', almost
immediately struck Ho. He was told that after basic design the kitchen was next in order of
importance for the operation of the virus laboratory. The thorough cleaning and sterilizing pro-
cess in the kitchen, which employed four workers, was considered the key to successful work
on viruses in tissue or cell culture. Since cultures of cells had been found to be extremely
vulnerable to contaminants, everything possible was done to prevent contamination with any
other particle or agent. Enders insisted on the working rule that all glasswork and other tools
be regarded as chemically and biologically dirty unless known to be otherwise. Ho was told
that a laboratory worker who was prepared to take a chance in this respect was a hazard to
himself and even more so to his associates. Providing he followed the established procedures,
he was told, the preparation of tissue cultures was rather straight forward. Soon Ho would find
out that the term 'straight forward' was rather inappropriate to denote the esoteric craft of
preparing tissue cultures and studying viruses in these cultures. According to Ho, the gist of it
was learning this craft through hands-on apprenticeship. Actual practice in Enders's laboratory
turned out to be a mixture of instructions in a methodology book on tissue cultures, and local
idiosyncrasies. For example, it was standard practice in Enders's laboratory to use double
distilled water when culturing cells, instead of 'normal' distilled water.** As part of this training
on the job Ho learned to cope with the frequent 'whims' of tissue cultures leading to difficulties
in interpretation of the experimental data. Most common was a spontaneous degeneration of
the cells, which occurred for reasons which were not always apparent: it might be due to a
poor viability of the cells, a lack of essential nutrients from the medium, or the introduction of
toxic agents. Furthermore there was always the danger of artifacts resulting from bacterial and
fungal contamination or from the presence of unknown viruses so-called 'wild viruses' in the
original tissue material.
During Ho's introductory period Enders came forward with a suggestion for research
which would offer Ho ample opportunity to learn the ins and outs of virus work. Quite
recently Enders had become interested in the exceptional behavior of a particular strain of
poliovirus, named 'RMC vims'. Unlike all other strains of poliovirus it had almost no cell-
damaging effects when added to a culture of human kidney cells. However, when introduced in
a culture of human amnion cells, RMC virus proved to be highly cytopathogenic.
•" Monto Ho, 'An Early Interferon: "Viral Inhibitory Factor"'. 7. //Hfr/iron /?«., 7 (1987), 455-7, p. 455.
48
Interview with Monto Ho.
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Fig 27a. Diagram form of preparation of tissue culture (1950's):
(1) fragmentation of tissue;
(2) trypsinization of the fragments;
(3) Sedimentation of the cells;
(4) Copunling of the viable cells;
(5) Distribution of cells suspended in growth medium.
Courtesy of MRC
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Fig. 27b. c. Large surfaces of cells are produced in rubber stoppered pyrex
lass 'Roux' flasks which are stored in an incubator.
Courtesy of J. Veraeeg.
Moreover, this strain of poliovirus had the rather unusual ability to multiply in chick embryos.'"
Ho received a stock of RMC virus, which had been grown in embryonated eggs, and
was asked to see whether he could find out more about the deviant behavior of this biological
agent. This provided the impetus for Ho to build and manipulate his own experimental system.
While doing so he ran into resistances: the observed viral effects were, and even more impor-
Monto Ho, interview; and J. Enders. 'A Consideration of the Mechanisms of Resistance to Viral Infection
Based on Recent Studies of the Agents of Measles and Poliomyelitis', 7>a/i$. Co//. P/iyscnj. P/ii/a</., 28
(1960), 68-79. pp. 75-6.
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tantly, remained inconsistent with the expected effects. He indeed managed to observe that,
when added to his test-tubes with human cell cultures, RMC virus had a highly pathogenic
effect on amnion cells and almost no effect on kidney cells, although evidence of virus multi-
plication could be obtained in both cases. However, Ho was surprised to find that when he
collected fluids from tubes containing either RMV virus infected human kidney or amnion cell
cultures, and subsequently used these fluids to infect a fresh series of test-tubes with human
amnion cell cultures, the pathogenic effect did not occur at all. If, instead, he first diluted these
fluids and then added them to fresh amnion cell cultures, he could observe the usual de-
structive effect on these embryonic cells. It was a perplexing situation.
Eventually Ho suggested the possibility that the anomalous effect might be due to one
or the other factor present in the medium. Of course, Ho was aware of the likelihood that
some artifact was involved, but the effect could also be due to an as yet unknown biological
factor. The novel factor might be responsible for inhibiting the pathogenic effect of the virus, a
factor analogous with the inhibiting components in rat serum which Ho had studied during his
fellowship year at Thorndike Memorial Laboratory. When Enders heard of his postdoc's latest
findings, he seemed to have favored an alternative explanation.
In Enders's view what had happened in Ho's experimental system was very similar to a
phenomenon that had been described extensively in the literature, the auto-interference
phenomenon. It basically amounted to the claim that the infectivity and pathogenicity of
concentrated virus preparations tended to be lower than that of diluted preparations. This
paradoxical phenomenon was thought to be due to the high content of non-infective virus
particles in undiluted fluids, which interfered with the multiplication of infective virus particles.
Upon discussing the experimental events over and over again, the two researchers agreed that
further experiments were required.'"
Thus, both Ho and Enders were building their explanations upon perceived similarities
between the actual, unknown experimental events and known phenomena, which had either
been described in the literature or experienced in another unrelated research project. It was a
similar kind of analogical reasoning—utilizing the knowledge one has of a familiar case to a
new, unclear and problematic situation—as Isaacs and Lindenmann practiced once and again in
shaping the interferon factor in room 215 of the NIMR."
One of the experiments Ho did next was to see whether there would be a difference in
effect if 'normal' RMC virus from the chicken-grown stock was added to fresh amnion cell
J. Enders, 'A Consideration of the Mechanisms of Resistance to Viral Infection Based on Recent Studies of
the Agents of Measles and Poliomyelitis'. 7"ranrac//ons <S 5/urfiVi o/fAe Co//f£f o/PAvj/cianj 0/ Pni7<u/e/p-
ni'u, 28 (1960). 68-79. pp. 75-6; E. Lennette. 'Interference Between Animal Viruses'. Ann. /tev. Aficroi., 5
(1951). 277-94. pp. 284-85; and interview with Monto Ho.
See, for an analysis of the scientist as an analogical reasoner; K. Knorr. 77ie Afanu/ac/ure 0/ Know/erf^e; An
£.vsrtv on //if GvurfriMV/v«/ and Conre.vrua/ JVafure 0/Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 49-66.
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cultures, or to amnion cell cultures which had been pretreated with medium collected from
RMC virus infected human kidney cell cultures. Like before, the chick-grown RMC virus had
clearly visible pathogenic effects on fresh amnion cell cultures.
However, far more interesting to Ho was the observation that it hardly had any effect
on the pretreated amnion cell cultures. Ho immediately informed Enders of his latest finding,
which he believed to point in favor of the idea that the undiluted infected fluids contained a
factor capable of inhibiting the pathogenic effect of RMC virus on embryonic cells. In addition,
he asked Enders what he thought about calling his as yet hypothetical factor 'viral inhibitory
factor' or simply 'VIF. Enders cautioned him by saying that 'viral inhibitory fluid' would be a
more appropriate terminology. It was more appropriate because it would be impossible for
them to determine whether they were dealing with a biological factor related to the virus, a
non-viral factor or with a tissue culture artifact due to a deficiency of some nutrient from the
medium that was essential in supporting cell and viral growth.
Somewhat reluctantly Ho then admitted that he was proceeding too fast with his
inferences, although he thought that Enders was a bit overcautious in using the term fluid
instead of factor. Ho agreed with Enders that further experiments were required to determine
whether the observed inhibitory effect of VIF was related to the presence of virus in the
medium or to some other factor, and to see whether or not Ho's VIF inhibited the pathogenic
effect of other viral agents than RMC virus." First, however. Ho had to scale up the
production of VIF, as such experiments would require relatively large quantities of VIF.
Instead of the original test-tubes, Enders told him to use the bigger chemically neutral Pyrex-
type flatsided 'Roux' bottles, which were routinely used in his laboratory to grow larger
quantities of virus, which he did. The change from tube to bottle monolayer cultures of human
kidney cells required some time. Ho had to figure out the optimum conditions for the prepara-
tion of VIF in Roux bottles as he had previously when using the smaller tubes."
The exact sequence of events can no longer be traced, but it is most likely that
sometime during the spring of 1958, Ho and Enders must have become aware of Isaacs's and
Lindenmann's articles on interferon. Presumably it was Enders who found out first about
interferon during one of his informal meetings with the animal virologist Werner Henle.
According to Ho, one morning Enders popped into the laboratory and told him that he had
discussed their 'VIF experiments with Henle. Apparently, Henle seemed to have been quite
M. Ho, 'An Early Interferon: "Viral Inhibitory Factor"', J. /n/er/lfron Ä«., 7 (1987), 455-7; and interview
with Monto Ho.
M. Ho and J. Enders, 'An Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures', fror. A/. A 5.. 45
(1959), 385-9. p.385; M. Ho, 'An Early Interferon: "Viral Inhibitory Factor"'. / /nffr/fron /to., 7 (1987),
455-7. p.456; J. Enders, "A Consideration of the Mechanisms of Resistance to Viral Infection Based on
Recent Studies of the Agents of Measles and Poliomyelitis". 7ra/uarfi°0n£ <4 5/w/i>5 o/ //i* Co/fcg* o/
o//%!7<ufe(pAia, 28 (1960), 68-79, pp. 76: and interview with Monto Ho..
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skeptical of Enders's report on VIF, which the former to some extent believed to be similar to
recent work published by the British animal virologist, Alick Isaacs. The latter claimed to have
found a factor called 'interferon', presumably a small viral component which escaped detection
by conventional virological techniques and interfered with the growth of viruses in their
host/virus system. Upon reading the interferon articles, Henle and his associates had almost
immediately started efforts to see whether a similar inhibitory factor might be responsible for
the observed resistance of chronically virus infected tissue cultures against unrelated viruses.'''
However, despite extensive testing, they had not been able to demonstrate the presence of an
interferon-like factor in their experimental system. Henle had concluded that it was most likely
that the observed virus resistance, which was said to fulfil the criteria for viral interference, had
nothing to do with interferon and he even doubted the validity of Isaacs's experimental claims.
These claims did not correspond with Henle's concept of viral interference as an inter-viral
competition phenomenon that was not considered to be transmissible. As Enders's report on
'VIF sounded similar to what Henle had read about interferon, Henle did not think much of it
either. Far from discouraging Enders and Ho, the meeting with Henle was an incentive to carry
on and to get hold of the English interferon articles."
What were for Henle experimental findings that resisted replication and violated the
basic criteria for viral interference, were for Enders results that not only sounded interestingly
familiar but might also be instrumental in furthering work on VIF. It is highly questionable that
Enders considered the subsequent situation in these terms, but retrospectively it looks like the
transfer of knowledge regarding interferon changed the order of events in Enders's laboratory,
rendering the situation different for work on VIF. The fact is that the subsequent series of
experiments that were performed to forge a primary profile of VIF bore a close resemblance to
trials Isaacs and Lindenmann had run in the case of interferon, a year earlier.
Ho and Enders realized that they should be careful to rule out the possibility that the
observed virus inhibitory effects in their experimental system might after all be due to the direct
effect of interfering virus particles. Since interference by virus particles had already been
known for years, the presence of virus particles in their VIF preparations would relegate their
phenomenon to the limbo of ordinary laboratory events. Hence, all available techniques and
procedures that were known to exclude the presence of virus were applied to see whether or
Henle et al were already in the process of studying host cell-virus interactions in continuous lines of human
cells, of malignant origin (e.g. human bone marrow cells derived from bone marrow of a leukemic patient, so-
called 'MCN cells'), which were chronically infected with virus (e.g. an avian virus that went by the name
New Castle disease virus): G. Henle. F. Deinhardt. V. Bergs and W. Henle, 'Studies on Persistent Infections
of Tissue Cultures: 1. General Aspects of the System'. 7. £tpr/. Werf., 108 (1958), 537-60.
F. Deinhardt. V. Berghs. G. Henle and W. Henle. 'Studies on Persistent Infections of Tissue Cultures: III.
Some Quantitative Aspects of Host Cell-Virus Interactions'. 7. £rp//. iWed.. 108 (1958). 573-89: interviews
with Monto Ho, Ion Grosser, Norman Finter. and Kari Cantell.
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not the virus inhibitory activity of VIF would disappear. For example, VIF preparations were
centrifuged at a certain speed that was known to separate fluid and virus particles. After remo-
ving the 'virus sediment' the presumably virus-free supernatant fluid was tested for its virus
inhibitory capacity (result: the supernatant fluid still showed a considerable virus inhibitory
activity). In addition to the centrifugation experiment they tried to figure out—like Isaacs and
Lindenmann had done before—whether treating the virus specimen with a specific viral
antiserum would affect the viral inhibitory activity of their VIF preparations (result: it did not
affect the virus inhibitory activity). Furthermore Ho tested the effect of VIF preparations
against a number of different viruses, among others vaccinia virus (result: in all cases under
investigation a considerable reduction in cytopathogenicity could be monitored) and subjected
to various physical manipulations (result: for example heating at 56°C resulted in partial loss of
inhibitory capacity).
Moreover, some efforts were devoted to studying the mechanism whereby the
inhibition was brought about. The first data indicated that VIF neither acted directly on the
virus nor interfered with absorption of virus particles on cells, but presumably affected virus
multiplication within the cells. These kinds of trials were run primarily by Ho over a period of
eight months, thereby forging a primary profile of the elusive factor which he and Enders
thought to be present in their experimental system.**
Since there were still many questions concerning the nature of the factor which might
be responsible for the inhibitory effects, Enders was in favor of maintaining the term 'viral
inhibitory fluid' in their first joint publication which was submitted to the /Voceed/ngs o/ f/je
Mi/iona/ Acadewy o/ Science on 7 January, 1959." In this article they claimed to have
discovered that fluids from certain human cell cultures, which were infected with a strain of
poliovirus, inhibited the cytopathogenic effect and probably multiplication of several viruses.
This property was associated with the presence of a factor that could be separated from the
virus and was not inactivated by specific viral antiserum. In addition, the following reference
was made to interferon: 'In certain respects this inhibitor is comparable to 'interferon', a factor
appearing in chick embryo tissues exposed to influenza virus.'"* However, no reference
whatsoever was made to the phenomenon of interference, nor was there any further
speculation as to the nature of their factor.
The rather short reference to interferon in the aforementioned publication did not
prevent Ho and Enders from having frequent discussions in Enders's room about the growing
M. Ho and J. Enders, An Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures', Proc. N. A. 5., 45
(1959), 385-9.
57 . . . .Ibid.
" M. Ho and J. Enders. An Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures', />roc. JV. A. 5., 45
(1959), 385-9, p.389.
109
list of similarities between VIF and interferon, and from speculating once and again on the
nature of the relationship between VIF and interferon. It became a matter of sorting out diffe-
rences and similarities. With a steady growth in the number of perceived similarities between
VIF and interferon, the novelty of VIF was clearly challenged. The issue began gradually to
stalemate research on VIF.
At the end of May 1959, Enders decided that in order to put an end to all guesswork it
would be best to ask Isaacs to send them a sample of interferon in order to test its effects in his
Boston laboratory. Enders's decision to ask Isaacs to ship off tubes with interferon in order to
arrange for a 'real-time and real-space meeting' of VIF and interferon—in other words, for an
experiment to compare the workings of both inhibitory factors in his Boston laboratory—was a
final attempt at clearing up the rather confusing and uncertain laboratory situation by practical
means.
According to Ho he was more than relieved to find that the specimens of interferon,
which Isaacs had arranged for them to receive by air in a special paper bag container, showed
no effects at all in Ho's 'VIF-system'. After all. more than a year of manipulating and producing
at the bench had made Ho develop a major commitment to his VIF studies. Ho considered the
test pivotal in the sense that it reestablished his, and to a lesser extent Enders's belief that they
were dealing with something different and novel.''' It is questionable whether Ho thought of
the test in these terms, but I would argue that at least to Ho the testing of Isaacs's interferon
alongside VIF was a crucial event. Before that VIFs status as a novel laboratory factor had
been in jeopardy. After the experimental event, with Isaacs's interferon having shown no
activity whatsoever in Ho's hands, a difference between VIF and interferon seemed self-evident
to Ho, thereby reinforcing his commitment to VIF.
Further research on VIF was discussed at great length in a second article, which was
accepted for publication in V/ro/o&y about half a year later. As in the case of interferon, materi-
al conditions and the emerging scientific object, VIF, are strongly interwoven:
The factor (or factors) responsible for this inhibition is inactivated by treatment with trypsin and is not
dialysable. It cannot be neutralized with type 2 poliovirus antiserum nor sedimented with infectious virus.
Attempts to identify it either with ribonucleic acid or ribonuclease have failed...'"
Another striking feature is the use of the term 'VIF. which is far from consistent. Despite the
statement of the authors that 'VIF stands for 'viral inhibitory fluid', more than once VIF seems
to connote viral inhibitory factor (Ho's favorite translation), as in the following case: '...may
Interview with Monto Ho.
** M. Ho and J. Enders, 'Further Studies on an Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures
and Its Role in Chronic Viral Infections'. Ww/ojv, 9 (1959), 446-77. p. 446.
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invoke an inhibitory factor analogous to VIF." In addition, it is interesting to see that on this
occasion VIF and interferon are compared quite extensively:
The chemical and physical properties of the two raistmc« [interferon and VIF], as far as these have been
determined, are similar. On the other hand, certain differences have been defined: (1) VIF is optimally
produced with active and interferon with inactive virus.(2) VIF absorbs poorly if at all to cells, whereas
inlerferon is readily bound. (3) VIF acts most effectively if it is continuously present in the systems, whereas
interferon after acting on cells to render them resistant may then be removed. (4) Interferon prepared in chick
embryo tissues, as tested in our hands, does not inhibit type 1 polio virus infection in amnion cultures. These
differences may be resolved in the course of further studies. But at the moment, it appears more probable thai
there may exist several different substances inhibitory to viral infections that are incidental products of virus-
cell interactions. Such substances may not be identical in chemical composition and may process varying
degrees of biological specificky.*-
In retrospect Ho explained that as Isaacs's interferon preparations had not produced any effects
in his experimental system he then strongly believed that VIF and interferon were neither biolo-
gically nor chemically the same. Of course there were striking similarities, and some sort of
relationship was to be expected, but in essence he considered VIF and interferon to be diffe-
rent."
It is worth noting that in the very same article Ho and Enders discussed the possibility
of VIF being a product of the virus infected cell." Instead of provisionally considering their
factor as an 'abnormal' viral product, as Isaacs and Lindenmann had done two years earlier in
the case of interferon, Ho and Enders considered VIF an 'abnormal' cellular product. In
retrospect it looks like this conceptual difference is related to a fundamental difference in the
nature of their respective experimental systems. Whereas in Ho's experimental system the host
cell figured prominently, in Isaacs's case the host cell played a secondary role. For instance, the
starting point of Ho's investigation was to study differences in pathogenic effects on different
cell types of a particular virus, while Isaacs's starting point was to study a possible difference in
virus structure before and after the induction of viral interference. In Ho's work the phenome-
non of viral interference hardly played a role. Furthermore, whereas in Ho's case the host cell
was directly involved in the production of experimental data, in Isaacs's system the host cell
M. Ho and J. Enders, 'Further Studies on an Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures
and Its Role in Chronic Viral Infections'. Virotogy, 9 (1959), 446-77, p. 475.
M. Ho and J. Enders, 'Further Studies on an Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures
and Its Role in Chronic Viral Infections', Wrofogy, 9 (1959), 446-77, pp. 475-6.
Interview with Monto Ho.
M. Ho and J. Enders, 'Further Studies on an Inhibitor of Viral Activity Appearing in Infected Cell Cultures
and Its Role in Chronic Viral Infections', Viro/o&v, 9 (1959), 446-77, pp. 475.
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was only a means to the end of producing data.
3.2.2 Debating interferon's mode of operation: the specificity effect
We will proceed by concentrating again on the events and occurrences related to 'Isaacs's
interferon kitchen'. At about the time Ho and Enders submitted their second article to
V/'ro/ogv, Henle sent personal word across the Atlantic to Isaacs about the characterization of
what seemed to be an interferon-like factor. Apparently, the same kind of experimental system
which had previously resisted all attempts to detect interferon-like substances and had fueled
Henle's scepticism regarding interferon and VIF, was now said to produce signs indicating that
an observed resistance against viruses was most likely due to the presence of an interferon. It
would have been interesting to know more about the sequence of events in Henle's laboratory
that tipped the balance in favor of interferon. This was not of great concern to Isaacs,
however, who seemed to be more interested in the bare fact that his ideas about the existence
of a viral interfering substance were gaining some ground among American animal virolo-
gists."
As I already mentioned, Isaacs was informed about Ho and Enders's research on VIF.
However, in contrast to the research team in Boston, the association of VIF with interferon
encouraged rather than discouraged Isaacs in his research work. In Isaacs's case, the perceived
similarities between interferon and VIF were important. These were considered instrumental in
putting an end to all doubts with regard to the isolated character of the interferon
phenomenon. From the very first moment that Isaacs had heard from Enders, Isaacs believed
VIF to be interferon produced by polio virus in a culture of human amnion cells. At once the
possibility of producing and manipulating an interferon in any laboratory no longer seemed
purely speculative. Neither Ho's failure to produce an effect with Isaacs's interferon specimens,
nor Isaacs's failure to prepare interferon in cultures of human amnion cells, could reverse the
situation. Isaacs also knew that it was possible to produce interferon in m viVro systems other
than the original chick embryo system, as he and Burke had succeeded in producing interferon
in cultures of monkey kidney cells.** Concurrent events in the laboratory of his friend and
colleague David Tyrrell, who worked as an animal virologist at the Common Cold
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letters dated 17, 24 July and 1 September, 1959. Jean Lindenmann,
Correspondence, Personal Archives; and interview with Derek Burke..
D. Burke and A. Isaacs, Some Factors Affecting the Production of Interferon', Sri/. 7. «p . fti/A., 39 (1958),
452-8. p. 456.
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Fig. 28a,b. The Common Cold Unil was housed in a former American
army field hospital Tyrrell's laboratory was located
in one of the central barracks. Courtesy of D. Tyrrell.
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Unit on the downs to the south of the city of Salisbury, only strengthened Isaacs's belief that
VIF was an interferon.
The Common Cold Unit was an extension of Andrewes's Division at the NIMR and
was regarded as a sort of field station for research on viruses related to the common cold (see
Fig 28a)." Tyrrell would go over to London quite regularly to discuss research matters and
visit the NIMR's library. During one of these visits Tyrrell told Isaacs that he had found indica-
tions suggesting the presence of an inhibitory factor resembling interferon in fluids collected
from monolayer cultures of calf kidney cells which were infected with virus—a so-called
'Sendai' virus strain of the subgroup of Parainfluenza viruses.''* Tyrrell emphasized the prelimi-
nary status of his observations. He had only just started physical and chemical tests to charac-
terize his vims interfering factor and, moreover, his experimental system was different from the
chick embryo membrane system Isaacs used to produce interferon. Tyrrell agreed with Isaacs
that it would be an interesting option to take a frozen sample of Isaacs's interferon to the
Common Cold Unit and test its effects on his Sendai virus/calf kidney cell system. Communica-
ting the interferon-like experimental features to Isaacs thus led to the transfer of interferon
related expertise and research materials from Isaacs's to Tyrrell's laboratory (see Fig. 28b).
Back in his laboratory in Salisbury, Tyrrell then started an experiment to see if Isaacs's
interferon preparation would induce the same effects as his own viral interfering fluid.
Surprisingly it did not. The tube cultures of calf kidney cells which were treated with the
interferon sample showed an almost normal level of cytopathogenicity—that was regarded as a
measure for virus reproduction—after the introduction of Sendai virus. Conversely Tyrrell
could measure a reduction in cytopathogenicity in cultures which had been treated with his
own viral interfering fluid. Tyrrell did not know what to make of the absence of an inhibitory
effect in the case of interferon. He immediately initiated another attempt.
However, the second set of data were almost identical. Since Tyrrell had heard from
Isaacs that there were frequent problems with the stability of the interferon preparations, he
inferred that the interferon sample most likely had lost its virus inhibitory activity over time. In
order to prevent this from happening again he considered it necessary to work with fresh
interferon preparations in future experiments. The logistics involved in getting a regular supply
" The Common Cold Unit was set up after WO II in (he buildings of the former American Red Cross Hospital
on the initiative of Andrewes and with support of the MRC and Ministry of Health as a centre for systematic
studies on the aetiology and spread of common cold inducing viruses such as the rhino and influenza viruses.
See, D. Tyrrell. The Common Cold Unit 1946-1990: Farewell to a Much-Loved British Institution'. PHL5
Afirrotoofo&v Di««f. 6 (1991), 74-6.
** Parainfluenza viruses were considered a subgroup of the Influenza viruses. These in turn were and are still
counted as part of the Myxoviruses. Contrary to the influenza viruses the Parainfluenza subgroup did not
appear to grow well in the chick embryo. The Sendai virus strain was hold responsible for inducing pneu-
monia in infants; T. M. Bell. 4/i /nmx/ucrion m G«i<ra/ V/ro/ogv (London. William Heinemann Medical
Books. 1965) pp. 129-43.
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of fresh interferon preparations from Isaacs's laboratory would be quite demanding. Tyrrell
therefore decided first to see if by reproducing Isaacs's interferon system it would be possible
to prepare interferon in his own laboratory.
Tyrrell was quite confident that he would succeed in his efforts, as Isaacs's
experimental system for the greater part resembled the in v/7ra system Tyrrell had used to
study viral interference between influenza viruses as a postdoc at the Rockefeller Institute for
Medical Research in New York some years before. Furthermore, on a number of occasions, he
had closely watched Isaacs manipulating his interferon system. It took him some time to figure
things out, but eventually he was able to prepare a batch of interferon by inoculating tubes
containing pieces of chicken embryo membrane and nutrient fluid with inactivated influenza
virus. '• '
Remarkably however, his 'fresh' interferon preparation, which clearly showed a virus
inhibitory effect in the chicken embryo membrane system, had hardly any antiviral activity
when applied to the calf kidney cell system. Likewise the viral inhibitory fluid which had been
collected from the calf kidney cell system was much more active in this system than in the
chicken embryo membrane system. Yet there did not appear to be a difference in physical and
chemical properties between the two preparations. It was a puzzling result.*''
Tyrrell believed that in both cases he was dealing with more or less the same chemical
substance, 'interferon', but there seemed to be a difference in biological activity. According to
Tyrrell, the only thing he could think of at that time was that some sort of cellular specificity
effect might be involved.™ In response to virus infection both his calf cell and chick membrane
system produced interferon. However, in one way or another, in both cases, the interferon
shared specific features with the cell type from which it was formed, such that the chick cell
interferon was less active in calf cells and the same was true for calf cell interferon in chick
cells."
Sometime early in 1959, Tyrrell talked about his findings with Isaacs and Burke. The
first reaction was one of disbelief:
Well it had never occurred to us at all that interferon might show host cell specificity. Viruses don't, antibo-
" D. Tyrrell. 'Interferon Produced by Cultures of Calf Kidney Cells'. ATa/iir*. 184 (1959), 452-3. p. 453; and
interviews with David Tyrrell. James Porterfield. and Derek Burke.
™ Robert Wagner is definitely wrong when he retrospectively claims that the animal species specificity of inter-
feron action was 'discovered' in his laboratory. He confuses 'discovering' with re-examining the hypothesis of
species specificity as stated in his 1961 article in Vira/o&v; See, R.R. Wagner. 'Biological Studies of
Interferon'. Viro/ogy, 13 (1961), 323-37, p. 334; and. R.R. Wagner, 'Reminiscences of a virologist wandering
in Serendip', Mrc/i. ViVo/., 141 (1996), 787-97.
" D. Tyrrell, "Interferon Produced by Cultures of Calf Kidney cells," Afoure, 184 (1959), 452-3; interview
David Tyrrell, and John Porterfield.
us
dies don't and so there was no reason to believe that interferon would."
However, they both knew Tyrrell as a careful experimenter, and the data seemed to be quite
clear. It was Isaacs who first acted on Tyrrell's idea that interferon might share specific features
with the cell type from which it was formed. Tyrrell's experimental results seemed to offer a
possible explanation for the inconsistencies Isaacs had experienced in testing the effect of both
interferon and inactivated influenza virus on laboratory rabbits more than a year ago. At that
time Isaacs had been surprised to see that inactivated influenza virus regularly protected rabbits
against infection of the skin with vaccinia virus whereas rather variable results were obtained
with interferon. This was thought to be inconsistent with his idea that the protective effect of
inactivated influenza virus was mediated through interferon. Now, with Tyrrell's experimental
results at hand, the rabbit experiments no longer seemed problematic to Isaacs. The perceived
inconsistency could be explained away. The most likely conclusion was that, following injec-
tion with inactivated influenza virus into the skin of laboratory rabbits, interferon was locally
produced. Upon taking into account a cellular specificity effect it was only to be expected that
this rabbit-skin interferon would protect rabbits more effectively against infection with vaccinia
virus than was the case with rabbits that had received an injection with chick interferon. Isaacs,
Tyrrell and Burke agreed that it would be worthwhile to examine this cellular specificity effect
more closely.
By bringing interferon into his laboratory and gradually incorporating it into one of his
own experimental systems Tyrrell created a new situation: the primarily one-way traffic
between Isaacs's and Tyrrell's laboratory became two-way traffic. Basically it meant that in
manipulating and producing at his laboratory bench in Salisbury Tyrrell managed to change the
order of events in Isaacs's 'interferon kitchen'. Tyrrell, firstly, failed to produce any effects with
Isaacs's interferon, which was ascribed to the instability of the interferon probe; secondly, he
started reproducing the material realization of Isaacs's interferon system; and thirdly, Tyrrell
brought this reproduced system face to face with his own original Sendai virus/calf kidney cell
system. Tyrrell's claim that most likely a host cell specificity was involved in the action of
interferon not only made Isaacs rethink and resume his earlier rabbit experiments, but was also
instrumental in reshaping Isaacs's interferon system as a whole: virus-oriented procedures and
models were modified to make the experimental system fit a more cell-centered research
perspective.
With regard to Isaacs's laboratory the specificity issue had both practical and
theoretical consequences, and resulted in a rather substantial reshaping of research on interfe-
ron. The production of interferon as a 'blind alley' of virus production no longer seemed to
make sense, once the specificity effect had been confirmed in Isaacs's laboratory. The host
Interview with Derek Burke.
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specificity was thought to indicate differences between interferons from cells of different
animal species. One and the same virus could induce different interferons depending on the
type of host cell, and this simply did not seem to fit the idea of interferon as an abortive
product of virus multiplication. Apparently the process of virus multiplication and the mode of
production of interferon had to be independent. Isaacs began to associate the production of
interferon with a cellular defense mechanism against viruses. According to Burke, it was no
longer the virus, but the cell, that was at the center of their thoughts." Isaacs confirmed this at
a symposium on virus diseases in September 1959 in London, where he proposed the following
line of thought with regard to the nature of the interferon phenomenon:
It may be that interferon is concerned in a natural mechanism of cellular resistance to virus
infections. For example, the fact that people recover from colds in the absence of any clear evidence
of specific immunity [resisting infection by the presence of antibodies in the blood] suggests that
local cellular immunity may play a part."
From this point of view interferon was considered to be a product of the cell, which might be
involved in the natural defense of cells against viruses.
Obviously the virus was losing ground to the cell. This transformation of ideas
concerning the nature and mechanism of action of interferon coincided with other changes in
the experimental system. Basically, virus-oriented procedures were modified to make the
experimental system fit a more cell-centered research perspective. In studying the mechanism
of interferon's activity, attention was now focused on cellular metabolism, as such, rather than
on viral multiplication and viral interference. It meant doing different experiments. The
emphasis shifted gradually from experimental virology to a kind of cellular biochemistry, which
Lindenmann dubbed jokingly 'cytochemistry'." Isaacs moved to the molecular level of analysis
only when he needed to translate his experimental work into terms of role and function of
interferon in the cell when it was feasible to do so. As a biological phenomenologist—showing
a preference for studying and analyzing viral behavior—Isaacs was not interested in biochemis-
try and a molecular interpretation of virus-cell interaction per se. Nor was he very familiar with
the subject matter. However, only a basic kind of biochemistry was needed and Isaacs could
easily overcome his 'handicap' by asking a biochemically trained scientist outside the
Interview with Derek Burke.
™ A. Isaacs, 'Interferon: The Prospects', 77«> Prarrmoner, 183 (1959). 601 -5, p. 605.
Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 2 December. 1959, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence,
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department for assistance.'*
As the viral point of view gave way to a cellular research perspective, there was a shift
in emphasis from experimental virology to a more interdisciplinary, molecular biology type of
research. It meant employing whatever tools and techniques the problem at hand seemed to
demand to explain interferon's role as part of the cellular defense mechanism in terms of funda-
mental biochemical and molecular processes. Changes in the experimental system and research
perspective not only meant doing different experiments but also reshaping interferon's identity
as a research object. The ideas regarding interferon as a deviant product of the cell closely
associated with virus multiplication were abandoned in favor of interferon as an essential
product of the process of cellular resistance to viral infections. The events in Ho and Enders's
and Tyrrell's laboratories played an active part in this transformation process, as did the
practical context in which knowledge of interferon was claimed by Isaacs to be applicable to
the problem of antiviral therapy. In other words, work on interferon no longer meant work on
Isaacs's experimental system only—meeting the 'others' resulted in 'working forward' with the
'others'.
3.3 Researching interferon(s).
In the rest of this chapter I shall describe how interferon emerged as a central concept to a net-
work of laboratory practices within the field of animal virology. These practices were
particular and local in nature, each with its own ways of doing things and of presenting the
manipulations at the laboratory bench. Through the interaction of their activities, the
heterogeneous material and conceptual resources of these particular practices were fine-tuned,
leading to new ways of doing and representing things, independent of the immediate local
experimental situations. We will see that out of this adaptive behavior a new subfield of re-
search emerged in which a group of experimentalists learned to manipulate, communicate
about and work on a common set of research problems and laboratory phenomena.
3.3.1 What's in a name?
In the fall of 1959 additional foreign reports reached Isaacs's desk concerning work on
substances which seemed to have properties similar to interferon. Among these was a French
paper by two Japanese animal virologists, Yasuiti Nagano and Yasuhiko Kojima from the
'* A. Isaacs. 'Metabolic Effects of Interferon on Chick Fibroblasts', Vi'ro/ogy (letter to the editor), 10(1960),
144-5; and interview with Joseph Sonnabend.
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Kitasato Institute in Tokyo. In their article they described the production by vaccinia virus of a
virus-inhibitory factor, named 'facteur inhibiteur'. which was separable from the virus and was
able to inhibit vaccinia virus infection in the rabbit skin. Their factor was said to be relatively
heat resistant, unlike vaccinia virus not sedimented by centrifugation at 100.000 g for two
hours and resistant against ultraviolet radiation. However, no further pronouncements were
made as to the nature of their factor." Upon reading the article Isaacs became convinced that
the Japanese had been working with interferon. 'I have just seen a paper by two Japanese...who
have found interferon in vaccinia virus but don't know it'."
Isaacs then wrote a letter to Nagano to communicate his findings. Nagano answered by
return post that this 'facteur inhibiteur' was indeed very much like interferon, and included a
1954 article indicating that they had already pointed in their experimental system to the
presence of a virus-inhibiting factor, years before Isaacs and Lindenmann published their
interferon data. Since Isaacs thought Nagano's 1954 article even less clear regarding the nature
and effect of this factor, he did not pay much attention to Nagano's remark about the early date
of his research. For the moment he let things go at that and instead focused on yet another
American report concerning an interferon-like substance.™
Isaacs had received information through Andrewes that an American colleague of theirs
at John Hopkins Medical School, Robert Wagner, who in the early fifties had worked as a re-
search fellow in Andrewes's department for one year, had an interferon-like substance under
investigation in his virus laboratory. Apparently the substance was referred to as 'interferon B'
and was said to be distinct from Isaacs's interferon. As with Nagano, Isaacs immediately got in
touch with Wagner.*"
He learned that Wagner had become seriously interested in the interferon phenomenon
when he repeatedly managed to induce an inhibitory effect on the growth in chick cell cultures
of a highly pathogenic virus, a so-called Eastern Equine Encephalitis (EEE) virus under
investigation in his laboratory."' Like interferon, Wagner's inhibitory factor appeared to be
Y. Nagano and Y. Kojima. 'Inhibition de L'infection Vaccinale par un Facleur Liquide dans le Tissu Infect«?
par le Virus Homologue'. Co/n/w. Arm/. Soc. ßi«/. F/7/a/fj, 152 (1958). 1627-29.
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 10 September, 1959, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence,
personal archives.
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No. 788/2/1; and R.R.Wagner, 'Viral Interference', Bat/rr/o/. /tev., 24 (1960), 151-66, pp. 157-61.
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susceptible to treatment with protein degrading enzyme (result: its biological activity was des-
troyed) and its biological activity could be precipitated by ammonium sulphate. However, the
data indicated that Wagner's preparation was more stable in relation to heat than the interferon
preparation described by Isaacs. Wagner's factor appeared to be completely stable at 70°c for
one hour, whereas in the case of interferon marked inactivation took place after 1 hour at 60°c.
However, Wagner's factor seemed to be less stable in strong acid solution: stable at pH 3-11,
as compared to 1-11 in Isaacs's case. As in the case of Enders and Ho, Wagner let the
differences outweigh the similarities. Because of these differences to Isaacs's interferon,
Wagner called his virus inhibitory factor 'interferon B'.
In response to Wagner's claims regarding 'interferon B', Isaacs argued that the differen-
ces between 'interferon' and 'interferon B' did not seem to be significant. Most likely the diffe-
rence in heat stability could easily be reduced to a difference in pH of their respective
preparations. With regard to the pH-stability Isaacs pointed out that in accordance with
Wagner's data they too had noted some loss in activity over the pH-range from 1 to 3, but
regardless of this decrease in activity they had decided in favor of the stability range 1 to 11. If
one took into account the fact that most biological substances were completely destroyed
between pH 1 and 3, it seemed justifiable to say that interferon was rather stable over this
range. In addition Isaacs pointed out that Wagner's experimental system seemed to differ only
in its use of the whole chicken egg as a means to produce preparations of interferon instead of
the chicken embryo membrane system employed in Isaacs's laboratory. Isaacs therefore
thought it highly unlikely that they were dealing with different substances.
On his part, Wagner, who had digested Isaacs's remarks, admitted that the decision to
use the name 'interferon B' was based on a comparison of their experimental data with mostly
preliminary information on the physico-chemical properties of interferon, which had been
available to him at the time. However, upon assessing Isaacs's latest information he saw no
further need to make a difference between 'interferon' and 'interferon B', and decided to
withdraw the latter term. According to Wagner this decision was not based on any tests with
Isaacs's interferon in his laboratory at John Hopkins. It should be emphasized that Wagner's
'conversion to interferon' does not necessarily mean that Isaacs and Wagner both identified
interferon-B as interferon in a similar way. At least they agreed on identifying interferon B with
interferon biologically, but it is far from clear if Wagner shared Isaacs's belief that both were
chemically identical too.
In the process of discussing the nature of their respective virus-inhibiting factors both
researchers informally agreed on a provisional set of experimental criteria as to what
laboratory material they both would call an interferon. The production of this set of criteria
added up to listing the biological, chemical and physical properties the individual research
objects had in common, and choosing from this list the most exceptional ones—exceptional in
the sense that it would distinguish their factor from other known biological factors. For
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instance, one of the informal criteria was pH-resistance as both factors shared a resistance to
acid conditions. 'Fairly early on we had criteria among ourselves as to what we would call an
interferon. One of the very important things was pH-resistance. There are not too many
proteins with that property'."
In the meantime, word got around within the animal virology community that an
increasing number of laboratories were reporting work on interferon-like factors. Even fierce
critics like the American virologist Harry Rubin began to pay some attention to these
'interferon stories', although the issue still remained controversial. The published experimental
data were still considered circumstantial, as none of the laboratories involved could present
more than biological activities and a limited number of physico-chemical properties. For in-
stance, the claim that one was dealing with a protein was based on little more than experiments
showing that the virus inhibitory activity of preparations was destroyed by trypsin, which was
known to inactivate proteins, and precipitated by saturation with ammoniumsulphate like most
other proteins. Was it really a protein though? One of the things that disturbed people was that
hardly any other proteins were known to resist both heat and acid conditions in a similar way.
Moreover, assuming that it was a protein, some wondered how you could know that it was a
cellular protein and not a viral protein? Of course, different viruses reportedly induced the
same kind of inhibitory activity in one particular type of cells, whereas one and the same virus
could induce different kinds of interfering principles in cells from different animal species. But
what other proof was there to say that one was actually dealing with a primary product of the
cell? Repeatedly, researchers like Ho, Enders and Wagner had to respond to such questions
from their fellow scientists."
While attending a meeting of the American Cancer Society in New York in November
1959, Andrewes noticed the growing interest in interferon. He was even approached by one of
the members of the Program Committee of the prestigious Gustav Stern Symposium on
Perspectives in Virology to be held early January 1960, with a last minute request to present a
paper on interferon. On his return to Mill Hill, it was agreed that Isaacs would deliver a paper
with his latest data and ideas regarding the nature and function of interferon.** The latter
immediately dropped Lindenmann a note of the news:
I am going to America early in January to speak at a meeting on Perspectives in Virology and will take the
opportunity to meet all the interferonologists there, viz. Schlesinger, Henle, Wagner and the senior interfero-
Interview with Robert Wagner.
R.R. Wagner and A. Levy, 'Interferon as a Chemical Intermediary in Viral Interference', /4/m. W.K Acorf. Sc/\
88(1960). 1308-18. p. 1310; and interviews with Robert Wagner. Sam Baron. Monto Ho. and Hilton Levy.
Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon. dated 26 November. 1959, MRC
Archives File No. 788/2/1.
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nologist. Enders." >
In response, Lindenmann, who was aware of the growing number of claims regarding
interferon-like substances, congratulated Isaacs on his success, but at the same time expressed
his concerns about a possible confusion in the field. He thought it important to try to give at
least some direction as to what antiviral factors should be called interferon:
It is probably premature to undertake this, but on the other hand there is the danger that as more workers pop
into the field different names might be proposed for the same thing. It would be a good policy to reach a
provisional agreement as to what points are to be considered relevant for inclusion of a new antiviral factor in
the interferon group."*
Isaacs, for his part, thought that Lindenmann went a bit too far in his suggestions, and told him
that they could not stop 'other people from describing whatever they like and calling it
whatever they like.'"
Isaacs was in favor of a more subtle approach to the problem. He believed that it might
be possible to prevent people from using different names for substances similar to interferon in
the future by adopting a fairly broad description of interferon. To persuade other researchers
to adopt the term 'interferon' for biological factors similar to interferon, Isaacs proposed to use
the following 'tailor-made' definition at the 'Perspectives in Virology' meeting in January 1960:
A protein, slightly smaller than antibody globulin, produced by cells of different animal species
following inoculation with inactivated or live virus of many different kinds and capable of inhibiting
intracellularly the growth of a variety of viruses in cells of the same animal species, in doses which
are not obviously toxic for cells.**
Isaacs told Lindenmann that he did not think it easy for them to be dogmatic in saying that a
substance with these properties should be called an interferon. "It is usually much better to let
someone go his own course and see what happens in time...I have already transformed Wagner
** Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 25 November, 1959, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence,
personal archives.
** Jean Lindenmann to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 2 December 1959, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence, personal
archives.
" Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 4 December, 1959, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence,
personal archives.
" Ibid.
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and hope to work on Enders in January"."'* Isaacs's strategy appeared to be successful. At the
Perspectives in Virology meeting, Enders, who acted as chairman of Isaacs's session, made a
public statement, saying in effect that VIF might be considered an interferon:
The more recent data that Dr. Isaacs and his colleagues have assembled, together with those of others, interest
me because we have been working with an analogous factor, which we have called viral inhibitory factor
(VIF). We have noted certain differences between interferon and the principle we have dealt with, but these
more recent observations have, I think, explained most if not all these differences, and I now believe that we
are all dealing with fundamentally similar, closely related factors.'"
Enders made his announcement at the end of the discussion following Isaacs's paper
presentation on the nature and function of interferon. In adopting the term 'interferon' for his
and Ho's viral inhibitory factor, Enders, like Wagner before him, seemed to agree with Isaacs
on a basic set of experimental criteria as to what kind of biological factors would be qualified
to bear the name interferon. Enders's formal announcement had an impact among those present
and was instrumental in gradually attuning the research activities of a growing number of
laboratories in America, Britain, Japan and on the Continent, to one another.
3.3.2 The blossoming of a new subfield
By common usage, the term 'interferon' came to refer to the active antiviral substance(s) in
particular culture fluids. When used in journal articles, the word 'interferon' was considered a
generic term for all laboratory factors which complied with a specific set of experimental
criteria." These criteria had been shaped and reshaped and modifications were constantly being
made. Since a generally accepted definition and categorization of interferons was not yet
available, these 'interferon criteria' functioned as a means of communication for investigators,
who each used their favorite experimental system. The range of these various virus-cell
systems was wide.This shared set of experimental criteria was formulated as follows by
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 4 December, 1959, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence,
personal archives.
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Alick Isaacs. 'Nature and function of interferon'. in Pw5/w cf/V« in Vi'ro/ogy, ed. Morris Pollard, (Minneapo-
lis: Burgess Publishing, 1960) p. 123.
M. Ho, 'Interferons', AVvc £n#/. 7. Afed, 266 (1962), 1258-64; A. Isaacs, 'Interferon'. Ai/vanre. Virus /frj., 10
(1963), 1-39: and R.R. Wagner, The Interferons: Cellular Inhibitors of Viral Infection'. y4nn. /tev. Af/rrobio/.,
17(1963), 285-94.
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Fig. 29. Interferon plaque assay.: The two Petri dishes have been
seeded with mouse cells and infected with
sufficient influenza virus to destroy all cells.
The left-hand plate contained interferon and shows
no visible destruction of the cells (live cells show up dark).
The right hand plate contained no interferon
and shows large zones of dead cells (show up light).
Courtesy of R. Wagner.
Robert Wagner in one of the first review articles on what he called 'interferons' or 'cellular
inhibitors of viral infection':
The first criterion is production in cell cultures or host tissues in response to infection with active or
inactivated viruses.. To qualify as an interferon, a culture fluid or cell extract must be capable, on transfer to
test cultures of inhibiting the multiplication or cytopathic effect of a challenge virus. All current bioassay
methods are based on this principle...Additional criteria for identifying interferons are based on
physicochemical properties. Interferons are not sedimented by centrifugation at 100,000 g for 4hrs, resist
prolonged exposure to pH 2 at 4°C..."
These shared criteria added up to a set of identity conditions, with which research objects had
to comply in order to deserve the label 'interferon'. The bioassay played a central role in
shaping these criteria, which investigators used to qualify a certain culture fluid or cell extract
as an interferon preparation.
Quite different ways of assaying these biological substances were employed. The
process of tuning in the activities of the various laboratory practices to one another and
rendering them compatible resulted in the use of similar types of bioassays based on the so-
*" R.R. Wagner, The Interferons: Cellular Inhibitors of Viral Infection'. Ann. Äev. Afirrofrio/., 17 (1963), p.
285-6.
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called 'plaque inhibition' method (see Fig 29) .*' However, this was far from a straightforward
process. Isaacs's attitude is exemplary in this respect. Despite his knowledge that the plaque
assay technique was most likely a superior technique, Isaacs demonstrated a reluctance toward
change. He had worked for so long with the haemagglutination assay, that he was rather
hesitant to choose in favor of a new kind of bioassay. Switching to another assay technique
required reorganizing his experimental system, and thereby running the risk of losing the subtle
control over his interferon system. Not until Isaacs's restraint toward introduction of a new
assay technique threatened to isolate his laboratory practice was he prepared to change course.
Far from replacing the haemagglutination assay as a standard tool in Isaacs's laboratory, the
plaque assay was employed as an additional laboratory device in his interferon work.**
The process of validating interferon and forming it into a basis for consensus involved,
besides the recurrent elements of evaluating claims in terms of the perceived research
opportunities and of negotiating consensus, a collective process of engineering mutual ways of
communicating, manipulating, interpreting and elaborating on a common assembly of research
objects. The lead on interferon in the May 1961 issue of the Sc/e/jfr/fc .Amenca/i symbolized a
turnabout with regard to the scientific status of interferon (see Fig. 30)."
The controversy over the significance of the original knowledge claims regarding
interferon had died down. This was consonant with a shift in status of scientific statements
regarding interferon. Whereas up to 1960 journal articles contained modalities with reference
to interferon such as The data presented are too scanty to allow even the crudest guess as to
the nature of...' or 'It therefore seems reasonable to postulate that...' or 'It is necessary to state
from the outset that the evidence is purely circumstantial...', by 1962 these kind of modalities
" The 'plaque inhibition' technique had been largely developed by the prominent American animal virologist,
Renato Dulbecco, in the early fifties at the California Institute of Technology. It was basically performed as
follows. Monolayers of living cells were attached to the surface of petri dishes. Subsequently a normal maint-
enance medium was mixed with a red stain and a gel forming extract, so-called 'agar'. dissolved in water.
After inoculation with virus this mixture was then allowed to solidify over the cell sheet. Plates treated in this
way were placed in the incubator. The period of incubation varied with the virus used. The red stain was
included to distinguish between normal living cells, which were known to acquire a reddish colour through
absorbtion of the stain, and dead cells that had lost their colour through rupture of the cell wall. Colourless
areas were seen on the plate where cells had been destroyed. As viruses were known to induce cell rupture or
lysis after viral infection and multiplication, each of these colourless areas or 'plaques' as they were called
was claimed to indicate the presence of virus or to be more specific each plaque was said to represent the
production of a single original viral particle and its progeny; R. Dulbecco, Production of Plaques in
Monolayer Tissue Cultures by Single Particles of an Animal Vims', fror. A/a/, /lead. Sri. CS.A, 38 (1952),
747-52. See. for a detailed description of the historical development of the virus plaque assay by Renato
Dulbecco, who was a member of Max Delbriick's imminent research group at Caltech: D. J. Kevles, 'Renato
Dulbecco and the New Animal Virology: Medicine, Methods, and Molecules', / //u/. Bio/., 26 (1993), 409-
42.
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Interview with Burke.
A. Isaacs, 'Interferon', Scienn/ic American, 204 (1961), 51 -7.
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Fig. 30. Cover of the Si-irnnyir Ameriran, May. 1961.
Reproduced with kind permission
from the publishers.
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were mostly dropped.** Statements such as 'In 1957 Isaacs and Lindenmann observed the
formation of a virus interfering substance, to which they gave the name interferon...' or The
most notable breakthrough in the general area of host resistance to viruses was the discovery
in '57 by Isaacs and Lindenmann of a substance called interferon...' became common place.*"
As such, the provisional state of interferon was transformed into scientific fact. Interferon
became widely regarded as a product of the process of cellular/host resistance to viral
infection.'" At least from a biological point of view, the existence of interferon as a specific
biological entity was beyond dispute. However, in chemical terms interferon was still more a
putative substance, the active fraction of an impure biological preparation, or what often was
dubbed a 'protein soup', which showed some activity in a particular bioassay." Without a
chemical structure, interferon's chemical 'reality' was still up for debate.
In the process, 'misinterpreton' rumors gave way to talking about the pros and cons of
joining what some individuals now jokingly called an 'interferon bandwagon'.'"" The number of
laboratories and researchers working on research projects associated with the term 'interferon'
was indeed on the rise. However, for assessment of figure 31, which shows the number
A. Isaacs, J. Lindenmann and R. Valentine. 'Virus Interference. II. Some Properties of Interferon', /Vor. Ä.
Soc. 147 (1957), 268-73; A. Isaacs. 'Viral Interference'. Svmp. Sor. j><>n. MirroWn/.. No. 9, 102-121, p. 109;
and R.R. Wagner and A. H. Levy. 'Interferon as a Chemical Intermediary in Viral Interference'. Ann. NT.
•4««/. Sri. 88 (1960). 1308-18, p. 1308.
D. C. Burke, "The Purification of Interferon', ßioc/iem. 7., 78 (1961), 556-64, p. 556; and M. R. Hilleman,
'Interferon in Prospect and Perspective', / rW/. romp, «TMIO/., 62 (1963), 337-53, p. 337.
In claiming that he and Emanuel Heller simultaneously 'discovered' that interferon was a cellular product and
not a product of the virus by showing in 1963 that the antibiotic actinomycin D (a known inhibitor of DNA-
directed RNA synthesis of cellular proteins) inhibited the production of interferon. Robert Wagner not only
disregards the work of his female fellow-scientist Joyce Taylor, but even more important the lengthy and
complex transformation process through which interferon's identity as a cellular inhibitor of viral infection
was shaped. Wagner's. Heller's and Taylor's experiments were neither more nor less than constitutive of
interferon's genesis as a cellular protein; R.R. Wagner, Reminiscences of a Virologist Wandering in
Serendip. ArrA. Wro/.. 141 (1996), 779-788, p. 783; E. Heller. 'Enhancement of Chikungunya Virus Replica-
tion and Inhibition of Interferon Production by Actinomycin D'. Wro/og.v, 21 (1963), 652-56; R.R. Wagner,
'Inhibition of Interferon Biosynthesis by Actinomycin D', Afa/ur<", 204 (1964), 49-51; and J. Taylor, 'Inhibi-
tion of Interferon Action by Actinomycin', Bior/icm. Biop/ivj. An. Comm., 14 (1964), 447-51.
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The point of modalities which are constantly added, modified and dropped in the transformation of a provisio-
nal claim into a scientific fact was first noticed by Fleck and developed in greater detail by Latour and
Woolgar; L. Reck, Gen«« and Dfve/opmenf o/ a Sa>mi/ir Far/ (Chicago; The University of Chicago
Press, 1979), p. 118; Latour and Woolgar. Laboratory' k/<?' 7fa Co/u/rurfi'on o/SoWi/i/ir fartt (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986), 151-86.
"** E. De Maeyer, Interferon Twenty Years Later'. Bu//rtm dV Z.7n«imi ftM/rar. 76 (1978), 303-23, p. 303.
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17
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Fig. 31. The Number of interferon related papers published worldwide
over a len year period (1957-1967)
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of papers relating to interferon appearing in any of the given categories of scientific journals, it
is necessary to take into account the fact that the expansion of interest in interferon studies
after 1960 was associated with a rapid growth of biomedical research in general.'"' Seen in this
perspective, the growth of scientific interest then attached to interferon as a research topic and
the investment of resources in it was less spectacular than the numbers suggest.'"" By the end
of 1963, about 30 laboratories and 80 researchers worldwide had become involved in interfe-
ron research, but far from all of them pursued interferon research to the exclusion of all other
research problems. The researchers who contributed to the study of interferon were mostly
animal virologists with a training in medicine and, in a few cases, biochemists with a training in
science.
Gradually the outlines of a new subfield of research emerged, which was reflected by
the organization of an official symposium on interference and interferon at the 8th International
Congress for Microbiology in Montreal in 1962 and subsequently the organization of the first
formal interferon meeting by Vilcek in the castle of Smolenice near Bratislava, Czechoslovakia,
in 1964 (see Fig. 32)."" Finally, it is interesting to see that once interferon was gaining some
momentum in the international biomedical research community informal priority disputes
concerning the discovery of interferon began to surface. In the corridor it was increasingly
rumored either that the American researcher Koprowski had worked with interferon long
before Isaacs and Lindenmann, or that the Japanese researcher Nagano had first discovered
interferon, what he called 'facteur inhibiteur'. According to Burke, finishing
"" The table is based on author indexes and references from: M. Ho. 'Interferons,' N. Eng. J. Med., 266 (1962),
1258-1264; A. Isaacs. 'Interferon.' /Wvanc. Vin« Res., 10 (1963), 1-39; N.B. Finter (ed.).
(Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1966); and N.B. Finter (ed.), /mer/ero/w an*/ /nr<>//<Ton
/m/ncer.t (Amsterdam. North-Holland Publishing Company, 1973); See for the exponential growth in
biomedical research in America in the 196O's,. J. T. Patterson, 77ie Dread Disease (Cambridge; Harvard
University Press, 1987), p. 245.
'"* C. Chany. 'Interferon-like Inhibitor of Viral Multiplication from Malignant Cells'. Wro/ogy. 13 (1961). 485-
92; E. De Maeyer and J. Enders, 'An Interferon Appearing In Cell Cultures Infected with Measles Virus',
Proc. Soc. Evper. Bio/. <$ A/ed.. 107 (1961), 573-78; L. Glasgow and K. Habel, 'Role of Interferon in Vac-
cinia Virus Infection of Mouse Embryo Tissue Culture', 7. £ t /w. Afea\. 115 (1962), 503-12; and M. Ho,
'Kinetic Considerations of the Inhibitory Action of an Interferon Produced in Chick Cultures Infected with
Sindbis Virus', Viro/ogy. 17 (1962), 262-75.
"" J. Lindenmann. 'L'Interferon', Ate/, e/ //vg, 19 (1961), 945-46, p. 945; N. Gibbons (ed.), Keren/ Progress in
AficroWo/ogy, Proceedings of the VIII International Congress for Microbiology. Montreal 1962 (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press. 1963), pp. 419-457; The first formal gathering of interferon researchers was held
at the Home of Scientists in the wire-tapped castle of Smolenice in the woods near the town of Bratislava. Out
of fear of being tapped by the secret police, all informal talking occurred in the surrounding woods. Word has
it that Vilcek's flight to the West was the most important achievement of the four day meeting. My impressi-
on is, although none of those involved wanted to speak about the subject, that he was smuggled out of the
country in the car of two of the participants to the conference. What I do know is that due to Vilcek's flight to
the West, the publication of the proceedings of the meeting in the form of a monograph by the Publishing
House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, was banned; and interviews with Jan Vilcek, Edward De
Maeyer. and Kari Cantell.
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off these rumors was one of the primary incentives for Isaacs to put his mind to writing a
review on interferon. The introductory section of this review paper, published in Arfva«ce* in
Viri« /terea/r/i in 1963, shows that Isaacs wanted to set things straight regarding who
deserved priority over the very first interferon claims:
Interferon derived its name from virus interference, since it was first isolated and characterized during a study
of this phenomenon (Isaacs and Undenmann, 1957). However, similar substances were previously observed,
although they were not characterized.'"
By placing the work of others like Lennette and Koprowski, and Nagano in a particular order
of relations with one another he succeeded in making a convincing argument for justifying his
and Lindenmann's priority position. In doing so he superimposed new meaning on past
scientific work, thereby providing directions in research activities both retrospectively and
prospectively, as I will show in the next chapters.""
Fig. 32. From left to the right. Jan Vilcck, Jacqueline De Macyer-
Guignard and Edward De Maeyer in the corridors
of (he Smolenice meeting. Courtesy of Jan Vilcek.
A. Isaacs. 'Interferon'. /Wvan. Virus. R«. 10 (1963). 1-39, p. 2.
However, Isaacs' attempt to justify his and Lindenmann's priority claim regarding interferon could not prevent
the American patent authorities from claiming in I96S that the American researchers Lennette and
Koprowski published a paper in the Journal of Experimental Medicine in 1946 which might have anticipated
the work of Isaacs and Lindenmann. As such it threatened to undermine the possibility of a valid patent in the
U.S., although eventually in March 1966 after lengthy negotiations between the NRDC and the American
patent agency the basic U.S. patent application on interferon was accepted; Meeting of the G.N.R.D. Patent
Holdings Ltd.. 18 February 1965. MRC Archives. File No. A 812/5; and. Minutes of the 33th meeting of the
Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 7 April 1966, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4.
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3.4 Conclusion
This priority dispute provides a clear illustration of the fact that the knowledge claims
regarding interferon had been weaned from their matrix of origin and gained acceptance among
fellow scientists—largely independent of Isaacs's 'interferon kitchen'. Only about six years
earlier, while being 'hammered out' in the local context of Isaacs's laboratory, interferon
seemed largely inseparable from its 'home ground'. By moving rather easily between the 'world'
and his laboratory, Isaacs played a major role in linking interferon to a growing number of
events and people 'outdoors' and thereby in accomplishing a separation that mobilized
interferon beyond the physical space of room 215. Lindenmann's paper presentation in
Switzerland and Isaacs's demonstration for MRC officers were the first extramural extensions
of interferon research. A closer look at this mobilization process will gain us a clear insight into
how interferon developed as the organizing principle for a new line of investigation within the
international field of animal virology and more in general into the early stages of the evolution
of a scientific subfield.
First, I call attention to how different sets of expectations regarding interferon came
into being and provided a certain impetus to judge and act for a growing number of human
agents—both as individuals and as social groups. Depending on the audience the knowledge
claims regarding interferon aroused certain expectations. This was consistent with differences
in the audiences' description and handling of interferon.
Penicillin served in two ways as a powerful cultural symbol that steered judgments and
activities relating to interferon in Britain. First, a national so-called 'penicillin syndrome'—the
British desire to prevent at all costs missing out on a penicillin-like success story—was at stake
here and was typical for the British situation in the 1950's. Second, penicillin played a vital part
in legitimizing and strengthening the image of interferon as a promising lead toward anti-viral
therapy. The introduction of 'wonder drugs' like penicillin had effected a widely shared belief in
therapeutic breakthroughs as a dominant feature of a laboratory supported scientific medicine.
Together, these two cultural conditions played a pivotal role in yielding intense excitement for
what became publicly known in Britain as a possible new 'antiviral penicillin'. As I will show in
the chapter the interlocking of expectations of various social groups in Britain created a niche
for subsequent efforts to develop interferon as an antiviral drug.
I indicated that interferon mattered, in a different way, to members of the international
community of microbiologists. Instead of immediately focusing on the practical context in
which work on interferon might be applied to the solution of medical problems—assessing
interferon in the light of its potential benefits to practical medicine—Isaacs's and Lindenmann's
experimentally derived knowledge claims were validated in their own right. This meant that the
expectations and judgments were structured jointly by theoretical, methodological, practical
and strategical concerns.
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For the scientists involved it was a matter of judging Isaacs's and Lindenmann's claims
according to several criteria: First, the nature of the association of the claims with prior
findings and the prevailing theoretical framework, with the question being how the existence of
a biological entity like interferon fit into the existing body of knowledge; second the expected
'return on research investment', assessing the relevance of interferon research for biomedical
research programs that figured high on national research agendas; and third, the practicality of
integrating Isaacs's and Lindenmann's experimental features in existing experimental systems in
other laboratories.
The judgments made by experts varied from individual to individual and laboratory to
laboratory.'*' What was for Hallauer an insupportable inconsistency with accepted theories,
was for Nagano an immediate cause to start a priority dispute. For some, the mere association
with viral interference, a laboratory phenomenon that had been relegated to the limbo of
obscure phenomena of little biological significance, prevented them from becoming interested.
For still others the main reason to doubt the reliability of the claims was the inability to
replicate even part of the material results of Isaacs's and Lindenmann's experiments.
I should emphasize the important role replicability or reproducibility played in
extending work on interferon beyond the physical space of Room 215. Basically two types of
reproducibility can be distinguished in this chapter. The first type of replication was the
reproducibility of the material realization, or performance, of experiments, as happened in the
case of Tyrrell for instance. The successful replication in this cases implied that the same
actions were performed and the same experimental situations were produced as part of routine
laboratory practice in Isaacs's laboratory. This did not necessarily require agreement on the
interpretation of the results. This type of replication predominantly played a role in the transfer
of skills and the stabilization of a particular experimental system.""
Most common, however, was replicability of the material results of a particular set of
experiments, with investigators who each used their own favorite experimental system or
procedure to replicate the results. The evaluation of these attempts was the upshot both of a
non-trivial process of producing a particular set of material results at the bench and a rather
Unfortunately my source materials did not allow for specifying how all these different evaluative modes were
weighed against each other in individual cases.
"" Hans Radder has shown that there are more types of replicatication imaginable than the two presented here.
In exploring the scope and role of reproducibility in various case studies dealing with experimental practice,
by distinguishing as he calls it "between reproduction 'of what'—reproducibility of the material realization,
reproducibility of the theoretical interpretation and reproducibility of the result of the result of the experi-
ment—and reproduction 'by whom' (by any scientist or any human being, by contemporary scientists, by the
original experimenter and by the lay performers of the experiment)", Radder was able to draw a finely grained
map with up to 12 different kinds of reproducibility. See. H. Radder, 'Experimental Reproducibility and the
Experimenter's Regress', in D. Hull. M. Forbes and K. Okruklik (eds.) P5A. Vo/um<> / (East Lansing,
Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association. 1992), pp. 63-73.
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trivial process of judging the nature of the results in question and deciding how to go about the
research problem under investigation.'"* Failure to replicate was instrumental in bringing about
the 'misinterpreton rumours', and the subsequent claims about successful replication helped
reverse the balance of forces in favor of interferon. It clearly shows that both success and
failure in replication were used instrumentally to turn the activities of different laboratory
practices to one another. In other words, replication of the material results of experiments
fuelled the spread of interferon to other laboratories and countries.
Gradually the significance of experiments and experiences relating to interferon was
being transformed from a local into a trans-national issue as part of a new international line of
investigation within the field of animal virology. Work on interferon no longer meant work in
Isaacs's 'interferon kitchen' only. Through circulation, comparison and combination of written
and printed texts (letters, papers, articles, text-books, charts), research materials and skills,
interferon research became increasingly dependent on events outside the NIMR. It was a
matter of doing different experiments in a different time/space proportion. Beside Isaacs's
'interferon kitchen', 'others' began to take an active part in describing and defining the nature
and meaning of interferon in complementary ways.
In order to bring about a transformation of interferon's scientific status from a possible
'misinterpreton' to a new locus for professional commitment within the field of animal virology,
researchers like Isaacs, Wagner and. Ho and Enders, had had to engineer mutual ways of
communicating, manipulating, interpreting and elaborating on a common assembly of research
objects in an effort to describe other substances that complied with the agreed upon criteria in
terms of an interferon. I showed that this required quite some coordinating and coaching on
the part of Isaacs. This implied, among other things, helping to identify and eliminate factors
which prevented researchers in other laboratories from reproducing and manipulating an inter-
feron, organizing private experimental performances for fellow scientists in his London
laboratory, giving frequent talks on interferon, making suggestions for the publication of inter-
feron related experimental work, and stimulating further efforts to establish a common set of
experimental criteria as to what biological factors should bear the name interferon.
By accomplishing changes in the order of events in a growing number of laboratory
practices outside the NIMR, interferon increasingly gained independence from its initial site of
production. Isaacs's laboratory and interferon were no longer inseparable. In the process,
'interferon' emerged and functioned as an organizing principle and communication device of a
set of heterogeneous experimental practices—as a framework for manipulative and
interpretative practice—with investigators who each used their own favorite virus-cell system.
108
This is a clear illustration of Harry Collins's claim that these kind of empirical judgments necessarily have a
consensual basis or what Collin's calls the "experimenters' regress". See. H. Collins. C7ia/i#inj? Order
/fcp/icarion an</ /ndutd'on in Sci>n/i/7c Practice, (London, Sage Publications, 1985). p. 83.
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The range of these various experimental systems was wide and their number was on the
increase. As we have seen in chapter three, the building and manipulation of a workable experi-
mental system in Isaacs's laboratory required hard, uncertain, skilled and creative work. It was
a 'real-time and real-space' struggle to make things work. To engineer an association of
different laboratory practices that shared a data domain and style of language, is, then, not a
small achievement that can itself be taken as the explanation of a certain degree of scientific
consensus regarding the 'existence' of interferon as a specific biological entity.
Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, one may say that though in essence Isaacs's
laboratory had not changed that much, Isaacs's research world had become rather different
from the one he had inhabited when submitting his first interferon papers. What in 1957 was
still a laboratory phenomenon of local significance that had yet to pass its referees had not only
become the organizing principle for a new line of investigation—a growing group of re-
searchers sharing mostly practical and programmatical commitments within the field of animal
virology—but had also become a serious possibility for the development of an antiviral drug.
Furthermore, the scientific notion of interferon, which matured in conjunction with the work of
Isaacs and the 'others', had undergone a transformation. From a v/ra/ /n?e//<?ri7ig /actor which
was provisionally considered a oW/a/if v/'ra/ en/ify, interferon came to refer to acftW a/ift'vira/
jMtetanc« in particular culture fluids—as a generic term—which complied with a specific set
of experimental criteria and which were considered »renr/a/ prao'wcV.y o/ //i£ ce// that played a
part in resistance to viral infection."" However interesting this may be from a cognitive point
of view, we should keep in mind that the scientists under survey did not regard the situation in
terms of a shift of world view. They 'simply' manipulated, produced, and interpreted a body of
laboratory phenomena in what seemed to them the most appropriate way—as a means to the
end of increasing the range of manipulative options at the bench and of promoting the
blossoming of a new, cutting-edge field.
"" In cognitive sciences, e.g. psychology of science, the transformation process which interferon underwent
would be argued to exemplify in a gradual fashion some variant of a classical geslalt switch (quite common
are the rabbit-duck, pelican-antelope and Einstein-nude reversals). See, M. De Mey, 77ie Cogni'ftVe
(Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 1992). pp. XVI-XVII, 89-93, 173-6.
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Chapter 4
Interferon on Trial'
4.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter I described the formation of an international body of laboratory
practices with shared commitments in the pursuit of a common set of research problems. This
involved assembling heterogeneous collections of people and objects, without regard for the
walls of the laboratory. In being an essentially heterogeneous activity, collective work on
interferon required cooperation in order to create common understandings and produce
knowledge which retained its integrity across time and space. We saw how those engaged in
interferon research constantly faced uncertainty and difficulty. This was related to the problems
involved in operating essentially different experimental systems and at the same time making
efforts to exchange and compare research materials and data. Moreover we saw how the
products of research yielded and shaped different meanings and expectations in different social
realms. I showed that it was not laboratory research alone, but the perceived role of medicines
like penicillin as 'new wonders for the doctor's bag' as well as a national so-called 'American
penicillin syndrome', which triggered interest in developing interferon as a therapeutic drug in
Britain.
In this chapter I shall pursue my investigation of the emerging links between interferon
researchers, government administrators and entrepreneurs from several drug companies in the
British context. I will address the factors shaping the first successful postwar initiative to
secure a collaboration between the British government and the drug industry as a means to
develop interferon as a drug." The main point of interest is how these various parties tried to
cooperate across the domains which those involved routinely demarcated as 'science', 'policy'
and 'industry'. To what extent did they succeed or fail in bridging the differences between
industrial and academic 'life'? Furthermore I shall describe and analyze how interferon resisted
attempts at being integrated into conventional drug research and testing practices and how the
various parties reacted through a change of expectations and research agendas to these
A shortened version of chapter 4 was published in M«/ica/ //«wry; T. Pieters, 'Interferon and Its First
Clinical Trial': Looking Behind the Scenes', Wedica/ H«rory, 37 (1993), 270-95.
In 1955 the MRC and NRDC also initiated efforts to seek collaboration with British drug companies on the
development of the possibly interesting antibiotic, cephalosporin. However, despite initial mutual enthusiasm
because of slow research progress most companies soon lost interest and it never came to a formal Collabora-
tion Agreement; See, D. Wilson PeniciV/i/i in p<r.v/><>emr (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), p. 251.
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resistances. The intention here is also to point out how simultaneously the modes of perceiving
interferon as a therapeutic substance changed and differentiated.
The chapter begins with describing how upon deciding to start efforts to develop
interferon as a drug, the Medical Research Council (MRC) sought collaboration with British
drug companies to bring in the necessary expertise and resources. Attention focuses on the
symbiotic kind of relationship which develops between Isaacs, the MRC and drug companies. I
shall examine efforts to develop and carry out a collaborative research program by setting up
an Executive Body and a separate Scientific Committee on Interferon under the chairmanship
of Isaacs. In closely following the wheeling and dealing of this committee, I will show how in
the absence of a standard system for the testing of potential therapeutic drugs in the 1960's in
Britain, those involved decided on what tests should be done on the experimental substance,
interferon, to show if it might be safe and effective in the treatment of viral disease in humans.
We will see that in the process the expectations and commitments of the various parties began
to diverge. By focusing attention on the dynamics of the transitions between /« v/rro tests, ;'n
v/vo tests and tests on humans I will illustrate how through the consecutive experimental
sequences the objects of research as well as research agendas and commitments underwent
such changes as to drive the various parties gradually apart.
4.1 A partnership originating in national interests.
Following the extensive press coverage of interferon in which it was presented as a possible
'magic bullet' against viral disease in Britain in May 1958, the MRC received a letter from the
pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson. The American drug firm had noted the publicity
surrounding interferon in the UK and was most interested in receiving additional information
on this possible new lead to anti-viral therapy. In particular they wanted to know whether any
results from the administration of interferon to humans were available.' The American request
was passed on to Isaacs for reply. In response Isaacs provided Johnson & Johnson with refe-
rences of the latest publications on interferon while emphasizing that the NIMR and the MRC
had not yet "contemplated any experiments in man and even if present experiments go
favorably it is unlikely that we would do so for some time"."* Isaacs responded in a similar way
when contacted informally by Maurice Hilleman, the head of Virus and Cell Biology Research
The American pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson to the MRC, letter dated 25 June 1958, MRC
Archives, File No. A813/104.
* Alick Isaacs to Johnson & Johnson. New Brunswick, New Jersey, U.S., letter dated 25 June 1958, MRC
Archives . File No. A813/104.
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of the American drug firm Merck Sharpe & Dohme ('Merck').'
At about the same time, the Secretary of the MRC, Sir Harold Himsworth, was
informally approached by Glaxo's top executive, Sir Henry Tizard, about the patent position on
interferon.'' Together with the American requests for research information, this event provided
an important incentive for the Secretary of the MRC to consult the director of the NIMR, Sir
Charles Harington, about further action on interferon. Both parties realized that in order to
develop interferon as a drug some kind of collaboration with the British drug industry would
be needed. Harington indicated that he would welcome cooperation with one of the UK's
leaders in biologicals if it took the form of supplying interferon in large amounts, but he would
wait for Glaxo to take the initiative. However, Himsworth was in favor of a different approach.
The MRC's reluctance and restraint in co-ordinating things with regard to the industrial
development of penicillin during the second World War and the subsequent 'British failure' was
still fresh in everybody's memory.' It had an important influence on the MRC's attitude toward
interferon. If interferon would prove to be the new 'antiviral penicillin', the opportunity should
not be lost to develop it in Britain." Taking into consideration the American interest and a
possible drift of knowledge on interferon across the Atlantic where it might be developed into
a commercially successful product, Himsworth was in favor of taking determined policy steps.'
By actively seeking collaboration with British commercial firms only, they could best serve the
national interest.'"
Under the specific circumstances of British post-war science policy with the 'penicillin-
syndrome' as one of its guiding principles, the National Research Development Corporation
(NRDC) was entrusted with the task of making proposals for a form of cooperation. As a
result of the British "failure" to exploit penicillin, the National Research Development
Alick Isaacs to Jean Lindenmann, letters dated 19 March, 13 May 1958, Jean Lindenmann Correspondence,
personal archives.
* Internal Note MRC, dated 4 November 1958. MRC Archives. File NO. A814/17.
Liebenau pointed out how as a result of difficulties experienced when trying to co-ordinate things for insulin
in the 1920's. the MRC decided to keep its distance in future dealings with drug companies as can be seen in
the case of penicillin. Another factor that may have played a role in the MRC's reservations in the case of
pennicillin was the failed attempt in 1920's to unite a number of prominent British firms—among others
Boots. British Drug Houses and British Dyestuffs—in "The Pharmaceutical Corporation': see. J. Liebenau,
"The MRC and the Pharmaceutical Industry: the Model of Insulin', in J. Austoker and L. Bryder (eds.),
flisforica/ ferjpec/ivw on rfi<? Rote o//Ae MAC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 179-80.
Interviews with Derek Burke, Norman Finter and David Tyrrell.
In the 1940's the image of international competition (with American pharmaceutical companies) also helped
British academic workers to overcome part of their restraint towards British drug firms and start collaborating
on the development of penicillin as a drug; see, J. Liebenau, 'The British Success with Penicillin', Soc. 5fu<l
Sei., (17) 1987, 69-86, p. 75.
'" Internal Note MRC. dated 6 November 1958. MRC Archives, File No. A814/17.
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Corporation (NRDC) was set up under the British Industries Act of 1948 to secure the j
development of inventions resulting from public research and to obtain patents for these j
inventions. One of the first research projects in the field of biomedicine the NRDC took an
interest in was the development of the antibiotic cephalosporin C. In accordance with its terms
of reference the NRDC had been steadily patenting research results ever since the first results
on cephalosporin had been published in 1951 by an Oxford research group. By the time its
chemical structure had been established in 1955, the NRDC had initiated efforts to call in the
help of the British industry. In exchange for certain rights over use of the developed product,
several British pharmaceutical companies agreed to look at the problem. However it never
really came to a formal collaboration agreement and the NRDC experienced a rapid loss in
interest when progress turned out to be slower than expected. The cephalosporin experience
influenced NRDC's preference for a formal multi-party collaboration arrangement in the case
of interferon.''
In consultation with the NRDC the MRC decided to formally invite Glaxo as well as
other major British pharmaceutical firms to cooperate, by invitation to the Association of
British Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (ABPM).'~ In general, caution prevailed among British
drug company executives. The developments with the biological substance interferon were
closely followed. However, without Isaacs's claim about interferon's potential as a therapeutic
drug being substantiated by more extensive laboratory studies they decided to wait and see.
Even within companies like Glaxo with a long history of working with biologicals a reserved
attitude toward interferon prevailed. Few company scientists seemed to know what to make of
what essentially was not more than a mere protein soup with a claimed biological activity. The
perception of biologicals—drugs that are made of biological source materials (e.g. vaccines or
hormones like insuline) and whose potency and identity can only be determined by cumber-
some and inaccurate bioassays—as profitable but troublesome and high-risk commodities,
played an important role in preventing the drug companies from throwing themselves into
interferon research. In being primarily oriented toward medical chemistry and pharmacology
the drug companies preferred to deal with the relatively straightforward chemicals— com-
pounds that are made of source materials whose potency and identity can be adequately tested
by chemical or physical means. As far as the pharmaceutical industry was concerned, except
for the vaccines, most biologicals had a problematic developmental track record. They were
tricky to produce—requiring elaborate and expensive production and standardization proce-
' ' See, L. G. Matthews, tfmorv o/ P/wrmacv in BWrain (London: E.& S. Livingstone, 1962). pp. 330-3; and.
D. Wilson /VniriWin in/w>rs/K><mF (London: Faber & Faber. 1976). pp. 250-5.
'- Internal Note MRC, dated 4 November 1958, MRC Archives, File No. A813/104.
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dures, to be difficult to quantify and difficult to store." -*--•* • * '--
At the same time British drug company executives were quite familiar with the
industrial potential of substances of biological origin: the unparalleled clinical success record of
the biosynthetic penicillin-like antibiotics was all too visible. Their spectacular clinical activity
in eradicating bacterial infections had created a firm belief in the 'Ehrlichean' chemotherapeutic
research approach. Paul Ehrlich's ideal of generating chemical agents which, like 'magic
bullets', seek out and destroy the enemy and injure nothing else, seemed to have materialized.'*
Except for viruses most disease inducing microorganisms were known to be susceptible to
antibiotics. The common view was that the chemotherapeutic research approach would
eventually also provide them with some kind of effective and clinically useful anti-viral
therapeutic drug. One might say that in a clinical sense there was already an established frame
of thought for chemotherapeutic control of viral disease. This despite the fact that only costly
research failures had been reported as a means of developing a serious lead on viral chemo-
therapy. Most promising leads in the test-tube had proven to be too toxic in vivo and ever
increasing effort was being given to the control of viral disease by time-proven vaccination
('immunoprophylactic') principles."
Gradually, in reaction to the surge in public enthusiasm in Britain, and in relation to the
perceived clinical and economic promise of interferon as an 'anti-viral penicillin' the caution of
British drug firms subsided. The promise of interferon as a potential specific (that is truly cura-
tive) and innocuous drug which seemed to fit into the conventional ('Ehrlich's') concept of
chemotherapy as a sort of 'magic bullet' against virus infections was rather tempting. More-
over, from industry's point of view, risk-sharing with the MRC who offered their unique
expertise in interferon research and the eventual rights in the developed product, made work
on interferon look more feasible. This compensated for the uncertain manufacturing perspec-
tive of a biological like interferon.'*
Nearly all major British drug companies decided to accept the invitation and sent
representatives to the meeting with the MRC and NIMR. On 22 April, 1959 in one of the
L. E. Arnow, WeaWi m a flow/e; 5rarc/imj/o/- f/ie Drugs r/iar We/p (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1970); and, W. Breckon, 771c Drwg Watfrv (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd, 1972); and interviews with John
Beale and Norman Finter.
For an in-depth historical analysis of the development of Ehrlich's chemotherapy theory which was largely
based on the dictum "If the law is true in chemistry that corpora non agunt nisi liquida. then for chemotherapy
the principle is true that corpora non agunt nisi fixata."; see, J. Parascandola. The theoretical basis of Paul
Ehrlich's chemotherapy. J. Hist. Med. 36 (1981), 19-43: and, P. Ehrlich. 'Chemotherapy. In: 77K" ro/fecr«/
papers o/AW EJir/icA, (Himmelweit, F., Ed.) Vol 3 (1914), p.5O7, London.
" D. Wilson rVmaWin in perspective (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), pp. 278-279.
D. Wilson. PcniriV/in (London: Faber&Faber, 1976). pp. 278-82: and interviews with John Beale and
Norman Finter.
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NIMR's conference rooms at Mill Hill, London, representatives of the companies were infor-
med about the current state of affairs concerning interferon. Sir Charles Harington opened the
meeting by pointing out American interest in interferon, but emphasized MRC's preference to
first seek collaboration with British firms. Harington told the pharmaceutical companies that
the NIMR needed their help in developing this possibly interesting biological. The NIMR
simply lacked the expertise to tackle the production problem. In exchange he offered them
eventual rights in the developed product. Subsequently, both technical and patent matters were
discussed. A patent expert from the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC)
helped to clarify the patent position on interferon whereas Harington would call upon Alick
Isaacs, to answer technical questions." Isaacs was highly regarded by everyone as the
discoverer of interferon. Except for Harington nobody was aware that Isaacs had only recently
resumed all his duties at the World Influenza Centre (NIMR) after recovering from a severe
bout of depression and that at times he could behave in a rather manic way.'*
Most experimental results were argued to point in favor of the possible therapeutic
value of interferon. Enthusiastically Isaacs told the audience that in his laboratory interferon
had been shown to inhibit the growth of a wide range of viruses m viYro. He emphasized the
fact that apart from these in v/7ro studies also early animal experiments were carried out which
showed that interferon protected animals against virus infection. Moreover, so far all the
indications were that interferon was innocuous without any obvious ill-effects in animals. Of
course, Isaacs argued, his audience should take into consideration that systematic and large
scale investigations had yet to start and that there were still a couple of experimental problems
to solve. A major difficulty was the production of large enough amounts of active material to
start systematic investigations of both interferon's effectiveness against viral infection and its
toxicity in vivo. However, Isaacs expressed his confidence that with the help and expertise of
some of the companies present they would be able to find satisfactory solutions to these
practical problems.''*
Subsequently, with the help of the NRDC's patent agent, Harington succeeded in
playing down as a mere technicality the fact that the information available was considered
insufficient by the American patent examiner. Mainly because of a lack of evidence on the
drug's utility, the American examiner had decided that the patent application for interferon as
Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration in a program of work on interferon. held at the NIMR. 22
April. 1959. MRC Archives. File No. S788/1.
See. C. Andrewes, 'Alick Isaacs'. Bi'o^rap/ii'ca/ Memoirs o/fW/oivs o/f/if Rova/ SoriWy, 13 (1976), pp. 205-
21. p. 215; and interviews with Derek Burke and David Tyrrell.
Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration in a program of work on interferon. held at the NIMR. 22
April. 1959. MRC Archives. File No. S788/1.
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an antiviral agent had to be rejected until further research results could be made available.** At
the end of the meeting it was agreed that each firm represented at the meeting would let
Harington know as soon as possible whether or not they wished to collaborate on the
development of interferon.
In the weeks following the meeting the two British leaders in biologicals Burroughs-
Wellcome (Wellcome) and Glaxo Laboratories (Glaxo), and Imperial Chemical Industries-
Pharmaceuticals (ICI) informed the MRC of their willingness to co-operate."' Significant was
the fact that Sir Harry Jephcott, the chairman and managing director of Glaxo, announced that
Wellcome and Glaxo were prepared to act as one, hoping thereby to exclude ICI (who as yet
had not been active in the field of biologicals) from collaboration with the MRC.**
The following two factors played a most obvious role in this respect. First of all
Wellcome and Glaxo regarded biologicals as there core-business and tried to defend their
position as British leaders in biologicals against a newcomer like ICI (ICI's pharmaceutical
group was an off-shoot of its dyestuff division and as such had built up a strong position in
chemicals). Moreover, they both had had bad experiences with ICI as an unreliable collabora-
tor on penicillin. During the Second World War a consortium of British pharmaceutical
companies (including Wellcome, Glaxo and ICI), incorporated as the Therapeutic Research
Corporation (TRC), had collaborated on a penicillin development program." However, to the
unpleasant surprise of the others, soon after the war had ended ICI had prematurely pulled out
of the penicillin program.'''
The matter was eventually settled at an informal meeting when the MRC made it clear
to Jephcott that for public policy reasons ICI could not be arbitrarily excluded if the company
wished to participate." Anxious not to miss the boat on what might turn out to be a promising
innovative lead toward anti-viral therapy, the drug companies were eventually prepared to put
up with the multi-party collaboration arrangement. As will turn out the MRC's intervention
could not prevent the issue from being an early burden on the success of the collaboration.
Elkington and Fife, consulting chemists and chartered patent agents, to Alick Isaacs, letters dated 9 March,
1959, MRC Archives, File No. A813/104.
The pharmaceutical companies Wellcome, Glaxo and ICI to the MRC and vice versa, letters dated May 1959,
MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration in a program of work on interferon, held at the NIMR, 2 June,
1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
" J. Liebenau. The British Success with Penicillin', Soc. Smrf. Sei., (17) 1987, 69-86, p. 83.
Unfortunately due to the fact that the company archives have remained closed to outsiders up to this day the
knowledge about the wheeling and dealing of the companies and their policies is limited; J. Liebenau, The
British Success with Penicillin'. 5oc. S(«d. Sri.. (17) 1987, 69-86, p. 83.
" Internal note MRC. dated 5 June, 1959, MRC Archives, File No. S788/1.
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Further meetings were organized a couple of months later with all parties (NIMR,
MRC, NRDC, Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome) to discuss in more detail the proposed collaboration
and settle the outlines of an agreement for a collaborative program of further work on inter-
feron.-'' At the joint meeting which was held on 3 July 1959, the NRDC proposed to set up an
Executive Body to hold property, grant licences and administer the arrangement between all
the parties involved."' They suggested that NRDC's Patent Holdings Company, which had been
founded in 1953 with the aim of carrying out future collaborations between British government
institutions and private industry, might be used for this purpose. In addition they proposed to
set up a Scientific Committee on Interferon, which would come under the Executive Body and
provide a platform for the exchange of technical information and know-how.
Following further talks between the MRC, the NRDC and the three drug firms, all
parties in principle agreed to these proposals."* The MRC patents on interferon which were
currently being filed in the USA, Canada and West-Germany, as well as any further Council
patents regarding interferon, were made available to the NRDC's Patent Holdings Company.
The Executive Body would be run by senior managers of all the parties involved and the Scien-
tific Committee was to consist of research workers of the industrial firms and the MRC, under
the chairmanship of Isaacs. This committee was not only meant to serve as a clearing house for
information but also as a kind of scientific steering committee to allocate research work to the
various parties and to advise the Executive Body on the scientific aspects of further work on
interferon.-''
The parties concerned only agreed to the main points of an agreement for collabora-
tion. Further discussions and negotiations were needed to determine the exact terms of a
formal agreement between the NRDC, MRC and the three pharmaceutical firms relating to
interferon. In particular the differences in opinion on the issue of publication of research results
would require quite a bit of talking through before they could be settled. Harington and Isaacs
maintained that the results of all research work should be made available for scientific publica-
tion without limitations in the normal way in scientific journals. Only in order to ensure
adequate patent protection of any discoveries would they allow some delay to occur in
publication. The representatives of the drug companies, however, emphasized the need for
'* Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration in a program of work on interferon, held at the NIMR, 2 June.
1959. MRC Archives. File No. S788/1.
Minutes of a meeting to discuss collaboration in a program of work on interferon, held at the NIMR. 3 July,
1959. MRC Archives. File No. A812/5/1.
*' The executive body would be formalized in a GNRD Patent Holdings Ltd. with a board made up of
representatives of each of the collaborating firms and the NRDC. under an independent scientific chairman.
Proposed agreement with the NRDC on collaboration with some pharmaceutical firms, dated 10 July, 1959,
MRC Archives File No. A812/5/1.
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stringent control over publication. If necessary it should be possible to reject publication on
grounds that harm might be done to current and future patent positions.
All parties concerned regarded the issue of publication as the one point on which the
whole program of collaboration could easily break down. As I will show in the next two
sections much effort had to be invested in preventing this from happening. All parties to the
collaboration seemed to be prepared to do so. At least as long as each party remained
committed to the same central idea of developing interferon as an antiviral therapeutic drug
and shared similar thoughts about the constraints and the prevailing conditions under which
collaborative research should be performed.*
4.2 Establishing a'collaborative'program for research on interferon
While negotiations on the precise terms of a Collaboration Agreement were dragging on,
Isaacs was informally given the go-ahead to start discussing a program of research as chairman
of the Scientific Committee on Interferon." In showing their unconditional belief in the
authority of Isaacs's scientific expertise the MRC and the drug companies would virtually give
Isaacs carte blanche to pursue his personal research agenda regarding interferon.
In September 1959, under the vigorous leadership of Isaacs, the Scientific Committee
started to review and evaluate recent work on interferon." Isaacs emphasized that ultimately
all parties hoped to develop research on interferon to a point where it could be used therapeu-
tically in humans and animals. This would require both basic research and research on scaling
up from laboratory to manufacturing procedures. At the present stage of work it seemed that
more scaling-up than basic work was needed. Hence, Isaacs was very much in favor of a provi-
sional program for research that would focus on the development of methods for the large-
scale production, purification and storage of interferon. He also emphasized the need to
examine thoroughly the question of whether or not interferon was a species-specific biological
substance. MRC's research workers claimed that interferon prepared in chick tissues showed a
much higher antiviral activity when tested in v/zra in chick cells than it did in calf cells.
Similarly, chick interferon when tested in vivo in rabbits was found to have a far less protective
effect than rabbit interferon against viruses. Despite the fact that this species specific effect did
'" MRC to NRDC, letters, dated 10, 29 July 1959. MRC Archives, File No. A812/5/1.
The formulation of a clause on the publication of research results indeed turned out to be a major obstacle in
the negotiations. It would take until April 1961 to reach a formal Collaboration Agreement relating to
interferon.
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Minutes of the first and second meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon. 3, 9 September, 1959,
MRC Archives File No. S788/2/1.
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not seem to be absolute, it could have far-reaching consequences for the testing trajectory. If it
were to be substantiated by further experiments, tests on the virus-protective effect of inter-
feron in animals, and later in humans subjects, would require samples of interferon that had
been produced in cells of the same or a closely related species. The species specificity issue
most notably bothered the drug company scientists. They immediately realized that this would
complicate working in line with the conventional industrial new drug development trajectories
with preliminary toxicity studies on at least two species of animals." It meant that testing
interferon in mice would require the production of mouse interferon, testing it in rabbits would
require the production of rabbit interferon and so on. In addition, comparing test results in
different animal species would become far more difficult.
Until the spring of 1960, research on interferon was carried out, more or less, along the
lines of this provisional program, which closely resembled the initial stage in the industrial
development of a new drug involving a division of work and interplay between various
workers and disciplines (biologists, biochemists and physicians)". The MRC's researchers
mainly worked on the development of a purification method, the problem of the species-
specificity, and the mechanism of action. Meanwhile, researchers from the collaborating firms
focused on the development of methods for the large scale production of interferon.'''
In the meantime negotiations on the terms of an agreement relating to interferon
between the NRDC, MRC, Wellcome, Glaxo and ICI continued. The drug firms kept on
emphasizing the importance of a common obligation not to prematurely disclose relevant
subject matter to any person outside the collaboration."' Besides ensuring that patents were
taken out before publication of research results, the industrial collaborators wanted an
agreement that would provide for a particular clause to prevent one of the parties disclosing
information coming from another party. Wellcome even wanted to go as far as to impart non-
patentable information to outsiders. This met with resistance from Harington.
The director of the NIMR thought an absolute restriction on sharing of all non-
patentable information to colleagues most objectionable. In causing unnecessary delay in
publication of research results it could only harm the primarily academic interests of his
research institute. The MRC told Harington not to worry too much about this additional
demand. Since, as the MRC argued, this sounded fair and in these matters it would be better to
L. E. Amow, Hea/r/i in u So/r/e; 5farcAi/ij?/or r/if Dru^s r/iar //<•//? (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1970); W. Breckon, 77i? Drug Afaifefrj (London: Eyre Melhuen Lid, 1972); and interview with Norman
Finter.
Ibid
Minutes of the 3rd and 4th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 26 October, 26
November. 1959. MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
NRDC to MRC, letter dated 17 March 1960, MRC Archives File No. A812/5/1.
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wait and see how eventually the clause would be drafted." Ultimately all parties would agree
to the NRDC approving all papers before they were submitted: every first draft of a paper
would be submitted to the NRDC, who had agreed to give their approval within 14 days.'*
However, this could not prevent the parties from having occasional skirmishes over the
exchange of research information.
Apart from the publication issue, it is interesting to see how the definition of interferon
became part of the negotiations on the terms of an agreement and changed over time. From the
very beginning the industrial collaborators and patent advisers worried about the fact that
interferon did not denote a chemically characterized substance but a substance whose identity
could only problematically be determined by biological means. During the negotiations they
emphasized the need for a 'crystal-clear' definition of the agent of the agreement in order to
prevent future problems. The provisional description of interferon as "a viral interfering
substance produced by the action of partially-inactivated virus on a susceptible tissue" did not
satisfy this demand." However, it appeared to be rather difficult to find a definition that would
be narrow and broad enough to satisfy the demands of patent advisers, company executives
and researchers.
Eventually all parties chose in favor of a definition that was thought to serve the purpo-
se of both limiting the field of collaboration, and of covering under the agreement as many
natural virus induced substances with antiviral properties as possible:'"'
any substance (other than antibodies) which is produced by the interaction of a virus and a living animal tissue and
which is able to prevent, diminish or modify the multiplication of active viruses in living animal cells/'
However, the moment this definition made its appearance in the draft agreement it was again
called into question. The NIMR research workers had just claimed to have found natural virus
inhibitory substances which were different from interferon in that they shared serological
characters with the virus responsible for their production. In order to prevent these newly
discovered substances from being included automatically in the Interferon Collaboration and
MRC to Harrington and vice versa, letters dated 19, 23 March 1960. MRC Archives File No. A812/5/I.
Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 4 October, 1960, MRC Archives,
File No. S788/2/1.
Minutes of a meeting to discuss the draft Agreement prepared by the NRDC between Glaxo Laboratories
Ltd.. The Wellcome Foundation Ltd.. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.. the National Research Development
Corporation and G.N.R.D. Patent Holdings Ltd. relating to collaboration on interferon, held at The Wellcome
Building, Euston road, on 27 January, 1960. MRC Archives. File No. A812/5/1.
Ibid.
MRC to NIMR and vice versa, letters with comments on the drafts of an interferon agreement, dated 23, 31
March. 1960. MRC Archives, File No. A812/5/1.
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offering them for free to the industrial partners, the NIMR urged for the following change in
the wording of interferon's definition:
any substance (other than antibodies) which is produced by the interaction of a vims and a living animal tissue and
which, whilst it lacks the serological properties of the virus, is able to prevent, diminish or modify the multiplication
of active viruses in living animal cells/*
While succeeding in producing a more careful wording, gradually the complexity and length of
the latest definition began to bother the participants. As soon as it turned out that this
threatened to reduce the chances for obtaining official registration of the drug name interferon
from the national authority in this field, the British Pharmacopoeia Commission, negotiations
on a new wording started anew. The process of dropping, adding and changing the order of
modalities which either narrowed or widened the meaning of the wording went on until the
following definition was finally accepted by the Pharmacopoeia Commission:
a protein formed during the interaction of animal cells with viruses which is capable of conferring on animal
cells resistance to virus infection."
Once recognition at the national level was achieved, efforts were immediately launched to
secure the very same definition for interferon as a therapeutic compound at the international
level through adoption by the Council on Drugs of the American Medical Association and the
World Health Organization (WHO) in Switzerland. The industrial collaborators were alarmed
by the information that an Austrian drug firm had already started efforts to register the word
'intraferron' as an international trade mark. They regarded the definition and registration
question a high priority issue, as a means to defend their future market position.**
The complex nature of the negotiations about the collaboration agreement with fierce
debates down to the smallest detail took the NRDC by surprise. They obviously had not
expected to see such differences in interests between the MRC and the drug companies with
regard to research and information management, and, with regard to patent and market
position.
At a meeting in March 1960 NRDC officers asked the other parties whether there
might be a better way of effecting this kind of collaboration than the current proposal involving
the use of a Patent Holdings Company. The NRDC representatives even went as far as to ask
* MRC lo NIMR and vice versa, letters with comments on the drafts of an interferon agreement, dated 23. 31
March, 1960. MRC Archives. File No. A812/5/1.
•" Harington to MRC, letter dated 7 December. 1960. MRC Archives. File No. A814/17.
** See. NRDC to MRC. letter dated 13 October 1960. MRC Archives. File No. A814/17; and. Harington to
Wellcome, letter dated 29 March 1961, MRC Archives. File No. A814/17.
146
whether it would be desirable to proceed with the present collaboration using such an
arrangement. Upon discussing the matter it was agreed that, although in future cases it would
be simpler "not to use a patent holdings company but to set up a contractual arrangement", the
present collaboration should continue on the basis of a patent holdings company being used.'"
This certainly shows that so far the NRDC staff was far from on its own in their negative
assessment of the collaboration arrangement. >
At about the same time, after eight months of collaborative research, the Scientific
Committee suddenly revised the provisional research program quite radically.'** During the
April 1960 meeting research workers from the MRC reported the following two research
results. First, when testing the specificity of interferon prepared in a variety of animal tissue
cultures, monkey interferon had shown activity against a range of human and simian cells. In
particular, the observation that monkey interferon appeared to be active against a number of
respiratory viruses in human tissue-cultures aroused interest. It was agreed that, although
extrapolation from individual tissues to the complete organism was hazardous, monkey inter-
feron might be fit for future use in humans. Moreover, Wellcome's and Glaxo's experience of
many years with the production of poliomyelitis and measles vaccine in large scale cultures of
monkey kidney cells was argued to be helpful in overcoming problems with the production and
safety of monkey interferon.
Second, the purification work on interferon had reportedly resulted in a pure product.
The prospect of producing sufficient quantities of pure monkey interferon had a profound
impact on the planning of further work on interferon by the Scientific Committee. Immediately,
four suggestions were made for future experiments with purified interferon in monkeys and
humans:"'
1) Since the MRC was in the process of testing a measles vaccine, facilities to test interferon's
effect against measles would be widely available. It therefore seemed a feasible option to test
its protective effect against measles infection in volunteers. However, objections were
immediately raised. As measles was a systemic infection a measles trial would require conside-
rable amounts of interferon and extensive safety tests. Furthermore, interferon's effect on
measles had neither been tested in v/fro nor in vivo.
2) Interferon had shown a clearcut inhibitory effect against vaccinia virus ('smallpox') in vivo
and in vifro and it was proposed to test the protective effect of interferon against local
infection with attenuated smallpox in volunteers. There would be enough recruits available
Minules of a meeting lo discuss proposals of the industrial participants relating to the Collaboration
Agreement on interferon, held at NRDC offices, on 16 March 1960, MRC Archives, File No. A8I2/8/1.
Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 6 April, 1960. MRC Archives
File No. 788/2/1.
" Ibid.
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who had not yet been vaccinated against smallpox and were willing to volunteer in such a trial.
Moreover, as a local infection it would need much less interferon than a systemic infection and
require fewer safety tests.
3) The idea to test the protective effect of interferon on respiratory infections in volunteers
originated from a combination of experimental results and logistics. Interferon had shown a
protective effect against respiratory viruses in the laboratory and the MRC had an official site
for common cold trials in the form of the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury. Moreover the
common cold was a local infection which would require only small amounts of interferon and
relatively limited safety testing.
4) Quite recently Andrewes's Division had succeeded in culturing trachoma virus, which
caused local but potential debilitating infections in the eye and the MRC seemed interested in
finding a therapy against this virus disease.''* Testing the protective effect of interferon on
trachoma virus infection in monkeys was considered an excellent experiment to do first as a
final check before proceeding to experiments in humans. As a local infection it would require
only small amounts of interferon.
Isaacs, in particular, seems to have been rather keen on having an early demonstration
of interferon's effect in humans. He felt that it would help to keep people interested and
maintain the necessary pressure, because the negotiations on the Collaboration Agreement
were not completed yet/' The company scientists were less enthusiastic about deviating from
the conventional drug testing trajectory. However, they too were aware of the fact that the
American patent examiner had rejected interferon's patent application on utility grounds. If
interferon could be shown to have an effect on humans, even in an experimental infection, this
decision might be reversed. Moreover, Isaacs convincingly argued that interferon was different
from most other biologically active compounds in showing unusually few toxic side-effects in
human cell-cultures. According to Isaacs any substance being tried out in humans always
presented hazards, but in the case of interferon it was a great comfort to realize that it was not
so much a matter of administering a foreign substance as supplementing a natural mechanism
of resistance to virus infection. For this reason there was little chance of interferon producing
any severe adverse effects when administered to humans. Isaacs met the company scientists
part of the way by indicating that for safety reasons they would carry out the trachoma experi-
ment in monkeys first, followed by the vaccinia and common cold trial. A measles virus trial
was just too demanding to carry out at the present time. All agreed that in order to be able to
""* The trachoma agenl which is now considered to be part of the Chlamydiae family—a group of bacterial
organisms—was still referred to as a virus in the early 1960's: interview with a senior MRC-official who
prefers not to be identified, following the presentation of a preliminary version of this chapter to the Twentieth
Medical History Group of the Wellcome Trust, held at the Royal College of Physicians. 11 February. 1992.
The collaboration agreement was signed on 24 October. 1960. Memorandum and Articles of Association of
GNRD Patent Holdings Limited. MRC Archives File No. S788/6.
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carry out the trial program an early start had to be made with work on the large-scale pro-
duction, purification and storage of monkey interferon.'"
As we have seen in this section various considerations played a role in guiding plans for
research, most notably Isaacs's conviction that interferon was a natural non-toxic body-
substance and the fact that the patent examiner had rejected interferon's patent application on
utility grounds. Obviously work at the bench and policy-making co-evolved. Recall that when
members of the Scientific Committee reported the observation that monkey interferon showed
an activity against viruses in human cells in the test-tube, it was agreed that extrapolation from
individual cells to the complete organism was problematic. Yet it was decided to switch
attention to trials in monkeys and humans without further pursuing the legitimate question to
what extent extrapolation from one organism to the other was justified. In the next section I
will focus on the problems and questions that were raised during the preparations for and
performance of the trials, and again analyze what elements played a major role in constituting
the conditions of practice and in (re-)shaping plans for research.
4.3 Preparations for an early trial in volunteers
In preparing for clinical trials at its 1960 meetings, the Scientific Committee on Interferon star-
ted with general discussions about the nature and design of testing procedures. For a detailed
understanding of the trial proceedings it is important to realize that in the 1960's in Britain
there was no national system for controls regulating the testing of potential remedies. Neither
the Dangerous Drug Act 1951 nor the Therapeutic Substances Act 1956 provided a regulatory
context for the testing of medicinal substances in human subjects. And there were no ethical
committees to sanction (or otherwise) experiments on human volunteers or formal rules on
how to carry out a clinical trial." The British Ministries of Health left the control over testing
of new pharmaceutical substances for toxicity to the good sense of the researchers and
pharmaceutical companies involved."
50
Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 6 April, 1960, MRC Archives
File No. 788/2/1: A. Isaacs. 'Interferon', Sr/fn/i/Ic /Imerican, 204 (1961), 51-7, p. 57; Interviews with John
Beale, Derek Burke, Norman Finter, and David Tyrrell.
Medical ethics were primarily defined by the hippocratic oath, which all newly qualified doctors were
required to swear; J.S. Porterfield to T. Pieters, letter dated 9 November. 1993.
In the late 1950's in response to public anxiety in Britain about the hazards to the public health from
widespread use of potent over-the-counter drugs for self medication, the system of selfregulatory control over
new medicines was subjected to growing criticism. Political momentum was building up to reconsider and
strengthen British medicines regulation. Governmental steps to set up a central regulatory agency on drugs
safety were stimulated by what has become known as the Thalidomide traged/f 1960-62). In 1957 Thalido-
mide was marketed in Europe as a sleep-inducing and anti-emetic drug under the brand-name Comergan.
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, Except for the routine testing of immediate toxic effects on at least two species of
laboratory animals for several months no standard procedures existed to evaluate the clinical
safety and efficacy of new therapeutic substances. Usually after completion of the acute
toxicity studies in laboratory animals British academic and commercial laboratories began with
studies on healthy volunteers." This earliest trial of a new drug on humans involved adminis-
tering a single dose or a small number of repeated doses of the pharmacological substance to a
small group of about twenty volunteers. In most cases the volunteers participating in these
early trials were employees of the pharmaceutical company or institute involved in the
development of a specific therapeutic substance. Volunteering came with the job.'''
I will show that in the absence of a standard system for the testing of potential
therapeutic drugs, the knowledge and skill assembled over the years from testing biological
The drug was claimed to be far safer than the commonly used barbiturates and became a popular sleeping-pil.
However, in the course of 1960 the number of reports about serious side-effects related to the use of thalido-
mide began to rise sharply. By 1962 its use by pregnant women in Europe had been associated with the birth
of several thousand babies who exhibited serious birth defects, most notably a condition where children were
born without hands or feet named phocomelia. In the wake of the thalidomide scandal politicians and the
public in America and Europe called for stronger drug laws. In Britain the issue of medicines control was put
at the top of the political agenda and this led to the setting up of a Committee on Safety of Drugs ("The
Dunlop Committee") in June 1963. However, a new drug regulatory legislation which would force
manufacturers who wanted to obtain a Product Licence for a new medicinal preparation to provide the
Government with clinical evidence of safety and efficacy, had to wait until 1971 when the Medicines Act of
1968 came into force. Within the resulting regulatory system a so-called 'Medicines Commission' acted in
concert with the newly established Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) to advise through the
Medicines Division the Minister of Health (the Licensing Authority) with respect to the safety, quality or
efficacy of a drug; See, W. Breckon, 77ie /JnißrmiArr.v (Plymouth: The Bowering Press, 1972), pp. 121-41;
and D. G. Grahame-Smith. Problems Facing a Regulatory Authority, in J. F. Cavalla (ed.) Ri.vJt-ßf/ip/ir
i4n«/v.vi'.v m Dru^ Re\sp«r<7i (Lancaster. MTP Press Limited. 1981). pp. 51-4; and E. M. Tansey. Catterall
P.P.. Christie, D.A.. Willhoft S.V. and Reynolds. L.A., Wellcome Witnesses to Twentieth Century Medicine
Vol I (London: Wellcome Trust Occasional Publications. 1997).
" In the 1950's toxicity testing required no more than LD-SO's in a single species.
As soon as the results from the volunteer studies and additional animal testing indicated that there were no
serious health hazards likely to be encountered, preliminary studies in patients were initiated. In practice, it
meant that the new therapeutic substance was distributed among a small group of doctors who were experts
in the disease for which the substance was claimed as a therapeutic agent. These clinical investigators or
'consultants' as they were called set up trials ('suck it and see trials') in their hospital wards. Neither in the
case of these preliminary studies in patients nor in the early studies in healthy volunteers did the investigator
have to obtain informed consent' from patients and volunteers or was approval required from a human-
subject review board or other qualifying agency. A special code of ethics relating to early drug testing on
volunteers had to wait until 1971 when the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI)
publicly announced that its members would observe a new code of ethics relating to early experiments with
volunteers. In I960 in Britain you got the permission of the people involved and went out and performed the
trial; This description of the drug testing practice in Britain around 1960 is based on; W. Breckon. 77ie
Drng»miA<'r.v (Plymouth: The Bowering Press. 1972). pp. 121-41; A. Landsborough Thomson. Wo// a
O-nmrv »/Maftru/ Resfarr/i VW. // (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1975), 226-243; W. Sneader,
Dra# Dci'Wo/immr: From Laboratory r« C/m«- (Chichester: John Wiley&Sons. 1986). pp. 75-86; D. Healy,
77i<> P.m7i<>/>/i<)rm<i<'«/<»£i.\7j (London: Chapman and Hall. 1996). p. 113; and. information gathered during
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Medical History Group of the Wellcome Trust, held at the Royal College of Physicians, 11 February. 1992.
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products both within the companies and the MRC played an important role in establishing
testing procedures. This is nicely illustrated in the discussions about the need for and nature of
safety testing. Repeatedly the question would be brought up for debate whether they should
adopt an already existing safety test procedure for biologicals or devise an alternative test-
protocol for interferon."
4.3.1 Debating safety tests and interferon standards
At the June 1960 meeting of the Scientific Committee, the Glaxo researcher Alastair Dudgeon,
pleaded in favor of employing the same stringent safety test procedures as were being used
throughout the whole production process of the oral poliomyelitis vaccine, including the
repeated use of quarantined laboratory animals. Only by applying these kind of 'in-process'
safety controls did Dudgeon think it possible to exclude the rather worrying possibility of
potentially dangerous monkey viruses or other infectious microorganisms being present in the
final monkey interferon product. The Wellcome representative, David Edwards, however,
objected that repeated testing in quarantined animals throughout the production process would
greatly increase the expense of the project. He in turn thought it sufficient to concentrate on
the safety testing of the final product. The Glaxo chemist, Karl Fantes, then argued that it
might be profitable to study the effect of the virus-killing chemical, formalin, on interferon. A
combined treatment of interferon with acid and formalin, which were both known for their
viral inactivating capacity, might greatly increase the safety of the final interferon product
without having to rely on a complex and costly series of in-process controls (see Fig. 33a, b).*"
Eventually, on the basis of these discussions, preliminary safety requirements were
drafted for the production of interferon to be used in clinical trials. This included an early virus
identification test as was used for poliomyelitis vaccine, subsequent treatment with both acid
and formalin, and final z'n vj7ro anrf in vivo control tests. Moreover, an early trial in volunteers
would be organized first before any large-scale clinical trial was projected. In order to receive
critical feed-back on this draft the Scientific Committee proposed to send it for comment to
David Evans, the Head of both the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards and Immuno-
logical Products Control Laboratory which was housed in the old building of the NIMR at
Minutes of the 7th. 8th and 9th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 24 June, 4 October,
5 December I960, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/1.
Minutes of the 7th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 24 June 1960, MRC Archives,
File No. S788/2/1.
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Hampstead about 3 miles from the Institute at Mill Hill." In addition they planned for a special
meeting with Evans's staff of safety testing experts before finalizing a more detailed safety test
protocol.
Since its establishment in 1955 as a laboratory specially aimed at exercising laboratory
control for the Ministry of Health over the safety of the American (Salk) vaccine against
poliomyelitis, the NIMR's Immunological Products Control Laboratory had widened its
activities. Other control work for the Ministry had been added to its functions and by the early
1960's it was involved in the safety testing of a large range of virus vaccines and other
biologicals. Over the years a lot of knowledge and skill in testing the safety of biologicals had
been accumulated. In asking the Hampstead people for advice the Scientific Committee on
lnterferon hoped to profit from this pooled experience."* The safety test protocol that resulted
from the discussions with the experts at Hampstead on Wednesday, 22nd February 1961, was
based on the same 'in-process control' principle that was applied in the production of vaccines.
Extensive in vitro and animal tests would be performed at several stages of the production
process, so as to minimize the possibility of contamination with infectious agents."
In the meantime the trial plans underwent changes. Isaacs proposed to cancel the
trachoma experiment and concentrate on the vaccinia and common cold experiments. The
latest information on trachoma was that it responded, unlike any viral disease, to some
antibiotics and this casted doubt on the virus aetiology of this disease. The agent responsible
for trachoma might as well be of bacterial origin and hence insensitive to the actions of
interferon. Most likely, a trachoma trial in monkeys would only complicate research matters
instead of contributing to the understanding of interferon's actions in vivo.** All agreed with
Isaacs that taking into account the innocuous nature of interferon and the proposed extensive
safety testing procedure it was justified to start with volunteer studies right away. Since a
vaccinia trial seemed to require less preparatory time than a common cold trial, the former was
chosen as a first experiment to test the anti-viral effect of interferon on virus infections in
Minutes of the 10th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 16 February, 1961, MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/1.
Before its move to Mill Hill in May 1950 the whole N1MR was located at the Hampstead site. Since the work
on biological standards and control expanded more rapidly than expected soon it became necessary to
reoccupy the old Hampstead laboratories again. Eventually in 1972 a seperate National Institute for Bio-
logical Standards and Control would be established at Hampstead; See, A. Landsborough Thomson, W<i//a
On/ury n/Mf(ftu/ /frseurc/i VW. // (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 1975). pp. 250-252; and. J.
Austoker and L. Bryder. The National Institute for Medical Research and Related Activities of the MRC, in
J. Austoker and L. Bryder (eds.) /foforica/ Pers/vc-fives on »/if Äo/e off/ie MAC (Oxford; Oxford University
Press, 1989), pp. 56-7.
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human subjects. All agreed that the first volunteers should be recruited from the staffs of the
NIMR, Glaxo, Wellcome and ICI.
Apart from the nature and design of the human experiments, and the recurrent safety
debate, the need for standardization was discussed at length in preparing for trials with
interferon. From the very beginning the variability of assay results had been on the Scientific
Committee's research agenda. Researchers reported considerable variations in the potency of
interferon preparations from day to day, week to week, from researcher to researcher and
laboratory to laboratory. Each time the matter came up for discussion, pleas could be heard for
the standardization of assay methods and the creation of standard interferon preparations for
common use. However, apart from individual efforts to set some interferon preparations aside
to be used as internal standards in one's own laboratory, little was done to establish common
interferon standards until the issue began to hamper the preparations for human trials.
Half-way through February 1961, the ICI researcher, Norman Finter, again raised the
standardization issue." He told the others that he was able to achieve a marked reduction in
the variability of test results by expressing the potency of interferon preparations as a percen-
tage of an arbitrary interferon standard which was assayed in parallel. By coinciding with
discussions on requirements for human trials Finter's report stirred up serious interest in the
standardization issue. Everyone began to realize that establishing and using a reference
standard preparation was absolutely necessary to give authority to the eventual trial data,
which could be appealed to under all circumstances. However, the need for standardization
was also increasingly felt in the preparations for the trials. Without sharing a standard it
appeared already difficult to agree on the activity of a particular preparation, let alone
justifying the decision to discard a costly batch of clinical trial interferon because of its poor
biological activity. Moreover, it was hardly possible to produce sound answers to important
questions—like 'Does the interferon remain stable over time?', and, 'What dose of interferon is
required to produce a detectable antiviral effect in humans?'—in the absence of a tool to
correlate and compare the potency of interferon preparations.
All these considerations underlined the immediate need for establishing a reference
standard preparation for monkey interferon, to which an agreed potency would be assigned.
This time things went beyond the discussion stage. The Scientific Committee decided to start
effort to establish a provisional standard for monkey interferon against which all monkey
interferon samples could be compared. In order to prevent the members of the Scientific
Committee from describing potency in several different ways, the potency would be related to
a common unit for monkey interferon. Finter indicated that, as no such unit existed, it had to
be defined on an arbitrary basis once appropriate material for the standard preparation had
Minutes of the 10th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 16 February, 1961, MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/1.
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been obtained. This was the usual procedure in establishing a standard for biologicals. As the
NIMR's Division of Biological Standards was responsible for establishing and supplying all
British biological standards it was thought most appropriate to leave the task of keeping and
distributing a provisional standard to this Division.'"
The Executive Body was far less enthusiastic about the efforts to establish national
interferon standards. The free circulation of standards, however practical and profitable in
research terms, was perceived as troublesome in management circles. Senior company
executives had just signed the final Agreement for Collaboration on Interferon and the plans
with regard to establishing a provisional British standard was giving rise to concern among the
Board of the Patent Holdings Company."' It was of particular concern to them that the
standard preparation would most likely be made available to workers outside the collaboration.
They strongly believed that this would inevitably lead to the disclosure of valuable research
information and hence to the commercial disadvantage of the collaboration.
The concerns over standardization coincided with rumors within the Executive Body
that Isaacs had conveyed secret information to an outsider. Reportedly he had told Enders
about his latest research results concerning the stimulation ('induction') of interferon produc-
tion in cell cultures by the administration of so-called 'non-viral (foreign) nucleic acid
fractions'—preparations of nucleic acid (either DNA or RNA) derived from cells not infected
with viruses such as RNA from yeast cells. Moreover, reference to this highly confidential
subject matter also appeared to have been made in an article that was published by Isaacs in the
5c/Vn/(/i'f /WM<?r/ca/j.** It was generally felt that Isaacs's unauthorized disclosures were putting
efforts to establish a strong patent position for inventions that might emerge from work on the
use of these foreign nucleic acids as interferon inducers in jeopardy. All agreed that not only a
letter should be sent to the MRC to draw attention to the possibly damaging nature of both
issues to the Company, but also a personal approach would be made to Sir Harold
Himsworth.'''
The affair gave rise to substantial disquiet within MRC quarters. Himsworth, who
wanted at all costs to make a success out of the first formal post-war collaboration between
the Government and the British pharmaceutical industry, personally demanded that Harington
*"" Minutes of the 11 th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 19 April, 1961, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/1.
*•' Agreement for Collaboration on Interferon. 3 May 1961. MRC Archives. File No. A 812/5/1.
" A. Isaacs. 'Interferon'. SWenft/ic-Amrriron, 204 (1961). 51-7.
" Minutes of a meeting of Directors of GNRD Patent Holdings Limited, dated 19 June. 1961. MRC Archives.
File No. A 812/5/1.
156
should provide an explanation.** Harington immediately consulted Isaacs, who unaware of
having caused resentment in MRC circles, was enjoying his recent appointment as head of the
Division of Bacteriology and Virus Research. Isaacs told Harington that he could not
remember leaking significant information to Enders or the Scte/iri/ic American." Isaacs was
equally surprised to hear about the fuss that was made over the standardization issue. As far as
he was concerned an experimental standard had been prepared for research purposes only, and
it had so far only been distributed to members of the Scientific Committee.**
Through the agency of Harington, whose social skills were seriously tested, the matter
was eventually settled.*' To show his good-will Isaacs formally asked approval from the
NRDC to present as invited speaker his research on foreign nucleic acids as inducers of
interferon to the Swedish Academy of Medicine and the Royal Society.'" As we can read in the
minutes of the subsequent meeting of the Executive Body, which was held at the office of the
NRDC in London on 21 September, 1961: "The Board expressed itself content with the
exchanges which had taken place". This included a compromise-in-the-making about the issue
of the provisional British interferon standard. Eventually the Board decided that they had no
objection to the distribution of material to be used for standardization purposes only to
"appropriately qualified" non-collaborating persons or parties under the control of a member of
the MRC staff."
The whole affair clearly shows the enormous energy that continued to go into bridging
the differences in cultures. On the one hand, you had the government researchers like Isaacs
who continued to regard the free exchange of information and laboratory materials as a
precondition for fruitful research. On the other hand, virtually opposed to this position, stuck
the drug company people to their perception of the same working practice as a threat to the
commercial development of therapeutic drugs. But at least for the time being they were able to
craft compromises.
** Internal note MRC. dated 20 June 1961, MRC Archives, File No. A 812/5/1.
" A. Isaacs, 'Interferon', Scien/i/ic- American. 204 (1961), 51 -7.
** Harington to NRDC, letter dated 21 June 1961, MRC Archives, File No. A 812/5/1.
Harington then sent a couple of letters to both the NRDC and MRC. in which he emphasized the fact that the
Scientific Committee supported the agreement that the distribution of the standard would not be extended to
people outside the collaborating group without prior reference to the NRDC; Harington to NRDC, letter dated
21 June 1961, MRC Archives, File No. A 812/5/1; and Harington to MRC, letter dated 10 August 1961,
MRC Archives, File No. A 812/8/1.
™ Harington to NRDC, letter dated 21 June 1961, MRC Archives, File No. A 812/5/1.
" NRDC to MRC, letter dated 21 February 1962, MRC Archives File No. A812/8/1.
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4.3.2 Handling production and safety problems
Meanwhile, problems were forming relating to the preparations for tests in humans. The fact
that the production of a large batch of monkey interferon for clinical trials took much longer
and resulted in less material than was anticipated began to put the collaboration within the
Scientific Committee under strain. Isaacs, in particular, was disappointed by the slow rate of
progress. He was surprised to see that the scaling up of production and purification procedures
took so long. The latest in a row of setbacks was the news from Glaxo Laboratories about the
loss of a large batch of satisfactory monkey interferon due to one or another filtration error.
Isaacs wondered whether something could be done about this rather frustrating situation and
what steps were needed to speed up research work. Far too often there had been duplication of
research work and, in his view, the contribution of the scientific staff of the collaborating firms
could have been more substantial. The representatives of the firms agreed that progress was
slow, but this was only to be expected in this stage and certainly not due to a lack of commit-
ment. Confronted with an unexpectedly stiff opposition Isaacs gradually toned down his
criticism and showed his good will by promising to pay special attention as chairman to a more
efficient distribution of research work.'"
Almost all of Isaacs's spare time went into keeping the wider public interested in the
interferon cause. Both in lead articles in the SciV/tft/tc /4m?nca/i and the Afew 5c/e nft'rf, and on
the BBC television program 'Achievement 1961' Isaacs made reference to imminent tests of
interferon in humans which would show whether interferon fulfilled its promise as medicine's
first really effective cure for virus infections." He also became the first academic investigator
ever to deliver a lecture at the annual British Pharmaceutical Conference (see Fig. 34).
Addressing the audience of mainly pharmacists and representatives of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry he called interferon "a round unvarnish'd tale", an exciting example of
how investigation in an academic field of research can lead to the practical prospect of treating
virus infections in humans. Apart from informing his audience on the general state of the art of
interferon research Isaacs emphasized the fact that success in reaching the stage of clinical use
Minutes of the 13th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 13 September, 1961, MRC
Archives. File No. S788/2/1; Tyrrell, interview; and Finter, interview.
" A. Isaacs, 'Interferon', SriVnfi/ic /4mfr/ran, 204 (1961), 51-7; and, S. Baron and A. Isaacs, 'Interferon and
Natural Recovery from Virus Diseases'. New Scientist 243 (1961), 81-2; and. Internal note MRC. MRC
Archives 9 March 1962, File No. A 742/14.
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of interferon in humans largely depended on the ability of the MRC and three pharmaceutical
firms to develop a productive research partnership." In publicly linking the success of the
research venture to the success of the Collaboration Isaacs cleverly put all parties under an
obligation. At the same time, by presenting the Collaboration as a crucial test-case that might
be extended in the future to many other fields of research, Isaacs limited his own freedom of
speech and action: neither the others nor he was supposed to prejudice its possible success.
Pharmaceutical
Conference
Fig. 34. A round unvamish'd tale. Courtesy of Dr. S. Isaacs Elmhirst
A. Isaacs, Interferon: A Round Unvamish'd Tale,
13 (1961), pp. 57T - 6IT: and. Editorial, 77ie Ctemür am/ Druggwf, 30 September 1961, 375.
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Fig 35a,b. Production of interferon at Wellcome
Laboratories with Dr R.F. Sellers in the left hand photo (1961).
Used with the permission of Glaxo Wellcome pic.
In November 1961, two months after the disruptive notice that a large batch of monkey
interferon had been lost due to a technical failure, news came from the Wellcome Laboratories
that the first three litres of clinical trial interferon and control material were ready and had
proved satisfactory in both activity and sterility tests (see Fig. 35a,b). According to the agreed
upon safety test protocol, the clinical trial interferon and control material had been subjected to
toxicity tests in mice and guinea pigs. The toxicity test in mice went satisfactorily. However,
this was not the case when the guinea pigs were used. One guinea pig out of two died three to
four days after subcutaneous inoculation. Confronted with the high mortality rate in guinea
pigs the Wellcome scientists immediately had decided in favor of additional tests in dogs and
monkeys. The same interferon and control material had then been given to a couple of two
year old dogs subcutaneously and to two rhesus monkeys intradermally, but in both cases no
sign of toxicity was monitored. It was altogether a puzzling affair. What was the meaning of
the high guinea pig mortality after interferon inoculation?"
The matter was brought up for discussion during a meeting of the Subcommittee on
Preliminary Clinical Trials in Man at the Immunological Products Control Laboratory in
Hampstead. Dr. Sellers from Wellcome Laboratories pointed out that guinea pigs were
described in the literature as being extremely sensitive to penicillin. Since penicillin was used to
prevent bacterial infection in the large scale culture of monkey kidney cells in which interferon
Interferon report by The Wellcome Research Laboratories, December 1961, MRC Archives File No.
S788/2/1.
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was produced there might be enough penicillin in the interferon material to be fatal to guinea
pigs. Unfortunately the lengthy debate that followed was not registered, but what I do know is
that after much discussion the majority agreed that although further guinea pig tests were
required to confirm their singular sensitivity to penicillin no harm would be done by proceeding
at the same time with toxicity tests in human volunteers. The members of the scientific
committee would perform the toxicity tests on themselves and volunteering colleagues. As a
precautionary safety measure penicillin-sensitive and allergic individuals would be excluded.
The proposed course of action showed the strong belief in interferon as a non-toxic natural
antiviral agent in humans. Instead of waiting for the results of additional tests in guinea pigs
the members of the scientific committee volunteered for self-testing. ™
At the subsequent meeting of the Scientific Committee the misgivings of the past
months seemed to be forgiven and forgotten with the preparations for a trial in humans moving
into gear. Isaacs reported that of 5 volunteers inoculated at the NIMR only two showed an
abnormal flushing of the skin after 24-hours. but only in one case was the reaction so severe as
to prevent the person from being enlisted in the ultimate trial. Tyrrell had inoculated himself
and three other subjects and only he himself had had an abnormal flushing of the skin. Of the
five volunteers inoculated at Glaxo the members of Scientific Committee, John Beale and
Robert Andrews, showed a reaction to the interferon inoculation consisting of a substantial
swelling of the skin of the arm and pain but no reaction to the control. Beale argued that in
having experienced a rather severe inflammatory reaction to the interferon inoculation himself,
he was far less worried about the safety aspect than about the possibility that such an
inflammation due to interferon might interfere with the interpretation of the experiment. In
assessing the provisional results all agreed that since no alarming reactions had occurred it was
justified to go ahead with the trial and start discussions on the trial design. With no standard
rules how to perform a clinical trial the trial design was left to the wisdom of those involved.
Most common at the time was a so-called 'open' experiment in which the investigator
was held responsible for administering the pharmaceutical substance to the volunteers or
patients and monitoring their condition. On the basis of the volunteer or patient records the
clinical investigator then formed impressions of the potential toxicity and the probable
therapeutic value of the substance and sent a summary of the experiment together with his
conclusion to the sponsor of the trial. However, the practice of testing therapeutic drugs in
Officially self-testing was and still is frowned upon and condemned as 'sloppy* science: "How can one
possibly maintain objectivity in the reading of results if the experimenter and the human subject who will
undergo the preliminary experiment are the same?". However, in actual laboratory practice it was the normal
thing for scientists to try out any new medicines or biomedical procedures on themselves first in order to get
an indication as to whether a larger field experiment was warranted. Self-testing still takes place on a much
larger scale in our laboratories than anyone dares to acknowledge.Minutes of meeting of the subcommittee on
preliminary clinical trials in man at the MRC, Hampstead. 4 December 1961. MRC Archives File No.
S788/2/1.
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humans was slowly beginning to change in Britain. Convinced that the methods of the
statistically controlled trial or so-called 'randomized controlled trial' would provide a more
reliable, more objective basis for evaluating medical research and directing clinical practice, the
MRC actively promoted the use of randomization in testing new therapies."
In the most advanced type of randomized clinical trial the new agent was tested against
a look-alike placebo—a harmless, inert preparation—under circumstances where neither the
patient nor the doctor and nurses knew whether the remedy or the placebo was administered to
particular subjects. This type of controlled experiment was usually referred to as a 'double
blind' experiment. The double-blind clinic trial was the most complicated to run. Every dose of
both trial medication and placebo had to be coded, and the codes had to be cryptic enough not
to be cracked by the ingenious minds of the people involved. An independent third party had to
keep careful records of who got what and keep those records secret until after the trial
monitoring data had been gathered, counted, compared and evaluated. Among biostatisticians
the double-blind trial was considered an absolute requirement if you did not want to throw the
statistical validity of your test right out of the window. For instance, in a single-blind study, the
'blind' subjects might pester their physician who kept records of who got what, to tell them
what they got or did not get, or the doctor might react to the condition of his patients
according to their expectations about the new agent. In double-blind placebo-control studies,
subjects and investigators alike were believed to be much less susceptible to psychosomatic or
other personal factors which threatened to undermine the statistical validity and hence
assessment of clinical trial data.'*
Taking into account the central role of the MRC in the Collaboration it may not come
as a surprise that the members of the Scientific Committee decided in favor of the state of the
art double-blind placebo-controlled trial design. The trial would be carried out on a limited
number of about forty non-allergic and unvaccinated volunteers, who would be recruited
within the various collaborating laboratories. The trial procedure went as follows.™ Two sites
5 cm apart on the upper part of the arm of each volunteer were to be inoculated with either
interferon or the control material. The ampules with interferon and control preparations would
See, for a personal account of the historical development of controlled trials in British medicine: R. Doll.
'Development of Controlled Trials in Preventive and Therapeutic Medicine'. 7. 0/O.KM- So, 23 (1991). 365-78.
This description of the actual controls over new medicines in Britain around 1960 is based on: W. Breckon,
77i«> Oraj;'"«*«'''.« (Plymouth: The Bowering Press. 1972). pp. 121-41; A. Landsborough Thomson. Ha//n
Onrurv o/A/erfiVtf/ Rcjcorc/i VW. // (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 1975), 226-243: W. Sneader.
Drwj? DfrWo/imcn/: from La/wrafory /<> C/iniV (Chichester: John Wiley&Sons, 1986). pp. 75-86; and
information gathered during discussions following the presentation of a preliminary version of this chapter to
the Twentieth Century Medical History Group of the Wellcome Trust, held at the Royal College of
Physicians, 11 February. 1992.
Minutes of the 15th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 14 December, 1961, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/1.
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be labeled either X or Y and distributed 'blind' together with special forms by a researcher from
NIMR's Immunological Products Control Laboratory, who would be the only one to know the
code. A so-called form A with the name of the volunteer should indicate, as decided by a
random coding procedure, whether the inoculator was supposed to inoculate X or Y in the
front or backside of the arm. Subsequently the inoculated areas would be marked with indelible
pencil to make it possible to carry out the vaccination with attenuated cowpox virus twenty
four hours later on the exact site of each of the previous inoculations. A different person, the
observer, should then receive a so-called form B with only the name of the volunteer on it and
spaces for daily observations for a period of 14 days as to ensure that the vaccine takes would
be read 'blind'. Any possible sign of a lesion developing at the injection side would be moni-
tored as closely as possible as inflammation due to interferon might in one way or the other
affect the development of virus lesions (see Fig. 36a, b, c).®°
On Thursday the 22nd February 1962 the great day had come for Isaacs and the other
members of the Scientific Committee on Interferon to exchange and discuss the results of the
first trial of its kind to see whether interferon prepared in the laboratory could prevent the
establishment of a virus infection in humans. Unusually large delegations of all the parties
involved were assembled for the occasion in one of the conference rooms of the NIMR and
waited anxiously for the chairman to open the meeting. Isaacs cheerfully announced that the
trial with interferon had yielded promising results."'
At the NIMR 17 out of 23 volunteers showed a clear protection at the interferon site
against cowpox infection and the development of vaccinia! lesions. As far as interferon's
protective effect was concerned the NIMR volunteer group had been exceptionally successful.
At Wellcome Laboratories 7 out of 19, at Glaxo Laboratories 2 out of 4, at MRC Hampstead
two out of seven and at the Common Cold Unit only 1 out of five volunteers showed clear
protection against virus infection. Despite the considerable deviation in test results between the
various volunteer groups the overall protection rate of 60% against virus infection was
considered a definite success."
All agreed that the results of the clinical trial were certainly qualified for publication in
either the iLfl»«-/ or the ßrif;j7i A/CY/ICYI/ 7oMnia/. Isaacs immediately offered his services to
prepare a first draft. This time even the commercial side to the Collaboration encouraged him
Minutes of the 15th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 14 December, 1961, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/1.
Minutes of the 16th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon, dated 22 February, 1962, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/2; and Tyrrell, interview.
Ibid.
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Fig 36a. The arm of a human volunteer
before vaccination.
wcc*oot>on
take at control
sH< only
Fig 36b. Principle of the vacination experiment with interferon. The arm is
injected with two fluids. V being Interferon and "y"
an inactive control material for comparison. Subsequently
smallpox vaccinations arc made at both sides.
R g 36c. The ami oi a human volunteer after vaccination. The vaccine has
clearly taken' in site B (no interferon).
but not in the other (interferon).
Courtesy of D. Tyrrell.
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to do so. All parties realized that with such a publication they would have a strong case in
support of the American patent application. For once the interests with regard to the dissemi-
nation of information of both government researchers and company executives seemed to
correspond.
4.3.3 The La/ieef report.
As promised, Isaacs prepared a rough draft of the trial results and circulated it to the members
of the scientific committee and to the MRC before finalising it as an official report to the MRC
from the Scientific Committee on Interferon, and submitting it for publication to the La/ice/.
During a routine check of the trial data in Isaacs's report, the MRC's medical officer who had
been present at the presentation of the preliminary results, came across oddities in the figures
from the Wellcome laboratories. As far as he could remember more than the reportedly three
volunteers had participated in the Wellcome trial group. Furthermore he could not avoid the
impression that apart from the fact that the vaccinator and the observer had been one and the
same person, this individual also seemed to have taken part as a volunteer in the trial. The
medical officer immediately informed Isaacs, who confirmed that his suspicions were correct:
"Dr Isaacs telephoned me this morning to say that the query I had raised in my letter to him of
2nd April about the results from the Wellcome laboratories had been very astute (more so than
I had suspected)".'"
Isaacs told him that after the meeting of the scientific committee he found out to his
dismay that the Wellcome scientists had made a mess of things. How on earth could the
monitoring of the volunteers have been blind if there was no difference between the vaccinator
and the observer? They even appeared to have forgotten about the agreed upon single arm
procedure and inoculated volunteers in both arms. By tampering with procedures the Well-
come laboratories obviously had broken the rules of the trial which was supposed to be double
blind. Isaacs indicated that he had tried to cover up for Wellcome's sloppy data in his report by
including only 3 out of the 19 volunteers tested at the Wellcome Laboratories. The issue
worried him and he asked the MRC officer advice on what to do next. Would it be best to
make no reference to the Wellcome data at all as suggested most recently by David Edward of
Wellcome, who had been away in the United States during the time of the trial?
In response the medical officer urged Isaacs to discuss the matter with Sir Charles
Harington. Eventually, in consultation with the research director of the Wellcome Laborato-
ries, Colonel Mulligan, Harington decided that the Wellcome laboratory figures should be
Internal Note MRC. dated 4 April. 1962. MRC Archives File No. A8I3/I27
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Fig 37: Results of individual vaccinations in the vaccination trial"'
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deleted from the text of the report.®' In the meantime the original report had been submitted to
the I/wicrf but was being held up until the matter had been settled. With the "delete decision"
in mind, it is surprising then to see that in the final Lance/ report the three Wellcome volun-
teers can still be found. Furthermore, both in the case of the Common Cold and Hampstead
figures, two volunteers are missing (see Fig. 37).**
According to the report in the Lance/—"A report to the Medical Research Council
from the Scientific Committee on Interferon"—the clinical trial with interferon to study the
effect of interferon on vaccination in volunteers was carried out as a result of unambiguous
experiments with an antiviral substance in the laboratory. The transition from experiments in
the test-tube and in laboratory animals to experiments with humans was depicted as unproble-
matic. In addition, the trial was said to have proceeded smoothly and unmistakably showed
that interferon had an antiviral effect in humans.""
Obviously the contingencies and uncertainties which the committee members had faced
in preparing for and performing the vaccination trial and the simultaneous management of
uncertainty were deleted from the public record. While Isaacs proclaimed the trial a success
and wrote in the Atew Scie/i/is/ that work on interferon had "just passed a critical stage" by
producing statistically highly significant results which showed that interferon protected human
volunteers against infection with the vaccinia virus, the managing boards of the companies
judged the efficacy data differently.** In their opinion the resources invested in the trial efforts
were in no proportion to the experimental results: interferon had only shown a protective
effect in a clinically insignificant viral infection under controlled circumstances. The trial was
not regarded as particularly informative as to whether or not interferon deserved the label
therapeutically-interesting with regard to everyday practice. They were concerned about the
already high costs of producing minute amounts of semi-purified monkey interferon, not to
mention the possible production costs of human interferon.
Going by the information from their scientific staff the production process seemed to be
bedeviled by technical problems too and much more basic laboratory work would be needed
than expected to figure out interferon's clinical potential. The idea began to settle within
management circles that it might take years before the large-scale commercial production of
material suitable for clinical use might even be taken into consideration. With the growing
doubts about whether interferon was indeed worth the big effort that was being put into it, the
Alick Isaacs to Derek Burke, letter dated 5 April. 1962, Derek Burke Correspondence, Norwich, personal
archives; and Internal Note MRC, dated 4 April, 1962, MRC Archives File No. A8I3/I27.
Unfortunately the current editorial staff of the Lancet was unable to locate the 1962 Lancf/ editorial files
dealing with the publication of the vaccinia trial report from the Scientific Committee on Interferon; D. Sharp
to T. Pieters, letter dated 25 March 1998, T. Pieters personal archives.
Scientific Committee on Interferon. 'Effect of Interferon on Vaccination in Volunteers', Lance/, i (1962), 873-
5, p.875.
A. Isaacs, 'Interferon tried in man', Atew 5ri>n/ü(, 3 May 1962.
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commitment of the three drug companies to interferon came under pressure.*'
My analysis of the 1962 Lance? report shows that the consistency of an experimental
study is influenced by more than the rigor of its experimental design and the statistical
elaboration of the trial data; this can be seen by the way test objects are recruited, by the
compliance of those involved to the agreed-upon trial procedures, and by the way in which
decisions for starting, stopping and reporting a study are made. Moreover, in closely parallel-
ing what one might call a treatment's scientific basis, the published efficacy data appeared to be
of little value to those primarily interested in assessing interferon's therapeutic potential in
everyday practice ('effectiveness'). I will show in the next section how following the publica-
tion of the first trial report a gradual reversal of commitments and objectives of those involved
came about. Questions were raised about whether or not the development of interferon as a
therapeutic drug constituted a worthwhile pursuit, and about the appropriate research
approach among those working at the bench and administering the collaboration.
The dissensions which arose in the process reflected the conflicting time-horizons and
conflicting ways of handling and judging research data of the various parties involved in the
Collaboration. The academic scientists were foremost interested in creating new opportunities
for research, advancing their scientific careers and the prestige of the institute or research
organization. They regarded interferon as a somewhat unruly but promising biological
substance that represented a major new stratagem of defense against infection by viruses.
Sooner or later interferon would prove of use to medicine in one way or another—if not as an
end in itself than as a means for stimulating people to make their own interferon. However
difficult and time-consuming, this was not believed to be beyond the powers of modern
pharmaceutical technology available through the pharmaceutical industry.
The executives of the drug companies, on the other hand were trained in evaluating
research projects rather sooner than later in terms of their market potential, and the likely time
and expenses involved in translating laboratory data and processes into practical and
commercially-viable medical technologies. They took note of the published efficacy data but
reacted to what they judged and perceived to be therapeutically-interesting remedies. They
actively created their own profile of the treatment's effectiveness, attaching much importance
to commercial-viability (research expenses compared to market potential) and social-accept-
ability (whether or not a provisional every-day therapeutic rational existed for its use). Their
negative assessment of interferon's therapeutic potential was accompanied by mounting
pressures for accountability.
*'' Interviews with John Beale, Derek Burke. Norman Finter, David Tyrrell and Karl Fantes.
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4.4. Interferon losing its momentum i - >•
Company scientists working on interferon sensed a shift of research priorities away from
interferon. Unlike before, their research plans and efforts were assessed with the utmost rigor
in competition for company research resources. It is unlikely that its development as a
therapeutic drug would have been pursued much longer on the ground of purely economical
motives. It is in this context that the 'American penicillin syndrome' continued to play a most
vital role in sustaining interest.'*
All senior company executives were aware of the fact that one of the U.S. leaders in
biologicals, the large drug company Merck Sharpe & Dohme, was putting considerable
resources into interferon research. While the British Interferon Collaboration invested heavily
in efforts to test the effect of interferon in humans, the American drug firm focused on
biochemistry: making sure that interferon could be processed to a high degree of purity in a
cost-effective way." In a most recent informal talk with one of the members of the Board of
the Interferon Collaboration, Max Tishler, the president of Merck Sharpe & Dohme Research
Laboratories at Rahway, New Jersey, had indicated that it would only be a matter of time
before interferon would be obtained in pure crystalline form.^ This kind of competitive
rhetoric from the other side of the Atlantic kept the various research projects dealing with
interferon within the three drug companies going, though on a much more modest level.
It did not last long before the lower rating of interferon within drug company quarters
made itself felt within the Scientific Committee. Isaacs's ambitious plans to step up immediately
the production of clinical trial interferon to proceed to further clinical trials met with increasing
opposition from Glaxo, Wellcome and ICI scientists. Confronted with a decline in research
resources and increasingly critical managements they questioned more and more frequently the
aim and relevance of the Committee's research program. Instead of stepping up the costly and
troublesome production of monkey interferon and expanding the clinical trial program, the
representatives of the drug firms argued in favor of doing more animal work and more
chemical studies on purification. As the most outspoken critic of a continued clinical trial
approach, the ICI researcher Norman Finter was on a collision course with Isaacs."
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Interviews with John Beale, Derek Burke. Norman Finter, David Tyrrell and Karl Fantes.
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Interview with Maurice Hilleman.
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Minutes of the 17th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 18 April, 1962, MRC Archives
File, No. S788/2/2
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Interviews with Norman Finter and David Tyrrell.
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4.4.1 Emerging conflicts over research approaches . ; , . . ; . .:• :,{
The mutual dissatisfaction over research policies began to manifest itself when the material
consequences of the eroding support for the clinical trial approach were making themselves felt
through a shortage of clinical trial interferon. By the end of May 1962 Isaacs was fed up with
the situation. The fact that the collaborating firms continued to fail to meet the agreed-upon
production requirements originally seemed to confirm his earlier fears that the firms were
dragging their feet. In consultation with the MRC, who told him not to beat the big drum,
Isaacs decided that he would first challenge the firms in the Scientific Committee. As chairman
he felt it would be relatively easy to put the problematic supply position of interferon on the
agenda.""
At the last Committee meeting before the 1962 summer holidays Isaacs brought the
matter up for discussion. In accordance with previous plans, the next step should be for Tyrrell
to perform a trial at the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury in order to test the effect of interferon
on the common cold in volunteers. The idea was that if the human nose and pharynx was
treated repeatedly with interferon by means of nasal drops or nasal spray it might become
protected against infection with viruses capable of causing colds like rhinovirus." The trial
would be carried out in line with the general experimental routine at the Common Cold
Unit—fortnightly trials with volunteers kept under strict isolation at the special volunteer flats,
daily clinical examinations, a short quarantine period to exclude intercurrent infections, and a
double blind assessment of symptoms.'* Isaacs emphasized that Tyrrell did not envisage having
difficulties in finding appropriate volunteers for the interferon trial. The Common Cold Unit
had a regular supply of volunteers from the general public, mostly students and civil servants,
who were willing to participate in the Unit's ongoing common cold studies program with a
nationwide reputation. The interferon trial would be run side by side the regular research on
common colds.'"
However, Isaacs sneered, with the current problematic supply there would be hardly
any need for volunteers." The available clinical trial interferon only allowed for 3 instead of the
Internal note MRC. MRC Achives File No. S 788/2; and MRC to Charles Harington, letter dated 29 May,
1962. MRC Achives File No. S 788/2.
" Minutes of the 16th meeting of the Scientific Committee on interferon. dated 22 February, 1962. MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/2
** D. Tyrrell. 'The Common Cold Unit 1946-1990: Farewell to a Much-Loved British Institution', PHLS
Microtoo/o&y Djg»(. 6 (1991). 74-6.
In order to maintain a high public profile and attract enough volunteers for its regular common cold studies
program, regular press visits were organized to the Unit's laboratories and spacious centrally-heated volunteer
huts; Interview with David Tyrrell.
This impressionistic account of the 18th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon is based on:
Minutes of the 18th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 2 July. 1962, MRC Archives
File, No. S788/2/2. Internal note MRC. 11 July 1962. MRC Archives File. No. S788/5: Internal note MRC,
16 August 1962. MRC Archives File. No. S788/2/2; I. Gresser. Production of Interferon by Suspensions of
Human Leucocytes, />.£.S.ß.Af, 108 (1961) 799-803; Ion Gresser to John Enders, letter dated 26 June 1962,
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planned number of 20 volunteers per trial. With less than a handful of trial subjects one could
not expect to generate statistically significant data. Isaacs was willing to accept that at
Wellcome Laboratories the production of interferon was affected by organizational problems.
The two scientists who had been undertaking the production and purification work at
Wellcome had been transferred, and it was only to be expected that the production would fall
or stop in consequence until substitutes would have been found. However, the other parties
had no valid excuse for their shortcomings.
Glaxo's representatives on the scientific committee time and again promised half a liter
of concentrated interferon, the last time within a month. When at last he decided to contact
someone at Glaxo more immediately concerned with the matter, Isaacs learned that no such
goal was set and that there were still numerous problems to overcome. The situation at ICI
was even worse. Isaacs's impression was that ICI not only produced no signs of producing any
clinical trial interferon, but did not even seem to be prepared to undertake any initiatives in that
direction.
Finter rather boldly confirmed this position. He said that he could not envisage ICI
making interferon for use in the common cold trial from (primary) monkey kidney cells and, to
be honest, he thought that there was no ultimate hope for the production of interferon from
any primary tissue culture. At ICI they preferred to concentrate on animal work, on the mode
of action of interferon and on the production and purification of interferon. He thought it
absolutely necessary to develop a more practical way of making interferon since the current
procedures were commercially unacceptable.
It cost quite some time to ease the tension between Finter and Isaacs, but towards the
end of the meeting the situation was looking up a little. Without succeeding to recapture his
full authority as chairman of the Scientific Committee, Isaacs settled the differences by
compromise: they would await the results of the common cold trial before entering into further
debates about the research program.
Isaacs's disillusionment was great when at the end of September 1962 Tyrrell revealed
that the trial results had been disappointingly negative. After having tested interferon against
three different common cold viruses in 20 volunteers there was no clinical evidence of a
protective effect (see Fig. 38). However negative his trial results looked, Tyrrell indicated that
he had not given up hope. Personally he did not consider discontinuing this line of work as it
would most likely only be a matter of increasing the dose of interferon." Tyrrell's reassurance
could not prevent the company scientists from reopening the discussion on the targets for
future work on interferon. The company scientists seized the opportunity with both hands to
bring the research program more in line with the standard research trajectory for biologically
Ion Gresser personal archives. And interviews with John Beale, Derek Burke, Norman Finter, and David Tyr-
rell.
Minutes of the 19th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 25 September 1962, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/2; D. Tyrrell. Interim Report Clinical Trials with Interferon up to 24th September,
1962, MRC Archives File, No. S788/2/2; and, Internal Note MRC, 26 September 1962. MRC Archives File,
No. S788/2/2.
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Fig. 38. After having inhaled an interferon preparation the woman
volunteer (one of the "guinea-pigs' at the
Common Cold Unit at Salisbury)
is now infected with common cold virus.
Courtesy of David Tyrrell
active compounds in the pharmaceutical industry—focusing on animal testing and production
processes first.
They pointed out that the Scientific Committee now had a considerable amount of
experimental information showing that human clinical trials should wait until better methods
for the production and purification of human interferon were developed. The most practical
and cost-effective way to find out whether interferon did do something in infections, and to
learn about dose-response relationships, definitely was the use of laboratory animals. They
could then simultaneously try to develop a more practical way of making interferon for human
application since the use of monkeys not only was cumbersome but also commercially
unacceptable. Isaacs must have realized that the preparedness to collaborate actively and
closely on a clinical trial program had just received yet another blow, although he managed to
keep putting off a decision on the issue."*
Outside the private rooms of the collaborators few seemed to know that the Interferon
Collaboration went through hard times. A clear indication was the following story entitled
"Whitehall men join battle on common cold: This new drug may be the answer", which
"* Minules of the 19th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 25 September 1962, MRC
Archives File, No. S78872/2.
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appeared in the Evening Standard on Friday. October fifth:
Scores of top Civil Servants are being asked to take 10 days off to act as 'guinea pigs" in the first large-scale
trial of a British medical discovery which doctors hope can be used to beat many virus diseases including the
common cold...scientists will inject them with a newly-discovered substance called interferon and at the same
time try to infect them with thousands of cold germs. The hope is that colds will not break out...A Medical
Research Council spokesman told me today: ..."Not everybody will be given interferon: some will get water
or a salty solution but nobody will know who has which. We have to satisfy the statisticians that any effect on
colds is not due to chance."""
The final assessment 'indoors' of the carefully controlled common cold trial in Decem-
ber 1962 doubtless must have satisfied the statisticians, but it was disastrous for the clinical
trial program. The number of volunteers which either developed disease symptoms or
improved on the interferon treated group was said to differ insignificantly from the control
group. It seemed pointless to pursue these clinical studies any further until more information
had been obtained on dose-effect relationships and the method of administration. Even Isaacs
agreed that the trials should not be proceeded with for the present, knowing that none of the
collaborators was willing to continue the costly production of monkey interferon to perform
further clinical trials.
: Isaacs reconciled himself to the situation and decided in favor of more animal experi-
mental work in the hope of finding a better test model. Moreover, confronted with the negative
sentiments regarding the testing of the clinical potential of 'exogenous' interferon, Isaacs chose
to ride his latest hobbyhorse. He told the other members of the Scientific Committee that after
all he was becoming more and more convinced that interferon injected or otherwise given to
patients might prove less useful than developing a means for stimulating people to make their
own interferon. He pointed out that he soon hoped to clarify the use of foreign nucleic acids as
a means of stimulating 'endogenous' interferon production through tests in laboratory mice.""
In his view this would make a most promising new approach for future work of the committee.
However Isaacs had lost too much political capital to get a hearing for what the company
scientists already had dubbed 'Isaacs's ludicrous nucleic acid story'.'" By reacting rather
halfheartedly to his proposed change of research priorities the fellow-members of the Scientific
Committee made him feel more and more isolated and exposed.
The December meeting of the Scientific Committee not only proved to be somewhat of
a landmark inasmuch as the decision had been taken to stop the clinical trial program but also
with regard to Isaacs's fragile mental health. Isaacs's continuous concern about the working of
the Collaboration, the disappointing trial results, and the growing opposition to his research
guidance within the Scientific Committee began to take their toll. The succession of problem-
Peter Fairley, Whitehall Men Join Battle on Common Cold. £v«»ng Stomiarrf, Britain. 5 October, 1962.
Minutes of the 20th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 4 December 1962, MRC
Archives File, No. S788/2/2.
Interviews with Norman Finter and John Beale.
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atic events was instrumental in provoking a second bout of depression that was more severe in
nature than the first three years earlier. He felt extremely restless and irritable most of the time
with little self-confidence. This time Isaacs had to go into mental hospital where he received
extensive medical treatment for a couple of months.'**
Meanwhile across the Atlantic Ocean at the Merck Institute for Therapeutic Research,
a paper had been cleared for publication through Merck Sharp & Dohme's (MSD) patent
office that would play a major role in the reordering of the British research agenda as well as
research organization concerning interferon. Sections of this paper on the purification and
characterization of interferon had already been leaked purposely to MSD's British rivals.'"'' In
making a tentative approach early in 1962 to join the Collaboration on Interferon (which was
ignored by the British) Max Tishler, the President of Merck Sharp & Dohme Research
Laboratories revealed that his researchers had prepared interferon material that was far
superior to anything the British had thus far produced. Almost simultaneously Maurice
Hilleman MSD's head of Virus and Cell Biology Research—a man who had a rather strong ego
and was not averse to competition and throwing his competitors into confusion—let Isaacs
informally know that they had prepared chick interferon that not only was 200 hundred times
more pure than Burke's interferon but also had a different molecular weight."*
While these American newsleaks mainly had the effect of stimulating the sense of
rivalry on the British side without really affecting work on interferon. the formal publication of
MSD's studies on interferon in the prominent American journal Proem/wigs o///;e Soc/>ry 0/
£jcpenm«i/a/ S/'o/ogv and A/«/;c/ne had a more profound impact."" Reading in black and
white that for years British researchers had studied interferon which essentially contained only
minute amounts of the interferon agent and consisted largely of extraneous material, was quite
a different cup of tea. Hilleman's research team claimed to have purified interferon 4500 times
with respect to initial protein content—an unprecedented degree of purity of interferon
material.""* In the article the previous failures of purification were articulated by juxtaposing
purity with impurity: emphasizing the marked difference in properties between their highly
purified interferon and the allegedly crude interferon studied heretofore by other researchers,
most notably Isaacs and his British colleagues.
"* Minutes of the 20th and 21 th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 4 December 1962 and
7 March 1963, MRC Archives File. No. S788/2/2.3: Internal note MRC. 4 December 1962. MRC Archives
File. No. S 788/1; D. Tyrrell, Experiments With Interferon, Third Draft of Interim Report to the Medical
Research Council by the Scientific Committee on Interferon, MRC Archives File, No. S788/2/2.
"" Interview with Hilleman.
'"* See, for a detailed social-historical description and analysis of the development of biologicals at Merck. Sharp
& Dohme between 1895-1995: L. Galambos and J. E. Sewell, Networks of Innovation (Cambridge,
University of Cambridge Press, 1995).
' G. Lampson. A. Tytell, M. Nemes and M. Hilleman, 'Purification and Characterixation of Chick Embryo
Interferon". P.5.E.B.M.. 112 (1963). 468-78.
' " Ibid.
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Although the disagreement was not complete it was substantial enough to throw
serious doubts on the British research achievements so far and to further weaken the British
patent position. To the same extent that it lent credibility to MSD's efforts, the American
publication threw discredit on the work of the British collaborators. In doing so it would have
an additional discouraging effect on senior British company executives to invest considerably
in interferon thereby reshaping the balance of forces both within and outside the Interferon
Collaboration.
4.4.2 Clipping Isaacs's wings ,s;p^
By the time Isaacs had recovered from the severe manic-depressive episode at the end of April
1963, deputy chairman David Tyrrell had brought the American article under the attention of
most members of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. Finter was first to react."" In a series
of two letters to Isaacs, he mentioned having read the studies on interferon published by
Hilleman's research group and indicated that on the face of it these appeared to be an advance
over anything which had been achieved within the Collaboration on Interferon. In Finter's
opinion the collaboration's lack of success in purifying interferon remained a major stumbling
block to further progress in the development of interferon as a practical chemotherapeutic
agent. "From the scientific point of view there might therefore be very real advantages to be
gained from liaison with Merck Sharp & Dohme if this would give us access to their 'know-
how' in this field (since in all probability they have data available other than those
published).""" Finter then proposed to reopen the question of whether or not MSD be invited
to join the collaboration, assuming that they still wished to do so, and discuss it at the next
meeting of the scientific committee.
Isaacs, however, showed himself rather reluctant to bring the matter up for
discussion."' He didn't think much of a liaison with yet another party and certainly not if it
meant collaborating with Hilleman whom he suspected of being driven solely by self-interest.
At least in the article, Hilleman had done everything to make the work of Isaacs, Burke and the
Committee look rather silly. It was only because of Finter's persistence that eventually the
question of liaison with MSD was discussed. Finter must have been disappointed to find out
that the other members of the Committee did not think much of the idea either and decided to
hand over the matter to the Board. However, rejecting the proposal to collaborate across the
109
Norman Finter to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 9 May 1963, MRC Archives File No. A812/5/2.
"° Norman Finter to Alick Isaacs, letter dated 14 May 1963, MRC Archives File No. A 812/5/2.
'" Alick Isaacs to Norman Finter. letter dated 10 May 1963, MRC Archives File No. A812/5/2.
175
Atlantic ocean did not mean ignoring the American interferon studies."*
Isaacs rapidly got the better of his initial embarrassment about losing the initiative to
Hilleman's research group in a field of which he considered himself the founding father. More
determined than ever before, he devoted himself to steering the scientific committee, pursuing
his interferon studies and promoting his ideas."^ He decided to turn the published American
purification and characterization studies to his advantage. Should interferon indeed be
powerfully adsorbed onto glass, as claimed in the American report, and should as a result
interferon preparations stored in glass bottles lose their anti-viral activity in time, then this put
the outcome of the clinical trials in another perspective. Isaacs therefore thought it worthwhile
to assay some interferon bottles left over from the trials. When it indeed turned out that the
antiviral activity of the clinical trial interferon remnants had dropped considerably as compared
with the original material, Isaacs took the matter up with the Scientific Committee. Isaacs's
story was considered very convincing, and it was unanimously agreed that since there was no
guarantee that the interferon samples used were still potent at the time of the trials, the
assessment of the clinical trials of interferon should be suspended—a private report should be
sent to the Council but not published."''
So far so good, it seemed. However, much to Isaacs's regret, the reassessment did not
take away the general reluctance to plan further trials. Even more disappointing in Isaacs's
opinion was the subsequent lack of support for his proposal to discontinue the obviously
disastrous purification studies and instead concentrate on the radically different approach of
exploring ways to exploit the potential interferon productive capacity within a living organism.
If it would be possible to find ways to fight off viruses by stimulating the production of
interferon inside the body ('endogenous interferon') by non-viral means Isaacs believed that
there would be no further need to continue the costly and problematic efforts to produce large
amounts of exogenous interferon. His proposal for a change of course in work on interferon
resembled to some extent Hilleman's simultaneous shift in attention from interferon administra-
tion to interferon induction as the most promising lead toward anti-viral therapy, although
Isaacs did not share Hilleman's radical ideas about exogenous interferon as a dead end.'"
"" Minules of (he 22lh meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 21 May 1963, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/3.
""' I agree with Stephen Hall that "Isaacs's battle for intellectual normalcy, for a return to the wit and brilliance of
his earlier career, is without doubt the saddest chapter of the interferon story"; See S. S. Hall, /I Commofio/i in
//if S/<«></: £j/c?, i/fiif/i, ant/ //if imnunr iv.«/fm (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1997) p. 157.
' '•* When al the end of 1964 word came from the NIH that they were planning to repeat Tyrrell's trial against the
common cold, the publication ban was lifted. Tyrrell was able to convince the other members of the Scientific
Committee that because they had now further evidence that the British common cold trial had been
unsuccessful due to the small dose and speed of removal of interferon inside the nose it would still be
worthwhile to report the trial results to the scientific world; Minutes of the 28th meeting of the Scientific
Committee on Interfeam, dated 10 November 1964, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/3; and. A Report to the
Medical Research Council from the Scientific Committee on Interferon, 'Experiments with Interferon in Man',
Lane«, i( 1965), 505-6.
' " Minutes of the 22th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 21 May 1963, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/3; and. Internal note MRC. I June 1963. MRC Archives File No. S788/1.
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After almost four years of interferon studies, Hilleman had come to believe that despite
its remarkable non-toxicity, administering exogenous interferon had no real potential for
clinical usefulness in anti-viral therapy. Interferon's prophylactic rather than therapeutic action
and the expected high costs and technical problems involved in producing large amounts of
high quality interferon material were instrumental in bringing about a change in research
perspective. Instead of regarding interferon as a potential chemotherapeutic agent in itself,
Hilleman began to see and promote interferon in terms of a research tool to study resistance to
and control of viral infection. Eventually this new approach was thought to open the door to
the development of chemical means for achieving viral chemotherapy. This would also fit in
well with the majority of chemistry-based drug development programs within MSD.
Consequently Hilleman decided to give up his purification studies. Instead he turned his
research resources to assessing the possibility of engineering chemical compounds which are
potent inducers of 'endogenous' interferon production and can be used to limit and preferably
preventing viral infection in a host organism. Hilleman's new endogenous approach closely
resembled Isaacs's ideas about the non-viral stimulation of the production of interferon in living
organisms."*
Taking into consideration Hilleman's motivations to change course it comes as a
surprise to see that the 'endogenous' approach did not even receive the benefit of the Glaxo,
Wellcome and ICI scientists within the Scientific Committee."^ The wonder grows if we add
to this Isaacs's accusation that the attitude of the company scientists within the Scientific
Committee seemed to be conditioned for the greater part by what he called a "chemical habit
of thought". Apparently the mere association of the endogenous approach with Isaacs's
interferon inducer studies sufficed to relegate the new concept to the circular file within the
Scientific Committee. As such it marked the credibility crisis concerning Isaacs's abilities to
steer and coordinate research on interferon.'"
Increasingly frustrated in his efforts to direct research as chairman of the Scientific
Committee, Isaacs eventually decided to plead his case through other channels. At the yearly
visit of medical and science correspondents to the National Institutes of Medical Research
Isaacs saw his opportunity both to promote his foreign nucleic acid' interferon inducer
research and to show his dissatisfaction with the Interferon Collaboration. On this occasion
Isaacs had prepared a laboratory demonstration aimed at associating his work on foreign
nucleic acids with the practical medical promise of interferon. While showing the journalists
Since Isaacs correspondence got lost and access to Hilleman's correspondence was not granted it was not
possible to properly address the interesting question how both Isaacs and Hilleman developed similar ideas
about the use of inlerferon inducers as an alternative means to exploit interferon's therapeutic potential and to
what extent Hilleman's new line of research was related or influenced by Isaacs's work; M. Hilleman,
Interferon in Prospect and Perspective, 7. CeW. Comp. «lyrio/., 62 (1963), 337-53; Internal note MRC, MRC
Archives, File. No. S788/1; and interview with Maurice Hilleman.
Minutes of the 22th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 21 May 1963, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/3.
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Interviews with Karl Fantes, Norman Finter. and David Tyrrell.
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conn Dam AL .a«™ am.» |*|-*1
Bwr Fatar,
At • racrat aaatlng of tha Scientific Coaalttea on Intarfaroa
It waa agreed that * report ahould ba prepared for subalaalon to th« Council
on tha ollnioal trials of interfaron carried out until now, and on tha
ganaral progroas of tha work of tha Coaaiittaa. Tha raport waa praparad
by Tyrrell in collaboration with Andrawa of Glaxo and I ancloaa a oopy.
Tha tlM aeeas to a* to ba opportune to flva you in oonfidanca ay own
paraoaai opinion of tha work of tha Coaadttes.
Tha Cnaaittee la now nearly <• yaara old. Tha first year waa
apant In studying tha tlssua spaclflcity of lntarfaron and at tha and of
this Us» It was dacldad that »a should study ths action of aaokay lntarfaroa
in aaa. * pro«ri—i »aa agread that a batch of 11 l i t » * of iatarfaroa '
would be prepared, oancantratad 10 tiasa aaa uaet aa follows:-
a) A prellaiaary trial would ha oarriad out of tha affaot of this
•atsrlal in preventing- tha oeciurraaca of priaary vaccination la
aan which would naad about 1 l itra of latarfaron.
b) If thie wara sucoassful tha reaaining 10 lltraa would ba uaad
for trlala with coamon oold rirusaa in Sallabury.
To agr sind 11 l l tras waa a sndsst tarfat, but tba aaount of affort
devoted by tha pharaacwtlcal fira* waa poor. I.C.I, aada no aonkey
lntarfaroa at a l l , sad laft thia antlraly to tha other twa firaa. 3y tha
and of tha aacond yasr Glaxo had atade aaarlj 10 l l tras of Interferon - ana
than lost tha antira bates by filtering i t without asking sura bafarahssd
that tha tachnlqua waa asfa. Wellcose Lsboratoriaa procaadad slowly but
aora affactivaljr and 18 aontha aftar tha daciaion to aaka an 11-litra
batch, Vallcoaa had praparad J litraa. Our Coaadttaa than had to dacida
whathar to wait until tha 11 litraa was praparad or to cut our loaaaa and
proeaad with tha vaccinia tr ia l . Tha lattar couraa was dacldad on and
iu faot tha trial provad auccaaoful (1962 raport ancloaad).
Having aada thia affort, Vallcoaa Laboratoriaa than dacidad thay
had dona aaoufh and that i t waa tlaa Qlaxo producad aoaa iatarfaron. By
last in—ii Olsiro had producad > faw lltras and Vallcoaa bar* not aada
any aora. Oa a nuabar of occaalona both firaa hava «Iraasad tha oast
of prapsrlng aatarial of thia kind, and whila ona cannot dlsauta that It
has baan aoatly I hava always fait that a rathar aora advaataroaa spirit
was ravilrad of tha firaa than thay hava ah awn so far.
Tha intarfaron praparad by Olaxo has baan usad for trlala with
caaaon cold vlrusas in Salisbury and trials with harpaa virus lnfactiona
of tha aya oarriad out In collaboration with Mr. Barria Jonaa. You will
aaa froa tha ancloaad raport of tha Coaalttaa that tha rasulta hsva
largaly baan negativ«. Kowavar, I think i t ia worth atraaalng that tha
lntarfaron, whan taatad for ita antiviral sativlty aftar tha olinlcal
trials , showad a larfa drop In tltra. Tha aatarial uaad by sarria Jonaa
waa sant to TjrraU and to aa In codad fora and wa both found that i t had
lost about 90 par cant of Ita activity. Racantly a raport haa appaarad
(Laapaon at a^. 196), raprlnt ancloaad) Indicating that purlflad chick
latsrfsras. la air sail) abaarbai to glaaa aaa that this can ba pravaatad
Fig. 39. Letter Alick Isaacs to Sir Peter Medawar (1-7-1963).
Courtesy of Dr. S. Isaacs-Elmhirst.
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by keeping the Interferon in polypropylene containers. The material '
we used for c l in ica l tr lala was stored in glass tubes in refrigerators
for periods of some weeks, whereas the original stocks are usually kept
fronen. I t seeas important, therefore, to investigate whether this
oould be a factor in the negative results of the recent c l in loal t r i a l s .
Bovever, the genersi comment I would aake Is that tht whole scale of the
effort so far has been p i t i fu l ly amall.
A second field of act iv i ty of the Committee has bees to study
the purification of Interferon. I have always f e l t that th is SAould
not be a major interest of the CoaaiUee, tot In th i s I found mystlf
la disagreement with the firms and have had to bow to their opinion.
It turns out that a l l three firms have now apent a considerable time :
on tlii« problem, as has Bprke, • former colleague of sine here who now
works in Aberdeen and has remained a »sober of the Committee. Ttt l a -
spit« or the fact that this has been a major activity of tht Commlttst
i t would not, I think, be an exaggeration to say that practically
nothing of note has been achieved by us. Meanwhile, Kerck
and Doha* have just published the results of their research'
Sharps
>a on the
. purification of chick Interferon (reprint enclosed) and I am bound to
«salt (and I have heard the comaent from others) that i t makes the work
of our Committee look s i l l y . Their material i s 100 times »ore pure
than the best material produced by any member of the Committee, and
Incidentally i t ahows Interferon to have an extremely high potency, one
unit being between 0.001? ug *nd 0.0067 ug of protein.
Allison was told by Dr. Hilleman that Herck, Sharps and Doha*
had spent £290,000 on th is research and thst they had decided not to
work further on this problem but to concentrate instead on looking at
substances that stimulate the production of Interferon. This interested
ms greatly as this Is precisely what X have been advocating to the
Committee for some time. about 2 years ago I put forward the theory
that production of Interferon might represent the reaction of c e l l s to
foreign nucleic acids which could be viral or non-viral. From time to
tiae I have presented to the Committee results of work which tended to
favour th is hypothesis but the Coaalttee has reacted lukewaraly, at
least in terms of practical research. Recently our evidence in favour
of this idea baa been growing stronger but ay feeling Is thst the
Committee are quits happy for me to investigate this end show l i t t l e
wiah to join i n .
In general the atmosphere at Committee meetings has been
fairly good. There has been very l i t t l e jeslousy or secrecy between
the firms. The fault seems to l i e in the opposite direction, namely
that each firm prefers to lesve i t to the others. 1 nave been told
- that Burnet has advised Glsxo that Interferon la theoretically interesting
but unlikely to be of practical value sad this may account in part for
their lack of enthusiasm. Tet surely this i s not enough to explain how
when 3 pharmaceutical firms and Burks and his colleagues were engaged on
the problem of purification and had quite a start over a l l competitors,
they were l e f t behind by an American firm. I can only conclude rather
sadly thst our three firms are greatly lacking drive.
To my mind, the present machinery has been given s long enough
tr ia l and i s not achieving what i t set out to do. Oeroral possible
solutions might be considered:
1. An attempt nay be made to inject new l i f e Into the Committee,
for example by bringing in Prof. E.B. Chain and his team. I
might mention that la the past, Chain has shows great interest
la th is subject.
2* If tht participation of 3 f i n s i s an unsound approach, 2 f inu
mi£at be asktd to withdraw, and tht third lnrited to increase
greatly the se i l t of Its effort.
>. Tht collaboration could be dissolved tod u academic body encouraged
to dtvtlop this work on «a «dto&ttt »Mit.
I would be most sappy if by «Mat of oat of tatst solutions, or
by aoat othtr means, tht Oosaitttt could -tarry out an effort of tsiiah tht
Council could bt proud.
lr*r yourt,
flu
(Aliok Iwu)
179
around in his laboratory, Isaacs told them that he believed the UK's effort on interferon to be
inadequate and particularly so when compared with what was going on in the USA.'" Only a
couple of days earlier Isaacs had sent a formal letter with a similar vote of non-confidence to
the new director of the NIMR, the immunologist and recent Nobel prize winner Peter
Medawar.'-"
Isaacs's personal letter to Medawar evokes an image of a scientist who feels intensely
disappointed in the commitment of other parties to his life's work and launches an all-out effort
to turn the tide (see Fig 39).'-' However colored his analysis of the problematic state of affairs
might seem—as key person in directing the research program, he himself is curiously enough
not to blame—Isaacs raises legitimate questions. Why is it that in spite of having a start over
all competitors, the British Interferon Collaboration was beaten in its research efforts by a
single American drug company? Could it be that the formal and at the same time noncommittal
and fractionary nature of the multi-party collaboration frustrated concerted efforts at the
laboratory bench? Going by the course of events one, indeed, gets the impression that the
Interferon Collaboration was burdened with a squandering of resources, energies and
commitment. Too much effort had to be invested to keep the various parties with their specific
working cultures aligned with each other.
Medawar, was informally—through his predecessor Harington—already well aware of
Isaacs's dissatisfaction with the co-operation they had received from the consortium of three
drug companies. And he immediately passed the letter on to Sir Harold Himsworth. The letter
did not take Himsworth by surprise either. Himsworth already knew for some time that Isaacs
was dissatisfied with the efforts of the industrial collaborators. At first Himsworth thought that
Isaacs was too soft to be chairman of the Scientific Committee, tending to discuss possible
lines of action rather than requesting that certain work should be done. Later on however he
came to believe that this was not the case. The main reason for the firms' "lethargic" effort was
a collective action problem in terms of the logistics involved in communication between so
many different parties and the growing feeling amongst them that there was no practical value
in interferon.'-• After extensive consultation with his own staff and Medawar, Himsworth
eventually decided that Medawar should meet the Board of the Patents Holding Company
('Executive body') to put forward and discuss all the reasons for concern about the working of
the Interferon Collaboration. Medawar met the Board at their November 20th meeting. The
whole atmosphere was charged with an anxiety as to whether the collaboration should be
continued. Whereas Medawar was disappointed with the contribution of the industrial
collaborators, the commercial partners concentrated on the negative assessment of the possible
' " Internal note MRC, 4 July 1963. MRC Archives File No. A742/14.
' * In I960 Medawar logelher with Burnet received the Nobel Prize "for the discovery of acquired immunological
tolerance"; A. M. Silverstein. /4 f/isiort' »//mmunotojv (San Diego. Academic Press. Inc. 1989). p. 344-345.
' • ' Alick Isaacs to Peter Medawar, letter dated 1 July 1963, MRC Archives File No. A812/5/2.
' " Internal note Himsworth. dated 11 July 1963. MRC Archives A 812/5/2.
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practical and commercial value of interferon. They generally felt that the prospects of
interferon becoming a saleable therapeutic agent had not improved since the start of the
collaboration. Despite its imaginative action against a wide range of viruses, interferon did not
live up to the hopes of an Ehrlich sort of "poison-arrow" specifically aimed at the virus
invader.'" Worse yet, far from being the 'magic bullet' that was hoped for. interferon was
known as a chemically undefined biological substance that was part of a poorly understood
natural mechanism of resistance to virus infections. As such it was regarded as alien to the
industry'sEhrlicheanchemotherapeutic program. , [/' v'-
Medawar's interpretation of the backwardness of the enterprise as a lack of engagement
and effort of the three drug firms met with severe criticism from the commercial collaborators.
Though lack of progress was not denied, the effort of the companies was said to be "genuine
and wholehearted".'"'' The chairman of the Board of Directors of the Patent Holdings
Company indicated that the industrial partners had spent about twice as much as Merck Sharpe
& Dohme—over 250.000 pounds so far. On a yearly basis this meant that about 0.75 % of the
annual research budget of all British-based pharmaceutical firms was spent on interferon. He
clearly wondered how much further they should go.'" So little progress had been made to date
that there were serious doubts as to the wisdom of continuing the Collaboration. At the same
time, the companies were reluctant to write off all their efforts over the past few years.
The fact that a marketable product was no nearer than when the Collaboration started
was attributed, if not to the "cussedness of nature" and to the incompetence of the scientists
engaged on the work, then to the shortcomings of Isaacs as chairman of the Scientific
Committee and research coordinator.'-' According to the Wellcome representative, Col.
Mulligan, it seemed clear that there was a difference in opinion between Isaacs and the other
members of the Scientific Committee on whether priority should be given to the production of
large quantities of interferon for clinical trial or whether more work should first be done on the
physico-chemical properties of interferon. With reference to similar dilemmas and difficulties in
the early days of insulin and penicillin development he thought it most likely that the trouble
with the case of interferon had arisen because the collaboration had tried to produce interferon
for clinical trials before sufficient knowledge had been collected about its properties. Mulligan
doubted whether Isaacs really understood how difficult and expensive the production of large
batches of clinical trial interferon was. Did Isaacs realize that the product could not be tested
' " J. Parascandola, 'The theoretical basis of Paul Ehrlich's chemotherapy, J. Hist. Med. 36 (1981), 19-43, p. 38;
and interviews with John Beale and David Tyrrell.
'** Minute of a special meeting of the Board of G.N.R.D. Patent Holdings Ltd., dated 20 November 1963, MRC
Archives File No. A812/5/2.
W. Breckon, The Drug Makers (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p. 43.
'** Minute of a special meeting of the Board of G.N.R.D. Patent Holdings Ltd., dated 20 November 1963, MRC
Archives File No. A812/5/2.
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on humans without the most exhaustive safety trials?'"
It was generally felt that Isaacs was too deeply involved in interferon, scientifically and
emotionally to continue carrying the responsibility for the scientific policy of the Collaboration.
During the meeting Medawar grew increasingly uneasy about Isaacs's position. Medawar was
taken aback by the views expressed by the Board in particular with regard to the general
dissatisfaction with the way Isaacs had run the Scientific Committee. Without letting Isaacs
down he eventually agreed with the Board that the enterprise lacked effective overall scientific
direction—the consortium as he put it had no "central nervous system". As a means to tackle
this problem Medawar proposed to set up a small high-powered Scientific Steering Committee
with an independent chairman.'"* The existing Scientific Committee could then continue in its
present form with the same chairman to fulfil the essential task of acting as a forum where the
bench workers could meet and exchange information and ideas.'"'
None of the parties appeared to be willing to take the initiative in bringing the collabor-
ation to an end without giving it another trial period. However unanimous in their wish to
continue the Collaboration for another year, it required quite some talking on the part of the
MRC to reach an agreement on an arrangement for regulating the responsibility for research
policy and strategy. Himsworth himself had to take diplomatic action at the highest company
level to convince the industrial collaborators—who did not think much of Medawar's idea of
multiplying committees and were in favor of removing Isaacs from the chairmanship of the
Scientific Committee—that the best thing to do was to set up a separate Scientific Steering
Committee.""
Faced with a lack of imaginative research results, not only drug company executives
but also the British medical community grew impatient with interferon as is interferon is
succinctly illustrated by the following excerpts from a 1964 editorial in the
a
Immense practical problems attend any future use of interferon in man and even if they can be overcome
the problem still remains of ensuring that the interferon reaches the cell in time to produce any therapeutic
response. The use of it for controlling virus infections in man and other animals is likely, therefore, to be
limited.'"
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Minute of a special meeting of the Board of G.N.R.D. Patent Holdings Ltd., dated 20 November 1963, MRC
Archives File No. A812/5/2; Internal note MRC. dated 17 december 1963. MRC Archives File No.
A812/5/2; Medawar to Himsworth, letter dated 7 January 1964. MRC Archives File No. S788/8.
Minute of a special meeting of the Board of G.N.R.D. Patent Holdings Ltd., dated 20 November 1963, MRC
Archives File No. A812/5/2.
Medawar to Himsworth. letter dated 7 January 1964. MRC Archives File No. S788/8.
Minutes of a meeting of the Directors of GNRD Patents Holdings Limited, dated 20 February 1964. MRC
Archives File No. A 812/8/1; Himsworth to Medawar. letter dated 19 March 1964, MRC Archives File No.
A 812/5/2; Internal note MRC. dated 29 April 1964. MRC Archives File No. A 812/5/2 and. minutes of the
first meeting of the Interferon Scientific Steering Committee, dated 24 July 1964, MRC Archives File No. S
788/8/1.
Editorial. 'Interferon', ßnfi.v/i Afo/iV«/J««™«/. 26 December 1964. 1612-13. p. 1613.
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Through this kind of high-profile vote of no confidence in the clinical potential of interferon as
a therapeutic drug, interest plummeted and interferon became widely regarded as just another
medical 'discovery' which had not lived up to its promises.'" The waning of public enthusiasm
and the new arrangement for scientific policy within the Interferon Collaboration made itself
felt in the work of the Scientific Committee. In response to the steady decline in research
resources and new research directives from the Scientific Steering Committee plans for clinical
trials were pushed into the background. Attention shifted to studies of the physico-chemical
properties and mode of action of interferon and to assessing through animal experiments the
possible therapeutic value of interferon.'" ,: , ;
The greater part of the political jousting over his position and the change of research
priorities passed Isaacs by for the greater part. On New Year's Day 1964 Isaacs suffered from
a sub-arachnoid hemorrhage which kept him away from work—due to a slight paralysis and
blurring of his eye-sight—for more than three months. The hemorrhage was said to be related
to an abnormal tumorous blood vessel which compressed the surface of the brain, as revealed
by angiography. Apparently, from its position, the tumor was out of reach of the surgeons.'**
On return to the Institute Isaacs found himself relieved from his post as head of the Division of
Bacteriology and Virus Research and instead he was appointed head of a small group for
research on interferon—consisting of Isaacs, Joseph Sonnabend and his laboratory technician
Dennis Busby—that was officially named The Laboratory for Research on Interferon'.
Isaacs's lamentable condition was symbolic for the paralytic state of affairs not only of
British interferon research but of interferon research in general. Despite a short-lived excite-
ment that accompanied Hilleman's research group's purification studies, the enthusiasm for
interferon within the international scientific community had definitely waned. The powerful
group of quantitative, molecular oriented virologists in America (with people like DelbrUck,
Dulbecco, Rubin and Huebner), who had tolerated what they considered as one of those
shortlived 'research fashions' as long as it lasted, had an important hand in marginalizing
interferon research.'"
By openly displaying their serious doubts about interferon as a troublesome biological
substance, which after more than five years of research still resisted chemical characterization
and purification, they gave interferon researchers the 'grilling of their lives'. Interferon became
widely perceived as an odd laboratory substance that had never got much further than an
Interviews with John Beale, Derek Burke, Norman Finter, and David Tyrrell.
For instance, at ICI Finter had initiated experiments in mice on the possible therapeutic or prophylactic use of
interferon - Finter had prepared 11.5 litres of crude mouse interferon from the brains of over 8000 mice and
after concentration of up to 20-fold he was in the process of using this large batch of mouse brain interferon in
a series of experiments which aimed at demonstrating protective effects in mice against systemic virus
infections; Minutes of the 25th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 8 January 1964,
MRC Archives File No. S788/2/3.
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Helio Pereira to Jean Lindenmann, letter dated 8 January 1964. Jean Lindenmann personal archives; and.
Internal note MRC, dated 7 January 1964, MRC Archives File No. A. 812/5/2.
Interviews with Robert Friedman, Robert Wagner, and Joseph Sonnabend.
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assumed protein and had not lived up to its promise as an important lead toward viral
chemotherapy—and that was unlikely to be ever of much practical value. The fact that the
scientists interested in problems of interferon admitted that the agreed-upon criteria for
identifying an biological factor as an interferon were not exclusive enough to determine
authoritatively whether or not one was dealing with an interferon only complicated matters.'**
In the corridor of scientific conferences and meetings, questions like 'Do you really
think that interferon exists?, and, 'How do you know that the phenomenon which you
observed in your laboratory was due to interferon and not to an impurity?' were repeated.'"
Unlike in the early sixties, not 'everything' on interferon was publishable anymore by the end of
1964. Edward de Maeyer, for instance, received rejection letters from both V/ro/og>> and
Science on the grounds that the material under study ('interferon') was ill-defined and impure,
and therefore of no great scientific interest.'" Never before had this been a reason for
rejection.
Considering interferon's low scientific image as an ill-defined laboratory substance of
peripheral interest, for most biomedical researchers, entering the area of interferon research
just did not seem worth the effort. Why join a marginal subfield of virus research that was
considered to lie well outside the mainstream of virology (viral genetics and animal-tumor
virology)?'" Apart from image related problems there were other more technically related
matters that "locked people out". '•*" If you wanted to start working on interferon as an outsider
to the subfield of interferon research you first had to acquire specific skills to set up your own
production and assay system. This was rather time consuming. Practically it meant that one
had to learn through hands-on apprenticeship the production and assay techniques from
established interferon researchers. This was far from a straightforward process as the
interferonologists themselves were still in the process of getting to grips with their experimen-
This very problem was discussed during an informal gathering of 31 interferon researchers at the 1964
meeting of the American Society for Microbiology in Washington, D.C.. According to Monto Ho they could
not and would not produce an inclusive definition of what more precise conditions must be met for a sub-
stance to be called interferon; See M. Ho, 'Identification and "Induction" of Interferon', ßocffno/ogica/
Reviews, 28 (1964), 367-81, p. 367.
' '" The ambiguous status of interferon is nicely illustrated by the following excerpt from Vilcek's 1969
monograph on interferon: "The other day I had lunch with the Bacterial Geneticist working next door to my
lab. While consuming his yoghurt(which he had for desert) he asked what I was working on all the time. So I
told him all about interferon synthesis requiring mRNA to be made thus being an induced protein which
induces new mRNA and another protein which by bindig to ribosomes inhibits translation of the viral mRNA
but not the translation of other mRNA. "That's very interesting", said the Bacterial Geneticist while finishing
his yoghurt, "but do you really think that interferon exists?"."; J. Vilcek, Interferon (New-York, Springer-
Verlag , 1969) , p. 1 1 1 .
'"'* Science to Dr. Jacqueline De Maeyer-Guignard, letter dated 21 January 1965. Edward de Maeyer personal
archives; E. De Maeyer, 'Interferon Twenty Years Later', fiu//e r/n De Z/intfi/ur Pa.«f«r, 76 (1978), 303-23, p.
304; Edward De Maeyer and Jacqueline De Maeyer-Guignard, interview.
' Interviews with Jan Vilcek, Jean Lindenmann, Edward De Maeyer, and Sam Baron.
' * We can see in figure 31, chapter 3 that the number of scientists working on interferon leveled off between
1964 and 1967.
184
tal systems and the biological substances that went by the name interferon. '*' As we will see in
the next chapter a great deal of their efforts went into managing differences.
4.5 Conclusion . , . .....-.; ....... v„
Confronted with the pervasive scepticism that prevailed at the end of 1964 it seems hard to
imagine that only four years earlier efforts were started to secure a collaboration between the
British government and British drug industry. This immediately raises the question "What
brought about the dramatic changes in commitments and objectives of those involved, and how
did they materialize? Without trying to delineate any schematic succession of 'changes', I shall
analyse the dynamics of the processes through which changes came about.
Bringing the partners together in the first place appeared to be a matter of aligning
commitments and tasks. Both the MRC and the drug companies were committed to the notion
of therapeutic breakthroughs as a dominant feature of a laboratory-supported scientific
medicine, to the feasibility of generating medications which like 'magic bullets' seek out and
destroy infectious agents, and to the need of defending British industrial interests. However
promising in terms of a potential 'antiviral penicillin', British drug companies, including the UK
leaders in biologicals, initially showed restraint with regard to interferon. This was due to the
'iffy' status of interferon as an undefined biological substance and the general perception of
biologicals as troublesome and high-risk commodities with uncertain manufacturing prospects.
From industry's point of view, risk-sharing with the MRC, who offered their unique expertise
in interferon research and the eventual rights in the developed product, made work on
interferon a more attractive option. Joining in with the MRC-led interferon project, without
having to start from scratch a private high-risk developmental program, reduced the liability
and as such made it easier to accept the many imponderables. At the same time the resources
of the pharmaceutical industry matched the MRC's need for material and financial support in
developing interferon as a therapeutic drug. The MRC nurtured the links with the pharmaceuti-
cal companies because it realized that the pharmaceutical industry alone had the expertise and
capacity to produce large amounts of biologicals for use in humans.
I showed that just as Isaacs drew legitimation from the use of his knowledge claims in
MRC's deliberations, so MRC and drug company officials were better able to legitimate their
decision to participate in efforts to develop interferon as a drug by attaching to it the authority
of Isaacs's expertise. Thus, the MRC, the drug companies and Isaacs had good reasons to get
close to each other, but not too close. Their dilemma was to prevent choices and futures
becoming either merely 'scientific', 'political' or 'commercial' beyond the grasp and thus control
of the other.
In order to fit their own programmatic goals and maintain the integrity of mutual
interests there was a continual need to maintain accountability to one another with each party
Interview with Ion Gresser.
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working hard to re-interpret and translate the concerns of the others. Differences became
manifest in conflicts over research agendas and publication rules. While the commercial
partners felt bound to stringent control over publication and relatively fixed developmental
trajectories, MRC workers like Isaacs were used to freedom of publication as means to the end
of advancing scientific reputations and to 'follow their nose' in exploring research problems.
From the beginning much energy and resources went into bridging the differences between
industrial and academic cultures. As long as each party was committed to the same central idea
of developing interferon as an anti-viral drug, and had similar thoughts about the constraints
and the prevailing conditions under which collaborative research should be performed, they
were prepared to put up with this efficiency loss. However, their perception of the Collabora-
tion changed dramatically when it appeared that they were scored off by the research efforts of
a single American drug company. To the same extent that it lent credibility to MSD's efforts, it
threw discredit not only on the work of the British collaborators but also on their form of
research organization.
I agree with Isaacs's assessment of the situation that the noncommittal and factionary
nature of the multi-party collaboration arrangement frustrated concerted efforts at the
laboratory bench—although he as chairman of the Scientific Committee deserved some of the
blame, too. His increasingly tiresome and even frantic behavior was not particularly helpful to
keep the various parties with their specific working cultures aligned with each other.
As work at the bench and policy-making co-evolved plans for research and the objects
of research underwent changes. Initially the plans for research closely resembled the initial
stage of conventional industrial new drug development trajectories with an emphasis on animal
testing and the development of production techniques. However, from the beginning the
difference between the restraint of the company scientists and the drive of the academic
scientist Isaacs to bridge the worlds of the laboratory and the clinic, comes to the fore. Isaacs's
dominance within the Scientific Committee early on is reflected by the premature shift in
attention to trials on human volunteers. In succeeding to define interferon in terms of a natural
non toxic-agent, which was different from most other existing pharmaceutical substances,
Isaacs created latitude to follow an alternative testing trajectory. He received unwitting
support in his rush to human testing from the American patent-examiner, who rejected
interferon's patent application on utility grounds. It made the industrial partners realize that
having an early demonstration of a clinical effect in humans was needed in order to reverse this
judgment and safeguard their future market position. Similar concerns led to early efforts to
create a common and publicly acknowledged definition for interferon that would be narrow yet
broad enough to satisfy the demands of patent advisers, company executives, researchers and
drug registration authorities.
Zooming in on the question whether or not interferon could induce a clinical effect in
humans did not result in a whole-sale shift in research work but in a reshuffling of research
priorities. There was no such thing as laboratory oriented research giving way to clinically
oriented research—as either or alternatives. As can be expected from 'exploring uncharted
territory' the scientists under survey in this chapter worked in a 'zigzag' fashion; as soon as any
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progress was perceived toward tackling one problem, they would simultaneously begin work
on the next problem regardless of whether this involved a transition from in vifro to humans or
from I« vivo to in vifro and back to humans. However this did not mean that in the prepara-
tions for and performance of the clinical trials there was no guidance of any sort. Whenever
possible those involved tried to create landmarks by linking up their trial efforts with already
existing testing practices. This immediately raises the question, "What points of reference
played a major role in constituting the conditions of practice in the case of testing interferon?"
In the absence of a standard system for controls regulating the testing of potential new
drugs in Britain, the members of the Scientific Committee tried to fall back on existing testing
practices for biologicals and other therapeutic drugs within the companies and the MRC.
Among other things this resulted in the adoption of the in-process safety control concept, and
the MRC promoted statistically controlled trial procedure. Due to the non-compliant nature of
the subject matter or resistance arising from the continuous interplay between the various
parties, adjustments had to be made over and again. Deciding on how to go about problematic
and uncertain situations and cope with the 'mangle' of practice involved ad hoc judgments and
assumptions. This is not to say that they necessarily proceeded arbitrarily, but that given the
specific problem context they collectively weighed the perceived pros and cons of proposed
solutions derived from the material, social and cognitive resources at hand.''"
As a final point I would like to specify how the modes of perceiving interferon in terms
of a therapeutic substance changed. The Interferon Collaboration started from the common
understanding and perception of interferon as a potential 'anti-viral penicillin'. As a non-toxic
agent interferon seemed to come close to Paul Ehrlich's ideal of generating medications which
(like 'magic bullets') seek-out and put infectious agents out of action without harming the host
organism—in other words a most important lead toward viral chemotherapy. With accumulat-
ing production and purification problems, the perceived lack of effectiveness and the changing
ideas about the mechanism of action of interferon, questions were raised about the practicality
and rationality of developing interferon as a chemo-therapeutic agent along the lines of what I
dubbed the 'exogenous approach' Interferon did not seem to be the 'magic bullet' against
viruses that was hoped for, but a chemically undefined substance with a rather ambiguous
mechanism of action that was quite alien to the Ehrlich's concept of chemotherapy—different
in other words from conventional chemotherapeutic substances.
We saw how both Maurice Hilleman at Merck Sharp & Dohme and Alick Isaacs at the
NIMR—in efforts to come to terms with the practical limitations of the 'exogenous ap-
proach'—almost simultaneously began to promote an alternative therapeutic concept for
interferon, which I designated the 'endogenous approach'. While Isaacs considered it as just
another option for research, Hilleman held stronger views. In his opinion interferon should no
longer be considered as a practical therapeutic agent in itself but as a research tool to develop
preferably chemical means for achieving viral chemotherapy. This made a difference in the
142
Brian Wynne was first in pointing out the important role of ad Aoc rules and judgments in developmental
practices such as clinical trials in: B. Wynne, 'Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses
and Public Understanding.' 5ocia/5n«tftt o/5ci>nce, 18 (1988), 147-67, p. 162.
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ways Hilleman went about making plans for research. Instead of concentrating on ways to
tackle production and purification problems, attention shifted toward investigating ways of
stimulating endogenous interferon production. The credibility crisis surrounding Isaacs seemed
to have played a major role in the negative assessment of the new endogenous approach in the
British context, at least temporarily.
In the next chapter I will show how these differences in 'seeing' interferon would lead
to a serious controversy in the field of interferon research and paradoxically helped to keep the
British Interferon Collaboration 'afloat'.
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Chapter 5
Managing Differences in Biomedical Research:
The Case of Standardizing Interferons.'
5.0 Introduction ,
We have finished with the romantic period of interferon and we now have to start on the scientific period."
In a very general sense this chapter is concerned with the topic of transferability or portability.
I shall describe the difficulties which researchers in the embryonic subfield of interferon
research faced in maintaining collaborations and alliances, communicating research results and
ensuring the reliability and credibility of the products of their research work, both locally and
trans-nationally. More specifically, what is at issue here is to show how standardization played
a part in mastering and establishing differences in interferon research.' To further our under-
standing of the dynamics of biological standardization, the following questions deserve further
exploration/ What were the incentives for establishing interferon standards? What efforts and
resources did it take to establish, disseminate and maintain standards? And, to what extent
were they instrumental in narrowing down the margins of interpretation and changing
individual laboratory practices into universal practices that could be made to work elsewhere?
In chapters four and five I already indicated that a central issue for the working on
A preliminary version of chapter 5 was published in .Sftufiei m Wisfory and Pni/osopny o/SciVnce; T. Pieters,
'Managing Differences in Biomedical Research: The Case of Standardizing Interferons', Sri/d. //«/. /%//. 5ci'.,
29(1998), 31-79.
Quote is taken from statement by Pieter De Somer at the first session of the International Symposium on
Standardization of Interferon and Interferon Induccrs; See, F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.). Symposia
Series in /mmunoo/o/og/ca/ SfandVira7:af/on vol. 14 (Basel: S. Karger, 1970), p.5.
Most studies in the history and sociology of science which deal with standardization as a key dimension of
portability in the biomedical sciences are confined to discussing the role and effects of standardization: See,
N. Oudshoom, 77ie AfaAin^  o/f/ie rtormona/ BooV (Amsterdam: Ph.D. diss., Univ. Amsterdam. 1991). pp.
72-80: J. H. Fujimura, 'Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and 'Translation'", in A.
Pickering (ed.) SciVntf ns Prac/ice am/ Cu/mre (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 168-
211; P. Gossel, 'A Need for Standard Methods: The case of American Bacteriology, in A. Clarke and J.
Fujimura, rne/ttgnr 7bo/s/or /ne 7ofc (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1992). pp. 287-311; P. Faasse.
Expenmenrs in Grove/A (Amsterdam: Ph.D. diss.. Univ. Amsterdam, 1994), pp. 92-111.
With an exception to Theodore Porter's book 7>usr in Afam^erf the processes of realizing, maintaining and
disseminating biological standards have received relatively little attention from science studies scholars to
date.; T. M. Porter, 7rusf m AfamAera (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 29-32.
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interferon was the uncertainty resulting from the non-compliant character of research materials
and organisms, and the idiosyncrasies of the myriad of experimental systems. Apart from
production and purification problems, interferon researchers had a difficult time comparing
experimental results. An example of this was the measurement of the antiviral activity or
potency of interferon preparations. What was for some a high potency preparation was for
others a preparation with a low biological activity, depending on the laboratory, the test
method and the scientist involved.
This chapter will be concerned with how interferon researchers tried to cope with these
kinds of differences and with the extent to which they were able to reduce uncertainties with
regard to the exchange and interpretation of research data. As we follow the subsequent
attempts to manage differences, we shall find that there is nothing inevitable or 'natural' about
establishing and using biological standards in biomedical research. The researchers involved
accomplished much by informally agreeing on exchange mechanisms—without rigorously
defining common units of measurement. I shall show how, amongst other factors, the intrusion
of powerful spheres, such as the pharmaceutical industry, into the relatively private domain of
'laboratory life' was instrumental in breaking down informal practices of measurement and in
creating a demand for standardization. In focusing attention on the process of realizing
interferon standards, I then highlight how national centers for biological standardization played
a role in the initiation and coordination of standardization efforts. Simultaneously, I will
describe how the mounting controversy between the proponents of interferon inducer research
and the supporters of the exogenous approach not only strongly influenced the standardization
efforts but also the further vicissitudes of the British Interferon Collaboration.
5.1 Coping with differences
In the previous chapter we saw that from the very moment the British Scientific Committee on
Interferon started a collaborative research program in September 1959, as a means to the end
of developing interferon as an antiviral drug, the issue of mastering differences had been on the
agenda. Making comparisons between the results obtained on different occasions within any
one of the collaborating laboratories was already quite demanding; far greater difficulties arose
when attempts were made to compare results obtained in different laboratories. Again and
again the members of the Scientific Committee reported considerable variations in
experimental results from day to day, week to week, from researcher to researcher and
laboratory to laboratory. For the greater part, this was thought to be due to the wide variety of
methods and materials employed in the assay of interferon. It was generally believed that a
standardization of procedures might be helpful in facilitating the comparison of research
results. However, little was known about how to go about standardizing interferon research
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and the extent to which standardization would make the numerous variables in these biological
systems more manageable.
Sheer pragmatism made them choose in favor of material standards, since
standardization of methods would make far deeper inroads into laboratory life without any
guarantee of success.' Initially, the need for standardization was nourished by the mere
involvement of the pharmaceutical industry, which had a practical interest in preventing the
existence of a variety of different arbitrary units for expressing the potency of one and the
same drug. However important as a first incentive to standardization I will show that the
national centers for biological standardization played a central role in disseminating and
'materializing' the perceived needs for standards.
5.1.1 NIMR's Division of Biological Standardization
Shortly after the establishment of a provisional standard for monkey interferon at the NIMR's
Division of Biological Standards, early in 1962, David Evans left his post as head of the
NIMR's Division of Biological Standards to become Professor of Bacteriology and
Immunology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.* His successor, Derek
Bangham, was informed about Isaacs's wish to set up a reference standard preparation for
chick interferon. Partly for historical reasons—having a head-start as Isaacs's original
experimental system—and partly because of the relative simplicity and low cost, most work in
the field of interferon research was performed on chick systems: this made some researchers
refer to chick interferon as the "working man's interferon".' However, while the absence of a
monkey interferon standard had been regarded as an immediate threat to the preparations for
clinical trials by the Scientific Committee—a reference standard preparation was considered
mandatory in the case of human trials, the absence of a chick interferon standard was regarded
as a handicap which rendered collaborative research work more difficult but not impossible.
This difference in perception of research needs was reflected by the fact that a working
standard for chick interferon had yet to be established.
With Bangham in charge of the Division of Biological Standards, new priorities were
established. Bangham immediately took a keen interest in the issue of setting up a working
Interviews with Norman Finter and David Tyrrell.
In 1972 the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards was transformed into what is currently known as the
National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC); See. for a short history of this British
institute, A. Landsborough Thomson, Ha//a Cen/urv «/ Af<?d7co/ R««jrcA Vo/. // (London, Her Majesty's
Stationary Office, 1975). 244-54.
Interviews with Norman Finter, Robert Friedman, and David Tyrrell.
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Standard for chick interferon. It fitted well with his plans to extend the scope of the Division's
activities.* In serving as a national and international center for biological standardization, the
Division had primarily been engaged in establishing and providing national and international
standards (defined as preparations with assigned units) and reference preparations (defined as
preparations without assigned units) on behalf of the British Government and the World Health
Organization (WHO) for practical medical purposes—for use in control of therapeutic
biological substances like penicillin and insulin. Bangham now thought it worthwhile to start
efforts to use the Division's resources for the introduction of reference standard preparations
of interest to medical research.' He firmly believed that, with the rapid growth rate of medical
and biological research there were great opportunities for the application of the methods of
biological standardization in biomedical research. Establishing an official British research
standard for chick interferon was considered a useful pilot-project that served the Division's
expansion plans. In consultation with Isaacs it was then decided that the Division of Biological
Standards would start efforts to establish an official British working standard for chick interfe-
ron.'»
On 22nd March 1962 a parcel containing tubes with crude chick interferon prepared by
Glaxo Laboratories as batch No. A62, was sent to the NIMR's Division of Biological
Standards. The tubes were kept in crushed ice for three days, then Bangham and his staff
started preparing the research standard. Basically, they followed the Division's standard
production procedure for reference standard preparations. First, the batch of chick interferon
was concentrated tenfold by centrifugation and the supernatant distributed by special filling
equipment into hard glass ampules—approximately 0.9 grams of solution per ampule."
Subsequently, the ampules were treated in the Division's automated freeze-drying system
which, like the filling system (see Fig. 40), had very recently been designed, built and installed
in close collaboration with the NIMR's Engineering Division. Finally, at the end of the
production line, the ampules were sealed under anaerobic conditions (by inflating with the inert
gas nitrogen) and received a label which designated 'MRC Research Standard A for
Interview with Derek Bangham.
' In 1962 only three research institutes working on biological standards had received the WHO designation
'International Laboratory for Biological Standards': the Statens Seruminstitut. Copenhagen, the NIMR and the
Central Veterinary Laboratory. Weybridge, U.K.; See. W. C. Cockbum e.a.. The International Contribution to
the Standardization of Biological Substances. fiio/ogic-afc. 19 (1991), 257-64.
'" Annual Reports nr. 19 (1962-1963) and 20 (1963-64) of the NIMR to the MRC, NIMR Archives; and
interview with Derek Bangham.
" First draft of the Report of Collaborative Examination 1962 of Medical Research Council Standard A of
Chick Interferon, Oktober 1962, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/2.
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Fig. 40. Ampule filling machine in use ai the NIMK's Division of
Standardisation in the 1960's.
Fig. 41. MRC Research Siandard A, 62/4 for Interferon, Chick.
Courtesy of NBSB
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Chick Interferon' (see Fig. 41). By definition each ampule was said to contain 100 units of
chick interferon.''
It was common practice in the Division of Biological Standards to assign to each
standard a unitage: it was decided that one ampule of standard chick interferon contained 100
units of activity. This was an arbitrary choice and the only thought that was given to the choice
was that the unitage should be such that when the activity of interferon was expressed in units,
the numbers used were of a manageable size. The unitage that was settled upon provided an
enduring yardstick of chick interferon activity so that measurements made and potencies
obtained could be communicated and related in time and in space."
As part of the usual process of establishing an official reference standard preparation, a
number of the British laboratories involved in interferon research were asked to assess the
suitability and stability of MRC Research Standard A in a so-called 'collaborative assay'. It was
known, on the basis of experience, that the successful establishment of reference standard
preparations depended on the agreement of the 'user experts' that the standard was suitable.
Basically, the test procedure went as follows: first of all a test protocol was designed in
collaboration with the Division's statistician, then the draft protocol was sent to the
participating laboratories for approval.''' Subsequently, the Research Standard and dilutions
thereof were distributed to five out of the seven laboratories working on interferon within the
British Collaboration on Interferon, and finally assays were carried out according to the jointly
agreed protocol. The laboratories sent the 'raw data' from the actual measurements back to
the NIMR for analysis."
Processing the complete set of raw data and working out the results was time
consuming. A lot of'number crunching' had to be done with only the help of a little mechanical
machine for doing mathematical computations. Furthermore, much of the time was occupied
with discussion on the variation in 'precision and accuracy' between laboratories, and between
experiments in individual laboratories, and on clarifying ambiguities in experimental procedures
and assay reports, and finally, by obtaining agreement on the draft report. According to the
final report—which was made available in December 1962—after thorough statistical analysis
of the data, the collaborative assay results were considered to be "all in the correct order and
14
Up to 1959 the same procedure had to be performed completely by hand and would take more than two
weeks. Both technicians and scientific staff would participate in the production process which included glass
blowing thousands of ampules; and interview with Derek Bangham.
Interview with Derek Bangham.
Minutes of the 17th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 18 April 1962, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/2.
First draft of the Report of Collaborative Examination 1962 of Medical Research Council Standard A of
Chick Interferon. Oktober 1962, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/2; and interview with Derek Bangham.
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were all of the correct order of magnitude"." , vs t.- .;,
In practice, however, it meant little more than that, on the whole, the results from the
collaborative assay were considered to be encouraging." The most exciting aspect of working
with the MRC Research Standard was generally thought to be the fact that for the first time
one was able to talk about the activity of different chick interferon preparations in terms of a
jointly agreed unitage. By employing laboratory 'yardstick', as Bangham and his staff used to
call the research standard, all the researchers involved agreed that the comparisons of research
results from one laboratory with another, and between researchers could be made more
meaningful.'* In other words through the use of a common standard differences in
experimental results between individual laboratories became more manageable.
So far so good, it seemed, but formal agreement on the suitability of MRC Research
Standard A, for Interferon, Chick, would turn out to be a long way off from broad acceptance
of its application in laboratory practice amongst those actively engaged in interferon research.
For one thing, in response to concerns raised by the Board of Directors of the British
Interferon Collaboration about giving away valuable information to third parties, the distributi-
on and use of Research Standard A was not actively promoted." Consequently, few research
workers outside the Scientific Committee on Interferon learned of the establishment of the
British standard, and of the possibility of obtaining ampules of freeze-dried material free of
charge on request from the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards. It is questionable,
however, whether there would have been many more requests for the MRC Research Standard
for Chick interferon if its application had been promoted more actively right from the
beginning. This becomes apparent when compliance with the agreed upon standardization
procedure by the members of the Scientific Committee is taken into account. It appears that
the application of the MRC Research Standard in-every-day laboratory life—as a constitutive
element of the various experimental systems—cannot be taken for granted, even for those who
started the discussions of the need for standardization, and who were closely involved in
Final Report of Collaborative Examination 1962 of Medical Research Council Standard A of Chick
Interferon, December 1962, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/2.
Minutes of the 19th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 25 September 1962, MRC Ar-
chives File No. S788/2/2.
First draft of the report on the Collaborative Study of Interferon Assays. October 1962, MRC Archives, File
No. S788/2/2: Minutes of the 19th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 25 September
1962, MRC Archives File, No. S788/2/2: Final Report of Collaborative Examination 1962 of Medical
Research Council Standard A of Chick Interferon, December 1962, MRC Archives, File No. S788/2/2; and
interviews with Derek Bangham, Norman Finter, and David Tyrrell.
It was of particular concern to them that the standard preparation would most likely be made available to
workers outside the collaboration. They strongly believed that this would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
information and hence to the commercial disadvantage of the collaboration; Minutes of a meeting of Directors
of GNRD Patent Holdings Limited, dated 19 June. 1961, MRC Archives. File No. A 812/5/1.
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establishing a common reference preparation for chick interferon.
Upon assessing the use of the MRC Research Standard in 1965, about three years after
its establishment, Finter had to conclude during one of the meetings of the Scientific
Committee that the compliance had been rather poor.** The disappointing performance was
thought to be due to the dominance of the informal, personal kind of knowledge exchange and
to the absence of sanctions or rewards which would compensate for the extra work and self-
discipline that was required to implement the standardization procedure in one's laboratory."'
Whenever there were disagreements about experimental results, they mostly could be
negotiated by letter or telephone, or face-to-face. If the dispute could not be settled by those
involved, then they would exchange research materials and informally agree on additional tests
in order to assess the nature of the variation in results. Only in the case of preparations for
human trials, which required special concern for control and rigor due to a relatively high level
of public responsibility that was involved, serious efforts were made to formalize the process
of knowledge production. By establishing and using a research standard for monkey interferon,
the Scientific Committee explicitly tried to address problems of uncertainty and variability, in
order to anticipate public scrutiny and to satisfy a larger audience.
5.1.2 Portrait of a 'gift culture'
In general, however, researchers working on interferon operated with a high degree of
informality in a relatively small and flexible network of personal contacts that was built and
maintained through conferences, colloquia, sabbatical visits, postdoctoral fellowships and
extensive correspondence. Basically it was a 'gift culture' based on the regular exchange of
laboratory samples, techniques and skills." This gift culture was instrumental in facilitating the
comparison of research results and the management of differences between laboratories and
researchers in the field of interferon research. A case in point is the relationship of many years
which existed between the Finnish virologist Kari Cantell and the American virologist Kurt
Paucker. When, on his return to the Department of Virology at the State Serum Institute in
Helsinki at the end of the summer of 1962, after a two-year stay as a postdoctoral fellow at the
"' Minutes of the 30th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 4 May 1965, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/4.
' ' D. Burke and A. Buchan, 'Interferon Production in Chick Embryo Cells; I. Production by Ultraviolet-
Inactivated Virus'. Viro/oyv, 26 (1965), 28-35, p. 29; and interviews with Derek Burke. Norman Finter and
David Tyrrell.
" The notion of a 'gift culture' was borrowed from Theodore Porter; See, T. M. Porter, 7>M.tf in A/umim
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 226.
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Virology Section of the Research Department of the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia,
Cantell experienced difficulties in establishing an experimental system similar to that he had
worked with in America (the transfer of skills and materials had only been partly successful) he
immediately fell back on his former research 'pal', Paucker. As we can see in the following
excerpt from a letter by Cantell to Paucker, there was more at stake than an occasional call for
assistance to reproduce a particular production system for chick interferon:
Our work on interferon is in slow progress here (A/e/j/nii). We produce interferon in eggs with mumps vims,
but have not yet found suitable conditions to get very high liters. This is why I would like to have WS (jfrain
o/in/7uen:a virus), if we can not improve the yields with mumps virus. The interferon is assayed by a similar
plaque inhibition test we had there (/*/ii'WWp/iiYj) and it works nicely. We get the Falcon plastic dishes
(suiiv-ffis/ws) from California. Our purpose is to start soon producing interferon on a rather large scale and
to purify the stuff to some extent. One of the things I would like to do with it (</«• />«/•///<></ mrer/eron) is to
prepare good anti-IF sera. I wonder whether we could not establish some co-work or co-operation between
your lab and my lab. We would supply you with antiserum against chick interferon and you us with
antiserum against mouse interferon. What do you think about this? (Ilalics are mine)"'
By emphasizing the profitability of mutual assistance Cantell obviously tried to establish a
permanent connection between his Helsinki laboratory and Paucker's laboratory at the Childre-
n's Hospital of Philadelphia. As it turned out Paucker too thought it profitable to set up a kind
of permanent barter with Cantell. During Cantell's stay in Philadelphia both men had learned to
respect each other's abilities as laboratory researchers and they knew that they could count on
each other to produce high quality data and research materials which would be useful in
pursuit of one another's research.'''
Both Cantell and Paucker were well aware of the problems involved in exchanging data
and research materials between laboratories. They knew by experience that even when working
together in the same laboratory it could be quite demanding to make comparisons between
each other's data. According to Cantell, different researchers could make research materials
perform differently and these differences could be even greater in the case of experiments
involving biological specimens. Collaboration between the same pair of researchers in different
laboratories would only complicate matters." Apart from occasional difficulties with customs
over the contents of packages and occasional loss of material due to critical damages to
containers during the journey or to contamination, most problems originated from the
" Cantell to Paucker, letter dated 24 September 1962, Cantell Personal Archives.
Interview with Kari Cantell.
* Ibid.
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changeable behaviour of biological specimens."' However skillfully one packaged the tubes
with biological materials (mostly in containers filled with dry ice and labeled as "Biological
specimen, no commercial value") for shipment, the exchange of biological specimens often met
with resistance." More often than not, strains of cells or viruses which were sent from one
laboratory to the other behaved differently on arrival and it required some manipulation to
make them 'adapt' to the local situation. At times, for no obvious reason at all, a virus strain or
cell-line lost some of its original properties on transfer to a foreign laboratory, or even stopped
growing at all.** In general, however, the differences were manageable and laboratory
organisms could be made to work in a similar fashion in both Cantell's and Paucker's
laboratory.*'
The regular exchange of research materials turned out to be profitable for both parties.
Whenever either Cantell or Paucker experienced difficulties in working along similar lines of
research, they could appeal to the other for help. Paucker called it 'the easy way out'.'" Cantell
indicated that the exchange mechanism was instrumental in addressing problems of uncertainty
and variability.'"
In the process, they also exchanged interferon preparations in use as internal laboratory
standards, with the aim of facilitating the comparison of assay results. It was far from a
rigorous attempt at correlating research results. Cantell, for example, sent Paucker a number of
tubes with "standard IF" with the following specifications:
This interferon has been prepared by Lee virus in chick embryo's and purified to some extent according to
Tytell el al. Every tube contains 50 mg of dry substance consisting mostly of salts because the IF was not
dialysed before lyophilization. In our hands every tube contains about 10.000 IF units when assayed by the
plaque production test against VSV. By the way, we use 13 day-old chick embryos for this purpose, because
"' Whenever possible, mostly on return from overseas meetings, biomedical researchers would carry the packa-
ges themselves or ask fellow scientists who happened to be in the area of a specific laboratory to pick up a
package on their way home. For instance at the end of his stay in Philadelphia on his trip back to Helsinki
Cantell took along with him a couple of bottles with virus strains he had worked with in Werner Henle's
Department. It was regarded as a practical way to get around problems relating to logistics (customs, export
licences, transport costs and damages). In particular during the summer months with a peak in congresses in
both Europe and the USA there was a lively traffic of biological specimens between the continents; This
observation is based on both correspondences and interviews of the various scientists under survey in this
paper.
Interviews with Kari Cantell. and Ion Gresser.
"" Kari Cantell to Kurt Paucker. letter dated 23 October l%2. Cantell Personal Archives.
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their cells are clearly more sensitive to IF than the cell from 10 day-old embryos which are generally used."
This description of the properties of Cantell's chick interferon standard is largely qualitative in
nature with only a minimum concern for rigor. As long as interferon researchers like Cantell
restricted their dealings to fellow scientists like Paucker with whom they could make frequent
recourse to shared, often tacit knowledge this made perfect sense. However, when following
the first formal interferon gathering in Czechoslovakia, in 1964, researchers with an interest in
interferon research began to expand their networks with fellow scientists they only knew by
name, the informal form of measurement began to show flaws. This is clearly illustrated by the
problems involved in an exchange of samples of human interferon between Cantell and the
Head of the Division of Infectious Diseases of Stanford University School of Medicine (CA),
Thomas Merigan.
5.2 Creating a breeding-ground for standardization
After noticing in the literature in the fall of 1965 that Merigan, whom he had met once at the
Smolenice meeting, like himself was involved in setting up a production system for human
interferon, Cantell immediately contacted Merigan." With most interferon researchers using an
assay system of their own, it was difficult to compare the assay data in the literature and to
judge which production system was more promising in terms of the yields of human interferon.
In order to get some idea about how his production and assay system compared to Merigan's,
Cantell therefore proposed to exchange interferon probes. Merigan, who was keen to improve
on his laboratory results with an eye toward producing a preparation suitable for limited trial in
man, was receptive to the suggestion. Subsequently Cantell sent Merigan a batch of his human
interferon. As per the specification the human interferon had been prepared by incubating
cultures of human white blood cells ('leucocytes') with Sendai virus. The isolation and
purification method employed was said to be similar to the methodology of Tytell et al. The
potency ('titer') of the material was said to be '1:500' or 500 units when assayed by "plaque
reduction against VSV (virus) in amnion cells''.^
Whereas a similar kind of specification made perfect sense to Paucker, in the case of
Merigan it gave cause for confusion. In Merigan's hands, Cantell's interferon had measured a
Kari Cantell to Kurt Paucker, Letter dated November 19, 1964, Cantell Personal Archives.
Kari Cantell to Thomas Merigan, letter dated 30 October 1965, Cantell Personal Archives.
Kari Cantell to Thomas Merigan. letters dated 30 October 1965 and 11 July 1966, Cantell Personal Archives.
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titer of about 1:2600 or 2600 units, but Merigan did not know what to make of the five fold
difference between his and Cantell's results." If confirmed, it would imply on the one hand that
his assay system was definitely more sensitive, but on the other hand, and less positively, it
would imply that Cantell's production system for human interferon was superior to the one he
employed (based on virus infected cultures of neonatal fibroblast cells). However the results
were far from clear yet. Much depended on what Cantell meant exactly by indicating that the
titer of the Finnish interferon was 500 units. In a letter to Cantell Merigan therefore put the
matter up for discussion.
I am not clear when you say 500 units whether or not you mean per ml or per 4 ml as you use as an absorp-
tion volume in your assay on l5xl00mm plastic plates or the equivalent. If you measure your interferon in 4
ml and divide it by 4 to express it on a per 1 ml basis then our results on your WBC (white blood cell)
interferon would be quite similar."'
Merigan emphasized that in order to figure things out and enable a more accurate comparison
of assay data, it would be necessary to know as precisely as possible the assay procedure each
of them employed, as well as the mode of expressing interferon units. In his view, it was most
important to know the volume the units were measured in. He told Cantell that following an
exchange of chick interferon samples between his and five other American laboratories, he
chose to express his units as "the reciprocal of the dilution which inhibited 50% of the VSV
plaques as measured in 4ml aliquots"."
Judging by a follow-up letter from Merigan to Cantell, Cantell disagreed with Merigan
on the relative importance of the volume aspect, but he shared Merigan's concern for more
rigor in the exchange of information. They were ultimately able to settle, at least for the time
being, on a fivefold difference in sensitivity of their assay systems. However, before extending
this sort of comparison to a larger number of laboratories they were both in favor of
establishing a common standard for human interferon. Merigan indicated that he would bring
the standardization issue up for discussion at the next international interferon meeting that was
planned for the spring of 1967 in London."
For a couple of years Merigan had vocalized his support for the establishment of
interferon standards among the group of American scientists interested in this biological agent.
In order to assess the therapeutic potential of interferon, Merigan had chosen to work along
•" Thomas Merigan to Kan Cantell, letter dated 11 July 1966, Cantell Personal Archives.
* Ibid.
" Ibid.
•*" Thomas Merigan to Kari Cantell, letter dated 17 November 1966, Cantell Personal Archives.
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the lines of exploring in a quantitative way the conditions needed for optimal protection against
experimental virus infections both m v;7ro and ;'n v/vo. Merigan had not been discouraged by
the inconclusive results of the British experiments with interferon in humans. The various
published data on the broad antiviral spectrum and non-toxic nature of interferon in vi/ro was
too promising to be put off by a single unsuccessful human trial. In his view, the British
scientists had been too hasty." They should have at least waited until they had investigated the
quantitative aspects of the interferon phenomenon more thoroughly. It did not seem to make
much sense to start clinical trials without knowing more about how much interferon was
needed to protect laboratory animals against experimental virus infections. Having experienced
difficulties in assessing the relative merits of the various published methods for production and
purification, when starting his interferon research in 1963, and later on in correlating his
research data with those of others, he became increasingly concerned with standardization.
However, he learned that for a majority of workers in the field standardization was not
a major issue. A large portion of the work done was qualitatively descriptive in nature and
usually considered to stand on its own merits. In general these researchers felt less need to be
able to correlate published results from different laboratories. As long as the variation in
research results did not make a qualitative difference, the matter was not taken very
seriously.'" As a subject, standardization was considered rather boring."" According to Finter,
as far as most interferon researchers were concerned, if they got an answer than that was the
answer. Should somebody else then come with a tenfold difference in research results, for
instance, mostly the reaction would be in the following terms: "Okay if you say so, most likely
this means that your assay is more sensitive then mine".'"
Merigan was pleased to hear during an informal gathering of interferon researchers at
the 1964 meeting of the American Society for Microbiology in Washington, D.C., that the
established interferon researchers Sam Baron and Monto Ho shared his concern about the need
for common units of measure. They agreed with Merigan that with a growing number of
scientists interested in research problems relating to interferon, and a gradual shift away from
qualitative descriptive to a more quantitative oriented type of work, the usual way of
correlating one's results with those of others through the exchange of laboratory samples
would become increasingly time-consuming. In the long-term, it might therefore pay off to set
up interferon standards as a means to even the variation between laboratories and to facilitate
the comparison of research results. Following the discussion of this subject, Baron, Ho and
39
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Merigan announced that they would request financial and material support from the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) for establishing and distributing reference standard preparations for
chick and mouse interferon, which were most widely used among American interferon
researchers/'
5.2.1 An experiment in scientific communication
Without much trouble, the NIH granted the request. In his capacity of Medical Director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)—one of the institutes that make
up the NIH—and as former Head of the Virology Section of the Division of Biological
Standards, Baron knew his way around the NIH bureaucracy. Mainly through Baron's offices
the NIH administrators gave the undertaking to supporting efforts to establish reference
reagents for both mouse and chick interferon. This basically meant that the NIH
acquired—through the efforts of Baron and Merigan—batches of partially purified mouse and
chick interferon, where after the Reference Reagents Branch of the NIH was given the job to
prepare thousand ampules filled with one ml freeze-dried samples of what would be designated
'NIH Reference Reagent' for chick and mouse interferon respectively.""
While the preparations for research standards were under way, Baron learnt through
his NIH network that NIH administrators were looking for research areas that might benefit
from experimenting with a new form of communication, the so-called 'information exchange
group'. In studying ways to speed up the development of the biomedical sciences, the NIH had
engaged in an experiment in communication which aimed at improving and speeding up
communication between scientists. It was argued that because of the inevitably long delays in
publication and the distaste of editors for polemics, there was no longer any space left for real
discussion in journals. Setting up information exchange groups with the means of dispatching
communications, without any editorial restrictions, within a matter of days, free of any charge
to all the members of a group, was expected to restore the role of argument as a public
instrument of scientific progress. As Baron understood it, the working of this new form of
information exchange would enable anyone working on interferon to communicate research
findings or other scientific information in record time to all the others in the same area of
research throughout the world. This seemed just the kind of boost the embryonic field of
interferon research needed. Baron decided overnight to take the initiative and ask the NIH
Information Exchange Group Office for support to set up an information exchange group to
"""* Interviews with Sam Baron, Monto Ho, and Thomas Merigan, and George Galasso.
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provide better communication among scientists actively interested in problems of interferon.'"
"I went to the administrator and said, "Here is an area that is not fully accepted with a few
struggling laboratories around the world. If we can keep them in constant communication they
are likely to accelerate the development of this biological substance that will be of ultimate use
as a therapeutic drug. "I indicated that it would be catalytic to set up an information exchange.
Would they be willing to try it and they said "yes". I wrote to Isaacs and he agreed too. In fact
he was chairman".""*
Whereas most interferon researchers in America and overseas welcomed the initiative
and immediately applied for membership of the NIH sponsored Information Exchange Group
no. 6 ('IEG 6') for research on interferon, its reception within the British Scientific Committee
on Interferon was mixed. The letter of invitation which was signed by both Baron and Isaacs
took the members of the Scientific Committee on Interferon by surprise and immediately
caused some unease. Apart from the fact that they had not been informed about the American
initiative by Isaacs, they were irritated with the idea of losing the lead in the field to the Ameri-
cans.'" Furthermore, when on reflection the members of the Scientific Committee realized that
there was every advantage to be gained from joining this group, they became worried about
possible resistance within the collaboration. Participation in the exchange group was thought
to conflict with the policy of stringent control over publication of work on interferon.'"' Their
suspicions proved to be correct.
The industrial collaborators, in particular, were horrified by the thought of members of
the Scientific Committee freely exchanging information with anyone actively working in the
field. The invitation letter spoke about communications that would include not only
manuscripts but also discussions, unpublished research findings, technical suggestions,
unofficial notes of meetings or any other original communications. The drug company
executives took the view that to accept this would be to destroy the basis of collaboration.'"
Eventually, following extensive correspondence between the Scientific Committee and the
Board of Directors of the Interferon Collaboration it was decided that on the condition that
only manuscripts would be circulated which were already intended for publication and had
*' D. E. Green. An Experiment in Communication: The Information Exchange Group'. SciVnr*. 143(1964),
308-9; Anonymous, 'Information Exchange Group', Ato/nre, 204 (1964), 627; Interviews with Sam Baron and
George Galasso.
Interview with Sam Baron.
•" Minutes of the 28th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 10 November 1964, MRC Ar-
chives File No. S788/2/3.
•** Internal note MRC, dated 10 November 1964. MRC Archives File No. S788/2/3.
*' Minutes GNRD Patent Holdings Ltd. meeting, 10 December 1964, MRC Archives File No. A812/8/2; and
Internal note MRC, dated 10 December 1964, MRC Archives File No. S788/9.
203
been cleared by the patent adviser, members of the collaboration were allowed to participate in
the exchange group.'"
By the end of January 1965, 109 biomedical researchers from 17 countries had been
enlisted in IEG 6." In its first two years the interferon exchange group distributed over 220
different communications of its members." For the greater part these consisted of preprints of
articles in press and reprints of talks given at symposia, but also included unofficial notes of
meetings, technical suggestions, notes of unpublished research findings, and discussions of
research problems such as difficulties in reaching some decision on what one ought to call an
'interferon', or difficulties with correlating research results from different laboratories."
Generally the information communicated by the IEG 6 preceded journal publication by six to
nine months. It was this gain in time that appealed most to the members of the exchange
group. According to Baron once you had your laboratory results processed you could have
them out in two weeks time. "This allowed for the following kind of dialogue: in response to
so and so's item of last month I want to say that I did the same experiment but it did not come
out quite the same way and I therefore think that the interpretation should be different". ^
However valued by its members the new communication system began to face increas-
ing opposition from the editors of the biochemical journals. The editors heavily criticized the
fact that a large part of the communications appeared to consist of preprints of full articles. As
such the communications were in effect publications and could no longer be considered to be
an equivalent to a society newsletter. They threatened to ban from publication anything that
had first gone through an IEG. In order to meet the objections of the journals IEG 6 was
modified and transformed into 'Interferon Scientific Memorandum' in the course of 1967 (see
Fig. 42). However, the change of name and sponsorship—from the NIH IEG office to the
NIAID Policy Council—and the new rule that only abstracts of work being prepared for
publication, plus the tables and figures would be accepted for circulation, did not affect the
principle of the communication mechanism.
*' Sonnabend to Medawar. letter dated 9 November 1964. MRC Archives File No. S788/9; Medawar to NRDC.
letter dated 9 November 1964. MRC Archives File No. S788/9; NRDC to Medawar. letter dated 10
November 1964, MRC Archives File No. S788/9: and Minutes GNRD Patent Holdings Ltd. meeting, 10
December 1964. MRC Archives File No. A812/8/2
" IEG 6 membership list, dated 18 January 1965, Kari Cantell personal archives.
*" Sam Baron to members of IEG 6. letter dated 2 November 1966, Ion Gresser personal archives.
" IEG 6. communications 1-220. Kari Cantell personal archives.
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Interferon Scientific Memoranda
Frtruary 1968
The present system for the rapid and Informal exchange of information
among researchera in tha Interferon field is being modified and improved,
as was announced in the January 1968 issue of Interferon Scientific M—o-
randa (ISM). The first Issue in the new format, still entitled Interferon
Scientific Memoranda, will be mailed in March.
Sygopal» of Hew System
The purpose of the ISM is to bring scientists engaged in Interferon
research around the world into closer contact for a mutually beneficial
exchange of findings and opinions. The modified system, however, will
permit the exchange of table«, graphs, and photos as »ell as notes and
abstracts.
What Kind of Material to Submit
Contributions may Include:
1. Progress notes, abstracts or aummarles of unpublished research
findings, along with tables, figures, and photos which clarify
the text.
2. Discussions and crlticiaas.
3. Notes of bibliographic omissions.
4. Technical suggestions.
5. Unofficial notCB of meetings.
6. Any other original contributions relating to Interferon research.
Material will be printed In the language submitted, along with an
English translation if included.
Complete manuscripts cannot be accepted. Aa in the past, the Inter-
feron Committee will play an advisory role In setting policy and making
operational decisions.
As a recipient of privileged, unpublished information, each partici-
pant agrees on his own behalf and on behalf of any other peraon with whom
he shares the information that research findings comnunlcsted via the ISM
will be treated aa "personal communications" from professlonsl colleagues,
and that they »ill be given credit as such in any situation where question«
of priority might arise. Reference to material In the ISM ahould be cited
only as "personal communication," with the date of ISM issue (e.g., "Smith,
J., Personal Coaaunication, Jan. 1968").
Fig. 42. February 1968 new policy announcement on ISM by Gerald
BkUack, project manager. Courtesy of NIAID.
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Like IEG 6 before it, the Interferon Scientific Memorandum functioned as a central
clearing house for communications on interferon." Sharing a formal mechanism for communi-
cation that was meant to accelerate the dissemination of information required sharing and
shaping common denominators that allowed for dialogue and enabled participants to share
research problems and cope with differences. As such the NIH sponsored international
information exchange system was instrumental in creating needs for standards. At the same
time, by bringing out difficulties with correlating research results obtained in different
laboratories, the IEG and Scientific Memorandum contributed to a growing awareness of and
attention to this issue. The gradual rise in interest in the standardization issue manifested itself
in American and subsequently British efforts to establish common units of measurement.
5.2.2 Safeguarding British interests
The news that the NIH had obtained batches of chick and mouse interferon from Merigan and
were distributing freeze dried samples of this material as provisional reference standard
preparations stirred a renewed interest in the standardization question in Britain. Before the
news about the existence of American interferon standards, there had been occasional calls for
more attention to the use of standards by the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards, but
without much effect."' However, the fact that the Americans seemed to treat the matter very
seriously led to an immediate reappraisal of the subject."
Most members of the Scientific Committee had mixed feelings about the American
standardization efforts. In particular, the claim that the NIH chick standard was made of the
purest chick interferon material yet produced, was regarded with suspicion. The existence of
another reference standard preparation of chick interferon beside the MRC research standard
gave reason for concern, all the more so since there were indications that the MRC standard
contained an impurity that was responsible for non-specific protection. Neither the fact that the
biochemists on the Committee were convinced that Merigan's two-step purification procedure
did not justify the American claim to purity, nor recent studies suggesting that highly purified
chick interferon was far less stable than partially purified interferon, could dispel their
G.E. Wolstenholmc and M. O'Connor (eds). /n/er/mwi (1967. Cifco Foundation Symposium),(London. J&A
Churchill. 1968). pp. 260-1.
Minutes of the 26th, 27th. 28th and 29th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 21 April, 7
July. 10 November 1964 and 25 January 1965, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/3.
Minutes of the 30th and 31th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 4 May and 21
September 1965, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4; and. Internal notes MRC. dated 5 May and 29 September
1965. MRC Archives File No. 788/2/4.
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uneasiness about the state of affairs."
On behalf of the Division of Biological Standards of the NIMR, Frank Perkins urged
the necessity of active participation of the Scientific Committee in drawing up international
units of measure. By experience Perkins knew that if at one of the future meetings of the
Expert Committee on Biological Standardization (ECBS) of the World Health Organization
(WHO) the need for international standards for interferon would be raised, its members would
certainly want to know what the best preparations were and what the best ways of assaying
them were. In his view, the Scientific Committee had much to contribute to the American
standardization efforts on these two points. The normal procedure of the WHO in setting up
an international standard was to relate the new international unit to that of the first well-
recognized national standard prepared. In order to safeguard British interests and prevent the
MRC research standard for chick interferon losing to the American standard, it would not only
be helpful but desirable to keep up with American efforts. In the short term, the best thing to
do would probably be to establish an additional semi-purified chick standard that was species
specific, and a suitable mouse standard, and try and reach an agreement with the NIH on these
reference standards. This might be accomplished by arranging a collaborative assay to be
carried out by workers in both countries. Furthermore, he suggested that the committee should
undertake to circulate a report on the MRC research standard through the information
exchange group. In the meantime, Perkins would ask Bangham to bring up for discussion at
the ECBS of the WHO the need for international standards for interferon." Following
Perkins's plea for action, Glaxo scientists promised to supply the NIMR's Division of Biologi-
cal Standards with a large batch of semi-purified, species-specific chick interferon. This
material could then be used to prepare a new chick interferon standard that would stand a
better chance of being accepted by the WHO as an international standard than the currently
available provisional MRC Research Standard A for chick interferon.'*
In order to keep the question of standardization on the Committee's agenda on a
permanent basis, Finter added a little extra. With the very different units of measure used by
" Ibid.
In November 1966. through the agency of Bangham at a meeting of the Directors of the WHO Respiratory
Virus and Enterovirus Reference Centres, it was decided that it was advisable to establish reference material
to be used in the calibration of interferon assay systems. Subsequently, the ECBS of the WHO agreed that
'further information was necessary on the suitability of various materials and the quantities that would be
needed for particular purposes and requested the National Institute for Medical Research, London, in
collaboration with the WHO Secretariat, to collect such information': Report on Human Interferon, The
British Research Standard A, Division of Biological Standards, dated August 1971, MRC Archives File No.
S788/15/2.
Minutes of the 30th and 31th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 4 May and 21
September 1965, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4; and, Internal notes MRC, dated 5 May and 29 September
1965. MRC Archives File No. 788/2/4.
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various workers. Finter thought it hardly possible to evaluate quantitative data from different
laboratories in the field of interferon research. How should he correlate his interferon data with
those of Baron at the NIH, who like him was involved in studies on the possible use of
exogenous interferon to control virus infections in mice? Of course, as before he could try to
correlate his results with those of Baron by arranging informally for an exchange of internal
laboratory standards. However, even with people like Baron, whom he knew fairly well, this
procedure would increasingly take up his research time. How then should he judge recent
reports by American workers, whom he knew only by name, that high levels of interferon-like
activity could be induced in cell cultures by adding a substance known as Statolon, which
supposedly was a highly molecular carbohydrate?*' Did this new approach, which seemed to be
very much in line with Isaacs's ideas about artificially stimulating organisms to produce
endogenous interferon through the use of specific foreign substances, justify opening up a new
line of research? Because of the very different potencies of the interferon units used by
different workers, Finter thought it rather difficult to make a comparison between this
endogenous approach, and his exogenous approach. In Finter's opinion these latest develop-
ments only emphasized the need for international reference standards for interferons."
Subsequently, Finter asked and was given permission to exchange samples of his
laboratory reference preparation of mouse interferon—which, provided it would pass future
stability studies, might serve as a basis for a provisional British standard—with Merigan and
Baron. This was considered to be the first systematic attempt at correlating the unit used for a
preparation of mouse interferon by different workers in both Europe and America."
W.J. Kleinsmidt, J.C. Cline and E.B. Murphy. 'Interferon Production Induced by Statolon', Proc. Natl. Acad.
of Sei. U.S. 52 (1964), 741-4.
Professor Ernst Chain, who had received the Nobel Prize for the discovery of penicillin and its therapeutic
effects in various infectious diseases, would not wait for Finter's assessments. On hearing from Isaacs that the
interferon inducing substance Statolon was produced by a penicillium mould he immediately decided to start
looking for other active interferon inducing agents in penicillium moulds, which were available in abundance
in his laboratory at the Imperial College of Science and Technology in London. Both Chain and Isaacs hoped
that the penicillium molds might lead the way into the field of chemotherapy against viruses just as they did
into chemotherapy against bacteria.Minutes of the 30th and 31th meeting of the Scientific Committee on
Interferon, dated 4 May and 21 September 1965. MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4; and. Internal notes
MRC, dated 5 May and 29 September 1965, MRC Archives File No. 788/2/4; Minutes of the Scientific
Steering Committee, dated 9 March, 1965, MRC Archives File No. S788/8/1; and interview with Norman
Finter.
There was also general agreement that Finter should accept the invitation from the North Holland Publishing
Company, which was trying to extend its interests into the biological sciences, to edit a monograph on
interferon. It was felt to be a good idea to invite a number of British and American interferon experts to
contribute to a state-of-the-art textbixik on interferons, before the field expanded further and became
unwieldy. All agreed that a textbook approach would not only be helpful to make the subject more accessible
and encourage scientists to refer in their publications specifically to interferon but also to bring coherence to
the field.Internal note MRC. dated 12 May 1965. MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4; The textbook book on
interferons would be published at the end of 1966. N. B. Finter, /n/e//eron.s (Amsterdam, North Holland
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In the process of exchanging laboratory samples of mouse interferon with Merigan and
performing comparative assays, it turned out that Merigan's pure material was only as strong
as the ICI crude material. Finter was pleasantly surprised not only to see that correlating his
results with those of Merigan, with whom he only had a "nodding acquaintance", went rather
smoothly, but also to find out that the mouse unit used in both laboratories differed only slight-
ly." Conversely, correlating the units used in his and Baron's laboratory put his patience to the
test. The seemingly unremitting variance in the potencies obtained for a particular preparation
became a source of irritation on both sides of the Atlantic. Initially it was mainly Baron who
struggled to suppress the variation in his laboratory and Finter blaming him for not sufficiently
perfecting his series of measurements. However, the situation became confusing when for no
obvious reason the potencies in Finter's laboratory began to drift too." Eventually they decided
to come to grips with the problems by systematically studying the differences internal to and
between their laboratories; each series of measurements would be performed by using the same
reagents and assay method.
While Finter and Baron were still very much in the process of studying the nature of
the differences in results and agreeing on a conversion factor to correlate the work of both
laboratories, word came from Isaacs—who after a series of manic-depressive episodes with
periodic hospitalizations and occasional medication was having one of his rare good
periods'*—that the virologist and interferon researcher Charles Chany in his laboratory at the
Hopital St. Vincent-de-Paul, Paris, had succeeded in setting up a production system that
seemed feasible for the eventual 'mass production' of human interferon. Chany claimed to have
produced the largest batch of partially purified human interferon available anywhere in the
world. The news struck home as two months earlier it had still been difficult to envisage the
production of large amounts of human interferon that would be needed to perform clinical
trials.*"
At the October 1966 session of the Scientific Committee on Interferon Isaacs raised the
question as to whether or not efforts should be made to join forces with the French in
instituting clinical trials. Isaacs argued that establishing such a liaison would be in the interest
Publishing Company, 1966).
Minutes of the 31th meetin
Archives File No. S788/2/4.
g of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 24 September 1965, MRC
N.B. Finter, 'Interferon Assays: Sensitivity and Other Aspects', in G. Rita (ed., 1967, June, S/Vna Symposi-
um) 77ie /ntei/ero/u (New York, Academic Press, 1968), p. 211; and, Finter, interview.
Unbeknownst to his colleagues, he attempted to take his own life on at least two occasions; interview with
Susanna Isaacs-Elmhirst.
" Internal note MRC, dated 14 October 1966, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4; and N. B. Finter,
(Amsterdam. North Holland Publishing Company. 1966), p. 264.
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of both parties. As the three participating firms were clearly lagging behind in the production
of human interferon, he believed that the committee might take advantage of Chany's expertise
with the large-scale production of human interferon. While giving Chany and his collaborators
the credits for their production skills, there was reserve with regard to French clinical
methodology: the French were generally considered hopeless at arranging clinical trials.
Judging by Chany's interest in supplying human interferon for a clinical trial in the UK, the
French, in Isaacs opinion, were well aware that they could benefit from the Committee's
experience of conducting clinical trials with interferon and from the availability of testing
facilities at the Common Cold Research Unit. Isaacs then asked if the other members of the
committee thought the idea of arranging a clinical test of human interferon acceptable.'*
Isaacs's question stirred a discussion within the Scientific Committee about the
desirability of clinical trials as opposed to more basic in Wfro and animal studies of interferon.
Eventually the majority agreed that they should give it another try four years after the
negatively assessed clinical trial program had been aborted. Most members considered Finter's
mouse studies and the prospect of having access to a production source for human interferon
too promising to allow the opportunity of a test in humans to pass."
They agreed after much debate that it was most important not to go too fast. It was
emphasized that before any arrangement was made with Chany the work which might be
involved must be carefully considered. The chairman should therefore sent a letter to Chany
asking him for a quantity of human interferon and only suggesting the possibility of a joint
trial.'" Finter thought it terribly important first to correlate the units used for human interferon
in different laboratories. Without correspondence between units used by different workers, it
was difficult to compare Chany's interferon with human interferon that was produced in a
similar fashion by Cantell in Helsinki and Merigan at Stanford. Finter indicated that he would
be able to discuss the idea for a comparative study in detail with all three workers at the
Second International Symposium of Applied Virology and Medicine held in Fort Lauderdale
(Florida) in December 1966."
** Minutes of the 34th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 20 October 1966, MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/4.
" Minutes of the 34th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 20 October 1966. MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/4; and. Internal note MRC, dated 27 October. 27 October 1966, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/4: N.B. Finter. 'Interferon as an Antiviral Agent /n Vivo: Quantative and Temporal Aspects
of the Protection of Mice against Semliki Forest Virus', flr/r. 7. Erp. Pa/Ao/., 47 (1966), 361-70.
™ Isaacs to Chany, draft letter, dated 27-10-1966, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/4.
" Minutes of the 34th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 20 October 1966, MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/4; and. Internal note MRC, dated 27 October. 27 October 1966. MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/4.
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5.2.3 The 'interferon' versus 'inducer' people
In the corridors of the Florida meeting there were rumors buzzing that interest in interferon
was picking up momentum. No less than two international interferon meetings were scheduled
for 1967 and after years of radio silence the field of interferon research seemed to produce
results that were newsworthy. Beside news about French as well as Finnish and Russian
investigators having developed production methods for human interferon and plans to use this
interferon in clinical trials, word spread about promising results with the use of synthetic
interferon stimulating agents in protecting against viral infection.'"
It had been known for some time that the endogenous production of interferon could
be stimulated by extracts of living material such as the fungal product Statolon. However, the
complex and uncertain nature of these impure materials—Statolon initially was thought to be a
complex polysacharide, but now was claimed to be either a fungal virus or a double-stranded
ribonucleic acid—obtained from natural sources raised doubts about their practicality in
laboratory and clinical research. Most researchers were reluctant to work with natural
materials of undefined composition, which made their research completely dependent upon
biological test procedures with their inherent limitations of accuracy and their heavy cost in
material and skill. The impurity argument had been used before to call into question the
practicality of developing interferon as a therapeutic substance against clinical viral infection."
The news that Maurice Hilleman at the Merck Institute for Therapeutic Research at
Rahway, New Jersey, and William Regelson at the Medical College of Virginia had both
successfully explored the possibility of preparing synthetic materials of known composition in
their laboratories which were capable of stimulating endogenous interferon activity was
snapped up. It was most exciting that endogenous interferon production could be stimulated
and studied in vivo by the use of easy to make and inexpensive chemicals without having to
worry about impurities. Basically, working along these lines meant that interferon was no
longer perceived in terms of a practical therapeutic agent but as a research tool to develop
preferably chemical means—in other words synthesizing chemical compounds—for achieving
viral chemotherapy. The dominant view was that if interferon was ever going to come to
E.R. Falcoff, R. Falcoff, F. Foumier. and C. Chany, 'Production en Masse, Purification Partielle et Ca-
racterisation d'un InterfeYon Destine a des Essais Therapeutiques Humains'. A/»«, /ns/. ftis/pur. 111(1966).
562-84: A.K. Field, A. A. Tytell. G.P. Lampson. G.P. and M. Hilleman. 'Inducers of Interferon and Host
Resistance: II. Multistranded Synthetic Polynucleotide Complexes'. Pror. MM. ,4ra</. 5ci. i/.S.A, 58 (1967).
1004-10: W. Regelson. 'Prevention and treatment of Friend Leukemia Virus (FLV) Infection by Interferon-
Inducing Synthetic Polyanions', /Wvun. £vp. Afad. ß/o/., I (1967), 316-32; and interviews with Kari Cantell,
Maurice Hilleman, and Thomas Merigan.
M. Sanders and E. H. Lennette, M«/ica/ and App/iVrf V/ro/o&v. /Vor. Soc\ /n/. Symp. (St. Louis: Warren H.
Green Inc., 1968); and interviews with Sam Baron. Kari Cantell. Norman Finter, Maurice Hilleman. and
Thomas Merigan.
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something clinically useful, the synthetic interferon inducers showed most promise."
Isaacs was not to get a great deal of pleasure out of the reappraisal of the field of
interferon research. Following a fatal hemorrhage Isaacs died on 26 January 1967 in the
University Hospital, at the age forty-five. However shocking the news of his untimely death
was, it did hardly affect the course of events. Due to his illness he was already quite some time
a mere shadow of his former self."
Through the rapidly expanding work on interferon inducers new needs were being
created for common denominators. The research question that began to dominate the research
agenda was whether the endogenous approach offered a fruitful alternative to the exogenous
approach. Gradually, a division emerged between those who favored working along the lines
of the endogenous approach—the 'inducer people'—and others opting for holding on to the
exogenous approach—the 'interferon people'." However different their modes of perceiving
interferon as an object for research, both groups shared a growing interest in standardization
and establishing common yardsticks as a means to the end of comparing and criticizing another
one's research data.
The higher rating of the subject found expression in the fact that during the general
discussion of the April 1967 Interferon meeting in London, special attention was paid to
ongoing attempts to prepare standard interferon preparations and two months later at a follow-
up conference in the beautiful setting of Siena (Italy), Finter—to his own amazement—was
invited to give a lecture on standardization." According to Finter, he did not think at the time
While it had been agreed in 1965 under pressure of the three pharmaceutical companies, who preferred to
work independently in the area of interferon inducers. to leave this topic outside the Interferon collaboration,
some MRC officers could be heart saying that it might be more advantageous to join forces on the study of
inducers too; Internal note MRC, dated 11 September 1967, MRC Archives, File No. A812/17/1.
" Tyrrell had been de facto chairman of the Scientific Committee on Interferon for the past few years and in
practice Isaacs's scientific assistant, the virologist, Joseph Sonnabend, ran Isaacs's Laboratory for Research
on Interferon at the NIMR. Medawar. the director of the NIMR, who had been thinking of disbanding the
unproductive Laboratory for Research on Interferon for quite some time, seized the opportunity to reassimilate
the Interferon Laboratory into what had been renamed the "Division of Virology". Medawar met hardly any
opposition as he could convince worried MRC officers that this would not mean that all work at the NIMR on
interferon would come to an end. On the contrary, he assured that the NIMR's efforts in the field of interferon
research would be continued "at not less than its present intensity". Medawar enforced his claim by pointing
out that the most promising research work on interferon at the NIMR. studying how interferon acted at the
molecular level, was currently performed by one of the staff members of the Biochemistry Division, the
biochemist. Martin Kerr.Intemal Note MRC dated 9 February 1967. MRC Archives. File No. A812/8/2: The
MRC to Sir Peter Medawar. letter dated 14 February 1967, MRC Archives. File No. S788/13; and Sir Peter
Medawar to the MRC. letter dated 17 February 1967, MRC Archives, File No. A812/8/2.
'* Interviews with Sam Baron. Kari Cantell. Norman Finter, Robert Friedman, Ion Gresser, Maurice Hilleman,
and Jan Vilcek..
" The London meeting held 19th-21st April 1967 in London, which was organized on behalf of the Ciba
Foundation, was the first meeting after Smolinice completely devoted to the subject of interferon. With the
idea of getting some new input from an expert-outsider, Francis Crick was specially invited as a participant to
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that his presentation made very much impact except for the fact that it was instrumental in
emphasizing once again the need for standards and in initiating discussions in the corridors
concerning British and American efforts to set up interferon standards."
Following the Siena symposium the standardization issue as well as the organization of
clinical trials figured prominently on the Scientific Committee's agenda. In consultation with
the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards, plans for organizing international collaborative
assays of chick, mouse and human interferon were made. One of the researchers in Bangham's
Division, Gray Anderson, was already in the process of enlist on behalf of the ECBS of the
WHO seven laboratories in Britain, the U.S. and Finland which were prepared to participate in
an international collaborative assay of chick embryo interferons. The participants were told
that the assay was to be carried out in order to assign potencies to both a new British and
American chick interferon standard in terms of the existing British Research Standard. This
was said to enable researchers in the future to assign potencies on a common unitage basis.'''
What Anderson did not tell the participants was that in the first place the assay was
meant to produce a replacement of the MRC Research Standard A by a new standard to be
offered to the WHO, which was expected to stand a good chance of being accepted as an
international reference preparation. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to include in
the assay the NIH chick interferon standard, so that in the future British and U.S. standards
could be assigned potencies on a common unitage basis. Since the usual practice of the WHO
on setting up an international standard was to relate the new international unit to that of the
first well-recognized national standard prepared, the British hoped that the Americans would
agree to assay their standard in terms of the MRC Standard A.*" This did work out rather well.
Baron agreed to assay the NIH standard in terms of the MRC Standard A while the members
of the Scientific Committee did their share by adding to future papers a reference to the British
standard used.*'
The Division of Biological Standards had hoped to start simultaneously with an
international collaborative assay of human interferon. This assay was to be carried out with the
primary intention of investigating the suitability of Chany's material to serve as a research
the conference; see. G.E. Wolstenholme and M. O'Connor (eds., 1967, April, Lorufon Symposium) /nw//i»ron
(London, J&A. Churchill LTD., 1968). pp. 71-4.
Minutes of the 36th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 28 June 1967, MRC Archives,
No. S788/2/5; and interview with Norman Finter.
Gray Anderson to Kari Cantell. letter dated 19 September 1967, Cantell personal archives.
Minutes of the 36th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 28 June 1967. MRC Archives,
No. S788/2/5.
Minutes of the 37th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 17 Oktober 1967, MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/5.
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Standard to be used in clinical trials. If successful, the MRC would be the first to offer a
standard for human interferon, and it was hoped that such a standard would eventually prove
suitable for submission to the WHO for consideration as an international standard.*-
However, it would be a long time before Anderson started organizing an international
collaborative assay of human interferon. From the very beginning events were against the
establishment of a human interferon standard. The complications began with the presentation
of the results of the comparative study of human interferon from four different laboratories at
the March 1967 meeting of the Scientific Committee." Rather unexpectedly, the results of the
comparative assays showed that Chany's material was not particularly potent. It turned out that
Cantell's interferon was approximately 130 times more potent than Chany's sample which was
of average potency. The members of the Scientific Committee were in a scrape, because they
already had officially arranged for a meeting with Chany during the London Interferon Sympo-
sium to discuss a proposal to carry out a clinical trial with Chany's interferon in MRC facilities.
They did not feel like putting the friendly relation with the influential French interferon
researcher Chany on the line. That could only put at risk the growing coherence in the field of
interferon research, and that was in nobody's interest. Eventually it was decided to tell Chany
that the Scientific Committee could not but perform clinical trials with the most potent material
available—Cantell's interferon, but that Chany's material could well serve the purpose of
setting up a standard. It was a political compromise that would leave its mark over the years.
Although, Initially, everything went smoothly. Chany accepted the offer and at the beginning
of May 1967 sent five liters of human interferon preparation to the NIMR's Division of
Biological Standards. As soon as Anderson had time free in his freeze-drying program, he
began to process the material in accordance with the Division's standard production procedure
for reference standard preparations.""
At the June 1967 meeting of the Scientific Committee Bangham was able to report that
more than three thousand lml ampules (labeled with the code number 67/87) filled with freeze-
dried human interferon material were in store. The proposed MRC research standard 67/87
was currently undergoing stability tests, and he hoped that Anderson could soon start
arranging an international collaborative study in which this material would be compared with
other preparations of human interferon. During the same meeting plans for clinical trials with
*" Minutes of the 36th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 28 June 1967, MRC Archives,
No. S788/2/5.
" Minute of the 35th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 3 March 1967, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/5.
** Interim Report on Standards for Human. Mouse and Chick Embryo Interferons, Division of Biological
Standards, dated September 1967. MRC Archives File No. S 788/2/5.
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Cantell's interferon were discussed and it was decided that the action to be undertaken first
was to organize an inspection visit of Cantell's laboratory.'"
5.3 A 'Finnish detour'
On Sunday afternoon the 6th of August 1967 at Helsinki airport Kari Cantell nervously
awaited the arrival of Norman Finter. It had been more than half a year since he had decided,
during informal talks with Finter and Karl Fantes at the Fort Lauderdale conference, to start a
collaboration with the British Scientific Committee on Interferon Research. Over a six month
period Cantell had supplied Fantes with several batches of his human interferon produced in
white blood cell ('leucocyte') cultures for purification and potency studies. Apart from the
development of a precipitation method by which the interferon could be concentrated, little had
been achieved in terms of the purification of interferon. He had therefore been pleasantly
surprised early in July to receive an official request from the Scientific Committee to intensify
their collaboration. The British asked for additional amounts of his interferon to carry out
work which would lead to a trial in humans. However eager to participate in an ambitious
international project such as this, Cantell was somewhat taken aback by the fact that he had to
allow for an inspection of his laboratory by the secretary of the Immunological Products
Advisory Committee of the MRC, Frank Perkins. At first he felt irritated by the apparent lack
of confidence of the British in the safety of his production method: the production protocols in
his laboratory were in accordance with the same stringent safety standards that were operative
at the Finnish Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service nearby. Finter's personal assurances that
laboratory inspections were made a compulsory part of British research projects that involved
making biological material for use in humans helped to overcome his negative feelings. In
talking over the matter with his Swedish research-assistant, Hans Strander—who was trained
in medicine and immunology at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm and had arranged to
pursue his doctoral thesis at the State Serum Institute in Helsinki—he was further persuaded to
cooperate.**
Minutes of the 36th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 28 June 1967, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/5.
This impressionistic account of Finter's and Perkins' visit to Cantell is based on: N. Finter to J. Lindenmann,
letters dated 7. 15, 28. 31 July and 11 August 1967, K. Cantell correspondence, personal archives; K. Cantell
to N. Finter, letters dated 15 and 25 July and 10 August 1967, K. Cantell correspondence, personal archives;
Minutes of the 36th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 28 June 1967, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/5; Report of a visit made by Dr. N.B. Finter and Dr. FT. Perkins to Helsinki to see Dr. K.
Cantell, Dr. H. R. Nevanlinna and Dr. H. Strander, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/5; H. Strander and K.
Cantell, 'Production of Interferon by Human Leukocytes in Vitro', Ann. WfJ. ejp. Fenn, 44 (1966), 265-73;
K. Cantell, H. Strander. Gy. Hadhazy and H. R. Nevanlinna, 'How Much Interferon Can Be Prepared in
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Hadn't they been concerned too about the risks involved in using a product stemming
from leucocytes from blood donors in a trial in humans? Apart from the possibility of allergic
side-reactions, the final product might be contaminated with hepatitis or other pathogenic
viruses originating from the blood of infected donors. It was therefore understandable that the
Scientific Committee like they themselves wanted to proceed with the utmost caution in this
matter. Moreover, they both regarded the inspection visit as a sign that the British took the
project very seriously. Cantell also discussed the likelihood of virus infection, in particular the
hepatitis problem, with Harri Nevanlinna, the director of the Red Cross Blood Transfusion
Service in Helsinki. The information he gathered was less promising than expected. Cantell
learned that there could be no absolute answers. The only thing that Nevanlinna could be sure
about was that so far his service's plasma products had caused very few cases of hepatitis. It
made him feel a little bit uneasy about the inspection visit.
Cantell was relieved to find out that Finter would arrive one day in advance of Perkins
and stay overnight at his private home. This provided them ample opportunity to have
preliminary discussions about the ins and outs of the collaborative project and about the state
of the art of interferon research. Over dinner it turned out that they both looked upon the
rapidly growing popularity of interferon inducer research with envy and felt themselves
increasingly marginalized by the 'inducer people' under the virtual command of the powerful
and charismatic Maurice Hilleman. According to Hilleman there was no future for exogenous
interferon in medical therapeutic terms. This made Cantell and Finter feel that they were
fighting for a common cause: researching the actions of exogenous interferon without the
exclusion of the interferon inducer line of investigation. They felt encouraged by reports from
Vladimir Soloviev of the Virology Department of Russian Academy of Medical Sciences in
Moscow—despite a shared scepticism about the state of the art of Russian interferon
research—who had performed several successful trials with human leucocyte interferon in
large numbers of volunteers infected with influenza virus. The best protection seemed to have
been obtained when the interferon was given to humans 2-24 hours before being challenged by
the virus.
By the time Perkins arrived on Monday afternoon. Cantell had already familiarized
Finter with his work as head of the Virus Department at the State Serum Institute in Helsinki.
Finter learned that optimizing the production of interferon by human leucocytes was a
laborious and time consuming research activity governed by trial and error. The production
process of interferon appeared very sensitive to disturbances and changes—for instance they
experienced that for uncertain reasons using flat instead of round bottles for culturing the
white blood cells appeared to affect the interferon yields in a dramatic way.
Human Leucocyte Suspensions', in G. Rita (ed.). 77te /mer/irroas (New York: Academic Press, 1968), pp.
223-32; Interviews with Kari Cantell. Norman Finter, and Hans Strander.
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Keeping up the production levels already required hard and meticulous work—let alone
engineering an increase in interferon yields and to scale up the production system. So far the
most rapid and abundant production of interferon was achieved by incubating purified cultures
of white blood cells obtained from blood donors with large doses of Sendai virus." After
storage overnight the supernatant fluid which contained interferon was harvested, where after
the interferon fluid underwent a basic purification procedure. Since both Cantell and Strander
lacked the biochemical skills thought to be necessary for purifying the interferon preparations
to a degree acceptable for use in humans it was quickly agreed to leave further purification and
concentration work to the responsibility of Karl Fantes of Glaxo laboratories.
\
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Fig. 43. A plan of Caitell 's laboratory (dated 1967) .
The laboratory workers entered room 1
from ttie outside and ctiangcd their clothing.
They then walked round to room 4 tlirough rooms 2
and 3 since tlie door from room 1 to room 4
would be kept locked. The sterile air
supply was common to the rest
of the building loo..
In experimenting with a large number of different sorts of viruses from his laboratory stock Cantell figured
out that a rare Finnish strain of Sendai virus in the back of his laboratory freezer was the best inducer of
interferon.
217
l ig. 43b. The production of leucocyte interferon in Helsinki
(late 1960's/early 1970's). Courtesy of Dr K. Cartell.
Finter as well as Perkins were impressed by the amount of work that went into setting up and
maintaining an experimental production unit for human interferon, and by the efficiency and
skilfulness with which the production of interferon was dealt with. Interferon was produced in
a special room that was isolated from public health work and was occasionally used for the
production of vaccines. The small laboratory space for the production of interferon was
continuously supplied with sterile air and before entering the production area Finter and
Perkins had to change clothing in order to prevent contamination and to maintain sterile
conditions during the production process (see Fig. 43a, b). This resembled very closely the
stringent British vaccine production procedures.
They were also shown around the transfusion service where they learned that the
preparation of interferon was not done at the expense of blood that was needed for blood
transfusions. Since separate fractions of blood (plasma, packed red cells, antihaemophelic
factor and platelets) were increasingly used for transfusions instead of whole blood the
transfusion service was in the process of fractioning more and more of its donor blood. Of the
250.000 blood vessels collected each year about 100.000 were currently centrifuged to
separate the various parts of blood. It appeared to require only little extra work to routinely
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collect the leucocytes during this procedure as a "by-product' that was to be sent to Cantell's
laboratory for further processing ."
However short the actual tour through the Red Cross building, the visit itself was
drawn out. Lengthy discussions took place concerning the risk of hepatitis infection of blood
products. In an attempt to reassure his visitors with regard to the hepatitis problem, Cantell
emphasized that Finland compared favorably with other European countries with its low
incidence of infectious hepatitis and that he would as soon as possible send the latest official
figures to Finter. This turned out to be far from the last word in the matter.
On return to Britain Perkins met with further objections to the use of leucocyte
interferon within MRC's Immunological Products Advisory Committee that was responsible
for safeguarding the clinical safety of the final product.*' Ultimately, following lengthy
discussions it was decided, on the basis of Perkins's favorable report of the state of the art
nature of Cantell's production facilities, to allow for limited experimental use of leucocyte
interferon in localized infections in humans.^ Priority was given to a study of human leucocyte
interferon against rhinovirus in volunteers, with interferon given as a nasal spray." One of the
decisive factors in planning this trial first was that it could relatively easy be arranged in the
Common Cold Unit in Salisbury through David Tyrrell. Moreover they could take advantage
If they spinned blood in the centrifuge, they were left with three layers. Formerly after removal of the top layer
consisting of a thick, straw-colored liquid known as plasma or 'serum' they got rid of the intermediate almost
colourless layer of leucocytes, the so-called t>uffy coat', where after the bags with the remaining red cells were
stored for further use. Instead of discarding all buffy coats they now routinely collected the leucocytes.
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Apart from the disturbing likelihood that the interferon material might be contaminated with hepatitis, one of
the committee members pointed to the theoretical risk of contamination with so-called 'slow' viruses like
Kuru. Scrapie and disseminated Multiple Sclerosis. Despite the fact that this latest objection was not
sustained in view of the lack of practical evidence that these kind of slow viruses had ever caused problems in
similar situations, it was illustrative of the negative mood within the Advisory Commmittee regarding clinical
trials with Cantell's interferon.
First of all the final product should be tested for the presence of pathogenic viruses in Wfro and m Wvo, in
particular extensive animal tests for hepatitis viruses were required. Second, the interferon inducing Sendai
virus in Cantell's production unit should be free from leucosis (leukemia inducing) viruses. Third, it was
agreed that the blood donors involved should be checked for continued freedom from clinical hepatitis for 6
months after donating their white blood cells. Fourth, monkey experiments should be carried out in advance
resembling as far as possible the trials in humans. Furthermore the Safety Committe was in favour of making
attempts to obtain information from neurologists and the Multiple Sclerosis Club concerning contamination
problems related to blood transfusion of patients with disseminated sclerosis;First draft of the minutes of the
37th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 17 October 1967, MRC Archives File No.
S788/2/5; N. Finter to K. Cantell. letters dated 20 September and I November 1967, K. Cantell Correspon-
dence, personal archives; and K. Cantell to N. Finter, letter dated 26 September 1967, K. Cantell Correspon-
dence, personal archives.
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Except for a proposal to test the inhibitory effect against viraemia produced by yellow virus vaccine in
volunteers, the plan included the same kind of trials in humans as had either been performed or proposed by
the Scientific Committee in the early 1960's.
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of Tyrrell's experiences in the 1962 Common Cold trial.'* :
About the same time interest in interferon rose to a new height within the British drug
company quarters.'" Rumors were buzzing around that at Merck and the NIH animal
experiments were already in progress which showed that endogenous interferon stimulation
through treatment with specific synthetic substances could cure acute viral infection in animals
at a non-toxic dosage level. The drug company executives were drawn to these synthetic
interferon inducers because they were easy to make chemically—fitting perfectly well their
chemically oriented drug development trajectories—inexpensive and induced large quantities
of interferon, whereas the production of useful, in other words potent and pure enough
preparations of exogenous interferon appeared to be difficult and costly.** In management
circles everybody was particularly eager to capitalize on the clinical promise of the interferon-
stimulating agents. They seemed to be alerted by the tremendous drive between the NIH and
the pharmaceutical industry in America in the field of interferon inducers.
5.4 Wrestling standards
In the meantime, national as well as international interest in establishing interferon standards
continued to grow. Not only the British plans for human trials played an important role in this
respect but also the frequent misunderstandings between the groups of 'inducer' and 'interferon'
people about the quantitative aspects of their laboratory studies (such as the dose-yield
relationships or the toxicity:therapeutic dose ratios of interferon inducers versus exogenous
interferon). The fact that sometimes similar experiments appeared to produce inconsistent
results, without any prospect of reconciling these differences, added to the confusion. The at
times vehemently opposing parties acknowledged that, since neither of them knew how exactly
interferon acted or what its precise nature was, common yardsticks at least were needed to
facilitate the assessment of the relative merits of employing interferon inducers versus
exogenous interferon." As I will show in this section the NIMR's Division of Biological Stand-
ards took advantage of this perceived need by pushing ahead their standardization efforts.
By the time Anderson started up a collaborative study of the proposed research
'" Minutes of the Human Interferon Working Party, dated 4 January and 8 february 1968, MRC Archives File
No. S788/15/1.
Interviews with John Beale. Karl. Fames, and Norman Finter.
** Internal notes MRC dated 9. 16 and 19 February 1968. MRC Archives File No A812/5/3.
The minority of mostly European 'interferon guys' had a hard time defending themselves against the powerful
American alliance of inducer supporters headed by the charismatic Maurice Hilleman. Ion Gresser to Sidney
Färber, letter dated 17 January 1969. Gresser personal archives; and interviews with Kari Cantell. Ion
Gresser, Maurice Hilleman. Monto Ho. and Jan Vilcek.
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Standard of human interferon named '67/87' which originated from Chany's Paris laboratory, in
the fall of 1968, the Scientific Committee on Interferon began to make an issue of its relatively
low potency.* The fact that some of its members, who had been doing informal potency tests
with 67/87, failed to measure any interferon activity in the ampules, was of overriding
importance in the growing call for a more potent standard. It was argued that to be of any use
as an international reference preparation, a standard should also be suitable for those who used
less sensitive assay methods. However, to prepare another standard would mean another long
delay and moreover the Division of Biological Standards had already heavily invested in the
proposed MRC standard 67/87. Eventually, it was decided that Anderson should begin
preparations of a more potent standard that was made from human interferon to be obtained
from Cantell, while continuing the arrangements for an international collaborative assay of
67/87."
The parcel of Cantell's frozen leucocyte interferon arrived with flight AY 831 from
Helsinki on the 29th January 1969, 9.05 am local time at Heathrow airport, and was safely
transferred to Anderson's deepfreeze.'* About two months later the material was thawed,
filtered, distributed into glass ampules, coded 69/19 and freeze-dried. It had taken two years to
reach this stage, but except for the availability of two different proposed research standards for
human interferon little progress was made. Establishing 69/19 in conjunction with 67/87 even
created new disparities and therefore could only be expected to complicate the job of
managing differences. At least there was a 'private' human interferon standard (a batch of
67/87) available for use by members of the Scientific Committee only, which enabled them to
informally establish a common unit of measure.'" This could not be said of mouse interferon.
The state of affairs here was considered depressing by the Scientific Committee on Interferon.
From the very beginning things went wrong with regard to setting up a mouse interferon
standard.
It began with the news that the mouse interferon material prepared by Finter was not
** Gray Anderson to Kari Cantell, letter dated 1 November 1968. Cantell personal Archives.
" Minutes of the 40th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon. dated 24 September 1968. MRC
Archives File No. S788/2/5: and Minutes of the 8th meeting of the Working Party on human interferon. dated
6 November 1968, MRC Archives File No. S788/15/1.
Kari Cantell to Gray Anderson, letter dated 20 January 1969, Cantell personal archives; and Gray Anderson
to Kari Cantell, letter dated 4 february 1969, Cantell personal archives.
By organizing an informal collaborative assay between the laboratories working within the Interferon
Collaboration Finter's colleague, the ICI researcher Bob Bucknall, was able to establish the relative
sensitivities of all the assay procedures, thereby facilitating the comparison of assay data; Bob Bucknall to
Kari Cantell. letter dated 29 July 1968. Cantell personal Archives.
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considered by him to be sufficiently stable to be used as a standard.'"* Subsequently, Anderson
invited the NIH to contribute some of the same bulk material of crude mouse interferon
produced by Merigan, which was used to prepare the provisional NIH standard, for
collaborative study as a proposed mouse interferon standard for international use."" Upon
acquiring and processing this material, the ampules with freeze dried mouse interferon standard
preparation were distributed by Anderson to Finter, Baron and Merigan for collaborative
study. However, as soon as the first test results were assembled it appeared that something had
gone wrong. There were enormous discrepancies between the assay data obtained in Finter's
laboratory and in those of Baron and Merigan—for which no one seemed to have any rational
explanation. After repeated series of laboratory tests, it was eventually agreed that the NIH
material was unstable and lost most of its activity over time. The reasons for this loss in
potency were not quite clear. Early in 1969, word came from Baron that the NIH was working
hard to produce a new batch of mouse interferon material that instead of being freeze-dried
would be kept in the frozen state and could serve as an interim standard.'""
The problems to coordinate standardization efforts at an international level were a
constant source of irritation between the British, Americans and French. In an effort to bring
the parties closer to one another the Permanent Section of Microbiological Standardization of
the WHO started preparations for an international conference on the subject of standardizing
interferons.""
5.4.1 The October, 1969, Standardization Conference
In his conference address the chairman, David Evans, made an appeal to the 84 delegates from
13 countries to direct their attention mainly to reaching agreement on setting up interferon
standards, on assigning a unitage to them and on the use of these standards by all those
engaged in the interferon field. In Evans's opinion this was the only way to overcome the major
stumbling block in the interferon field - "namely, the inability of workers to express the activity
'"" Minute of the 35th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 3 March 1967, MRC Archives
File No. S788/2/5.
"" Minutes of the 36th meeting of the Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 28 June 1967, MRC Archives.
No. S788/2/5.
'"" Norman Finter to Thomas Merigan, letter dated 7 August 1968, Gresser personal archives; Norman Finter to
Ion Gresser, letter dated 7 August 1%8. Gresser personal archives; and. Minutes of the 41th meeting of the
Scientific Committee on Interferon, dated 14 January 1969, MRC Archives File No. S788/2/5.
"* Minutes of the 1 Oth meeting of the Human Interferon Clinical Trials Working Party, dated 25 February 1969,
MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
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of interferons in meaningful terms".'"* At the same time, in an apparent effort to reassure those
who were afraid of the fuss that was felt to be associated with the standardization efforts,
Evans tried as hard as he could to play down the requirements for providing all laboratories
with the same yardsticks. However, setting criteria, assigning units and choosing suitable
reference materials would require far greater efforts from the participants than Evans tried to
make himself and the others believe.
This is aptly illustrated by the numerous and lengthy discussions which were needed to
achieve consensus about the ins and outs of interferon preparations that would make most
suitable research standards. For instance, Evans indicated that the standard should be
distributed in a form which would ensure their stability for many years. Among other things, it
should be kept at a low temperature. However, what was for some a "frozen state" that would
guarantee stability was for others a freezing temperature that would still allow for degradation.
It was eventually agreed that the reference standard should ideally be freeze-dried and kept at -
70°C, but that the more practical temperature of -20°C was acceptable too."" In addition,
Evans's criterion that ampules containing standards should be sealed by fusion with glass
threatened to exclude the United States, where it was common practice to use rubber
stoppered vials, from contributing standard preparations. The issue was amicably settled by a
recommendation to siliconize the rubber stoppers, which would remove most likely
contaminants such as oxygen and water. Furthermore, should interferon standards be crude or
purified? Crude interferon preparations were known to produce easily misleading results
because of the presence of loads of impurities. While highly purified interferons would have the
advantage of giving those involved less cause to rack their brains over the nasty question: "Is
this phenomenon which I observe in my laboratory due to the interferon, or is it due to an
impurity?", they were claimed to be rather unstable.""' The compromise was to purify them in
such a way that would rid them of as many biologically active interfering impurities as possi-
ble.""
At times, an issue was judged too ambiguous to allow any conclusion, for example the
significance of the claim that the active interferon itself was not a homogeneous substance.
Was the claimed heterogeneity only a matter of one interferon molecule that was attached to a
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D.G. Evans, 'Conference Address', in F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.), Symposia Sen« in /mmu/10610-
/ogi'ca/ S/WaraVjaHon (Basel, S. Karger, vol. 14, 1970), p. 2.
F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.), 5vrnpo5ia Series /n /mmunofri'o/og/'ca/ .Sranrfan/iza/ion (Basel, S.
Karger, vol. 14, 1970), pp. 280-1
F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.). Symposia Series in/mm«/u>bio/ogica/S/a/uiardiza/ion (Basel, S.
Karger, vol. 14, 1970). p. 297.
F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.). Symposia S e n « in /mmunoWo/ogica/ Standardiza/ion (Basel, S.
Karger, vol. 14, 1970), pp. 291-5.
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variety of other inert molecules, or did there indeed exist several different interferon molecules,
on analogy with other biologically active proteins, and what consequences would this have for
the use of standards? Quite a number of these kinds of questions had to be left unanswered.
Toward the end of the conference the nature of the discussion changed. More practical
issues were discussed, such as the problem of acceptance. One of the participants stated that
what kept them arguing so long about standardization was basically the fact that it meant extra
work. All agreed that the investigators must be willing to do the extra work and that, without
some kind of encouragement from this Symposium, very little was going to happen. It was
generally felt that the timing was opportune and if they did not seize the moment they could
expect not to have common units of measure for a long time. Eventually it was decided that
the most practical way of achieving something was to ask a select group of interferon research-
ers to try to make some provisional recommendations for research standards of the various
interferons. These would then be discussed during the final session of the Symposium.""*
In the ensuing final discussion, whenever disagreement about the nature or status of a
most suitable standard for the various interferons threatened to deadlock the decision process,
Evans intervened. He repeatedly told the participants that they should not be perfectionist in
this matter, as there was no such thing as a biological standard that worked ideally every time.
In his view "nothing would come out in the wash" if they did not assign a unit and establish a
research standard. It was basically learning by doing. Evans argued from experience that, as a
result of handing around standards to people, new findings would arise that would contribute
to a better understanding of both the field of research and the use of standards. Having made
his point he then tried to put all the bits and pieces together, and produce, by general
agreement, final recommendations of the Conference.""
The Symposium recommended the adoption of four research reference standards, to
which an arbitrary number of units were assigned and that in future all results in published
work would be quoted in terms of the relevant units. While it was decided that the research
standards for mouse (6000 units per ampule) and rabbit interferon (3000 units per ampule)
would be made available through the Reference Reagents Branch of the NIH, they agreed to
adopt as the research standards for chick and human interferon the preparations that were at
store at the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards.
As spokesperson—in the absence of Finter who suffered from a pneumonitis—of the
Scientific Committee on Interferon, Tyrrell had tried hard to argue against adopting the
proposed MRC standard 67/87 (with human interferon material obtained from Chany) and to
"* F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.), Symposia Sen'fj in /mmunobio/ogira/ S/artdardfearion (Basel, S.
Karger, vol. 14. 1970), pp. 291-5.
"* F.T. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.). Symposia Series in /mmunofcio/ojica/ Srana'ara'iiarion (Basel. S.
Karger, vol. 14. 1970), pp. 296-318.
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make out a case for the more potent reference preparation 69/19 (with human interferon
material obtained from Cantell) during the final session of the Symposium."" However, he
came away empty handed as Evans and the others strongly favored 67/87, which had already
been handed around to and used by a lot of researchers without major problems being
reported. The fact that it had proved to be quite reliable in terms of stability was valued more
highly than its relatively low potency.'''
I do not know what went on behind the scenes in the weeks after the meeting, but what
I do know is that the recommendations had changed by 18 November, when the conclusions of
the Standardization Conference were sent to all participants."* The British Conference
Secretary, Frank Perkins, indicated in an accompanying letter that in consultation with Evans
he had decided to include in the recommendations that the more potent preparation 69/19
instead of 67/87 should be adopted as the research standard for human interferon.
5.4.2 'Having to haul down one's colors'
On receipt of Perkins's letter and the enclosed conclusions of the Symposium, Charles Chany
was, to say the least, surprised to see the changes and immediately sent back a letter to Perkins
to tell him that he had misquoted the recommendations.'" Critical reactions from American
and other quarters followed swiftly, and within ten days of the first letter Perkins was forced to
send around a revised statement on the section concerning human interferon.' '* It said that the
Conference agreed to adopt 67/87 as the research standard for human interferon and that the
Conference was also informed that a more potent preparation 69/19 would be made available
to serve as a working standard for special use in insensitive assay systems. The section ended
by giving the advice—which eventually would not be published in the Conference Procee-
dings—that 67/87 should be replaced with 69/19 sooner rather than later. Perkins had done his
best to find a compromise that was thought to suit either side, but in doing so he all but helped
to clarify the situation.
Norman Finter to Kari Cantell, letter dated 10 November 1969, Cantell personal archives.
FT. Perkins and R.H. Regamey (eds.), Svm/?o.na Sen>j in /mmunobio/ogiaj/Sfa/idan/izarion (Basel, S.
Karger, vol. 14. 1970). p. 311.
"* Frank Perkins to Kari Cantell, letter dated 18 November 1969. Cantell personal archives.
Interview with Charles Chany.
First draft of the Minutes of the 14th meeting of the Human Interferon Working Party, dated 25 November
1969. MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2; Frank Perkins to Kari Cantell, letter dated 28 November 1969,
Cantell personal archives; and Frank Perkins to Charles Chany. letter dated 28 November 1969, MRC
Archives File No. S788/15/2.
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At the 'laboratory bench', the state of affairs with regard to the standardization of
human interferon was regarded as messy.'" Instead of facilitating the comparison of results,
the provision of different human interferon standards seemed to complicate their correlation, as
is apparent from the following excerpt from a letter from Finter to Cantell. "Unfortunately and
shamefully there is major confusion over standards, and Karl (Fantes) has used four different
ones on different occasions if one cross-correlates all the results as far as is possible, the
position seems to be (subject to re-checking all the arithmetic) that the pool has a potency of
about 100.000 International Units".'"" Poor compliance with quoting results in terms of the
unitage of the agreed upon research standard ('international units') was not considered
particularly helpful either.'"
Despite or, more likely, due to a series of efforts by the NIMR's Division of Biological
Standards to set things right with regard to human interferon standards, the situation became
even more confusing in the fall of 1970. This is aptly illustrated by the ad-hoc changes in the
reporting of the Division's collaborative assay exercises on human interferon. In the first draft
report, Gray Anderson concluded that owing to the relatively low potency of 67/87 it did not
seem advisable to recommend 67/87 as a research standard."* The second and third draft
reports suggested that 69/19 was about fifty times as potent as 67/87, but there turned out to
be a considerable variation in the estimates of potency both within laboratories and between
laboratories. If taken seriously, this meant that in the present situation the usefulness of either
preparation as a standard was debatable.'"
However uncertain and ambiguous the interpretation of the results in the reports, the
nature of reactions which the reports elicited from their readers was far from ambiguous.
Finter, who still had strong feelings about the adoption of 67/87 at the Standardization
Symposium immediately reacted to the draft reports.'"" He wrote to Anderson to tell him that
he did not agree with the general tenor of the reports. "At the Standardization meeting last
October, it was generally agreed that there was much to be gained by establishing systems of
' " Kari Cantell to Hans Strander, letter dated 21 January 1970, Kari Cantell personal archives.
" ' Norman Finter to Kari Cantell, letter dated 8 December 1969. Cantell personal archives.
" ' Norman Finter to members of the Human Interferon Working Party, letter dated 12 December 1969. MRC
Archives File No. S788/15/2.
' " Draft of a Report concerning a collaborative study of a proposed research standard (67/87), dated 1 October
1970, MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
' " Draft of a Report concerning a first collaborative assay of 69/19 in terms of 67/87, dated 30 October 1970,
MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
'*' Norman Finter to George Galasso (Head of the N1AID Antiviral Substances Programme), dated 19
November. 1970. MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
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units quickly, and little to be gained by being perfectionist. A year later we seem no further
forward in relation to human interferon. Now is the time for taking the bull by the horns!". '*'
In Finter's opinion, it was a reasonable estimate to say that 69/19 was about 50 times more
potent than 67/87. It therefore seemed to him that a great deal could be gained, and very little
lost, by designating 69/19 as the reference standard, with a potency of about 5000 units per
ampule.'" *;
The Scientific Committee on Interferon was eventually able to talk Anderson into
changing the overall conclusion of the three collaborative studies. Anderson recommended, in
a fourth report which was intended to be a summary of the whole project, that preparation
69/19 be established as the British Research Standard A for Human Interferon, and that it be
assigned a unitage "so that are for all practical purposes 5000 units of activity in each
ampoule". In practical terms it meant that Anderson proposed to abandon 67/87, make 69/19
the primary standard and judge the suitability of 69/19 by its performance in action.'''
The summary report which was sent to all the participants in the collaborative studies
caused quite some upheaval in French quarters. Chany was baffled by the fact that, regardless
of the admitted inadequacies in the test results, a decision seemed to have been made regarding
the suitability of his and Cantell's material to serve as a research standard. Had not 67/87 and
69/19 both been found sufficiently stable to be employed for longer periods? How could the
Finnish material be established as a research standard without being able to produce a reliable
estimate of 69/19 in terms of 67/87? As far as Chany knew it had been agreed upon at the
Standardization Conference that all future reference materials would be adjusted to 67/87.'**
The British not only did not seem to feel bound to abide by the recommendations of the
Standardization Conference, but on top of that they proposed to fly the British flag over what
was supposed to function as an international research standard.'"
Chany immediately decided to take action. He began by sending his grievances in
diplomatic terms both to Anderson and the participants in the collaborative studies.'" He
realized that he had the odds stacked against him. In the January 1971 issue of the Interferon
Scientific Memorandum a joint statement from the NIMR and the NIH had been published to
'"' Norman Finter to Gray Anderson, letter dated 14 October 1970. MRC Archives, File No. S788/15/2.
' ~ Ibid.
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Summary of reports of three collaborative studies, dated I December 1970, MRC Archives File No.
S788/15/2.
'""* Charles Chany to Gray Anderson, letter dated 22 December 1970, Cantell personal Archives.
Interview with Charles Chany.
''* Charles Chany to Gray Anderson, letters dated 22 December 1970 and 7 May 1971, Cantell personal
archives.
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formally acquaint the workers in the field with some modifications of the recommendations of
the Standardization Conference. The position regarding the provision of reference materials
was said to be that 67/87 was no longer regarded as the research standard for human interferon
but that, depending on their suitability, either 67/87 or 69/19 would soon become established
as a research standard.'"" In Chany's view this was already a first formal step toward abandon-
ing 67/87, and unless he succeeded in gaining the support of the Americans he was fighting for
a lost cause. So, when Anderson did not show any response to his adverse comments and let
him know that most participants were in agreement with the use of 69/19 as reference material
and with establishing it as the British Research Standard for human interferon, Chany chose a
more aggressive approach.'"* Beside pleading his case in the corridors of the September 1971
International Colloquium on Interferon that was being held at the University of Leuven,
Belgium, in January 1972 Chany paid a visit to the NIH in Bethesda, Maryland, to win support
from those directly involved in the standardization efforts.'"' At the same time he requested
that the Division of Biological Standards return to him the material that he had given to them
as a possible interferon standard. He told them that he was planning to distribute it on his own
initiative as the original interferon standard.
Eventually, by the end of May 1972, through the intervention of the Americans, a
compromise was reached that offered a way out of the confused situation. Basically it meant
that 67/87 was retained as the original reference reagent available only on special request and
used as the basis for assigning unitage to any subsequent reference material, while 69/18 would
be distributed routinely as the standard for general use. Furthermore, to satisfy the American
demand that "nationalism be removed from the reagents", the NIMR's Division of Biological
Standards eliminated the word 'British' from the label and, renamed 67/87 into 'Research
Standard A' and 69/19 into 'Research Standard B' for human interferon.""
The political jousting hardly affected the work at the laboratory bench. Insofar as
'"' George Galasso to David Tyrrell, letter dated 24 December 1970, MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
'•* Gray Anderson lo Charles Chany. letters dated 19 April and 12 May 1971, MRC Archives File No.
S788/15/2; and interview with Charles Chany.
'"' George Galasso to Gray Anderson, letter dated 11 February 1972, MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
'*' George Galasso to Gray Anderson, letters dated 11 February and 12 April 1972, MRC Archives File No.
S788/I5/2; Gray Anderson to George Galasso. letter dated 15 March 1972. MRC Archives File No.
S788/15/2.
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INTERFERON. HUMAN LEUKOCYTE
Fig. 44. The Expert Commiltec ein Biological Standardization of WHO
considered data relating to 69/19 and
finally in 1978 established pan of the stock
of preparation 69/19 (MKC Research Standard B)
as the International Reference Preparartion of Interferon,
Human Leukocyte. Courtesy of NBSB.
researchers had been involved in the collaborative studies of human interferon they (apart from
Chany) already showed a strong preference for using the more potent preparation 69/19 as a
working standard. Eventually this preparation became regarded as the base line for comparing
work on human interferon (see Fig. 44). This was already the case in the report of the common
cold trial performed by the British Scientific Committee on Interferon at the end of March
1970.'" With reference to the standard 69/19 the poor results were claimed to be due to the
use of insufficient interferon. to the inadequate dosage and to an unexplained 10 fold decline in
biological activity between the time of preparation and administration."" This explanation
could not prevent the respiratory trial from leaving its marks on the Interferon Collaboration
per se. It played an instrumental role in Glaxo's and ICI's decision to abandon work on
Minute of the 17th meeting of the Human Interferon Clinical Trials Working Party, dated 14 April 1970,
MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2.
'*" Minute of the 17th meeting of the Human Interferon Clinical Trials Working Party, dated 14 April 1970,
MRC Archives File No. S788/15/2; and. Scientific Committee on Interferon, 'Experiments with Interferon in
Man', £ance7, i (1965), 505-6.
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interferon, leaving only Burroughs Wellcome and the MRC in interferon research.'"
However little this chemically putative natural substance still meant to most British
drug makers interferon had managed to establish itself as an object of laboratory study for an
international field of researchers. They mainly worked with chick, mouse and rabbit interfe-
rons. By 1972 most major laboratories were in the process of including the internationally
recognized research standards into their laboratory routines by calibrating their internal
laboratory standard against the appropriate research standard obtained free of charge from the
NIMR's Division of Biological Standards or from the Reference Reagents Branch of the NIH.
Increasingly, editors of pertinent scientific journals requested that papers dealing with
interferons should include results in terms of the internationally accepted unitage, but also in
informal contacts a growing number of researchers started to communicate in terms of the
appropriate MRC or NIH unit.'** The researchers involved were still in the process of learning
how to handle common units of measurement and disciplining themselves into specific routines
and actions. The local variances were still considerable, and time and again problems arose
with interpreting unexpected high variation in laboratory results. Had the activity of the
standard gone off, was it related to flaws in the standardization procedure, was one dealing
with yet unknown biological characteristics of interferon or even with a different type of
interferon?'"
By the time a second international workshop on standardization was being held at
Woodstock, in September 1978, the use of specific research standards had become embodied
in daily laboratory practice in the field of interferon research. It was widely considered to
constitute a necessary condition for performing research on interferons. The worldwide
distribution and use of a fixed set of research standards not only was generally thought to have
Whereas (he formal collaboration on interferon terminated on 2 May 1973. all parties agreed that the GNRD
as the Patent Holdings Company should be continued in order to protect the property held—e.g. U.S.
interferon patent; Internal note MRC. dated 13 May 1971, MRC Archives File No. A 812/8 (ii); and. Minutes
of the 46th meeting of the Scientific committee on Interferon, dated 22 February. 1973, MRC Archives File
No. S788/2/6; Internal note MRC, 22 April 1973, MRC Archives File A812/2/1.
For instance, in Paris, upon receiving a sample of mouse interferon from Bill Stewart, who temporarily worked as
a post-doctoral worker at the Rega Institute in Louvain. Belgium. Ion Gresser immediately wrote him a note to
ask him whether the units indicated on the label were NIH units. "The liter I gave you was in PDD-VSV units,
which was about 1/5 of an NIH unit in Delaware but seems to be about the same (within 2-fold) as an NIH unit
here in Leuven" Ion Gresser to William E. Stewart II, letter dated 28 February 1972, Gresser personal archives;
and William E. Stewart II to Ion Gresser. letter dated 2 March 1972. Gresser personal archives.
'•" Interviews with Sam Baron, Norman Finter, Robert Friedman. Ion Gresser, Joseph Sonnabend; In 1965
Frederick Wheelock of Western Reserve University in Ohio had published a highly controversial article in
Si'iVncf claiming that he had identified a new interferon-like inhibitor in cultures of human white blood cells,
thus implicating that not only different species produced different interferons but also that the same species
produced different types of interferon. Without proper standards he had difficulty in substantiating. Wheelock
had to wait a couple of years before his study was taken serious in the field of interferon research; E. F.
Wheelock, 'Interferon-like Virus-Inhibitor Induced in Human Leukocytes by Phytohemagglutinin'.
149 (1965). pp. 319-21; and interview with Frederick Wheelock.
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made the comparison of results from different laboratories more interpretable but also to have
played an instrumental role in redefining the nature and functions of interferons."* It was no
longer a question whether interferon was heterogeneous in nature and not only different
species but also the same species produced different interferons—two different types of human
interferon were officially distinguished: so-called 'classical' (acid-stable) type I interferon and
'immune' (acid-labile) type II interferon—but what the nature and function of these newly
established differences were. Thus, in attempting to cope with and master differences,
interferon researchers had created and as I will show in the next chapter would continue to
create new differences, albeit of a different nature.
5.5 Conclusion
With the constructed character of the standards no longer visible at the end of this chapter it
seems hard to imagine that the distribution and use of common units of measurement was not
the inevitable result of the evolving interaction between those involved in interferon research.
At the same time, what makes a lasting impression is that it took more than 15 years and
enormous efforts to reach this stage: from occasionally invoked devices to reduce extreme
variations between laboratories and researchers, to the use of standards as a prerequisite to get
research results published. In a most general sense, the large time span between the first dis-
cussions about standardization and the routine use of at least three different international
research standards as stable and unquestioned parts of interferon research shows that
discussing standards was as important to the emerging field of interferon research as their
actual establishment and use. My claim is that the standardization discourse in itself played an
instrumental role in disciplining interferon researchers into specific routines and actions, and
thereby coordinated their research practices.
Ultimately the introduction and routine use of international research standards was little
more than the tangible result of a collective effort to create a common frame of reference, as a
means to the end of welding and keeping together the field of interferon research. Moreover,
this chapter shows that the perceived need for standardization was dependent on the nature
and purpose of research, and on institutional and national as well as field interests. What, then,
were the incentives and impediments for standardization? And, what efforts and resources did
it take to establish, disseminate and maintain standards?
As long as the efforts to tune in the research activities of a growing body of laboratory
At the workshop all the recommendations of the 1969 Conference were reinforced by recommending the
same set of research standards for acceptance as WHO International Reference Standards Internal memoran-
dum on the occasion of an International Workshop on Interferon Standards held at Woodstock, Illinois. USA,
dated September 1978, MRC Archives File No. S805A7.
231
practices to one another and to engineer a new field of research were not seriously constrained
or threatened by the ability of experimentalists to choose their own favorite experimental
system and to provide their own interpretations of the objects under study, there was hardly
any incentive for standardization. Of course, the idiosyncrasies of the myriad of experimental
systems posed certain problems. For instance, what was to some a potent interferon
preparation could become in the hands of others material with a low biological activity.
However, by informal means, through circulating, comparing and combining research materials
in a relatively small and flexible network of personal contacts, researchers managed to reduce
extreme variations of experimental results and were able to narrow down the margins of
interpretation to workable levels. As I argued before, it was a 'gift culture' based on the regular
exchange of laboratory samples, techniques and skills. This gift culture was instrumental in
facilitating the comparison of research results and the management of differences between
laboratories and researchers.
Collaboration within the British Scientific Committee on Interferon between
researchers from different domains - industrial and government laboratories - as a means to the
end of developing interferon as an antiviral drug put the issue of standardization on the agenda
for the first time. With the intrusion of a higher order of interests (company, governmental and
public interests) into the relatively private domain of laboratory life, the informal kind of
measurement which interferon researchers normally practiced fell short of what was required.
Performing clinical trials meant passing judgments on the actions of experimental substances
within certain limits related to human health. Due to the high level of public responsibility that
was involved in experiments with humans, there was special concern for quantitative control
and rigor with regard to issues like effectiveness, toxicity and stability. Establishing and using
standards was considered a necessary operation to give authority to trial data, which could be
appealed to in the future.
The premature ending of the clinical trial program put standardization in another
perspective: from a necessary condition for work on interferon it became perceived by
members of the Scientific Committee as a course of action to manage differences, and one that
meant extra work. Without some extra encouragement, for instance in the form of editors of
the major journals demanding the use of common units of measure or a reappraisal of the
clinical trial program, there was little inclination to use standards at the bench. With an
uncertain return on investment, most chose in favor of the proven informal exchange
mechanism.
Not until the informal form of measurement began to show flaws, with the expansion of
the field of research and the shift away from a qualitative descriptive to a more quantitative
oriented type of research work, did a more general and permanent need for standardization
began to manifest itself. In conjunction with both the creation of a NIH-sponsored formal
information exchange mechanism, and an emerging controversy between the so-called 'inducer
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people' (endogenous approach) and 'interferon people' (exogenous approach) over the
possibility for application of their different research approaches in human medicine, this
provided a breeding ground for standardizing interferons. Standards were at least considered
helpful tools in resolving disputes, and in performing the balancing act between conflict and
appeasement, or between plasticity and coherence, that prevented the field from becoming
unwieldy. Finally and more generally those involved tried hard to diffuse escalating conflict for
the sake of the coherence of the field.
National centers for biological standardization played a central role in disseminating
and 'materializing' the perceived needs for standards. However, there was a marked contrast
between the nature of the involvement of the NIH Reference Reagents Branch and the
involvement of the NIMR's Division of Biological Standards. Whereas the American
laboratory for biological standardization played a relatively passive role as a provider of
standards, its British counterpart functioned both as a provider and facilitator, by initiating and
coordinating standardization efforts. Apart from the fact that establishing interferon standards
fitted rather well with the Division of Biological Standards' plans to extend the scope of its
activities into the area of medical research, this was mainly a result of historical contingencies.
Ever since the responsibility for establishing and safeguarding international standards
was divided between the State Serum Institute in Copenhagen and the National Institute for
Medical Research in 1924, the Medical Research Council had regarded biological standardi-
zation as one of the spearheads of its activities. In practice this meant that research work
associated with biological standardization was actively promoted and that the Division of
Biological Standards was encouraged to pursue an active policy in the international field of
standardization, aimed at maintaining its unique position as custodian of standards for the
whole world. It was considered a matter of national interest.'" American biomedical research
policy, on the other hand, had always been rather indifferent with regard to international
standardization, as is evident from the fact that until 1950 the USA maintained their own
national standardization system. By the 1960's international standardization began to receive
more attention from NIH officials, but it never became a priority issue.'"*
We saw that, initially, the establishment and provision of standards only seemed to
complicate matters at the bench by adding to the uncertainty and variability of the test results.
Considerable efforts, in terms of complex negotiation and decision-making processes, were
required to achieve consensus about the specifications of interferon preparations that would
make most suitable research standards. The value and power of interferon standards as
A. Landsborough Thomson, Ha//a Onmrv o/Afe/ica/ /terca/r/i Vo/. // (London, Her Majesty's Stationary
Office. 19751.244-54.
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W. C. Cockburn, 'The International Contribution to the Standardization of Biological Substances. I.
Biological standards and the League of Nations 1921 -1946', flio/ogica/.t 19 (1991), 161 -9.
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common frames of reference or 'laboratory yardsticks', which in being mobile, and conveying
relatively stable information, transform individual laboratory practices into universal practices,
appeared largely dependent on the extent to which they became embodied in actual research
practice. I should emphasize the instrumental role the statisticians played in this respect. In
their unremitting efforts to help the laboratories for biological standardization improve their
performance in terms of production of statistically reliable units of measurement, they were
largely responsible for designing the kind of collaborative standardization experiments that
involved a large number laboratories and researchers.
Ultimately as a result of handing around and learning to use standards, the interferon
researchers achieved far more than resolving research problems. In shaping and defining the
outcome of experiments, interferon standards came to serve as a constitutive part of interferon
research. As such, the use of standards not only helped researchers to discriminate between
and compare outcomes of experiments, but was also instrumental in creating differences and
redefining problems of research: in a collective effort to master differences those involved had
established new differences of such a nature that these multiplied their options for research. In
the next chapter we will see how the creation of new options between bench and bedside in the
1970's and 1980's once again resulted in the public promotion of interferon.
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Chapter 6
Interferon, Audiences and Cancer: A 'Quest' for Miracle Cures.'
6.0 Introduction
Every so often, in the past forty years, scientific claims of therapeutic accomplishment in the
treatment of cancer have entered the public domain in western countries like the USA, Britain
and the Netherlands.- The biographies of most of these experimental cancer therapies seem to
have a familiar pattern in common: implied claims for a cancer cure based on preliminary tests,
exaggerated coverage in the media, high public expectations, widespread disappointment and
loss of interest when the claims failed to materialize in large scale trials, researchers and
administrators forced on the defensive, and finally there seems hardly any reason for
continuation of research or for clinical application.
In the late 1970s, following scientific claims about interferon having an inhibitory effect
on human tumors, interferon made a come back as a promising therapeutic substance. As
might be anticipated, the media gave enthusiastic coverage to the implied claims for a cancer
cure. The question then deserves scrutiny whether a similar sequence of events unrolled in the
case of interferon?
In an effort to understand how the cycle of euphoria and disappointment manifested
itself, this chapter explores the complex events shaping interferon's biography as a new type of
cancer remedy. Focus will be on the ways in which the major collective or individual
actors—ranging from doctors, journalists, laboratory researchers, patients, politicians, and
regulators, to drug company executives—left their mark and influenced the ways in which
interferon was portrayed and perceived, primarily in the American public arena.' Special
attention will be paid to the role the mass media played in what has become known as the
"interferon crusade"/ They functioned as intermediaries between the scientific and medical
A preliminary version of chapter 6 was published in C/inica/ /Ipp/ica/ion.? o/f/ie /;Uf^i?ronj: T. Pieters,
History of the Development of the Interferons: From Test-tube to Patient, in R. Stuart-Harris and R. Penny
(eds.) 77ie C/mi'co//4p/j/ica»ioni <>//n(p//er<»u, (London: Chapman&Hall, 1997), pp. 1-19.
See, for exemplary historical cases: J. T. Patterson, 77w Drrat/Di.vea.sf (Cambridge (MA): Harvard
University Press, 1987); and. R. W. Moss, TAe Camw /ndu.v(rv (New York: Paragon House. 1989).
The actors to be analyzed are not only those individually and collectively 'present', articulate and committed to
action but also those implicated by the actions of others. As we will see the cancer patients as potential users
of interferon are the implicated actors examined in this chapter.
See, S. Panem, 77ie /m?//<?ro/i Crusade (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984).
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community, the pharmaceutical industry, government and the lay public, each using their own
specific arguments, images, facts and figures. I show how the media stressed and added certain
aspects and thereby contributed to the continuous process of reshaping the meaning of
interferon.
This chapter begins by laying out the events that helped to establish links between
interferon and cancer at the bench and at the bedside. The heart of the chapter examines how
interferon became a major issue in the American cancer arena and how the various engaged
social groups dealt with this natural substance and product of a laboratory-supported scientific
medicine. The similarities and differences between these groups' understanding and know-
ledge of interferon will be highlighted. In addition I will pay attention to the ways in which
each group tried to convince others of the validity of their own perspectives, to create alliances
and further their own divergent interests. In the fourth and fifth section I will concentrate on
the genesis and dynamics of the 'interferon crusade'. In the conclusion, we return to the
analysis of the cycle of euphoria and disappointment and the important role played by the
media.
6.1 The emergence of interferon as an anti-cancer agent
In the USA in early 1970, Mary Lasker the philanthropist and notorious lobbyist of American
medical research had assembled a panel of consultants. This group, largely consisting of friends
and influential associates also known as the "Laskerites or Mary's little lambs", was to advise
the American Senate on legislation involving a "moonshot" approach for cancer that held out
the promise of major progress in the officially declared "war on cancer".' One of the scientific
panel members was Mathilde Krim, a Swiss-born geneticist and Tumor virologist at New
York's Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, whose husband Arthur Krim was influential
in the Democratic party. Krim helped draft working papers on the progress of cancer research,
which became part of the technical portion of the Panel's report entitled Ato/ona/ /Vogra/n/or
r/if Conqruerf o/ Concur. This was presented to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare in December 1970."
After presentation of the report to the Senate, Krim remained closely involved with the
prelegislative agenda setting activities of Mrs Lasker up to the enactment by President Richard
Nixon of the National Cancer Act in December 1971. This event marked the start of an
expanded National Cancer Program and was the result of more than a year of political struggle
R. A. Rettig, Ca/ictr Crusade, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 18.
See. R. A. Rettig. Camvr CruWe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). pp. 77-115. 281-315: and
interview with Mathilde Krim.
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and compromise in which Mathilde Krim became familiar with the ins and outs of American
cancer politics. According to Krim it was Lasker who taught her the political groundwork of
how to use power and influence in order to secure one's ends.' ,•;; • -wi,
Krim did her share of the work in searching the literature for promising areas of cancer
research that deserved more attention. In doing so she ran across the interferon literature and
learned that there had been some noteworthy developments since she had attended Isaacs's
paper presentation on interferon at the prestigious Gustav Stem Symposium on Perspectives in
Virology in January I960." Among other items, studies had been published claiming that
interferon and interferon inducers, by means of their antiviral activity, had an inhibitory effect
on tumor viruses and virus induced tumors in mice and rats. More recently, mouse studies had
been published by the American virologist Ion Gresser. His studies suggested that interferon
might also have an inhibitory effect on tumors that had no obvious relationship to viral
infections. As a tumor virologist, Krim firmly believed that tumor viruses played a major role in
the etiology of malignancies not only in animals but also in humans and that interferon might
have an effect against both virally induced mouse tumors and mouse tumors not directly
induced by virus. She therefore regarded both interferon and interferon inducers as potential
antitumor agents for use in humans and insisted on including interferon research in the Panel's
report as a promising area that needed intensive further study.'
Before following up the further wheeling and dealing of 'Mary's most eager lamb', and
interferon promoter, Mathilde Krim, I will first describe how the notion of the antitumor effect
of interferon came into being.
6.1.1 Interfering with cancer
The action of interferon on tumor viruses had first been singled out for study and speculation
by two French virus researchers, Charles Chany and Pascu Atanasiu in the early 1960's. They
claimed that interferon inhibited the growth of polyoma virus, a specific strain of tumor virus,
in hamsters.'" Initially scepticism prevailed among fellow scientists, but after a couple of
S. Panem, 77if /n/ei/eron Ou«Mfc (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 16; and Krim,
interview.
M. Pollard (ed.), />e/\spec/iVes in Viro/ogv (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing. 1960)
9
S. Panem, 771« /nfcrfcron Cnuorfe (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 16; and Krim,
interview.
P. Atanasiu and C. Chany. 'Action d'un Interferon Provenant de Cellules Malignes sur L'infection Experimen-
tal du Hamster Nouveau-ne par le Virus du Polyoma', Cont/tfro Ä<vi</u.v HfMomm/a/ra 5^ant« </*•
Z.Vt<a<if'm/e <te Sciences, 251 (I960). 1687-9; and, C. Chany. 'An Interferon-like Inhibitor of Viral Multipli-
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British and American publications confirmed that interferon seemed to have an inhibitory effect
on certain strains of tumor viruses in vivo the subject matter was taken more seriously." At
about the same time several articles were published including one in 5ci>Mce, suggesting that
leukemia in humans was a viral disease.'^ Since viruses which were considered to induce
leukemia had already been isolated in mice and chickens, the claims were in general taken
seriously by biomedical scientists." Consequently the 'hunt' for a human leukemia virus was
intensified and a growing number of biomedical researchers got involved in the field of
leukemia research. As did the American virologist Ion Gresser.
Having accepted Chany's invitation to set up his own laboratory of viral oncology at
the /MS//7M/ de /?«7iert7i« 5cie/ir(/i<?Mex swr fe Ca/icer in Villejuif in the outskirts of Paris,
Gresser was looking for research projects that would satisfy his interests in interferon research,
fit into the research profile of a cancer research institute, and would be promising and daring at
cation from Malignant Cells (the viral autoinhibition phenomena)', Viro/ogy, 13 (1961), 485-92.
J. Bader. 'Production of Interferon by Chick Embryo Cells Exposed to Rous Sarcoma Virus', Virology 16
(1962), 436-43; R. Friedman, A. S. Rabson, W. Kirkham, Variation in interferon Production by Polyoma
Virus Strains Differing Oncogenicity, /Vw. Soc. £t/J. Bio/. Me</., 112 (1963), 347-51; 'NCI Scientists
Publish Data on Interferon as Cancer-Inhibitor', 77ie WH Record. XVI. 17 (1964). p. 8; See. the session on
viruses and interferon in Viruses, Mic/eic ,4ci</s am/ Cancer [A Collection of Papers Presented at the
Seventeenth Annual Symposium on Fundamental Cancer Research, 1963]. (Baltimore: The Williams and
Wilkins Company, 1963), pp. 429-84.
J.D. Almeida. R.C. Hasselback and A.W. Ham, 'Virus-like Particles in Blood of Two Acute Leukemia
Patients', Science. 142 (1963), 1487-9; and. E. J. Freireich and E. Frei. Ill, 'Recent Advances in Acute
Leukemia', in Tocantins. L. M. (ed.) Progress m /frnuiro/ogy, Vol IV (New York: Grune and Stratum,
1964), pp. 187-202.
Not until the late fifties did research into the possible viral etiology of cancer gain more respectability. For
more than fourty years the biomedical research community had persisted in the belief that mammalian cancer
was not contagious, thereby relegating occasional claims about viruses that could cause tumors in mammals
to the fringes of scientific research. The following developments played an important role in the change in
attitude towards the idea of viruses causing cancer. First, after a virtual stand-still in the reporting of viruses
that were thought to cause cancer in mammals, a number of scientists from highly regarded research centers
like the NIH came up with claims about the isolation of viruses that caused leukemia and other cancers in
laboratory animals like the rabbit, mice and rat. Second, virology as a whole had grown to maturity and was
increasingly recognized as a major scientific discipline. The isolation of the polio virus and the successful
production of effective vaccines against the widely feared disease polio should also be mentioned. This
medical breakthrough earned virologists a lot of credit both in and outside the scientific community. Third, it
was noticed that prominent virus researchers like Jonas Salk. who played a major role in the development of a
vaccine against polio virus, joined the club of supporters of the theory on the viral etiology of cancer. Hence,
by the early 1960's the idea that viruses could cause cancers at least in animals, had gained a firm foothold;
R.E. Shope. 'Evolutionary Episodes in the Concept of Viral Oncogenesis'. Perspecmes on Bio/og/ra/
Afe-oVcw 9 (1966). pp. 258-74; M. B. Shimkin. Conrrary (o Ataure (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institutes of Health. 1979), pp 213-23; K. Studer and D. Chubin,
77ie Cancer Mi;.viV>n: 5or/a/ Con/e.v/s o/BiomrJira/ Research (Beverly Hills: Sage publications, 1980), pp.
19-21; J. Patterson. 77ie Dread Disease (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 59, 98. 186.
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the same time.'" By coming close to these conditions he chose to organize his research around
the problem of leukemia and viruses." To Gresser's best knowledge there was no published
report of interferon's value or lack of activity in mouse leukemia."" More still, he knew of only
a small number of other interferon researchers who thought it worthwhile to invest their
resources in studying interferon's effects in v/vo. ''
The consensus among interferon researchers was that with the available techniques you
could never produce enough interferon to make a difference in animals, let alone man."
Moreover interferon had only been shown to prevent the development of virus diseases (as a
'prophylactic') and was without effect once the infection had established itself. Gresser,
however, did not want to take this for granted as long as nobody had made a serious attempt
at administering high doses of interferon in virus infected animals for longer periods of time.'*
Gresser could afford to plunge himself into a problem which entailed a break from
mainstream interferon as well as tumor virus research. The research expenses in his Paris
laboratory were for the greater part covered by a generous unconditional grant provided for by
the Nestor of American Cancer Research, Sidney Färber, who worked as Director of the
wealthy Childrens Cancer Research Foundation in Boston, the largest clinical center for the
study and treatment of child leukemia in the U.S.." This enabled him to take a relatively
independent research position and choose an area of research which most fellow-researchers
shunned.
Gresser's first objective was to find a method to produce large amounts of highly active
mouse interferon. From the literature Gresser knew that Norman Finter had developed a
The reason to give up a potential bright research career at the world-famous Harvard Medical School for a
relatively uncertain living in what was known as the French biomedical 'snake pit' was private in nature.
During his one year stay in 1961 as a postdoctoral research fellow at Charles Chan/s virology laboratory at
Hopital St-Vincent-De-Paul in Paris he had fallen in love with both the city and a particular Parisian:
interview with Ion Gresser.
I. Gresser to S. Färber, progress report period June-December 1965, dated 10 December 1965,1. Gresser
personal archives; Gresser, interview.
" He only knew of one recent American study by the virologist Frederick Wheelock in the Atew
Vou/Tia/ o/Afafcw claiming that repeated administration of viruses to a patient with acute leukemia had a
temporary inhibitory effect on the disease process; F. E. Wheelock and J.H. Dingle, 'Observations on the
Repeated Administration of Viruses to a Patient with Acute Leukemia', New. £ng. 7. iW«/., 271 (1964) 645-
51.
R.R. Wagner, 'Interferon; A Review and Analysis of Recent Observations'. i4m«rican 7o«rna/ o/Merf/cine,
38(1965), 726-737.
" I. Gresser to S. Färber, letter dated 10 December 1965, Gresser Correspondence, personal archives.
According to Gresser, for one or the other reason Färber treated him as his favourite adventurous son;
Gresser, interview; and, Gresser to C. Chany, letter dated 19 March 1965, I. Gresser Correspondence,
personal archives.
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production method—obtaining interferon from the brains of mice after infection with so-called
"West Nile' virus. However, the methodology was rather demanding because of the large
number of mice needed and the laborious isolation procedure.-" But, with a limitless supply of
laboratory mice at his disposal and the help offered by Chany and his team—who were also
interested in interferon as a possible approach to anti-leukemia therapy—Gresser decided to
give it a try.^'
By the end of November they routinely injected on Mondays about 500 mice with West
Nile virus and on Fridays it was 'butcher's day'. Standing all together along large tables they
mechanically opened and emptied the hundreds of mouse skulls and threw the brains in ice
chilled beakers." At the end of Friday afternoon the brains were mashed up in an electric mixer
where after the resulting mouse brain suspension was taken for further biochemical processing,
including centrifugation. The final product was the equivalent of soup broth after all solids
have been strained out and was designated 'mouse interferon'."'
These preparations of mouse interferon were employed to figure out what effect
interferon had on the pathogenesis of murine leukemia. It meant that a fixed number of mice
were treated with mouse interferon and subsequently inoculated with Friend mouse leukemia
virus ('Friend virus') which he had obtained from the American tumor virologist Charlotte
Friend. Daily administration of interferon was continued for 2 to 5 weeks. Simultaneously a
control group was only inoculated with the virus. The course of the leukemic disease process
in the infected interferon treated and infected untreated mice were compared. This entailed
daily monitoring of the condition of the mice until the animals were sacrificed between the
second and fifth week.-''
For more than four months they seemed to go absolutely nowhere. Analysis of data in
'" N. Finter. 'A Rich Source of Mouse Interferon. Atom/*?, 204 (1964), pp. 1114-5; N. Finter. 'Protection of Mice
by Interferon Against Systemic Virus Infections', Bri7. Ate/. / . 2 (1964), 981-85.
In 1963 in an desperate effort to save the life of his best friend's daughter, who suffered from acute leukemia,
Chany—as a strong believer in the virus ethiology of cancer—treated the girl with crude human interferon
preparations. Since the patient with about 6 months life expectancy lived for another 1.5 years, he believed
that the administration of interferon might have been beneficial: and interviews with Charles Chany Ernesto
Falcoff, and Ion Gresser.
^ E. Falcoff, R. Falcoff, F. Fournier and C. Chany, 'Production en Masse, Purification Partielle et Caracterisati-
on d'un Interfgeron Destind a des Essais The'rapeutiques Humains'. Annales de l'Institut Pasteur, (5) 1966.
562-84; and interviews with Charles Chany. Ernesto Falcoff. and Ion Gresser.
I. Gresser to N. Finter. letter dated 8 September. 1965. Gresser Correspondence, personal archives; N. Finter
to I. Gresser. letter dated 14 September 1965; Gresser Correspondence, personal archives; I. Gresser to S.
Färber, progress report period June-December 1965, dated 10 December 1965, I. Gresser personal archives;
Finter, interview; Gresser, interview.
"* I. Gresser to S. Färber, progress report period June-December 1965, dated 10 December 1965, I. Gresser
personal archives
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the lab notebooks were disappointing since no statistically significant differences could be
determined between treated and control group. Over and over again the experimental
conditions were changed until they were able to demonstrate by May 1966 that interferon.
provided that extra concentrated preparations were given, showed an virus inhibitory effect in
mice. While immediately initiating further experiments Gresser put himself to the job of writing
up the first results for publication. Ultimately in August 1966 a series of two articles were
submitted to the /Voc^«//ng.s o///w Soc/>fy o/Experimwita/ Bio/ogy and Af«/icine*."'
The referee reports were received with mixed feelings by Gresser and his team. They
were credited for showing that mouse leukemia could be inhibited by biological means, but the
data indicating that interferon was responsible for the inhibitory effects were considered
unconvincing. The identification of an antiviral substance as an interferon was known to be
fraught with pitfalls implicit in reliance on bioassay procedures. This was certainly the case
when using almost crude preparations. The inhibitory action might as well be due to residual
interfering virus or to mechanisms as yet undetermined. They insisted on Gresser employing
the term 'preparations of interferon' instead of interferon, since there was not sufficient proof
that the inhibitory effect was mediated by interferon. It was sheer pragmatism that made
Gresser, who himself was convinced that interferon was the decisive element in his experi-
ments, adapt his text. At least the incident underlined the importance of investing part of his
resources in attempts to further purify and concentrate his interferon preparations."*' The data
showing that purified preparations of mouse interferon were as effective as crude interferon
preparations, were used instrumentally in subsequent publications and seminars in both Europe
and America to argue in favor of interferon being responsible for the inhibitory effects."
At about the same time the discussions during the Friday 'slaughter' sessions in
Gresser's laboratory centered around the mechanism of the observed inhibitory effects. Gresser
I. Gresser to S. Färber, progress report period December 1965- June 1966, dated 2 September 1966,1.
Gresser personal archives
I. Gresser, J. Coppey. E. Falcoff and D. Fontaine. 'Action Inhibitrice de L'interftron brut sur le DeVeloppe-
ment de la Leucemie de Friend Chez la Souris', C.R -4caJ. Sc-i. Par«, 263 (1966), 586-88; I. Gresser,
Coppey, J., E. Falcoff and D. Fontaine, 'Interferon and Murine Leukemia. - I. Inhibitory effect of Interferon
Preparations on the Development of Friend Leukemia in Mice, P.S.E.B.M.. 124 (1966). 84-91; and, I.
Gresser. D. Fontaine, J. Coppey, R. Falcoff and E. Falcoff. Interferon and Murine Leukemia. II. Factors
Related to the Inhibitory Effect of Interferon Preparations on the Development of Friend Leukemia in Mice,
P.S.f.B.M.. 124 (1966). 91-4; and interview with Ion Gresser.
I. Gresser, J. Coppey, J. Falcoff, D. Fontaine, 'Action Inhibitrice de L'interferon Brut dur le D£veloppement
de la Leucemie de friend Chez la Souris, C./?. /Icarf. Sei. Pans. 263 (1966) 586-88; I. Gresser, J. Coppey, D.
Fontaine-Brouty-Boye\ R. Falcoff. 'Interferon and Murine Leukemia. Ill: Efficacy of Interferon Preparations
Administered after Inoculation of Friend Virus'. Mwurc. 215 (1967), 174-5; I. Gresser. R. Falcoff, D.
Fontaine-Brouty-Boye\ F. Zajdela, J. Coppey. E. Falcoff. 'Interferon and Murine Leukemia. IV. Further
Studies on the Efficacy of Interferon Preparations Administered after Inoculation of Friend Virus'. P.S.EB.Af,
126 (1967), 791-97; and, I. Gresser to S. Färber, letter dated 19 January 1967, I. Gresser Correspondence,
personal archives.
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would usually bring the topic up for discussion in the following way: "Given the dogma in the
field of interferon research that interferon inhibits virus growth we automatically seem to
accept that it acts by repressing viral multiplication and thus protecting normal cells from
infection and subsequent malignant behavior. But what evidence is there to exclude the
theoretical possibility that also some kind of direct inhibitory action of interferon on virus-
transformed malignant cells is involved?"."*
Started as a kind of funny thought experiment, it gradually became one of Gresser's
favorite topics for discussion both in and outside his laboratory. Most interferon researchers
laughed his theoretical speculations about interferon having additional biological effects off.-'
They were not prepared to give up on the generally accepted concept of interferon as an
essential part of a particular cellular defense mechanism against viruses. The fact that no other
research group had succeeded to inhibit Friend leukemia disease in mice by the administration
of interferon did not add to Gresser's credibility.™
Far from discouraging him the critics made Gresser more stubborn about his mouse
leukemia studies." In the process he was able to show that daily administration of mouse
interferon was also effective if treatments were started two and even as long as 7 days after the
mice had been infected with Friend virus. To his knowledge, these results represented the first
demonstration that interferon exerted a significant antiviral effect after infection had been well
established in the animal host.
At the end of 1967 Gresser learnt that a fellow-researcher in his institute happened to
be in the process of establishing a so-called 'RC19' tumor cell line which originated from mice
infected with Rauscher leukemia virus. The available tumor cell line suggested the opportunity
to test the idea about interferon having a direct effect on mouse leukemia that was different in
nature from inhibition of viral multiplication." It did not seem much extra work to do some
Interviews with Charles Chany, Ion Gresser, and Ernesto Falcoff.
I. Gressser et al (1%7, April. Ciba Foundation Symposium) The Effect of Interferon Preparations on Friend
Leukemia in Mice, in G. E. Wolstenholme and M. O'Connor (eds), /nter/eron (London: J&A. Churchill
LTD, 1%7) pp. 240-8; Interviews with Sam Baron, Edward De Maeyer, Robert Friedman, Joseph Sonna-
bend, and Robert Wagner.
M. VandePutte, J. Delafonteyne, J. Billeau and P de Somer, 'Influence and Production of Interferon in
Rauscher Virus Infected Mice', /Vc7i. C« . Virujt/oricA., 20 (1967), 235-45; and, E. F. Wheelock, Effect of
Statolon on Friend Virus Leukemia in Mice, Proc. Soc. Et/>. Bio/. Wed., 124 (1967), 855-8; E. F. Wheelock,
and R. P. B. Larke, Efficacy of Interferon in the Treatment of Mice with Established Friend Virus Leukemia,
P.S.£.RM., 127 (1968). 230-8; Interviews with Ion Gresser and Frederick Wheelock.
I. Gresser to J. Enders, letter dated 18January 1968.1. Gresser Correspondence, personal archives.
I. Gresser. C. Bourali. J.P. L4vy, D. Fontaine-Brouly-Boye, M. Thomas, Canc^rologie. Prolongation de la
Survie des Souris Inoculees avec des Cellules Turnorales et Trailers avec des Preparations d'Interferon. C.R-
Acarf. Sri.. 268 (1969). 994-7: I. Gresser, C. Bourali, J.P. UWy, D. Fontaine-Brouty-Boye, M. Thomas,
Increased Survival in Mice Inoculated with Tumor cells and Treated with Interferon Preparations, Proc. Ato/.
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experiments with the HC19' tumor cells, since a couple of changes in the experimental design
of the Rauscher virus experiment would suffice. Gresser left the bench work to his experienced
laboratory technician Chantal Bourali, who started with the actual mouse trials early in 1968.
Instead of inoculating mice with Rauscher virus she injected Rauscher leukemic cells and wait
for 24 hours for the leukemia to establish itself. Then she split the animals up into two groups.
One control group received nothing and the other the usual daily administration of interferon.
Bourali ear-tagged all the animals with a metal ring, wrote down the number of the mouse and
the treatment it received. When after two weeks Bourali told Gresser that the first mice in the
control were dying while the interferon treated mice were only having minor disease manifesta-
tions he responded coolly that it was best to wait and see what happened next.'"
Two weeks later in reaction to Bourali's presentation of the preliminary results of her
experiment Gresser was much more attentive. Whereas most of the control mice were reported
dead more than 90% of the interferon mice were still alive. Though initially excited he feared
the dramatic result might not be repeatable. He read Bourali's laboratory notes over and over
again. He suspected Bourali of having made a major mistake, but he could not figure out what
had gone wrong except for the fact that she had forgotten to inject the tumor cells into the
interferon group. He asked her to repeat the experiment. When by the end of April Bourali
again reported similar results Gresser was perplexed. He was still reluctant to accept the
results at face value and opted for yet another repeat experiment, this time together with
Bourali. However, the student riots in Paris—bringing public life to a stand still for more than
two months—put their patience to the test.**
By the time the international interferon conference was held in Lyon early in January
1969, Gresser had enough confidence in the consistency and persuasiveness of the laboratory
data to come out with the claim that continued administration of mouse interferon increased
the survival of mice inoculated with tumor cells. However, most interferon researchers
continued to smile at the suggestion that interferon might have a direct inhibitory effect on the
tumor cells—implicating that interferon was a multi-functional agent. They argued that the
antitumor effect was most likely due to non-interferon contaminants in Gresser's
preparations." Moreover, another paper presentation by the NIH researcher Hilton Levy, who
worked along similar lines using synthetic interferon inducers instead of mouse interferon, was
/lead. Sei. 1/S4, 63 (1969), 51-7; I. Gresser to F. Färber, progress report, period January-June 1968 (dated 1
July 1968), Gresser personal archives; and, interview with Ion Gresser.
" Ibid.
* Ibid.
I. Gresser. 'Prolongation de la Survie des Souris Inocul^es avec des Cellules Tumorales et Trailers avec des
Preparation Brutes d'Interferon'. Symposium International sur L'interföron, Lyon, Janvier 1969; Interviews
with Ion Gresser, Kari Cantell, Charles Chany. Sam Baron, and Robert Friedman.
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not particularly supportive of Gresser's claim.'* Levy indicated that he did not think that the
observed antitumor action of his chemical compound was directly related to its interferon
inducing capacity, particularly since only two of the tumors tested were of viral origin. He
believed that something different was involved in the chemical's antitumor action and this made
him very doubtful about the possibility that he and Gresser were dealing with the same
phenomenon. In Levy's opinion interferon was in neither case at the basis of the observed
effects."
Despite the controversy about the nature of the reported antitumor actions, there was
general consensus about the practical relevance of both studies. Supporters and critics alike
agreed that Gresser's and Levy's animal data were fascinating in their own right by suggesting
new therapeutic possibilities in the treatment of cancer.'*
6.1.2 Hoping for patients to behave like laboratory mice
Like most other interferon researchers present at the Lyon meeting, the Finnish interferon
researcher Kari Cantell had never paid special attention to the series of articles from Gresser's
research group showing that interferon was effective in treating virus induced leukemias in
mice. It never occurred to Cantell that Gresser was exploring "different territory"."* His experi-
ments seemed to confirm interferon's potential as a broad spectrum anti-viral agent but this
never made Cantell think about a serious therapeutic link between interferon and cancer.
However, hearing Gresser talk about increased survival of mice inoculated with tumor cells
and treated with interferon preparations made a difference to the physician Cantell. Whatever
the mechanism of the effects the exciting thing in his view was that interferon seemed to show
definite activity against a variety of tumors.*
" I. Gresser. 'Prolongation de la Survie des Souris Inocul&s avec des Cellules Tumorales et Traitees avec des
Preparation Brutes d'Interferon'. Symposium International sur L'interföron. Lyon, Janvier 1969; and, H. Levy,
L. Law and A. Rabson, inhibition of Tumor Growth by Polyinosinic-Polycytidylic acid'. Proc. A/af. /lead.
Sei. t/.S./l., 62 (1996), 357-63; Interviews with Hilton Levy. Ion Gresser, and Kari Cantell.
" 'Antitumor Action of Chemical on Mice Suggests Possible New Cancer Weapon', 77if N/tf R«w</, XXI, 2
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Gresser's animal studies in combination with the interest of the National Institutes of
Health (through its Antiviral Substances Program that was established in 1969) in his
interferon production facilities encouraged Cantell to initiate trials in humans on his own/'
Collaboration with the Americans was attractive, because of the high payments they offered for
the production of human leucocyte interferon.'" This enabled Cantell to employ more staff and
obtaining more sophisticated equipment needed to expand his production capacity as well as
research activities/'
While visiting one of the pediatricians at the University Hospital in Helsinki to discuss
plans for a leukemia trial in children in October 1969, Cantell learned that a 15 year old boy
was suffering from a rare complication of a measles infection ('SSPE')—a severe and ultimately
fetal subacute sclerosing panencephalitis (inflammation of the brain)—without any hope for
recovery. Apart from an immediate professional interest in the case as a virologist, Cantell
became personally touched by seeing the child-patient fighting a losing battle against the virus
disease. In consultation with the responsible pediatrician and the parents, who were willing to
try anything that might help, Cantell decided to give it a try. Treating the boy seemed better
than doing nothing and at least it provided a good opportunity to learn more about the
pharmacology (dose-effect relationships) of his interferon preparations.**
It was a big disappointment—although no one knew what to expect—to see that the
intravenous injections with the interferon material were followed by serious side-effects. In
spite of the fact that a couple of hours after the injections the clinical condition seemed to
improve considerably the pediatrician and Cantell decided to discontinue the treatment. They
would not resume interferon treatment until Cantell would have succeeded in producing a
more purified interferon preparation that was believed to cause less toxicity problems.
Two months passed before Cantell felt confident enough about his purification
procedure to give it another try. As a precautionary measure the injections were no longer
K. Cantell to G. Galasso, dated IS September. 1969, Cantell personal archives; and, K. Cantell to K. Paucker,
letter dated 12 November, 1969, Cantell personal archives.
K. Paucker to K. Cantell. letter dated 12 August 1969. Cantell personal archives; and. K. Cantell to K.
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the salaries, materials and equipment detailed in your letter (3390 pounds). For administrative reasons the
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for an unspecified period"; MRC to K. Cantell. letter dated 10 february 1970. MRC Archives File No.
S788/15/2.
K. Cantell to K. Fames, letter dated 12 february 1969, K. Cantell personal archives.
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letter dated 19 November, 1969, Gresser personal archives; and K. Cantell. 77w Story o//n/e;/€ron.- 77ie t/pi
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given directly into the veins but intramuscularly. The boy received a total of about seven
injections with what Cantell called 'semi-purified material'—containing about 400.000
'international units' of interferon/'' This time only a few minor flu-like side-effects were
monitored. However encouraging, the injections did not make a difference to the already bad
clinical condition of the boy. After treating yet another child-patient without achieving any
Favorable clinical results the pediatrician lost interest in Cantell's trial plans.''*
The failure of the Helsinki Endeavor coincided with a request from Hans Stran-
der—who after leaving Cantell's Helsinki laboratory had started residency in oncology at the
Karolinska Hospital in Stockholm—to do a collaborative study with interferon in cancer
patients at the cancer ward ('Radiumhemmet')/' The culture of clinical experimentation was
strongly present at the Radiumhemmet. There were historically grown links between 'cutting-
edge' research and cancer therapy. It was this combination of therapy and research that
attracted cancer patients from all over Sweden in the hope to benefit from the latest
technological advances: experimental surgery, x-ray machines and experimental drugs/*
For residents like Strander it was normal practice to combine cancer therapy with
clinical research. As a physician-researcher he was supposed to straddle between the bedside
and the laboratory bench in an attempt to bridge the gap between the laboratory and the clinic.
In other words he had to question what experiments in the test-tube and in mice meant vis-a-
vis human patients. Simultaneously, as a practicing physician, he had to take care of patients
suffering from more or less advanced cases of cancer, mostly with a bad prognosis. This made
him familiar with the ambiguous dilemma whether or not to treat patients with an experimental
therapy that had not been tested sufficiently yet, in view of the general willingness of patients
and doctors alike to try anything in search for a cure/'
However eager to collaborate with Strander and gear up for a test on cancer patients,
Cantell realized that even without a lot of administrative hurdles setting up a proper trial would
be far from easy. First of all there was only enough interferon to treat a few cases for a limited
period of time, while Gresser's mouse studies indicated that it was necessary to continue
treatment over a relatively long period. Furthermore the assessment of the clinical data would
be difficult. Malignant diseases mostly had a variable course and due to the fact that only in
*' K. Cantell to K. Fantes, letter dated 27 February 1970, Cantell personal archives.
•** K. Cantell to K. Fantes, letter dated 25 May 1970. Cantell personal archives.
•" K. Cantell to N. Finter. letter dated 25 May 1970, Cantell personal archives; H. Strander to K. Cantell, letter
dated 7 July 1970. Cantell personal archives.
•"* Interviews with Kari Cantell, and with Hans Strander.
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very desperate cases oncologists were prepared to omit other treatments it was difficult to find
proper controls.
Cantell was curious to hear from Strander what cases apart from leukemia he
considered suitable for treatment. "What would you think about myeloma (or other
lymphomas). fulminant melanomas or brain tumors?".™ Strander speculated on the basis of his
clinical as well as research experience that interferon as a viral inhibitory substance would most
likely have a beneficial effect in malignancies which were supposed to have a viral origin.
Except for human leukemia Strander identified at least four possibilities: multiple myeloma and
another kind of lymphoma, Hodgkin's disease (malignant tumor of lymph nodes),
osteosarcoma (a rare but extremely malignant bone cancer) and melanoma (highly malignant
form of skin cancer). Since there already existed an experimental treatment program for
leukemia patients at the Radiumhemmet, Strander opted for performing first a preliminary trial
with the other problematic malignancies such as osteosarcoma and melanoma.'''
In February 1971 Strander and Cantell were given the green light with the understan-
ding that they would only treat advanced cases of cancer who had been unresponsive to
conventional treatments. Since the study was primarily meant to see whether high-dose
interferon therapy would produce adverse effects when administered to humans, in other
words clinically feasible, a control group did not come up. Their first patient was a 39 year old
man with malignant melanoma which originated from a birth-mark in his skin and had spread
all over the body. He appeared to be resistant to all existing drug therapies and had a rather
poor prognosis. The patient consented to allow treatment with an 'experimental treatment'
which. Strander emphasized was something entirely new and hardly tested in humans." By
injecting the semi-purified interferon preparation—containing about half a million
units—directly in the blood stream ('intravenously') Strander hoped to accomplish the most
optimal exposure of the tumor cells.
Initially everything seemed to go well but after a couple of hours suddenly the patient's
pulse quickened and his temperature rose sharply. Subsequently he developed chills, began
vomiting and was shivering severely. The patient was diagnosed as suffering from a potentially
life-threatening anaphylactic shock and Strander had to intervene with an emergency cortisone
injection, where after gradually the side-effects subsided. The disappointment was great.
Cantell and Strander did not know what to make of the patient's severe reaction to interferon.
Was the patient allergic to interferon or was something different involved? They decided to
50
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investigate the case thoroughly before continuing with further experiments in patients."
Cantell launched extensive series of animal experiments in his laboratory in Helsinki in
order to learn more about the toxicology—supposedly due to the impurities in the preparati-
on—and pharmacology—next to nothing was known about the fate of interferon in the
organism—of his interferon preparations. It became a puzzling affair, tests with the same
interferon preparation, even when given in massive doses, produced only few side-effects—a
slight fever or contraction of vessels—in the animals studied. Neither did allergic skin tests on
the patient produce a reaction. In the end Cantell decided to see whether or not changing the
mode of administration would make a difference. At least in rabbits intramuscular and
subcutaneous injections resulted in long-lasting and stable blood interferon levels without even
the slightest contraction of the ear vessels.**
Three months after the first effort Strander and Cantell decided to give it another try.
This time Strander administered the interferon intra-muscularly, starting with a relatively small
dose. To his great relief the patient tolerated the injection "pretty well", with only a slight and
transient rise in body-temperature—a "feeling of warmth" and malaise manifested itself a few
hours after the injection." Even much higher doses up to 1.5 million units per injection did not
seem to harm the patient except for the fact that the transient malaise and fever reaction grew
more severe. The flu-like symptoms lasted for about half a day. Strander thought it most likely
that the dose dependent side-effects were due to contaminants in the preparations—which
were known to be still far from pure—rather than interferon. As long as he could minimize the
discomfort to the patient by giving Aspirin after each interferon injection he was prepared to
try even higher dosages."
By August 1971 two other patients had been enlisted in the interferon treatment
program: a 46 year old woman with far advanced Hodgkin's disease and a 19 year old female
with advanced osteosarcoma who had just recovered from the surgical removal of a very large
tumor in her frontal bone. All received three weekly injections with interferon without further
complications being monitored. Everything seemed to go well, although Strander thought it
H. Strander, K. Cantell. G. Carlström, and P. Jakobsson, 'Clinical and Laboratory Investigations on Man:
Systemic Administration of Potent Interferon in Man', 7. Na». Conor, /«if., 51 (1973), 733-42; and interview
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Ibid.
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H. Strander. K. Cantell, G. Carlström, and P. Jakobsson, 'Clinical and Laboratory Investigations on Man:
Systemic Administration of Potent Interferon in Man', J. Mi». Cancer, /nj».. 51 (1973), 733-42; and interview
with Kari Cantell.
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too early yet to say anything about the effect on the malignancies." The untimely death of the
two older patients at the end September only shortly affected morale and did not prevent
Strander from including 5 more advanced cases of cancer in his treatment group. Strander
spent a lot of time monitoring the condition of his patients at the bedside. Initially the clinical
data accumulated without noticing remarkable differences, but after a couple of months
Strander got the feeling that he was seeing responses to interferon therapy in a few patients. ;'
However questionable the nature and the endurance of the responses he did not have
difficulty in convincing Cantell to sent additional batches of interferon. On the contrary Cantell
assured that with the NIH contract money he had been able to scale-up the production of
interferon considerably. This would enable him to supply Strander with enough interferon to
keep 10 patients under treatment." Cantell also indicated that he had succeeded in improving
his purification process. He would ship by air freight a container with both the conventional
interferon material, which he had marked as 'c(rude)-IF, and a few tubes labeled 'p(urified)-IF
containing what he called "superinterferon"."
With the more highly purified and concentrated interferon preparations they hoped to
see more definite clinical responses but also a reduction in the dose dependent side-effects."
Their hopes did not materialize in the sense that the patients tolerated the P-IF only marginally
better, although the local reaction at the injection site almost disappeared. In none of the
patients was treatment with interferon followed by changes in the clinical condition that were
dramatic enough to support the claim that interferon exhibited antitumor or antiviral effects.
Nonetheless, Strander, relying mainly on his 'clinical touch' as a physician, became increasingly
convinced that he was getting some response: the three osteosarcoma child-patients were all
faring better than what might be expected from the 'average' osteosarcoma patient at the
Radiumhemmet and he observed how one of lymphoma patients became well, at least
temporarily, from his tumor disease. Furthermore, he was fascinated by the quick clinical
recoveries from shingles in a couple of the cancer patients treated with interferon, although he
was aware that spontaneous recoveries in these cases were not uncommon.*'
At least the clinical data looked promising enough to justify the decision that all future
osteosarcoma patients admitted to the Karolinska Hospital would be treated with interferon
" K. Cantell to K. Kato. letter dated 6 September 1971, Cantell personal archives; H. Strander to K. Canteil, 2
September 1971, Cantell personal archives.
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and to extend his studies with myeloma patients." Strander also got himself involved in labora-
tory studies at the nearby Institute of Tumor Biology, testing the effect of interferon on the
potentially virus-related human tumor cell-lines that were in stock." In doing so he organized
his studies along two coexisting lines: laboratory investigations and bedside practices. Like
Cantell, Strander seemed to adhere to the principle that establishing continuous links between
laboratory data and clinical data would facilitate the systematic development of interferon
therapy.
If we recall the series of experimental events that helped to shape the notion of
interferon as a potential cancer therapy two issues appear to figure prominently. First, I would
like to point at the central role the question of purity played so far in evaluating knowledge
relating to interferon. Depending on the situation researchers made an appeal to the purity or
impurity of interferon preparations as a means to justify and criticize experimental results and
claims. This is nicely illustrated by the controversy which arose over Gresser's antitumor claim
and the way in which Cantell and Strander tried to come to terms with unexpected clinical
effects in patients. By providing interferon researchers with a flexible arbiter in the context of
justification the 'purity' parameter would remain invariably popular in the production of
evidential arguments.
Second, the coming of age of the field of interferon research began to make itself felt
through the dogmatic resistance to a change of concept of interferon as part of the host
defense against viral infection and the pervasiveness of the non-toxicity dogma in evaluating
clinical data. In the next section I will describe how a similar kind of conflict and competition
over what questions were important, what phenomena were interesting and what answers were
acceptable, continued to influence the development of interferon as we follow Mathilde Krim's
efforts to mobilize interest in interferon as a possible lead toward cancer therapy in the USA in
the early 1970's.
6.2 'Mary's most eager lamb': Mathilde Krim
Despite strenuous efforts, Mathilde Krim did not fare well in mobilizing support for research
into the antitumor properties of interferon. Her applications for funding were rejected by the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
*" H. Strander, K. Cantell. G. Carlström, and P. Jakobsson, 'Clinical and Laboratory Investigations on Man:
Systemic Administration of Potent Interferon in Man'. 7. /Vor. Cnncfr. tor., 51 (1973). 733-42; I. Gresserto
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(NIAID), which are both part of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). During a visit to the
NCI's office in Bethesda, MD, Krim learned that NCI officers were not willing to support the
project because that would mean having "to step on to NIAID's turf'." The NIAID already
had a formal interferon program (as part of the Antiviral Substances Program) which coordi-
nated NIH in-house research with regard to interferon and was responsible for all interferon
extramural research—spending roughly 900.000 dollars or 1,5 percent of the NIAID's annual
research budget in 1970.*' Requests for funding of extramural interferon research should
therefore be addressed to the NIAID and not the NCI.
Apart from the territorial issue, the antitumor claims of the seemingly non-toxic (in
marked contrast to most other available modes of cancer therapy) virus inhibitory substance,
'interferon', had little appeal, despite the high priority of NCI's special V/nw Cancer Program."
Behind the scenes Hilton Levy had made no secret of his scepticism regarding Gresser's claim
that interferon in addition to its antiviral properties might have a direct inhibitory effect on the
tumor cells." At the same time Levy himself and the NCI researcher Arthur Levine were
having a difficult time in keeping the NCI administrators interested in their Poly I:C antitumor
testing program. Preliminary tests in cancer patients had been disappointing thus far without
any indication that the interferon inducer produced an antitumor effect; in addition the com-
pound appeared more toxic than was hoped for."*
The problematic and often conflicting reports regarding the tumor-inhibitory effects of
both interferon inducers and interferon were hardly an inducement for support. Moreover,
there were strong feelings within NCI quarters against funding research with a poorly defined
and impure substance or, even worse, some sort of family of biologically active proteins.
Published reports suggested a marked heterogeneity of human interferons with regard to
molecular weight, electrical charge and differences in stability to heat and acid.*'' However,
none of these interferons had been characterized in chemical terms and the production of
interferon was known to be beset with difficulties. In many ways interferon seemed to resemble
the kind of ambiguous complex biological activity the NCI had experienced in the
M. Krim to I. Gresser, letter dated 30 November 1971,1. Grosser personal archives.
In the fiscal year 1970 22 contract were awarded, totalling 868.811 dollar; Evaluatory report of the Antiviral
Substances Program, September 1976. NIAID Archives. DMID-ARB box /K 14; and, 'NIAID Initiates
Antiviral drug Program; Awards Contracts for Interferon Study'. 77i<> WH Äecord, XXII, 18 (1970), pp. 1,4.
" R. A. Rettig. Cancer Crusade (Princeton: Princeton University, 1977), p. 69.
Interview with Arthur Levine.
Interviews with Arthur Levine, Sam Baron, and Hilton Levy.
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S.E. Grossberg, The Interferons and their Inducers: Molecular and Therapeutic Considerations, New. £n#/. 7.
f., 287, 2(1972), 79-85.
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past with unproven cancer therapies like 'Coley's toxins'.™
The NIAID, in turn, was not receptive to Krim's applications either. George Galasso,
who headed the Antiviral Substances Program, was interested in interferon as a potential anti-
viral drug but was skeptical about the possibilities of interferon as an antitumor agent." His
sceptic attitude was based on a lack of evidence that inhibition of tumor growth was mediated
by interferon and not by some other molecule, given the impurity of interferon preparations.
Moreover, all interferon researchers on his Program Advisory Committee resisted Gresser's
idea that the action of interferon might be pleiotropic or polypractic—inhibiting the growth of
viruses as well as tumor cells. They held on to the principle that cells produced interferon in
response to viruses and that, after release from the cell, interferon in turn specifically reacted
with cells to induce the formation of another cellular protein which mediated the actual
antiviral activity. This so-called 'interferon system' was considered to be an important part of
the non-immunological host defense against viral infections. As such interferon fitted in rather
well with the 'biomedical model' of disease and treatment—based on the theory of specific
etiology and the notion of specific therapy—on which the Antiviral Substances Program was
largely based (see Fig. 45) . "
Despite the rather disappointing reception of her project proposals at the NIH, further
discouraging reactions from private foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, Krim did
not give up her fund-raising efforts. She felt that hurdles were there to be taken and that any
agent like interferon, which had shown inhibitory activity against several tumors in mice
R.W. Moss, 77IP Can«r /nrfutfry (New York: Paragon House, 1989). pp. 119-31; Interviews with Mathilde
Krim, Joseph Sonnabend, Arthur Levine, Thomas Merigan.
During a visit to Russia in the summer of 1971 Galasso had made the surprising discovery that human
leucocyte interferon was already available in Moscow area pharmacies for use as a nasal spray against
influenza. This encouraged him in funding a number of clinical trials to test interferon as a potential antiviral
drug. For instance, the NIAID financially supported Tom Merigan's and David Tyrrell's collaborative effort to
test interferon on respiratory viruses in volunteers at the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury (UK). In 1973 the
latter attempt would result in claims in both the Neu- Kor* 7Vmcj and Lanm that inlerferon was effective
against the common cold; Three U.S. Scientists Visit Soviet Union; Find Antiviral research Programs Differ',
77ie A7H /team/, XXIII, 18 (1971), p. 1, 4; Minutes Antiviral Substances Workshop, NIH. dated 1 december
1971, NIAID archives; 'Substance in Body Said to Block Colds', /Vftv- Kor* 7imej, 24 March 1973; 'Scientists
Report Interferon—Naturally Occurring Antiviral Protein— Effective Against Common Cold'. The NIH
record, 24 April 1973, p.8; T. Merigan, S. Reed, T. Hall, D. Tyrrell, 'Inhibition of Respiratory Virus Infection
by locally applied Interferon. Lane«, i (1973), 563-7; T. Merigan to J. Gold (SKF), letter dated 4 September
1972, Tyrrell personal archives; and interview with George Galasso
S. Baron, The Defensive and Biological Roles of the Interferon System, in N. Finter (ed.), /nfer/i?ro
/nter/(?ron /nducj-rs (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1973) 267-92; E. Richards, ViVamin
C and Cancer: Mattcine or Po/ifi«? (New York: St Martin's Press. 1991), pp. 21-2; and interviews with
Sam Baron, George. Galasso, and Joseph Sonnabend.
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without any toxic side-effects, deserved further intensive investigation." However, more than
two years elapsed before, in early 1974, Krim's applications finally met with some positive
response. Representatives of the German Behringwerke Company, which had become
interested in the possibilities of interferon therapy at the peak of the interferon inducer 'fashion'
round about 1969, approached the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center with an official
request for a clinical trial with human interferon in cancer patients." The German drug
company offered to supply the human interferon that was needed for the trial. The newly
appointed research director of Memorial Sloan Kettering, Robert Good, was rather taken by
the German interest and decided that the trial should be carried out. Since he knew about
Krim's vivid interest in interferon, he asked her to act as coordinator. Krim was encouraged to
involve outside experts and thus she got in touch with the most outspoken believer in interfe-
ron's antitumor activity, Ion Gresser."
In the spring of 1974, Krim visited Gresser in his laboratory. Gresser enthusiastically
informed her of his latest investigations and publications concerning interferon's antitumor
effects. Krim was intrigued by Gresser's speculations about interferon as a broad spectrum
cellular hormone serving to modulate cellular behavior and enhance the host defense mecha-
nism—acting locally or at a distance, stimulating when stimulation was needed and inhibiting
when inhibition was needed." This sounded similar to Robert Good's new approach to the
treatment of cancer dubbed 'immunotherapy' aimed at the stimulation of the non-specific
immune response by biological ('natural') means—involving non-specific factors that amplified
immune reactions, as opposed to the specific antibody related, classical immune mechanisms."
'•' M. Krim to I. Gresser. letter dated 20 March, 1974, Gresser personal archives; and interviews with Kari
Cantell and Mathilde Krim.
'•* Interview with Mathilde Krim; I. Gresser to S. Färber, letter dated 7 November 1969, Gresser personal
archives.
" M. Krim to I. Gresser. letter dated 20 March 1974. Gresser personal archives; Krim, interview; and Gresser.
interview; Krim and Gresser met in the fall of 1971. when Krim was in the process of interesting the NIH in
supporting work on the production of interferon for clinical trials in cancer patients; M. Krim to I. Gresser,
letter dated 30 November 1971. Gresser personal archives.
" 1. Gresser (Unpublished manuscript. 1973), 'Cancer and Immunology or the Resurrection of Sir Colenso
Ridgeon'; Gresser loved to quote his assistant Pernilla Lindahl who defined interferon as a substance "that
does what you want it to do"; I. Gresser. 'Interferon Therapy: Obvious and not so Obvious Applications', ,4<7a
Mn/ira ScflnrfinoWcfl, 197 (1975), 49-53, p. 52: and interviews with Ion Gresser, and Mathilde Krim.
From the 1920s up to the 1960s immunologists would describe their specialty in terms of the study of specific
defense mechanisms. The concept of antibody-related specificity as Stephen Hall aptly expressed it "remained
magnetic north to all immunologists, the orientation against which everyone set their research compasses".
Those who pioneered non-specific mechanisms were hardly taken serious by mainstream immunologists;
Stephen Hall, *4 C7»n»i«>fi<»i in f/i<" B/ood: ti/i?, Dfafn and /n* /mmunr Sytfrm (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1997). p. 170; The growing emphasis on local defensive processes and substances was not unique
to immunotherapy but was also visible in other areas of pharmacotherapy. For instance in the early 1970's
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As a result of extensive media coverage immunotherapy had a high visibility in the
USA in the early 1970's.™ Treatment with immunostimulating agents such as BCG (Baccile
Calmette Guerin, a bacterium related to the tuberculosis bacillus) was presented in the media
as a promising 'fourth modality of cancer treatment'—in addition to surgery, radiotherapy and
chemotherapy. The clinical oncologists who were involved in conducting the immunotherapy
trials viewed the new approach as potentially supplementing conventional cancer therapies,
with a preference for a combination with cancer chemotherapy.™
Hearing Gresser argue that interferon's antitumor effects were most likely based on
enhancing a variety of mechanisms of defense available to the host, Krim immediately saw
possibilities to align interferon with the increasingly fashionable immunologic approach to
cancer therapy. Gresser's advise to contact Hans Strander a physician at the Karolinska
Hospital in Stockholm who was performing experiments with interferon in cancer patients, did
not fall on deaf ears. Krim immediately booked a flight to Stockholm.""
In his room at the Radiumhemmet, Strander told Krim that over the years he had
treated more than thirty cancer patients with interferon without noticing serious toxic effects.
He considered the provisional results encouraging. In particular the osteosarcoma trial looked
promising." As a routine way to deal with trials concerning advanced cancer
patients—involving high and predictable mortality—he worked with historical controls: that is.
Strander compared his interferon-treated patients with the medical histories of osteosarcoma
patients treated by conventional means at the Karolinska Hospital. The historical record
showed that about 80 percent of the osteosarcoma patients developed metastatic tumors in the
lungs within 12 months that were invariably fatal, following conventional surgery and radiothe-
rapy.
pharmacologists began to talk about aspirin as an opponent of defensive local homione(s). so-called
prostaglandines; See, H. O. J. Collier. The Story of Aspirin', in M. J. Parnham and J. Bruinvels (eds).
SW«7i'«/!.s/rom Discoveries in Miaraiaco/ogv (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1987).
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Robert Teitelman notes that with Robert Good's arrival in New York, he and immunotherapy became famous
overnight. 'Time put him on the cover, and 77ie AVw Vorit r im« Magazine published a long admiring profile.
'Today almost every puzzling disease in the medical handbook has become the target of the new immunologi-
cal weapons." said the magazine"; R. Teitelman, Gene Dreams: Wa// 5free/. /Icademia am/ fne /?i5e »/
fiiorernno/ogv (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 31.
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Interviews with Ion Gresser and Mathilde Krim.
" H. Strander to K. Cantell. letters dated 8 and 13 March, 12 April and 22 September 1973. Cantell personal
archives: H. Strander to I. Gresser, letters dated 8 August, 22 September. 8 October. 29 December 1973,
Gresser personal archives; M. Krim, 'Interferon as an Antiviral and Anticancer Agent'. C/im'ca/ ßid/efin, 5
(1975), pp. 34-6; H. Strander, P. Jakobsson. G. Carlström and K. Cantell. Administration of Potent Interferon
to Patients with Malignant Diseases, Cancer Cv/otogv, 13 (1974), pp. 18-9; and interviews with Kari
Cantell, Mathilde Krim, and Hans Strander.
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Strander believed that a doctor should always choose the treatment, based on the
doctor's best judgment and knowledge of the particular patient. He argued that a retrospective
study—study that looks back into case histories—could supply the data needed to judge the
effectiveness of a given therapy. Furthermore he did not think it ethically acceptable to tell a
fatally ill patient, "I have several treatments, but I am not sure which one is best. To find out
I'll pick your treatment by a randomized procedure similar to flipping a coin. Is that okay with
you?"."
Strander's attitude is illustrative of the physician's conflict between loyalty to the
perceived needs of the patients and to the objectives of research. Moreover, his course of
action was in line with the culture of therapeutic evaluation in clinical oncology in the early
1970's. The spread of randomization was slow compared with other medical specialties and the
presentation of research results based on the accurate observation of single cases and on
comparison with historical cases was still widely practiced. According to the historian of
medicine, liana Löwy, the quasi-monopoly of oncologists over their patients—with little
interest from other medical specialties in the treatment of the mostly hopeless cancer
cases—might have contributed to the persistence of historical controls in clinical oncology."'
As we will see in the next sections, what thus began as an unproblematic decision became later
a matter of controversy and policy.
6.2.1 Staging a workshop on interferon in the treatment of cancer
Krim learned that up until the time of her visit to Strander of the ten osteosarcoma patients
that had been enlisted in the treatment group, only two had shown signs of tumor progression
after more than a year of being free of Symptoms." In addition, the data collected on lympho-
ma patients indicated that in single cases Strander was getting a response, at least temporarily.
Strander emphasized the preliminary status of his studies and thought it premature to draw any
firm conclusions. Yet the preliminary results of the Swedish trial sufficed too strengthen Krim's
belief in interferon as a potential non-toxic therapeutic agent." Krim decided to renew her
efforts to interest the NCI in supporting research into the possible antitumor effects of
interferon. With Strander's osteosarcoma trial as a vehicle to build an agenda for her cause, she
*•* I. Löwy, ßenveen Benc/i and Jtafr«/? (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1996). p. 59.
** H. Strander to I. Gresser, letter dated 29 December 1973. Strander personal archives; and interviews with
Mathilde.Knm and Hans Strander.
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was hopeful that NCI's Virus Cancer Program would make some funds available to interferon
research.**
Krim's immediate aim was raising consciousness. As a 'woman of action' she wanted to
show people in senior positions within the American cancer establishment how much potential
there was and the best she could think of was to stage an international conference on interferon
and cancer. In developing funding for such a meeting she met with quite some resistance, in
particular from NIH quarters. As I mentioned before, there was a basic mistrust of reports con-
cerning interferon's antitumor properties. In addition there were strong feelings about the
possibility that Mathilde Krim, an ambitious and politically well-connected outsider and
woman, would interfere with the current distribution of federal funds and might gain too much
control over the future course of interferon research. Moreover, the established interferon
researcher Tom Merigan—who played a central role in the clinical studies part of the Antiviral
Substances Program with his trials involving hepatitis patients and cancer patients suffering
from viral infections—had already approached the NIH with plans for the organization of an
international interferon symposium on the clinical potential of interferon as an antiviral."
Despite the fact that Krim's meeting had a rather different objective, interferon and cancer,
there were concerns that her workshop might upstage the NIH meeting.®* Krim, however,
persisted and finally in the fall of 1974 she received an invitation from the head of NCI's brand
new Molecular Control Program, Timothy O'Connor, who was to advise the Director of the
NCI, the tumor virologist Frank Rauscher, on new directions in molecular biology with great
potential in the fight against cancer."
On 12 December, 1974, Krim in the company of Strander—who had been asked by
Krim to work up his trial data into a presentable form and come over for the occasion—paid a
M. Krim to D. Habif, letter dated 19 July 1974, Cantell personal archives; and interview with Mathilde Krim.
Merigan, an infectious disease specialist, developed his plans for trials with interferon in cancer patients
suffering from disseminated virus infection (e.g. shingles) simultaneously with Cantell in 1971. Only after
Merigan had obtained a high visibility with his promising common cold trial in Salisbury (UK) did he receive
sufficient financial support from the NIAID for realizing his trial plans at Stanford (CA). In the course of
1975 he would ask permission for a trial involving human hepatitis infection, that was very common among
the large gay community in the San Francisco area. After initial problems about the costs of the interferon
required—the costs for the interferon were estimated at little less than 100.000 dollars for 8 patients—the
green light was given in June 1975; T. Merigan to G. Galasso, letters dated 16 April, 10 May 1974 and 21
March 1975, NIAID Archives, DMID-ARB box # 14; G. Galasso to T. Merigan. letters dated 22 April and 4
June 1975, NIAID Archives, DMID-ARB box # 14.
Interviews with Kari Cantell, George Galasso, Mathilde Krim. Arthur Levine, Thomas Merigan, Joseph
Sonnabend.
As director of the NCI Rauscher was part of what was dubbed the 'college of cardinals' which used to meet
twice a month—consisting of the directors of the various institutes of the NIH. They held in their hands
space, positions and budget. Individually and collectively they were a very influential group; and interview
with Frank Rauscher.
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visit to O'Connor at the NCI. O'Connor was impressed with Strander's latest data based on a
group of 11 interferon treated osteosarcoma patients. Strander told him that all these patients
had been followed up for at least six months, during which time none had developed tumor
progression. The data were judged as being increasingly exciting as they approached a
statistical significance between the interferon-treated group and the historical control group
consisting of 33 osteosarcoma patients treated between 1952 and 1972 at the same hospital by
conventional means. Strander suggested that the preliminary observations were worthy of
further expanded study. O'Connor agreed that interferon deserved further study and he was
prepared to advocate funding within NCI quarters. Shortly after this meeting, Krim received an
invitation to submit an application for a Planning Grant to support an international workshop
that would aim at evaluating the state-of-the-art in interferon research and formulate
recommendations for further research concerning interferon and cancer. The application would
be reviewed during a scheduled meeting of the Molecular Control Working Group on 7
January, 1975.'"
O'Connor's working group voted unanimously to approve Krim's subsequent grant
proposal on behalf of the Memorial Sloan Kettering. However, another month was needed to
overcome resistance within other parts of the NCI and Krim's application had to be
resubmitted to go through a second review. Finally at the end of February 1975 Krim was
informed that the Division of Cancer treatment of the NCI would co-sponsor the meeting. In
the meantime Krim had succeeded in getting additional funds from the Rockefeller Foundation,
the Sloan Kettering Institute for Cancer Research itself and a number of American
pharmaceutical companies.'" There was enough money available to do the unusual and offer
each participant a free trip to New York City, plus accommodations at the Westbury Hotel and
even a small honorarium.'*
On Sunday 30 March about half of the participants gathered for an informal 'open
house' reception in Krim's grand home at East 69th Street in New York. Krim felt that this
would provide a good opportunity for getting acquainted and meeting old friends in a relaxed
atmosphere before the start of the 'International Workshop on Interferon in the Treatment of
Cancer', which was held at the Rockefeller Institute nearby." Krim had succeeded in bringing
See the report of the International Workshop on Interferon in the Treatment of Cancer, held in New York,
March 31, April 1 and 2. 1975. Sonnabend personal archives; H. Strander and K. Cantell to Timothy
O'Connor, telegram dated 13 January 1975, Cantell personal archives; M. Krim to J. Sonnabend, letter dated
15 January 1975. Sonnabend personal archives: S. Panem. 77IF /n/erfcron CruWf (Washington. D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 17; and interviews with Mathilde Krim and Hans Strander.
" M. Krim to J. Sonnabend, letter dated 15 January 1975. J. Sonnabend personal archives.
M. Krim to K. Cantell. letter dated 13 March 1975. K. Cantell personal archives.
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together for the first time virologists, oncologists, immunologists, and representatives from the
NIH, NCI and pharmaceutical industry, who submitted, discussed, evaluated and simply
listened to a host of papers mainly concerning the antitumor effects of interferon. The size of
the meeting, with about 200 invitees, was not unusually large. However, for quite a number of
those present, the meeting represented their first educational experience with a field of
research, they had either never paid serious attention to or never heard of.
In spite of Krim's warm welcome, and the careful staging of the workshop, she could
not prevent that at times the atmosphere became tense and the meeting threatened to turn into
a battleground with believers and non-believers, Krim herself and NIH-interest groups fighting
each other in their common drive for power and access to federal funds. At the reception, for
example, rumors were spread that Strander's osteosarcoma study, which would be presented
the next day, was flawed. Detailed information about the trial and the clinical pictures of each
of the 14 osteosarcoma patients, which Strander had submitted to Alan Rabson, director of the
Division of Cancer Biology and Diagnosis at the NCI shortly before the meeting to
independent review, was said to disclose that most of the tumors were not osteosarcomas and
that the Swedish pathologist's diagnosis had been wrong. Furthermore the trial was not a
formally randomized comparison but relied on comparison with a historical group treated
conventionally. Moreover, the results of Strander's trial did not seem to differ significantly
from the recently published clinical results with a U.S. tested new chemotherapy regime of
high dose methotrexate, a cytotoxic chemical compound produced by the American Lederle
company.**
Cantell among others got worried and rather annoyed about this premature judgment of
research data, which had yet to be presented by Strander. "A surprisingly malicious, suspicious
and negative attitude seemed to breathe towards the research of Hans and mine..."*" Cantell
had the gut feeling that the trial might become the focus of a political struggle. He therefore
contacted his friend Merigan, whom he knew was part of the NIH establishment and had a
reserved attitude towards Krim's meeting too. "I told my worries to Tom and flashed the threat
that I would terminate my collaboration with U.S. scientists, if Hans's study would be publicly
decried on unjustified grounds"."' Merigan, whose clinical studies depended largely on the
continued supply of Cantell's interferon, took the threat seriously. He phoned Rabson in
I. Gresser to M. Krim, letter dated 16 April 1975. Ion Grosser personal archives; Krim, interview; Sonnabend,
interview; Levine. interview; Cantell, interview; Gresser. interview; and. G. Rosen et all. 'High Dose
Methotrexate with Citrovorum Factor and Rescue and Adriamycin in Childhood Osteogenic Sarcoma',
Cancf-r, 33(1974). 1151-63.
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and DOM-HJ »/'*«• k / f o / a So«!'«/) (Helsinki: Finland, WSOY. 1993), p. 131.
Kari, Cantell, /n/er/i?/wiin 7arina. 7W«fii>Aen £/ämäa- //o/a Jö 5uni/a. (77i« /n/erferon Story-'
and DOHTW o/rAe LJ/C o/a SCI«I/IJ/J (Helsinki: Finland, WSOY, 1993). p. 133.
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Washington, who would arrive the next day to review Strander's patient records. Rabson
reassured both Merigan and Cantell that there were some differences in interpretation between
the Swedisch pathologists and his research group, but the majority of the cases indeed
represented classical osteosarcoma. Cantell then let things go at that."
The actual session termed 'treatment of human osteosarcoma with interferon' satisfied
all parties. On the one hand Strander was given credit for having started a trial with interferon
in cancer patients, which had produced some potentially interesting results, but on the other
hand most agreed that the experimental sample size was rather small and that the diagnosis of
osteosarcoma was questionable in a number of cases. Hence, it was too early to draw any
conclusions. Further extended study should be awaited, with the proviso that, prior to the
entry of new patients in the study, the diagnosis of osteosarcoma should be confirmed by two
independent pathologists. The same kind of compromise was reached in other sessions
dedicated to /'w vi/ro and animal studies with interferon: the data were regarded as being
promising but not more than that. None of the interferon researchers present recalled having
heard any dramatically new in scientific terms at the workshop.**
Far from being a novel aspect of interferon related research it is remarkable to see that
a complete session was dedicated to interferon's interactions with immune defense functions
and cellular regulatory mechanisms. In the past there had been occasional paper presentations,
most prominently by Gresser and his team and the research couple Edward and Jacqueline de
Maeyer-Guignard from the Fomfo/i'o/i Ci<mM>!srt'fM/ d« fladium (Universite de Paris-Sud,
Orsay), pointing at interactions between the interferon- and immune system. In general these
claims did not meet with general approval and were ascribed to impurities in the interferon
preparations. Most interferon researchers supported the view of the interferon system as part
of the non-immunological host-defense against viruses. In discussions of host resistance the
'interferon system versus immune system' type of argument monopolized the conversation (see
Fig. 46a)."
Now for the first time the possible pleiotropic action of interferon as a kind of immune
defense modifier was on the agenda (see fig 46 b.c). The paper presentations at hand were far
from uni vocal regarding the nature of the interactions with the immune system. On the one
hand there were claims regarding an immuno-suppressive activity of interferon preparations as
witnessed by a slowing down of the rejection of transplanted grafts in mice. This would
Interviews with Kari Cantell and Hans Strander.
See report of the International Workshop on Interferon in the Treatment of Cancer, held in New York. March
31. April 1 and 2, 1975, Sonnabend personal archives; and interviews with Kari Cantell, Mathilde Krim,
Thomas Merigan and Joseph Sonnabend.
L. Glasgow, 'Interrelationships of Interferon and Immunity During Viral Infections'. J. Gen. PAw., 56 (1970),
212-27; and. E. de Maeyer, 'Interferon Twenty Years Later', Su/toin <fc £7furifur ftu/eur, 76 (1978), 303-23.
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Rg 46a. Lowel Glasgow used this picture in 1970 to support his controver-
sial claim that host resistance against viruses was multifactonal with
multiple interrelationships
of the interferon system and the immune system.
Reproduced with kind permission from the publisher.
Fig 46b. Around 1976 William Stewart II used the same allegory of die
seven blind men and the elephant,
to produce a caricature of several interferon workers
who all argue in favour of their own favourite hypothesis.
The drawing served as a means
to convince the audience that the action of interferon is pleiotropic
Reproduced with kind permission from the publisher.
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The Blind Men and the Elephant
II was six men of Indostan
To Learning much inclined
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind),
that each by observation
might satisfy his mind.
The First Approached the Elephant,
And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side.
At once began to bawl:
'God bless me! But the Elephant
Is very like a wall!
The Second, feeling of the tusk.
Cried. "Ho! what have we here
So very round and smooth and Sharp?
To me 'tis mighty clear
This wonder of an Elephant
I very like a spear!'
The Sixth, no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope.
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope.
'I see' quoth he 'the Elephant
1 very like a rope!"
And so these man of Indostan
Disputed loud and long
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong.
Though each was partly right.
And all were in the wrong!
Moral
So oft in scientific wars
the disputants. I ween.
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean.
And prate about an elephant
Not one of them has seen!
Fig 46c. Both drawings were based on this poem by John Godfrey Saxe.
Courtesy of Joseph Sonnabend.
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contradict the claim that interferon had an antitumor effect. On the other hand there were
observations which could be interpreted as saying that interferon had an immune enhancing
effect that might be related to its tumor inhibitory activity. Despite the conflicting and
ambiguous nature of the experimental data, this session played an important role in mobilizing
the interest of medical researchers working in the field of immunotherapy of cancer. In pionee-
ring various ways of stimulating the cells of the immune system to inhibit tumor growth, with
the aim to develop immunotherapies of cancer, they had become accustomed to the apparent
paradox that non-specific biological agents with immunoregulating properties could have both
immunoenhancing and immunosuppressive effects.'""
The 1975 symposium was choreographed by a hopeful Krim as a watershed event. The
conference was indeed instrumental in bridging the gap between the test-tube and the patient,
by linking laboratory data regarding interferon's actions at the cellular and molecular levels,
however insufficiently, with clinical data obtained at the bedside. Basically, it was the first
major public attempt at translating interferon's antitumor effects into scientific terms that fitted
both fundamental laboratory researches and clinical researches. However, Krim's grand
objectives were to gain approval and support from the scientific community, funding and
cooperation from the drug industry and to get enough funding from the NCI to expand
interferon research—a house of cards based almost entirely on Strander's fourteen cancer
patients. But, neither scientists nor the representatives of government, private funding agencies
and pharmaceutical companies, who attended the meeting, seemed impressed with the
experimental data presented over the three day period. The press all but ignored the event.
Despite the fact that Krim succeeded in raising consciousness, the workshop as such did not
suffice to gain interferon official recognition as a promising antitumor agent.""
'"* See the report of the Internationa] Workshop on Interferon in the Treatment of Cancer, held in New York,
March 31, April 1 and 2, 1975, Sonnabend personal archives; E and J. De Maeyer-Guignard, interview; and
Gresser, interview.
"" Few American pharmaceutical companies expressed interest in working on interferon. for the greater part
because of profitability assessments. Profitability of a drug like interferon was often examined from four
standpoints: The patentability of the compound (The British had obtained most of the interferon patents), the
developmental costs (Producing small quantities of semi-purified interferon was already beset with
difficulties and immensely costly), the size of the market and the likely prize of the product (treating one
patient for a couple of months already seemed to cost thousands of dollars) and the difficulty and expense of
acquiring FDA approval (going by past experience with products from human cell produced products a lot of
work was expected); M. Hilleman. interview.
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6.2.2 Attempts to put interferon on the cancer map
As a member of the panel of consultants, Krim had experienced the political importance of
producing an accessible scientific report with recommendations for further research. After the
workshop she asked the interferon researchers Merigan and Jan Vilcek and the NCI tumor
virologist, Arthur Levine, to help her produce a report of the workshop."" While the complete
report was being prepared, Krim was asked by Ateure to write a summary for their News and
Views column. Krim immediately put together a short report and sent copies to members of
the organizing committee and the Division of Cancer Treatment of the NCI.
Krim's version of the workshop caused a little row at the NCI. In her drive to put
interferon on the research map, Krim had left out accounts of dissenting voices, such as the
statement by Richard Adamson of the NCI that he had been unable to demonstrate an
antitumor effect of interferon in his mouse leukemia system."" This policy was criticized
severely within NCI quarters and Krim was told that unless she retracted the paper and
included what amounted almost to a disclaimer, detailing the shortcomings of Strander's study,
immediately an official dissenting opinion would be published in Watere. Krim decided to take
the threat seriously. She agreed to add Adamson's comments and to share authorship with the
other members of the editing committee of the official workshop report (see Fig. 47)."" The
outcome was a most carefully-worded communication, which pointed at the possibility that
interferon might exert its apparent antitumor effects both directly on the tumor cells and
through a modification of components of the immune system as a kind of immune defense
modifier.""
In the meantime, Krim exerted further pressure on the NCI to support interferon
research. Shortly after the workshop she sent Rauscher, who to her great indignation had not
attended the last day of the conference, a personal and confidential letter summarizing the final
recommendations he had missed and an indication of the level of support she expected the NCI
to provide."* Reluctantly, Rauscher submitted to Krim's pressure and invited her for a meeting
with senior NCI officials on 15 April, 1975. At this meeting the edited conclusions and
recommendations of the workshop were presented by Krim. Following her presentation it was
pointed out that the NCI was not prepared to take any action until the formal report was made
'"" M. Krim (o I. Gresser, letter dated 20 May 1975, Ion Gresser personal archives.
"" M. Krim. 'Interfering with cancer', first draft for Mjfure, News and Views (April, 1975), J. Sonnabend, perso-
nal archives.
"" M. Krim to I. Gresser, letter dated 20 May 1975, Gresser personal archives.
"* M. Krim. A. S. Levine, T. Merigan, and J. Vilcek, 'Interfering with Cancer', /va/ure, 255 (1975), 372^1.
"* M. Krim to I. Gresser. letter dated 23 April 1975, Gresser personal archives.
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available and the newly established NCI Interferon Working Group under the chairmanship of
Alan Rabson would have reviewed the report.""
By July, Rabson's interferon group had the extensive formal workshop report in hand
and finally, in the autumn of 1975, the Working Group's recommendations were sent to
Rauscher and the Director of the Division of Cancer Treatment, Vincent DeVita for further
consideration. The group recommended that 4 million dollars be allocated for interferon
research to support clinical trials, basic research and the production of interferon. In addition
clinical trials should be conducted under the supervision of the NCI's Division of Cancer
treatment. "* However, within the Division of Cancer Treatment, the recommendations were
received with mixed feelings, and DeVita decided to bring the matter up for discussion at the
November meeting of the advisory committee to his division, the Board of Scientific
Counselors.'*
The meeting of the Board on 11 November 1975 began with a presentation by
Mathilde Krim on the use of interferon in the treatment of cancer. Right from the start Krim
felt that she would have the odds stacked against her. Her report, its conclusions and
recommendations were indeed severely criticized, especially Strander's clinical trial. The tumor
data were questioned, the number of cases was thought to be too small and it was suggested
that it was unlikely that biological activity could be obtained in a mixture containing one in
thousand active molecules. Others stated that the clinical trial was difficult to interpret, even if
expanded, because of the use of a historical control group. One should at least include a
concurrent control group in order to be able to evaluate the present data.""
The critics within the NCI Board were, at least, biased in their accusation of Strander
for non-conforming or dissenting behavior regarding the design of his trial. In 1975 of the 47
cancer trials published in the New England Journal of Medicine 34% was uncontrolled, 13
historically controlled, 13 percent concurrent controls and 40 % was randomized.'" Clinical
oncologists who claimed that randomization of cancer trials was neither ethical nor necessary,
prevailed and at least half of the NCI-sponsored clinical trials were still non-randomized. In
addition, the widely praised American chemotherapy studies in osteosarcoma patients which
interfered with Strander's interferon claims were non-randomized either. Criticizing the design
"" M. Krim to K. Cantell. letter dated 11 April. 1975, Cantell personal archives.
'"* Minutes of the meeting of the National Cancer Institute's National Cancer Advisory Board, 17-18 November,
1975. NCAB/NC1 Archives.
''" Minutes of the meeting of the National Cancer Institute's Division of Cancer Treatment Board of Scientific
Counselors. 10. 11 November. 1975, Board of Scientific Counselors/NCI Archives.
' " G. Kolata. 'Dilemma in Cancer Treatment', Science. 209 (1980), pp. 792-4.
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of Strander's trial must have served the interests of the Randomized Clinical Trial lobby within
the NCI, who were pushing the randomized clinical trial as the ultimate means of applying the
scientific method to the practice of oncology. However, they could not have acted without the
support of the powerful chemotherapy lobby within the NCI. Only after the NCI would begin
to scale down its chemotherapy program in the late 1970's NCI statisticians began to question
the usefulness of chemotherapy in osteosarcoma."*
An air of hostility developed toward Krim during the meeting. Her strenuous efforts to
bring interferon to the attention of NCI officials and the recommendations made by the Inter-
feron Working Group were heavily criticized.'" At the end of the meeting Krim was
astonished to find that the board recommended that there was no compelling reason for
establishing a special NCI research program, to study interferon in humans. The majority
position was that before large-scale clinical testing of interferon was to begin, it would be more
fruitful first to concentrate on basic m viYro and in vivo studies with interferon. The work
could not be funded simply on the basis of Krim's say-so. The NCI was advised to provide
adequate funding by contract and grant mechanisms only.' '•*
The same month, Krim's report was also presented to the National Cancer Advisory
Board (NCAB). According to Richard Rettig "it is appropriate to think of the NCAB as the
•board of directors' of the National Cancer Program" with rather far reaching powers regarding
NCI's research agenda.'" Part of the NCAB were former members of the panel of consultants,
like Mary Lasker herself. Krim might have known that, despite the negative recommendations
of the Board of Scientific Counselors of the Division of Cancer Treatment with the support of
the 'Laskerites', something positive would emerge.
Eventually, during the NCAB meeting, the differences in opinion between on the one
hand Rabson's Interferon Working Group and Krim, and, on the other hand DeVita's Division
of Cancer Treatment and Rauscher, over the kind of support that should be dedicated to
interferon research, were settled in a compromise."* The NCI would make 1 million dollars
available—which amounted to little more than 0,15 percent of NCI's annual budget—through
''" T.C. Chalmers. The Clinical Trial', Mi7fan* Memoria/ Fund 0«ar/f r/v/tffaMi an</ Soa>ry, 41 (1972), 753-
8; E. Gehan and E. Freireich, Non-randomized controls in Cancer Clinical Trials', Ate»• £>i#/and Vourna/ o/
Afaftrin*. 290 (1974), 198-203; and. I. Löwy. 'Berufen ßenc/i a/u/ Bedsiae' (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard
University Press, 1996), p.59.
Minutes of the meeting of the National Cancer Institute's Division of Cancer Treatment Board of Scientific
Counselors, 10, 11 November, 1975. Board of Scientific Counselors/NCI Archives.
114 . . .
Ibid.
' " R. A. Rettig, Corner Ousaite, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). p. 297.
Minutes of the meeting of the National Cancer Institute's National Cancer Advisory Board, 17-18 November.
1975, NCAB/NCI Archives.
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NIAID's Interferon Program to purchase human interferon for investigation of interferon as a
possible antitumor agent.'" At the same time DeVita was granted approval to organize a site
visit by a blue-ribbon panel of experts—consisting of two oncologists, two pathologists and a
statistician—chaired by Arthur Levine, to evaluate Strander's data at the Karolinska Hospital in
Stockholm."* Apparently Krim had succeeded in overcoming part of the resistance within the
NCI against supporting interferon research. It was not the massive funding Krim had asked for
and the NIAID had succeeded in maintaining its key position as interferon's funding authority,
but interferon for the first time had gained official recognition as a potential antitumor agent.'"
In May 1976 the panel visited the Radiumhemmet. It was at Levine's insistence that
Strander added to his interferon-treated patients and the historical controls, a group of
contemporary ('concurrent') controls consisting of osteosarcoma patients that had been treated
simultaneously by conventional means in other Swedish Hospitals. In Levine's view by using
historical controls Strander ran the risk of "comparing apples and oranges".'-" Levine did not
appreciate Strander's defense that it was customary all over the world to employ historical
controls in studies on osteosarcoma.'-' The eventual site visit report was a great blow to
Strander.'•• The NCI panel concluded that by using a contemporary instead of a historical
control group to evaluate the trial data no evidence had as yet be found that interferon
treatment "significantly altered the present natural history of osteosarcoma of the long bo-
nes".'"
On behalf of the taxpaying public Rauscher congratulated Levine for his potentially
money-saving investigative efforts.'-'' In practice, however, the report hardly affected NCI's
policy regarding interferon—the decision to earmark 1 million dollars for interferon research
A committee consisting of both NCI and NIAID officials, under the chairmanship of Alan Rabson, was
installed to regulate the distribution of the $ I million worth of interferon for use in clinical studies. Among
others Tom Merigan was to receive a portion for a prospective randomized trial in patients with lymphomas
suffering from shingles; Minutes of the March 8-9 and October 25-26 meetings of the Board of Scientific
Counselors of the Division of Cancer Treatment of NCI, NCI Archives; 'Interferon Working Group', The
Cancer Letter, 2, 49 (1976), 1; and interview with Thomas Merigan.
" * M inutes of the meeting of the National Cancer Institute's National Cancer Advisory Board, 17-18 November,
1975, NCAB/NC1 Archives.
'" M. Krim to K. Cantell, letter dated 2 March 1976, Cantell personal archives.
'•" H. Strander to A. Levine. letter dated 21 April. 1976. Strander personal archives
'"' V. DeVita to H. Strander, letter dated 15 April 1976, Strander personal archives.
'•• H. Strander to N. Finter, letter dated 9 August 1976, Strander personal archives.
'""' A. Levine to H. Strander, letter dated 14 July 1976. Strander personal archives; Report on Site Visit to
Karolinska Hospital Stockholm, dated 14 July 1976. Strander personal archives.
'••* S. Panem and J. Vilcek, 'Will Interferon Ever Cure Cancer?. 77i? /W/ann'c, December 1982.
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was carried through.'^ As it turns out, Rauscher overestimated the influence of the essentially
negative site visit report and underestimated the impact of Krim's interferon lobby in
combination with anecdotal media reports of the treatment's effectiveness in cancer therapy.'**
In the next section I will describe how interferon succeeded in forming part of the American
cancer agenda.
6.3 Capitalizing on a growing demand for unorthodox cancer remedies.
Following further political groundwork by Krim, a growing number of scientists and influential
laymen in America lent their support to the interferon cause. Apart from the intrinsic lure to
scientists and laymen alike of a natural substance that was reportedly devoid of the severe side-
effects associated with most other anti-cancer drugs and that had emerged from the
mainstream of biomedical research, each social group or individual had private motives for
their 'jump on the interferon bandwagon'.'"
The group of American 'interferonologists' came to realize that Krim's lobbying efforts
proved effective in bringing in additional research money. Due to the growing disappointment
within NIAID quarters about interferon's therapeutic potential as an antiviral agent and the
seemingly permanent inability to purify interferon, the field of interferon research had been
facing a serious cutback in recent NIAID funding.'"* Together with the increasing costs of
doing research this made them shift attention to interferon-related problems for which funds
seemed more readily available—interferon and cancer.'*' They were swiftly followed by
advocates of immunotherapy like the oncologist Jordan Gutterman, who worked at the
Department of Developmental Therapeutics of the M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor
Institute in Houston, Texas. Gutterman would become one of interferon's most avid
promoters.
Minutes of the meeting of the National Cancer Institute's Division of Cancer Treatment Board of Scientific
Counselors. 25-26 Oktober. 1976, Board of Scientific Counselors/NCI Archives; At least the site visit report
might have played a role in Strander never being able to get his osteosarcoma data published in an
international refereed medical journal.
'** S. Panem, 77if /mer/iron Crusade (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1984), p. 21; and interview
with Frank Rauscher.
S. Panem, 77HT /nterfcron Cn«a<fe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).
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E. De Maeyer. 'Interferon Twenty Years Later, ßu//. //is/. Pas/fur, 76 (1978), 303-23, p. 316.; R. Friedman,
'Interferon Research in the Red Queen's Kingdom', /"rc/i. Pa/M. 98 (1974), 73-6; R.Friedman, 'Guest
Editorial: Interferon and Cancer', 7. War/. Cancer, 60 (1978), 1191-4; and interviews with Derek Burke, -
Joseph Sonnabend, Kari. Cantell, and George Galasso.
'** S. Panem, 77ie /nwr/eron CruWe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).
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Immunotherapy of cancer received considerable attention in the early seventies with
claims of immuno-stimulating biological agents such as BCG. It was the promise of a cancer
therapy which claimed to exert its antitumor effects naturally through a stimulation of the
body's own immune system as opposed to the use of the highly toxic chemical drugs employed
in conventional cancer therapy. As such it was a therapy well suited to the culturally unsettled
climate of the 1970's which was characterized by the malaise associated with Vietnam,
Watergate and the oil crisis, and by the growing number of Americans who began to question
the nation's institutional policies regarding environment, medicine and, science and technology.
The flourishing social reform movements, in particular the environmentalists and health-care
reform groups were united both in their belief that man-made chemicals were harming the
environment and responsible for the perceived cancer epidemic, and in their growing doubts
about the Cancer Establishment and the effectiveness of the war on cancer. The members of
the diverse but increasingly powerful cancer counter-culture favored unorthodox 'natural'
cancer remedies. Immunotherapy seemed to fulfil their needs.""
Immunotherapy was simultaneously legitimized scientifically through both an array of
laboratory researches and fundamental breakthroughs in immunological knowledge showing
the importance of the cellular (non-specific) mechanisms underlying the immune responses.
With the help of new immunological laboratory tools (e.g. lymphocytes) studies were
performed resulting in the claim that the immune-responses of cancer patients were suppressed
and should therefore be stimulated. However, by the mid-seventies, as negative clinical trial
data with immuno-stimulating agents like BCG accumulated—immunotherapy and
chemotherapy were not found to be superior to chemotherapy alone—interest in immuno-
therapy dwindled.'" As a promising antitumor substance which was claimed to be involved in
one way or another in the non-specific immune response of the body, interferon was readily
assimilable into a research program that was in urgent need of a new impetus.'"
Introduced to interferon at Krim's workshop, Gutterman became intrigued by the
possibility of using the supposedly non-toxic biological substance in cancer patients."'
Confronted with BCG's repeated failure to show a significant prolongation of remission and
survival Gutterman decided to give interferon a try, although he continued to apply BCG as a
"" A. Elzinga and A. Jamison, 'Changing Policy Agendas in Science and Technology', in S. Jasanoff et all
(eds), //um//><«>* o/Scwic* an</ 7V<7in«/«gv SWiV.s (London: Sage Publications. 1995). 588-9: J. Patterson.
7V Dr«u/ Dijrea^f (Cambridge (MS): Harvard University Press, 1987). 256-7.
' " 1. Löwy. 'BcfH'een BirncA anrf fifdsufc' (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1996). p. 112.
"" R. Teitelman. G<w Dr«»n.v: Wo/fa/rcer. Arwfcmia and //if /?!.«• »/Biof«7mo/ogv (New York: Basic Books,
1989), p.29; and, E. Richards. Vifcimi'n C an</ Cancer: Afafcw or Po«ii«? (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1991), p. 207.
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last experimental resort for patients unable to benefit from conventional therapy.'** Given his
own expertise with the experimental combination of immunotherapy and chemotherapy of
advanced breast cancer, he sent a request for interferon to the NCI to be used in a breast
cancer study.'" The NCI supply, however, appeared to be limited and had to be spread among
several clinical centers. Like all other applicants Gutterman was granted only a small part of
what he had asked for—hardly enough to treat a mere handful of patients for a short period.
In complaining about the frustrating state of affairs to Krim he learned that she was
increasingly successful in getting influential lay persons actively interested in interferon. Three
prominent public figures: Mary Lasker, the 'patron-saint' of American cancer research,
Laurence Rockefeller, the conservationist and member of the NCAB, and Congressman Claude
Pepper, Democrat of Florida, lent their support to the interferon effort. Krim told Gutterman
to inform Lasker personally of his problems.'"'
The commitment of these patrons of American cancer research to interferon was
influenced by the growing public criticism on the National Cancer Program. Despite the
additional investment of more than one billion dollars of tax-payers's money in cancer research
since 1972, the American cancer establishment could only claim credit for minor progress in
their self-proclaimed 'war on cancer'. This poor research performance did not mesh with the
public announcements by politicians, nor with the claims of senior NCI and American Cancer
Society (ACS) officials that they were about to discover a cure against cancer. More and more
critics emphasized the gaps in knowledge between laboratory and bedside and aired doubts
about the prospects for any sudden breakthroughs in the field of cancer therapy.'" Organized
elements of the cancer counter-culture like the International Association of Cancer Victims
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J. Gutterman, Immunotherapy for Recurrent Malignant Melanoma: The Efficacy of BCG in Prolonging the
Postoperative Disease-free Interval and Survival. In M. Sela (ed.). 77if fto/f o/Wo/i-5/vr//if /wimun/A' ;'n
/Vewnfton and Trfafrnfiif o/Cancer (Rome: Pontificia Academia Scientiarum. 1977), pp. 57-65; liana
Löwy argues that the low therapeutic efficacy of most new anticancer drugs emphasized the need for
agreement on what should count as success in a clinical trial of a cancer therapy. Such agreement was
achieved through the development of standardized criteria ('markers') of therapeutic success such as
prolongation of life and remissions or regressions in terms of reduction of cancer volume or perceptible
shrinkage of tumor mass; liana Löwy, 'Bertiwn Sf/ic/i am/ BnfaiVfc' (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University
Press, 1996), pp. 61-2.
Report of the International Workshop on Interferon in the Treatment of Cancer. March 31, April I and 2 1975
New York, Sonnabend personal archives; J. U. Gutterman et al, 'Chemoimmunotherapy of Advanced Breast
Cancer: Prolongation of Remission and Survival with BCG'. ßr. Wed. / , 2 (1976) 774-7.
S. Panem, 7"ne /nfer/<?ron Cn«aaV (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), p.21; and interviews
with Mathilde Krim and Jordan Gutterman.
With the American defeat in South-East Asia, the metaphors of war began to turn against the American
Cancer Establishment. "By comparison with the fight against polio", claimed a former FDA commisioner in
1978. "the war on cancer is a medical Vietnam".; Donald Kennedy quoted in J. C. Pelersen and G. E. Markle.
'Expansion of conflict in cancer controversies', in L. Kriesberg (ed.), Äejcarc/i IM 5ocia/ A
Con/7ic/,r an</ C/iange, 4. (1981) pp. 151 -69, see p. 152.
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disseminated information about alternative 'suppressed' cancer therapies and provided a
platform for dissident cancer voices. They openly accused the NCI, the ACS, and virtually the
entire American medical community of systematic opposition to alternative therapies, and
emphasized the failures of the orthodox biomedical model and conventional cancer treatments
in particular."*
The American cancer establishment was thus seriously under attack and needed a boost
in the fight against cancer to satisfy public demands. As a product of scientific medicine and
with its claimed naturalistic basis interferon seemed to offer the opportunity to silence the
growing opposition. Moreover, individual experiences with the limitations of conventional
cancer therapy played a role in their eagerness to encourage new approaches. Pepper's wife
and close associates of both Rockefeller and Lasker suffered from the 'dread disease' and were
not responding to conventional cancer chemotherapy."'
With the idea of fueling extra pressure for a major interferon campaign, Mary Lasker
provided 1 million dollars through her Foundation for the purchase of additional interferon for
Gutterman's clinical program.'*" Without further delay, in October 1977, Gutterman, who had
planned to attend a immunotherapy meeting in Rome, changed his travel plans and flew to
Finland to make arrangements for buying interferon from the Finnish Red Cross through
Cantell. Gutterman knew by experience (the previous year his request for purchasing interferon
for clinical work in cancer patients had been turned down) that the relatively scarce and
precious interferon material was not for sale simply to the highest bidder.'"' In order to gain
the maximum scientific and public impact for his human leucocyte interferon, Cantell cautious-
ly controlled its distribution. Since the Finnish Red Cross was the only major producer of
human interferon, Gutterman had no alternative (see Fig. 48).'''" Not until Gutterman had given
a full account of his research plans was Cantell prepared to start negotiations on the terms of a
contract for the supply of interferon. They agreed on a price of 25.000 dollars by the billion
units (daily dose between 1-10 million units a day) of partially purified interferon (PIF).'^
"* Eveleen Richards, 'Viramin C am/ Cancer; Medicine or Po/ificj' (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp.
46-47; R. Moss, FA? Cancer /naWrry (New York: Paragon House, 1989); and, R. Proctor, Cancer Warj
(New york: BasicBooks. 1995), and J. Patterson, 7Vie Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern America»!
Cu/Mre, (Cambridge (MA): Harvaixl University Press, 1987), pp. 256-268.
Interview with Mathilde Krim.
'•** S. Panem, 77ie /nfer/eron Cruttjde (Washington, D C : Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 21-22.
'*' J. Gutterman to K. Cantell, letter dated 8 June 1976, Cantell personal archives; K. Cantell to J. Gutterman,
letter dated 26 August 1976, Cantell personal archives.
Interview with Kari Cantell.
'*' In 1976 the annual Finnish production was about 100 billion units of crude interferon (C-IF) or 50 billion
units (with 50% recovery) of partially purified preparations (P-IF); Report on the production of human
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In early 1978 Gutterman was able to begin treatment of patients with inoperable and
recurrent malignancies. Like most American oncologists, Gutterman felt that it was vital to be
aggressive in order to get a response—cancer chemotherapy was synonymous with the use of
maximum-tolerated and often highly toxic doses of drugs.'"" He would usually push his
patients to the limit of what they could bear. However, he had only just started to treat his first
breast cancer patients with the primary aim to yield information on the highest tolerated dose
when he and his colleagues began to witness spectacular, partial regressions of mammary
tumors in five of nine treated woman for whom all treatment possibilities had been exhausted.
Gutterman was elated at the response, although he realized that his study was small, lacking
proper controls, and too short in duration to determine if the therapy really made a difference
in prolonging life. Sudden and seemingly miraculous improvements in cancer patients did
occasionally occur sometimes simply as a result of their doctors paying extra attention to them
when testing a brand-new remedy.'*' This could not prevent Gutterman from presenting an
anecdotal report of his promising preliminary results at the March 1978 Workshop on Clinical
Trials with Interferon organized by the NIH.'**
At the NIH meeting anecdotal reports presenting interferon as a lead in cancer therapy
came from a couple of other researchers as well. Tom Merigan from Stanford University,
reported encouraging shrinkage of tumors in two out of five patients with advanced non-
Hodgkin lymphoma and David Habif from Columbia University, claimed marked tumor
regression in six out of seven women with inoperable or recurrent breast carcinoma. In
accordance with Gutterman's clinical experiment both studies were short in duration and
lacking a control.'"" However anecdotal, the simultaneous presentation of three different
leukocyte interferon. dated 21 September 1977. Cantell personal archives: T. Merigan to K. Cantell, letter
dated 8 September 1979, Cantell personal archives; and interviews with Kari Cantell and Jordan Gutterman.
In the 1950's the NCI developed guidelines for the screening of chemical agents of potential value for
chemotherapy of cancer. Among other things compounds were considered active in animals when minimum
standards of activity were met at the maximum-tolerated dose. According to Lowy this approach was later
transferred to trie clinics: liana Löwy, 'Bfrwre/i itendi an</ Zta&iYfc' (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University
Press, 1996), p. 55.
M. Edelhart. /n;ei/?ro/i: 77if M-w Hope/or Conrfr (Reading (MA), Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1981), p. 36.
'•** Report of the NIAID/NCI workshop on Clinical Trials with Interferon, dated March 21, 22 and 23, 1978 at
the NIH, DMID-ARB box # 14.
In terms of formal clinical trial methodology in oncology these exploratory studies were considered 'Phase I'
trials. Basically these were toxicity screening studies to determine the maximum tolerated dose and a first
step in the established testing trajectory for testing potential new cancer drugs (followed by the larger, longer
and stricter 'Phase II' trials—screen for clinical activity—and 'Phase III' trials—determination of relative
efficacy). Phase I trials also served the purpose of getting a first indication whether or not a new compound
was of any clinical value in cancer therapy; Report of the NIAID/NCI workshop on Clinical Trials with
Interferon. dated March 21, 22 and 23, 1978 at the NIH, DMID-ARB box # 14; interview with Arthur
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Flg. 48. The large scale production of interferon at the Finnish Red Cross
Transfusion Service in the lale 1970's.
Courtesy of Dr. K. Cantell
American studies claiming that interferon produced encouraging clinical responses had an
impact on the small international audience of invited interferon researchers and NIAID, NCI,
and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) officials. Reduction in the size of malignant growths
per se was not an unusual therapeutic effect, but interferon's ability to induce a shrinkage of
advanced solid human tumors that resisted all conventional therapies was a rather uncommon
phenomenon in clinical oncology.
The optimism about interferon's therapeutic potential was also shared by those involved
in studying the possible efficacy of interferon as an antiviral therapy. In particular, Merigan's
placebo-controlled, randomized double blind study showing that daily treatment with
interferon diminished both the spread and the pain of shingles in patients with cancer, was
reason for optimism. This indicated that interferon might at least turn out to be useful in
controlling serious viral infections in immuno-suppressed cancer patients. There were also
anecdotal reports about beneficial effects in children suffering from recurrent laryngeal
papilloma—virus-induced warts that fill up the whole larynx so that the child can barely speak
or breathe and can be life-threatening—for whom the only treatment available was repeated
surgery. At the same time there were also less promising reports.
Levine: M. Buyse. M. Staquet and R. Sylvester (eds.). Cancer C/ini'ca/ 7na/.v (Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 1984).
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! V'- The clinical data presented by Pieter de Somer from the Rega Institute in Belgium, and
Huub Schellekens from the Erasmus Hospital in the Netherlands, called into question the
efficacy of interferon in chronic hepatitis as claimed by Merigan's research group in 1976.'^
Because it had been performed under controlled conditions, the Dutch-Belgian study would, in
formal terms, have an advantage over Merigan's uncontrolled observations. However, unlike
Merigan, they had used human fibroblast interferon—produced from large scale virus-infected
cultures of human cells obtained from fetal tissue or the foreskin of circumcised baby boys.
Since it had been established that fibroblast interferon differed from leucocyte interferon in its
physico-chemical properties, it might be possible that the two types of human interferon
differed in their clinical activity too.''" To Merigan and most other researchers present, giving
up on what was considered one of the most promising clinical antiviral effects observed so far
was not considered as being an option—hepatitis was a rather common virus infection that was
held responsible for severe liver damages and for which no treatment was available.''"" They
argued that apparently leucocyte interferon held more promise for treatment of hepatitis than
did fibroblast interferon.'"
When De Somer brought up next the question of side-effects the atmosphere
threatened to become rather tense. The year before at the international interferon meeting in
Israel De Somer had caused a wave of indignation among his fellow interferonologists by
openly criticizing the non-toxicity dogma."" Although one of the principal virtues of interferon
'•** H. Greenberg. M. Richard, R. Pollard. L. Lutwick. P. Gregory, W. Robinson and T. Merigan, 'Effect of
Human Leucocyte Interferon on Hepatitis B Virus Infection in Patients with Chronic Active Hepatitis', r/K"
New £n« /W 7o«rmj/ 0/ Afatirme, 295 (1976), 517-22.
K. Fames, 'Purification and Physico-chemical Properties of Interferons', in N. Finter (ed.), /n/er/pronj an«/
/nfpr/Vron /mfarir; (Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Company. 1973). pp. 171-99; and, J. O'Malley
and W. A. Carter, Human Interferons: Characterization of the Major Molecular Components', Journal of the
ReticuloEndothelial Society. 23 (1978) 299-305.
ISO
US federal researchers estimated that there were approximately 200.000 hepatitis carriers in the United States
and worldwide some 100 million people. With no cure available it was considered an important research area
by NIAID officials, although the escalating hepatitis epidemic among gay men was still non-existent as far as
the NIAID was concerned; L. Garrett, r/if Coming P/agi«" (New York; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994), p.
273; and, D. Burke, The Status of Interferon', Sci>nfi/Jc American, 236 (1977), 42-50.
' " Report of the NIAID/NCI workshop on Clinical Trials with Interferon, dated March 21, 22 and 23, 1978 at
the NIH. DMID-ARB box # 14.
' " S. Panem. 77ie /nter/eron CruWc (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984). p. 30; interview with
Alfons Billiau. interview; In 1976 Gresser already submitted an article to Science concerning the question of
kidney liver and spleen toxicity and disease causation by interferon in mice. The paper was rejected because
of insufficient evidence that the toxic effects were related to interferon and not to impurities in the preparati-
ons, "...without data to associate a specific material in the preparation with the progressive glomerulonephri-
tis (kidney toxicity), the findings presented are really only a starting point to isolate the cause..."; I. Gresser to
K. Cantell, letter with enclosed 5ri>nc«' referee comment dated 22 September 1976, K. Cantell personal
archives.
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was claimed to be its lack of toxicity, all interferon preparations tested so far were known to
produce side-effects. Most patients receiving interferon treatment developed transient flu-like
symptoms such as fever, chills, fatigue and loss of appetite, and in certain cases after prolonged
administration, some hair loss. The reversible side-effects were never taken very serious as
most of the clinical researchers involved were used to the much more severe toxic side-effects
arising from most other forms of viral and cancer chemotherapy. Moreover, since it appeared
that the effects diminished when using more purified preparations, the consensus was that the
side-effects were not due to the interferon molecule but rather to one or more impurities.
Few dissenters could be heard until 1977 when De Somer reported the observation of
serious side-effects following administration of interferon in a Belgian patient. In particular, the
fact that De Somer indicated that the side-effects may well be related to the interferon
molecule itself, was difficult to swallow for his audience. His remarks did more than violate the
non-toxicity dogma in the field of interferon research. The response to this news "by some was
that such negative results should not be made generally public because they might dampen
popular enthusiasm for interferon and stall the interferon crusade just as it was gaining momen-
tum".'"
To the relief of the 1978 NIH workshop invitees, De Somer did not show up with yet
another dramatic patient history."'' The side-effect issue hardly affected the final assessment of
interferon as a promising therapeutic substance that justified the testing on larger numbers of
patients under controlled conditions. However, obtaining interferon for a major study required
millions of dollars and, with the risk of ending up with just another bogus cancer treatment,
NCI officials remained hesitant to commit themselves to interferon. Gutterman did not want to
wait for a change in NCI policy to come about and turned to the wealthy American Cancer
Society (ACS) for help. The ACS was known to administer a special fund of 5 million dollar
for cancer research aimed at financing "best bets" that might produce benefits to the cancer
patient as quickly as possible.'" Encouraged by Lasker, Gutterman wrote up a daring proposal
for a large test program on more than 100 patients with a variety of tumors, including
metastatic breast cancer.
Once again Frank Rauscher, who had resigned as director of the NCI to become the
ACS's senior vice-president for research, was confronted with a request for massive funding of
S. Panem. 77i«" /nfei/mwi C™««/»- (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984). p. 30.
"•* Report of the NIAID/NCI workshop on Clinical Trials with Interferon, dated March 21. 22 and 23. 1978 at
the NIH. DMID-ARB box # 14.
The ACS is one of the biggest fund-raising organizations in the US, which by relying on 2.5 million
volunteers raised $ 85 million in 1979. plus an additional $35 million from legacies; J. Patterson. The Dread
Disease; Cancer and Modem Culture (Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 268-9; and
interview with Frank Rauscher.
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interferon research. In his previous post at the NCI Rauscher had opposed to a similar kind of
request but that was in 1975 when Krim's interferon crusade still had to gain momentum. Since
then political support for a major interferon campaign had been building up rapidly.
Furthermore, the managing staff of the American Cancer Society believed they were making
not enough progress in the treatment of cancer to satisfy public demand. This played a role in
Rauscher reconsidering the matter.'*'
Late in July 1978 a scientific advisory panel, consisting for the greater part of
interferon supporters reviewed the application. On the panel's recommendation Rauscher and
the ACS Board of Directors quickly approved a 2 million dollar grant for clinical testing of
interferon. Rauscher immediately appointed an ad-hoc committee of clinical researchers under
the co-chairmanship of Gutterman and Merigan to work out protocol details, such as the
selection of research institutions, patients and types of cancer. Scarcity and costs of the
interferon material was believed to limit the trials to no more than 150 advanced cancer
patients, who for reasons of validity would be randomly selected. The committee sent the
experimental protocols for approval to the FDA.'"
On 30 August the ACS publicly announced its plans to spend for the clinical testing of
interferon the largest sum ever committed by the Society to a single project. This fact was
obviously not lost on the media as the press release triggered a wave of interferon related
publicity with headlines such as 'Interferon: The cancer drug we have ignored' or 'New cancer
weapon?' and 'Interferon: No miracles without more molecules'.'" Together with additional
interest shown by radio and television networks this brought, as we will see in the next section,
interferon out of the relative seclusion of the laboratory into the limelight of public attention.
6.4 Interferon, scientists and the media
The portrait conveyed most often and most vividly in the mass media showed interferon as a
somewhat mysterious, clinically unharnessed, non-toxic natural body substance, that was
claimed to be the hottest, though long ignored—by a conservative cancer establishment—line
of biomedical research currently being followed. The idea generated by the media was, that if
only enough of this extremely scarce and expensive naturally occurring protein could be made
Interviews with Mathilde Krim. Jordan Gutterman and Frank Rauscher.
K. Krim to I. Gresser, letter dated 31 August 1978, I. Gresser personal archives; M. Edelhart, Interferon: The
New Hope for Cancer (Reading (MA): Addison Wesley, 1981). 38-9.
"* 'New Cancer Weapon?. Aten-wee*. 18 September 1978, pp. 90-1; J. Hixson, 'Interferon: The Cancer Drug
We Have Ignored'. 77ie /Wtv Konter, 4 September 1978, pp 59-64; K. White, 'Interferon: No Miracles
Without More Molecules', Medical Tribune, 18 October 1978.
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available by scientists, a kind of miracle cure for everything from the dread disease cancer to
the common cold was at hand. The double framing of interferon as a natural solution to a
dread disease and as the product of 'cutting-edge' biomedical research was reinforced by the
illustrations employed in the media. A case in point was a photograph in Afew.m'eejfc with the
subscript "searching for the natural key to interferon" showing scientists in laboratory coats
staring hopeful at a sophisticated laboratory set-up composed of a tangle of wires, tubes,
retorts and graduated cylinders filled with fluids, seeing things only they were supposed to
recognize (see Fig. 49).'"
Except for the excessive elements in the public media, the public image of interferon as
a promising product of a laboratory-supported scientific medicine was not dissimilar to the
associations and legitimations presented by interferon researchers to their scientific
audience—continually linking state-of-the-art basic research with achieving future cures at the
bedside.'*" Moreover, the growing interaction between the field of interferon research and the
fields of immunology (with the conceptualization of the body as a complex system) and
molecular biology (with the conceptualization of the body as a system of networks that process
information), helped to establish and elaborate on the image of interferon as part of a complex
system held together by communication and feedback."'' This is nicely illustrated in the
epilogue of the textbook 77ie m/e//i?/wi system where the interferon researcher William
Stewart II described the action of interferon in the following terms: "Interferon is only one of a
large number of products by which cells communicate. It is as though we have learned only
one of their words and pretend to speak their language"."""
Similar type of information metaphors were also increasingly employed to picture
interferon in the media, mostly in combination with the usual military metaphors (like bullet,
hunt, war and weapon). As such the media reinforced the interferon as-part-of-a-network
image. For instance, the journalist Joseph Hixson depicted in the trendy Afevv Kor/ter, the body
as a regulatory communications network that is continuously in the process of distinguishing
between what "is 'self and what is 'foreign' and thus to be destroyed" such as viruses and
'** 'New Cancer Weapon?, AfciwMwfc. 18 September 1978, pp. 90-1.
Discussing the interleukine-2 hype in the mid 1980's liana Löwy noted similar connections: I. Lowy,
'flcnree/i Wench ««</ ßf</.?/</e' (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press. 1996). p. 158.
See for extensive analyses of the rise of the information metaphor in molecular biology, immunology and
medicine; E. Fox-Keller. Refiguring Life (New York: Columbia Universituy Press, 1995); and, E. Martin,
Flexible Bodies (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).
' " W. E. Stewart II. 77ir for?//iro/i SV.M«M (Wien: Springer-Verlag. 1979). p.322.
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tumors.'" Interferon was presented as one of the intercellular messengers (using a superman
visual image) which emerge whenever what is foreign manifests itself and trigger the bodily
defense forces (see Fig. 50a, b). About the same time, the reporter of the M«Y//CÖ/ 7>ifonne
noted that interferon was exemplary for a new generation of therapeutic drugs which speak to
the body in their "native biochemical language". Simultaneously she pictured interferon as a
sophisticated product of modern science: "The difference between interferon and less refined
medical approaches is the difference between the demanding precision of Obi-Wan Kenobe's
high-energy laser sword, and the clumsy but often effective brute force of a tank". "**
Frequently linking interferon with advanced science and technology directly shaped
arguments concerning the question of interferon's exploitation. The deployment of the new
genetic engineering technology as a means to deal with the problems of interferon production
and purification became a vital rhetorical strategy in the interferon crusade. The high public
visibility and the scarcity of interferon as a potential new miracle drug in turn whetted the
appetite of the newly established genetic engineering firms which were looking for feasible
demonstration projects to lure public investments.
Fig. 49. Mathilde Krim and co-worker in their Laboratory at New York's
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (1978).
Reproduced with kind permission frpm the publisher.
J. Hixson, Interferon: The Cancer Drag We Have Ignored'. 77ie Afov Korter, 4 September 1978. p. 59.
K. White. 'Interferon's Future: For Common Colds, Transplants?, Medico/ 7Wftune (US), 10 November 1978.
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Fig. 50a. "The aler t : Invading viruses (I) approach and release nucleic
acid-a viral rcplicative blueprint-into
the cells (2). The body responds
by producing intercellular messengers.
giant protein molecules called imerferon' (3)."
Reproduced with Lind permission of the Publisher..
Fig 50b. "All systems go: Interferon triggers a cellular anti-viral mecha-
nism. Reproduced with kind permission of the Publisher.
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The genetic engineers used techniques (known as 'recombinant-DNA' or 'rDNA' technology)
developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's which allowed them to copy or 'clone' human
genes by slipping them into bacteria or other micro-organisms. Around 1977—as soon as the
first signs were there that the heyday of public DNA furore was over and the regulatory
climate was slowly improving—the cloning and expression of genes became the object of
intense research activity in the United States and Europe. The perceived allure of the new
technology was that medically important, but mostly scarce and costly, human and animal
proteins could be produced by the genetically engineered bacteria in unlimited quantities at
modest cost.'"
Confirmation of the feasibility of the commercial applications of rDNA techniques
came in the fall of 1977 when American scientists achieved the first complete bacterial
synthesis of an animal protein, the small peptide hormone, somatostatin, produced in the
human brain. Following the somatostatin experiment a growing number of genetic boutiques
were established by venture capitalists anticipating new industrial applications of rDNA
techniques with the active participation of a new generation of entrepreneurial scientists in
academia who were at the forefront of molecular biology. By 1978, several private companies
had been formed in the field of genetic engineering. The new firms, including Cetus, Genentech
(in California) and Genex (in Maryland), and the Swiss-based Biogen, were eager to prove the
commercial worth of the gene-splicing technology.
There were several reasons why the cloning of interferon was considered as an
attractive demonstration project that could serve this purpose."* First, with public expectations
running high, Wallstreets capital investers would be eagerly waiting to pour money into
interferon related commercial projects. Second, the production of interferon by conventional
means was still beset with enormous problems after twenty years of hard labour: the scant
amounts of interferon that were produced worldwide were impure and costly. It was the most
expensive experimental drug ever used in clinical trials in the USA. Once you had succeeded in
isolating the human interferon gene and splicing it into bacteria, the microbes were claimed to
do two jobs for the price of one: they produced human interferon in large quantities and in a
form (as a single protein product) that could be purified with far greater ease than for instance
See, for detailed social histories of the recombinant DNA debate, the development of international regulatory
166
policy for genetic engineering and the subsequent rise of industrial genetics; S. Krimsky. Genf/
(Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1982): S. Wright. Mo/pru/ar Po///;c.v (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1994); S. Krimsky. Biotechnics and Society (New York: Praeger. 1991); R. Teitelman. i
Dreams (New York: BasicBooks, 1989).
According to Panem only a few other proteins like insuline, growth hormone and several proteins identified
for use as human vaccines, qualified for a demonstration project; S. Panem, 77ie /nrer/ieron "
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1984), p 26.
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Cantell's protein soup.'*' Third, there was the technical challenge of isolating and cloning a
gene coding for a protein that still awaited chemical identification."*
The claims by genetic engineering firms and leading molecular biologists about the
imminent possibility of making available, in large quantities, at modest cost, substances that
were expensive or difficult to make such as interferon, and the resulting imaginative race to
clone the first human interferon gene, intensified public interest.'*' Krim seized the opportunity
and worked to use the Second International Workshop on Interferons, which like the first, was
held at the Sloan Kettering Memorial Cancer Center in New York, as a podium to the outside
world: she made it a media event.'™
6.4.1 Gene dreams and the inflation of expectations
Beside the 'old' group of interferonologists and representatives of the ACS, NCI, FDA, the
press, the by-invitation-only gathering was attended by about 300 molecular geneticists,
immunologists, biochemists and clinicians, ranging from infectious-disease specialists, clinical
oncologists to transplant surgeons. In addition more than fifty representatives of the genetic
boutiques and the large established pharmaceutical companies were present. Besides
Burroughs Wellcome and Merck Sharpe & Dohme, also relative newcomers showed interest
like Hoffmann-La Roche ('Roche'), the Schering-Plough Corporation ('Schering-Plough') and
Bristol-Myers Company. The latter had entered into commercial contracts with respectively
Genentech, Biogen and Genex not only as a means to develop interferon as a therapeutic drug
but also to acquire new technical expertise that could pay off even if in the end interferon itself
might never find a big commercial market.'" The growing involvement of the drug industry
'*' S. Hall, A Commotion in the Blood (New York: Henty Hold and Company, 1997), p. 184.
Weissman, interview; See, for a detailed personal account of the cloning of the gene for leucocyte interferon,
C. Weissman, The Cloning of Interferon and Other Mistakes', in I. Gresser (ed.). Interferon 3 (London,
Academic Press, 1981), pp. 101-134.
The public announcement, early in September 1978, of the cloning of the first medically significant human
gene to make human insulin hit the headlines and was said to open up a new and most exciting era in
biology, only added to the public interest for interferon: Victor Cohn, 'Scientists in California Create Gene to
Make Human Insuline', 7 September 1978, The Washington Post.
Interviews with Mathilde Krim, Joseph Sonnabend and Thomas Merigan.
' " The large drug companies had begun investing in genetic technology with the objective of protecting products
and markets from being undermined by the new technology and out of economical need for new growth and
above-average returns on investment; See. for a detailed account of dynamics of the industrial interest in
interferon; S. Panem, 77i? /nrei/f ron O u W e (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 25-8, 58-
74.
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and the major molecular biology laboratories that became manifest at this meeting marked the
move of interferon research to "big science', involving large-scale research programs. The 'small
fish' (interferonologists) who had taken on this line of investigation were increasingly eclipsed
by the team-led efforts of the leading industrial and academic research centers. Furthermore,
the intense industrial interest in interferon began to affect the relatively free exchange of
research information and materials in the field of interferon research. Certain previously
accepted norms of openness and exchange were no longer matter-of-course with the
development of commercially motivated forms of secrecy within the research community.""
In contrast to the 1975 Krim meeting, her second workshop went largely without
dissenting voices being heard and had the effect desired by Krim. It amplified the wave of
public enthusiasm regarding interferon. Without going into particulars, it is worth looking at
some of the latest data and concepts which were being presented, discussed or rumored over
the three-day period in New York and were particularly helpful in stirring the imagination of
the media and public at large.'"
After more than twenty years of scientific 'go slow' regarding the purification and
characterization of interferon, spectacular advances were being reported by biochemists
employing new sophisticated laboratory techniques like high-performance liquid chromato-
graphy (HPLC) and the so-called 'SDS polyacrylamide' gel electrophoresis. In fierce
competition a number of research groups not only claimed to have purified several different
human interferons to homogeneity but also to have determined their amino acid composition.
However, the chemical identity (or what many scientists still used to call "lack of identity") of
these proteins in terms of amino acid sequence was still the subject of considerable
speculation."'' At least the biochemical data strongly suggested the possibility that they were
" See, for a thorough analysis of ihe changing nature of the flow of research information and materials in
interferon research due to the growing interference between academic and industrial research activities: S.
Panem, 77i*r /n/ei/eron Cn«a<fe (Washington. D C : The Brookings Institution. 1984), pp. 75-81.
The following impressionistic account of the Second International Workshop on Interferons, April 22-24,
1979 at the Sloan Kettering Memorial Cancer Center in New York is based on: Anonymous, Can interferons
cure cancer? Lumrr. i (1979). 1171-72: T. Merigan. Human Interferon as a Therapeutic Agent. /VVM\ £n/?/. V.
Afei. 300 (1979). 42-3; K. Cantell. 'Why is Interferon not in Clinical Use Today?, in I. Gresser (ed.), /n/«/p-
ron. (London: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 2-28; J. L. Marx, Interferon (I): On the Threshold of Clinical
Application. Science, 204 (1979). 1183-6; J.L. Marx, Interferon (II): Learning About How it Works. Science,
204 (1979). 1293-95; A. Rosenfeld, 'If IF works it could...', July. 1979. LJ/<?. 55-62; J. Gutterman, e.a.
Leucocyte-interferon-induced regression in human metastatic breast cancer, multiple myeloma and malignant
lymphoma. Ann. Int. Med. 93 (1980). 399-406; F. Balkwill, What Future for the Interferons?, M-w Sc/cn/w/,
(1980). 230-2; and interviews with Sam Baron, Kari Cantell, Norman Finter. Robert Friedman, Mathilde
Krim, and Frank Rauscher.
The fact that interferon's chemical formula and structure had remained a mystery for more than 20 years is not
exceptional in the history biochemistry. We only have to compare it with the more than 30 years it cost to
produce insulin's or penicillin's chemical structure; M. Bliss, 77i<" Dwcovrry o/ /nsu/i'n (London: Faber and
Faber. 1982); G. L. Hobby, /»«i/ciV/in: Afrerinj; f'if Cfta//«i£f (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
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investigating a family of proteins. More than three different molecular forms of human
interferon had reportedly been characterized. This, in combination with the fear of the 'old-
timers' of interferon research to lose control of a field of research that was overwhelmed by an
invasion of immunologists, molecular biologists, tumor biologists and clinicians unfamiliar with
their means of communicating interferon research, provided an important incentive to devise a
new system for their nomenclature.'"
As of March 1980 the interferon research community would decide to abolish the old
terminology of Type I ('leucocyte' and 'fibroblast') and Type II ('immune') interferons in favor
of the type designations alpha, beta and gamma. Alpha and beta corresponded to what always
had been called Type I interferons, but helped to make explicit the knowledge that leucocyte
and fibroblast cells could each produce different sorts of interferons. The new naming also
enabled them to react swiftly to future claims of new interferon-like factors that were different
from current types by adding sequentially a delta, epsilon etc.'"'
Optimism was also expressed with regard to meeting the challenge of producing more
and cheaper interferon.'" Rumors abounded that several 'gene splicing' groups were on the
verge of cloning and expressing the human interferon gene in the bacterium £jcAeric/i/a co//
('E-coli')."' If successful, this was thought to open the way for producing unlimited quantities
of relatively inexpensive human interferon. At the same time, researchers from Wellcome Re-
search Laboratories had reportedly succeeded in piloting an industrial process based on
conventional fermenter technology for the mass production of human interferon from
continuous cultures of a specific line of lymphoblastoid cells, so-called Namalwa cells.'" After
Interviews with Charles Chany and Kathy Zoon.
Stewart et al. 'Interferon Nomenclature: Report from the Committee on Interferon Nomenclature', In Gresser
(ed.) /nrer/erun 2 (London: Academic Press, 1980), pp 97-9.
In 1979 virtually all the human interferon available worldwide was still supplied by the Finnish Red Cross.
Their production facility had an annual production output of 2.5 x 10" standard interferon units (roughly lg
of pure human leucocyte interferon), using leucocytes from 90.000 Finnish blood donors. The production
costs amounted to about 5 to 10 million dollars per gram. The Finnish supply of partially purified inlerferon
preparations ('P-IF, containing 10-20 million units per milliliter) only sufficed for annually enlisting 200 pa-
tients with neoplastic or other chronic diseases (employing a daily dose of 3x10* standard interferon units) in
clinical trials: Cantell. interview.
E-coli or 'the common lab's workhorse' was and still is widely used in laboratory experiments for bacteriologi-
cal and genetic studies. The bacteria originate from the intestines of humans and many animals; and
interview with Charles Weissman.
"* This particular human lymphoblastoid cell-line originated from a young Ugandan girl named Namalwa who
suffered from a fatal kind of African lymphoma (a Burkitt's tumor). A piece of her tumor taken for diagnostic
purposes in the early seventies was sent to and stored in George Klein's laboratory for tumor biology at the
Karolinska Institute. Strander and Cantell had figured out that somehow this particular cell-line not only grew
readily under laboratory conditions but also yielded high amounts of human interferon when induced with
Sendai virus. With their help the Wellcome researcher Norman Finter had been able to obtain a sample of the
Namalwa cell-line. Despite the knowledge that in the early 1960's the use of malignant cell lines for the
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initial concerns about product safety of this interferon prepared from a human cancer cell line,
regulatory authorities in Britain and America were expected to grant permission to start limited
clinical trials with this kind of interferon.""' Apparently the Wellcome interferon closely
resembled the common leucocyte interferon in chemical and immunological properties.
.,..-. Notwithstanding the fact that the ACS trial had only just started there were further
anecdotal reports about promising results with interferon in viral and malignant disease.
Warnings that none of the trials was large enough or suitably designed, and that the interferon
preparations had more side-effects than initially expected, could not prevent most participants
from becoming excited about the long-range possibilities of interferon both as an antiviral and
antitumor agent. According to one of the clinical researchers present it might turn out to be
one of the first natural products for use in human medicine, with an effect potentially as great
as that of the corticosteroids. The whole thing might still be dubious—'iffy'—but it was a
promising topic, if only one looked at the impressive number of laboratory data that had been
amassed regarding the molecular biology of the interferon system.
It is interesting to note that the question whether or not the bewildering array of effects
(cell growth inhibition, induction of a resistance to virus infections and regulation of immune
responses) could be attributed to one molecule, no longer aroused fierce debate. The once
popular argument that effects different from the antiviral activity were most likely due to
contaminants in the preparation was no longer taken seriously after several 'pure' interferons
had been tested in vi7ro and /« v/vo. Instead of the 'antiviral versus antitumor' type of
argument, the idea was gaining ground that the many diverse effects of the interferons were
related through common initial sites of action. No longer interferons were regarded as specific
production of vaccines had been forbidden for safety reasons—the risk that one or the other residual
biological agent in the preparation might induce cancer was considered too high—the Wellcome learn had
given it a try, but only after overcoming fierce opposition from management circles. Finter was able to
convince them that by employing state of the art purification and detection techniques—to get rid of all
suspicious biological material and in particular genetic material—and performing extensive animal safety
testing he would be able to persuade the regulatory authorities into accepting the final interferon product. The
doubts about the high investments associated with the safety aspects were taken away by pointing at the fact
that the lymphoblastoid cells had the great practical and commercial advantage over leukocyte cells that they
could be grown in continuous cultures on a very large scale using conventional and relatively cheap fermentor
technology. It turned out to be a lucky venture; Interviews with Kari Cantell Norman Finter, and John Beale.
Important in the change in attitude toward the use of transformed (tumerous) cells in the production of a
biologic like interferon. was the consensus achieved at the 1978 meeting at Lake Placid sponsored by the
United States Bureau of Biologies of the FDA that if such materials could be made nucleic-acid free cautious
initiation of limited trial in humans was warranted. Wellcome indeed claimed their interferon material to be
nucleic-acid free; and, T. Merigan, 'Human Interferon as a Therapeutic Agent, 77i« Afcw &i#/and 7ou/7ia/ o/
Merficme, 300 (1979), 42-3.
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viral inhibitory substances but as a kind of cell mediators or regulators, thought to modify and
mediate cell functions in various ways through mechanisms similar to those described for the
hormones, probably as part of the non-specific host defense system.
It was becoming fashionable to speak about interferon in terms of a prototype of a
'new' class of hormone-like cell regulatory proteins, biological response modifiers, which were
known to immunologists under the name 'cytokines'. In providing a rationale both for
interferon's versatile action in the test-tube and the patient, this concept of interferon had an
irresistible appeal to laboratory and clinical researchers alike. On the one hand, this concept
fitted the regular biomedical framework of drug/receptor interaction, despite the stated
difference between the polypractic interferon therapy and the 'magic bullet' oriented
conventional cancer chemotherapy. On the other hand it was considered a breakthrough that
promised to open up new fields of research and therapy.
The implied claims of a potential medical breakthrough regarding both virus and cancer
therapy at the New York meeting signaled yet another wave of public enthusiasm regarding
interferon. The popular media gave enthusiastic coverage of the potential of the 'natural drug'
interferon with dramatic lead paragraphs such as "If IF works it could ...be a vital weapon in
the battle against cancer, protect against viral and bacterial disease, provide a cure for shingles,
rabies, chicken pox, eye infections and prevent the common cold" or "Interferon: the promising
new drug against cancer"."" The interferon story had the drama of life and death, the horror of
dying patients, the awesome picture of decades of obscure and difficult research, the
dedication and persistence of a handful of scientists to produce minute amounts of a potential
life-saver. It had all the ingredients that journalists love to write and talk about.
Encouraged by Lasker, who more than ever before was putting all her political weight
behind interferon, Krim gave numerous interviews to newspapers and magazines appeared on
radio and TV programs, and she testified at the hearings on new developments in cancer treat-
ment before the House Select Committee on Aging in June 1979.'" Instead of committing
herself completely to interferon she presented interferon as a prototype of a new form of
cancer therapy that should be viewed as supplementing conventional treatments. This was in
line with her newly acquired status as member of NCI's Subcommittee on Biological Response
Modifiers that was set up to develop a comprehensive research program aimed at developing a
new generation of therapeutic drugs for the treatment of cancer. This so-called 'Biological
Response Modifier (BRM)' program resulted from a compromise between interferon
supporters who lobbied hard for a special interferon program aimed at purchasing as much
interferon as possible and study its efficacy as a cancer therapy and opponents within the NCI
"" A. Rasenfeld. If IF works it could... Z.i/c Mo,i;»;mc July 1979, p. 55: and F. Hauptfuhrcr. Will interferon kill
cancer? Finnish Dr. Kari Cantell is helping the world find out. People (US weekly), 2 July 1979.
"" K. Krim to 1. Gresser. letter dated 5 October 1978, Ion Gresser personal archive.
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who resisted against funding a short-term interferon-only-program.'*'
Krim's statement in American Congress reflected her indisputable political talents: '
I want to comment on how we foresee, today, interferon's place in the medicine of tomorrow. We believe that
as important as it may become, it is going to be one among many other hiologicals used....We do not think
that, in the treatment of cancer, interferon will be a panacea, the cure all. Rather, it is likely to be most useful
in conjunction with other treatments, such as surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy...'
There was a risk that temporary setbacks in work on interferon might put a premature end to
research support. Obviously, Krim wanted to reduce that risk by presenting work on interferon
not as a purpose in itself but as part of a new therapeutic approach that would help to
constitute a medicine of tomorrow. Having said this I have to add that at the same time Krim
was not scrupulous about promoting interferon on its own merits in discounting undesirable
effects produced by the administration of interferon. She presented them as temporary
shortcomings, though she did not go as far as Gutterman who boldly stated:
Interferon opens up a new form of cancer treatment which is non-toxic. There is no nausea, no vomiting, no
diarrhoea, or the other side-effects of chemotherapy...It is the most promising cancer lead we have""'
The ends seemed to justify the means. By wittingly suppressing available information on
interferon's side-effects—responses (in general reversible) as observed during interferon
treatment at the M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute included fever, nausea,
vomiting, lassitude, hairloss and bone marrow suppression (which, though less severe in
nature, resembled those experienced during conventional chemotherapy)—Krim and
Gutterman succeeded in further fueling the enthusiasm for interferon and mobilizing public and
private funds. "*
' " Minutes of the October 16-17, 1978 Meeting of the NCI's Division of Cancer Treatment Board of Scientific
Counselors, NCI Archives Volume I.
'** Pepper Committee Hearings, 77if Ca»rcr £<•«<•/-, dated 29 June 1979.
'*' Pepper Committee Hearings, 77«- Cancer Letter, dated 29 June 1979; and, NCI Memorandum, dated 21 June
1979, NCI Archives D-7906-3418.
Gutterman should have known better considering the paragraph on toxicity in his September 1980 article
dealing with interferon therapy. His non-toxicity claim is all the more remarkable when taking into account
Constance McAdam's article (she was at the time associate director of nursing at the M.D. Anderson Hospital
and Tumor Institute) in the American ./ourna/ o/ Wurrinj». She indicated that because of it's side-effects
patients receiving interferon required serious nursing assessment and close monitoring. Krim's silence is also
surprising when taking into account the following remark by Krim in a letter to Cantell. "Dr Oettgen has
started treating some patients at our hospital Altough he started at doses 10 times less than Levy and
Arthur Levine (remember?) say can be tolerated, he already found severe toxicity. particularly immediate very
high fever. He had to discontinue one patient"; K. Krim to K. Cantell, letter dated 21 May 1979, Cantell
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Following the hearings, the American Congress awarded additional funds to the NCI in
total 13.5 million dollar (about 3 percent of the annual NCI budget), specifically earmarked for
the BRM program but only on the condition that it would focus attention on interferon.'" The
news that the NCI was going to pour millions of dollars into interferon research and
production, and simultaneous public claims by Gutterman that 50 % of his cancer patients
showed remissions after interferon treatment, snowballed the flow of interferon-related
publicity: "A wonder drug in the making", "Potent protein; Medical researchers say the drug
interferon holds great promise", "Interferon: The body's own wonder drug" and "Race is on for
miracle drug".'**
Despite the sobering facts which underlaid the bold headlines, the frequent associations
of interferon with terms like 'medical breakthrough', 'cancer', 'wonder drug', and 'panacea' built
the foundation for a global interferon mania. In addition, the fact that interferon was extremely
hard to come by and costly, and the knowledge that no other biological substance could match
interferon's extraordinary biological activity, all encouraged the popular belief that interferon
must be highly effective. Most of these descriptions in the media were directly or indirectly
inspired by optimistic statements by interferon researchers, though they did their best to pepper
their public declarations with 'if, 'could' and 'might'.
The race to clone the interferon gene was fascinating in its own right; not because it
was one of the first medically significant human genes to be cloned nor because it proved that
genetic engineering had passed, as the Wallstreet Journal put it, "from science-fiction fantasy
to fact".'"'' Rather, it was the metaphor of a race in combination with both the promises of a
new and wondrous production technology and of a billion-do liar miracle molecule, that made
interferon so fascinating for the general public.""
personal archives; C. McAdams. Interferon; The Penicillin of the Future?, j4mrric°an ./oHnia/ o/Aftirang,
April 1980, pp. 714-7; J. Gutterman et al, 'Leukocyte lnterferon-induced Tumore Regression in Human
Metastatic Breast Cancer, Multiple Myeloma, and Malignant Lymphoma', /4nnak o//menia/ A/e<flcme, 93
(1980). pp. 399-406, p. 402.
Congressional inquiry received and answered by phone relating to interferon, NCI Archives No. 00-
78032816; In 1980 and '81, 80 percent of the BRMP funds would be allocated for studies of interferon; In
Background on Interferon. ACS News Service. NCI Archives No. 0000-001171; S. Panem. 77ie /nrerferon
C r a m * (Washington. D C : Brookings Institution, 1984). p. 52.
"* interferon: The Body's Own Wonder Drug', Sa/urd<ry Äevi'ew, 13 October 1979;'A Wonder Drug in the
Making', SU.SIHF.M Wpc/t. 19 November 1979; Hal Lancaster, 'Potent Protein; Medical Researchers Say the
Drug Interferon Holds Great Promise', 77i<? Wa/Asfreef 7ouma/. 6 december. 1979; The Race is on for Miracle
Drug'. 77if Ofecnrr, 30 December 1979; 'Interferon Trial: Early Results Promising', Afedi'ca/ WorW Ato«,
10 December 1979, p.27.
" ' Hal Lancaster, 'Potent Protein; Medical Researchers Say the Drug Interferon Holds Great Promise', The
Wallstreet Journal, 6 december, 1979.
This is nicely illustrated by a cover story of AteHweW; magazine entitled 'DNA's new miracles'; "By turning
hy y y gbacteria into living factories scientists can cure disease and create new forms of life"; /WH'SHeei, 17 March
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The euphoria reached a peak after Biogen and Schering Plough announced at a joint
press conference at the Park Plaza Hotel in Boston on 19 January 1980—skillfully orchestrated
to arouse media attention (see Fig. 51)—that through the use of genetic engineering the
molecular biologist Charles Weissmann and his team were the first to succeed in getting bacte-
ria to produce human interferon in biologically active form. While admitting that there were
still a lot of questions to be answered, Nobel Prize winner, Walter Gilbert, a Harvard professor
and chairman of the board of Biogen, predicted that within one or two years the mass
production of interferon for use in clinical trials would be feasible."'
Fig. 51. Charles Weissman delivers the news of the successful cloning of
the human leucocyte inierferon gene
and its expression in biologically active form
at a press-conference held at the Boston Park Plaza Hotel.
Reproduced with kind permission from the publisher.
But did this announcement really deserve the connotation "breakthrough'? For one
thing, the cloning of interferon had already been accomplished by a Japanese research team and
published in the Procee<i//ig.s o/f/ie Japa/i«e ^carff/nv a few months earlier.'**" In addition, no
one knew whether the engineered protein would behave in the same way as the natural one
192
1980.
N. Wade, Cloning Gold Rush Turns Basic Biology into Big Business, SciVncp, 208 (1980), pp. 688-92; S.
Andreopoulos, Sounding Board; and. Gene Cloning by Press Conference, The New England Journal of
Medicine, 302 (1980), 743-6.
T. Taniguichi. M. Sakai, Y. Fujii-Kuriyama, M. Muramatsu, S. Kobayashi, T. Sudo, Construction and
Identification of a Bacterial Plasmid Containing the Human Fibroblast Interferon Gene Sequence, Proc. Jpn.
Acad.55B (1979), 461-9.
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did. It was known that the bacterial cells were not programmed to add sugar molecules to the
interferon product as the human cells would naturally do. However, hardly any knowledge was
available about the biological function and effects of these missing sugar residues. Moreover,
the commercial significance of the news, with several competitors in the race to produce
human interferon, was far from obvious. Yet, the linkage between genetic engineering and the
possibility of manufacturing a promising anti-cancer drug sufficed to make journalists report it
as a 'breakthrough'. With a few exceptions they failed to ask critical questions that might have
helped to place the work, that had yet to be published in the scientific literature, in a critical
perspective."'
Both CBS and NBC led their evening newscasts with the latest promising news on
interferon. The next days and months the story appeared on the front pages of most American
newspapers and magazines, and others around the world—in France, Germany, Italy. Japan,
Great Britain, the Netherlands—ran major pieces on it."* The event was described by Nicholas
Wade in Sc/«ice in terms of a 'cloning gold rush' that turned molecular biology into big
business—with biotechnology stocks rising to record levels at the international stock markets.
Popular magazines talked about genetic engineering as the solution to the problem of
producing a 'priceless miracle drug'.""' Interferon became a hype.
Thousands of telephone calls overwhelmed the NCI, NIH and ACS switchboards.
Other cancer centers around the country and in Europe were similarly inundated with requests
for interferon. Countless desperate patients and their families were begging hospitals, doctors,
research centers and drug companies to provide them with the new wonder drug. Cantell, who
like Strander was widely portrayed in the media as one of the divine heroes of interferon
research, was literally besieged with requests for interferon from Europe, the US to Japan,
Malaysia and India—confronting him with the horror of hundreds of fatally ill husbands, wives,
relatives and children seeking a cure but also more benign cases like the following man: "I am
having the biggest health problem of my life. I am having cold sores in my penis....I beg you
help me...""* Even those familiar with the rage surrounding the development and testing of the
" ' N. Wade, Cloning Gold Rush Turns Basic Biology into Big Business. SciVnce, 208 (1980). pp. 688-92; S.
Andreopoulos. Sounding Board: and. Gene Cloning by Press Conference, The New England Journal of
Medicine. 302 (1980). 743-6.
"* 'Medical Breakthrough Reported', Z/« AngW« 7im«, 21 January 1980; 'L'interferon: Enjeu d'une Competition
Mondiale Scientifique et industrielle'. L<" AfonoV. 6 February 1980; 'Cancer Treatment Available Soon'. 77ir
Guardian. 20 march 1980; The Big If-interferon', 77w Zj.tf«i*r, 29 february 1980; 'Interferon Duurste Stof ter
Wereld'. 7W<\<>r«a/; The Making of a Miracle Drug. AfeMvuw*, 28 Januan 1980; and interviews with Kari
Cantell and Joseph Sonnabend.
" ' N. Wade. Cloning Gold Rush Turns Basic Biology into Big Business, Scienrr. 208 (1980), pp. 688-92; 'At
only $100 Million a Gram, This 'Miracle' has a Future', frirm-e Dig«/, April 1980;
"* For privacy reasons 1 can only refer to the letter files I have studied in Cantell's personal archives.
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'miracle' drug cortisone in the early 1950's had not seen anything like this happen on this scale
and with such vehemence.''"
The interferon mania only added to the media interest: "Wonder drug hope for miss
Anelli: Amazing case book of the wonder drug doctor", "Dad's wonder drug plea" and "Drug
brings hope for tumor boy 'Daniel'"."" Personification of scientific medicine and
disease—projecting the inherent benevolence of medical science on individual scientists,
doctors and patients—was a powerful rhetorical tool that journalists routinely employed but
which helped to maintain and intensify the interferon furore. Imagery replaced content in most
cases. Journalists eagerly reproduced the analogy popular among interferonologists comparing
interferon's move from the laboratory into the clinic with the long, obstacle filled road that
penicillin had had to travel from Fleming's laboratory to the pharmacist's shelf (see Fig. 52).'^
Between personal accounts and metaphor—the media continued to describe
interferon's versatile actions in the diseased body with the highly imaginative mixture of
militaristic and information metaphors (see Fig. 53), a balanced view of the pros and cons of
the actual technological-medical development and use of interferon was almost absent in the
story-telling. The main message was that of scientific progress and faith in the promise of a
medical breakthrough offered by current and future biomedical research.
All segments of society had a part in the hype. As Sandra Panem aptly portrayed the
situation: "scientists who genuinely believed that they were on the right track and that money
solicited at the expense of candour would be wisely used; investors and the public who wanted
interferon to be a wonder drug and did not choose to ask whether the claims might be
overstated; and those representatives of the media who reported anecdotes with unbridled
enthusiasm".-"" Until the Biogen announcement, the dramatic portrayal of interferon seemed to
work to the advantage of all, with enormous amounts of energy and money pouring into
efforts related to interferon in times of otherwise sharp financial cutbacks. However by the
spring of 1980 the interferon wonder began to show signs of decay. Confronted with the
stormy public reactions doctors, researchers and the medical authorities began to regard the
' " See, for a detailed account of the cortisone case; D. Cantor. Cortisone and the Politics of Drama. 1949-55, in
J. V. Pickstone (ed.), Afe/ira/ /nnovaf/on.s in W/rtorica/ Perspective (Houndmills: MacMillan. 1992), pp.
165-99; and interview with Norman Finter.
"* 'Wonder Drug Hope for Miss Anelli'. 5un</ay Mirror, 1 June 1980; Dad's Wonder Drug Plea'. Sunday
Mirror.8June 1980; and "Drug Brings Hope for Tumor Boy'Daniel'. 77if Dai/v 7V/f#rapn. 12 April 1980.
' " K. Cantell, Why is Interferon not in Clinical Use Today?, in I. Gresser (ed.), /nwr/i»ron, (London: Academic
Press. 1979). 2-28, p.3.
**" S. Panem. 77if /nftr/eron Cru ra l (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1984), p. 99.
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INTERFERON
The Penicillin of the Future?
Fig. 52. Lead article in the American Journal of Nursing /April 1980.
Reproduced with permission of the publisher.
Fig. 53. This diagram filled with an imaginative combination of
militaristic and information methaphors in the 77mr cover story
on interferon (March 3 1 , ! 980) was largely based
on Mathilde Krim's portrayal of interferon
as a kind of chemical Paul Revere.
Reproduced with kind permission of the publishers.
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hype as disturbing and problematic.
Every patient suffering from cancer or a severe virus disease wanted to have access to
a drug that was in short supply and had yet to be tested. A lot of distress was involved. In their
face-to-face contact with patients, doctors found themselves besieged by demands for a drug
that they could not supply, and frustrated by hopes of a cure they could not deliver.-°' At
centers where interferon was being tested everyone wanted to be in the trial and doctors had a
hard time explaining that nobody could or would be favored in their selection of trial
candidates. In order to determine whether interferon had any 'real' efficacy they had to work in
accordance with stringent testing protocols which implied that only patients meeting the highly
specific trial requirements would be allowed to participate. In addition, the doctors involved in
testing interferon feared that the high hopes of 'the chosen' could affect the scientific validity of
clinical trials—their test subjects's own enthusiasm for interferon and feelings after its administ-
ration might work against what was defined as 'objective benefit'.
Despite the fact that the excitements and motives of its own members had played an
obvious part in the hype, the medical profession swiftly left the media to carry the blame. Once
defined as a threat to the practice of medicine and professional autonomy, physicians on both
sides of the Atlantic started making public appeals for a moratorium on publicity about
interferon and in particular about ongoing clinical trials with interferon. They were openly
supported by the interferon community in their efforts to blame the journalists for raising
patient's hopes through irresponsible reporting.""" The primary concern of the
interferonologists was that the continued media frenzy, which had initially worked to the
professional advantage of interferon research, might in the end rebound to the discredit of
interferon research itself.*"
At the same time, medical research organizations like the NIH and the British MRC
and the Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF), drug regulatory authorities such as the FDA,
and health administrators, saw the public demands for interferon as a challenge to their
authority of drug evaluation, registration and supply procedures.""" There were worries that
private funding bodies and manufacturers would yield to public pressures to provide interferon
outside the formal testing channels and, even worse, that a black market for
*" 'Publicity on Interferon has Caused Great Distress', 77ie 77m«, 10 June 1980.
*" Editorial, What not to Say about Interferon', Afaftire, 285 (1980), pp. 603-4.
M. Edelhart, /n»er/eron: 77ie New / /ope/or Cancer (Reading (MA), Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1981), pp. 1-9; and, 'Interferon-The Hopes and the Reality, BAM A/eiw Äeview, September 1980, 18-22.
** Department of Education and Science to Sir John Eden (MP/House of Commons), letter dated 12 June 1980,
MRC Archives File No. S806/5.
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CASHING IN ON CANCER
tNCES, INC
: Street North
Fig. 54. Rcpon on Interferon black mark« in the Sunday Times
(November. 8 1981). Reproduced with
permission from the publishers.
interferon might develop (See Fig. 54)."'" The authorities realized that it was hard to explain to
patients suffering from cancer that there might be a more effective treatment in the pipeline,
but that it could not be generally available for some years until license procedures would be
completed, by which time he or she might be dead.""*
Distribution of the unlicenced drug interferon outside the approved medical trials was
not only believed to undermine the ongoing drug evaluation process but also the whole state
regulated drug testing practice—established in the 1960's to maintain certain quality and safety
standards."'" With the prospect of improving supplies it seemed even more difficult to resist the
public's disinclination to wait and make sure that all available material would be channeled into
the official trajectory of controlled clinical studies, required for the proper evaluation and
licensing of new drugs.""" Confronted with the desperate efforts of countless families and
A flourishing black market rapidly developed in often dubious interferon samples, fuelled by those rich,
famous and desperate enough to try anything like the dying film hero John Wayne and the exiled Shah of
Iran.
206 MRC to ICRF. letter dated 23 June 1980, MRC Research Archives File No. D1009/40.
Internal note MRC. dated 23 June 1980. MRC Archives File No. D1009/40.
Interviews with John Petriccianni and David Tyrrell.
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friends of cancer sufferers to obtain supplies of interferon at any price, the British Government
and the major funding bodies for cancer research in the UK decided to issue a joint press
notice in May 1980, cautioning against over-optimism and attempts at by-passing the formal
drug evaluation route."™
It can be no accident that, while doctors and authorities were struggling to cope with
what they regarded as mass hysteria about interferon, preliminary, unexciting results of the
American Cancer Society sponsored interferon clinical trials were announced at the annual
meeting of the American Association for Cancer Research. Whereas in February 1980 the
consensus of the chief investigators associated with the ACS study was still optimistic and
Gutterman's 50 percent response rate claim spurred on the ACS to allocate another 3.4 million
dollars for further study, by the end of May things had changed.*'"
The information made available cooled expectations by suggesting that interferon was
no more active than other available chemotherapeutic agents in treating breast cancer and
multiple myeloma. Moreover, contrary to what was hoped for (in particular by outsiders who
were sold on interferon as a non-toxic agent), side-effects were reported similar to those of
other cancer medications; the patient who responded best was said to suffer the most serious
side-effects such as abnormal liver function and even cardiac toxicity, and therapy had to be
interrupted.'" These results placed interferon in perspective, just like any of the many
substances being tested for antitumor activity.
Immediately following the premature release of the first ACS trial results the American
Society of Clinical Oncology, with the prominent oncologist Charles Moertel of the Mayo
Clinic as its immediate past president and spokesperson, took the unprecedented step of
issuing a strong warning against overexpectations for interferon."'" In a personal statement to
journalists Moertel emphasized that, while the jury was still out on interferon, cancer patients
should realize that cancer treatment was a complicated matter and the best thing a patient
could do was "get in the hands of knowledgeable cancer specialists and let them call the
*" Internal note MRC, dated 27 June 1980. MRC Archive File No. D1009/40; Press notice, dated 13 May 1980,
MRC Archives File No. D1009/40.
Interferon Results "Promising." ACS will Commit Additional $3.4 Million. 77ie Corner L*"Wr, 22 February
1980.
*" 'Interferon Results Cool Expectations', 7V Ca/irer Z^ner. 6 June 1980.
'Interferon "Hysteria out of Hand", Asco Warns Against Expecting Benefit', Tne Cancer i^r/er, 20 June
1980; This public warning on interferon by the American Society of Clinical Oncology should not be
mistaken, as Evelleen Richards did. for an organized opposition of established oncologists against interferon
as just another dubious immunetherapy; See, E. Richards, 'Vi7ami/i C and Cancw Af?</iri>if or PO/I'/ICI*
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 207.
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shots".*" In saying so Moertel articulated the worries of doctors about the eventual damaging
effects of public 'enthusiasm' on professional autonomy.
The redefinition of interferon as a potentially harmful experimental treatment with
uncertain therapeutic benefits proved effective in undermining its public image as a wonder
drug and put a lid on what Rauscher described as his continuing nightmare: "the unquenchable
desire for interferon by cancer victims"."''' The media immediately picked up the message with
headlines such as "Interferon: Studies put cancer use in doubt", "Is it a wonder cure for cancer
or the most expensive flop in history?".'" Unqualified optimism quickly shifted to the other
extreme by casting doubt on interferon's potential.
6.5 Conclusion
My intention here is to discuss the most essential features of the interferon crusade. The first
point that deserves scrutiny is the nature of opposition that Mathilde Krim, as self-appointed
lobbyist, initially faced in finding an audience in the U.S. receptive to interferon as an
antitumor agent, and the way she managed to overcome the resistance. Sandra Panem has
already identified some of the factors that worked against Krim: apart from being a puMc
wwwart in 'a man's world', Panem noted that Krim was regarded an outsider to the field of
interferon research, neither knowledgeable enough nor sufficiently critical about interferon.""
Among interferon researchers and the NIH bureaucracy there was anxiety that Krim, as Mary
Lasker's most dedicated disciple, might gain too much control over the course of interferon
research.
Another factor that figures prominently in my story is the tenaciously held view in the
field of interferon research that interferon was exclusively part of a nonimmunological host
defense system against viruses ('the interferon system'), thereby excluding the possibility of a
direct tumor-inhibitory effect. The idea that the action of interferon might be pleiotropic did
not seem to fit either the 'interferon system' consensus concept or the dominant 'biomedical
model' of specific etiology of disease. Nor did it fit the notion of specific therapy on which
most therapeutic drug research programs were based. Moreover, there were concerns about
V. Cohn, 'Leading U.S. Cancer Doctors Agree to Issue Warnings on Interferon', 7 V Was/img/on ft«/. 15
June 1980.
M. Edelhart, /«»pr/pron.- 77K> New Hope /or Cancer (Reading (MA), Addison- Wesley Publishing Company,
1981), p. 6.
H. M. Schmeck. 'Interferon: Studies Put Cancer Use in Doubt'. Afevt- rent 77m«, 27 May 1980: 'Is it a
Wonder Cure for Cancer or the Most Expensive Flop in History?. 77K" OaiVy 5/ar, 19 June, 1980.
S. Panem, 77r* /Wer/eron Crunufe (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1984).
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funding research with a poorly defined and impure substance for which a production and
purification technology had yet to be developed. < • _;J ;>:v
Krim nevertheless succeeded in managing the opposition effectively by involving
herself in a hybrid activity that combined elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with
large doses of social and political judgment. Without trying to reach agreement on the
controversial issues, she tried to address the common interests and characteristics of the
various parties involved. On the one hand she emphasized the mysterious elegance of using a
naturally occurring non-toxic substance, and on the other hand she underlined the fact that an
impressive body of laboratory studies legitimated the potential value of interferon in the
treatment of cancer. She properly valued the importance of linking basic research to clinical
problems: convincing scientists and policy-makers alike that correlating laboratory findings
with clinical findings seemed a perfectly straightforward goal in the case of interferon and
cancer. However her attempts at linking laboratory with clinical data were beset with
difficulties. In particular, the dispute arising over the exemplary status of Strander's trial data
and the way it was managed deserve further attention.
The controversy over Strander's trial data illustrates that acceptance of experimental
therapies in American clinical oncology hinges mainly on their evaluation by NCI-endorsed
evaluators and methods. Moreover, it unequivocally shows that treatment evaluations shift and
change in response to fluctuations in the balances of power in the context of evaluation. For
instance, whereas initially Strander's trial data were well received within NCI quarters,
gradually the mood changed with growing criticism of Strander for non-conforming behavior
regarding the design of the trial. I indicated with reference to the NIH trial-design statistics
that the critics were biased in their accusations. In my view, criticizing the Strander trial served
the interests of the increasingly powerful randomized controlled trial lobby within the NCI.
The outsider. Strander made a good target to plead their case and push the randomized clinical
trial as the ultimate means of applying the scientific method and the objective kind of
evaluation it supposedly entails to the practice of oncology.
However, as it turned out they underestimated the impact of Krim's consciousness-
raising efforts. Krim understood the importance of persistent political pressure and of the
transfer of negotiations about the value of interferon in the treatment of cancer increasingly to
public arenas outside the established biomedical order in America. By mobilizing the politically
powerful group of the 'Laskerites', Krim succeeded in upsetting the balance of forces for the
benefit of her 'interferon crusade'.
Once support was building in American cancer circles for interferon as a lead towards
anticancer therapy, it was coopted by a growing number of social groups. Apart from shared
expectations about interferon as the natural science-based solution to cancer, each group had
specific motives to jump on the interferon bandwagon: from the 'interferonologists' and the
advocates of immunotherapy, who came to realize that Krim's interferon crusade might be
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helpful in giving a new impetus to their research fields; to the genetic engineers, who were
looking for suitable demonstration projects to prove the commercial worth of the rDNA
technology. Moreover, the American Cancer Establishment was seriously under attack and
needed a scientific promise in their self-proclaimed 'war on cancer' to satisfy the growing
public demands for better (more effective and less 'debilitatingly' toxic) cancer treatments.
These political and professional interests, as well as consumer demands, thereby introduced
additional pressures that affected professional judgments of the effectiveness and risk of
interferon therapy. The interferon research community even went as far as to turn a blind eye
to the emerging issue of side-effects following interferon treatment in order not to stall the
interferon crusade.
An important institutional link in the network of relationships which developed around
interferon is the role played by the media. My analysis focuses on the active role the mass
media played as intermediaries between the scientific and medical community, the
pharmaceutical industry, government and the lay public. Examining interferon stories in the
British and American media, there is essentially one major script centering around the theme of
'promise and hope'.
Initially the media highlighted the dramatic curative potential of interferon against the
body substance which exerted its antitumor effects in a natural way, and at the same time as
the latest promising product of a laboratory-supported scientific medicine. Subsequently,
attention shifted to interferon as the most promising demonstration project of a revolutionary
production technology, genetic engineering. I described how, by blowing up the imaginative
combination of two wondrous products of modern science and medicine, the media helped to
trigger an international interferon mania. However, I would like to stress that, except for a
general tendency to reinforce and overstate interferon's promise, the media coverage of
interferon was for the greater part a mirror of the expectations, legitimations and opinions
circulating within the biomedical and public realm.
The intermediary role of the media is well illustrated by the drastic turn in the nature of
reporting in the course of 1980. For fear of the loss of control of the unexpectedly strong
public reaction to the interferon crusade and of the possible future backlash in the form of a
loss of authority and autonomy the international biomedical establishment launched its own
counter campaign. While local doctors and authorities worldwide were struggling to cope with
the interferon mania among patients and their families and friends, special news conferences
were orchestrated as a means to dampen public enthusiasm. The message basically was that
interferon as a non-toxic cancer wonder-drug was a myth created by the media, unsustainable
in view of the available scientific test results. Whereas before the side-effects associated with
interferon treatment had always been played down, now the very same side-effects were
emphasized to show that interferon was hardly any different in its toxic effects from other
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available cancer treatments. In a similar fashion as biomedical researchers had been overly
successful in seeking a favorable press, they managed to reshape the nature of the media
coverage of interferon. Following the dissemination of information specially designed to lower
public expectations, the nature of the stories in the press rapidly shifted from medical zealotry
in promoting interferon's benefits as a miracle drug to the other end of the spectrum: disil-
lusionment about a failed promise.
However similar to the cycle of promise and disappointment pictured in the
introduction, the course of events in the case of interferon turned out to be far less
straightforward. Moreover, as I will show in the next chapter the most common dead-end
scenario of experimental cancer remedies would not materialize.
299
Chapter 7
The Final Twist: Marketing Interferon as a Helpful Neighbor'
7.0 Introduction
"When it comes to clinical trials, few issues are simple. And many are controversial" wrote the
SciVnce correspondent Gary Taubes in 1995.- Taubes's dictum seems to be at odds with the
public model of controlled clinical trials as a most helpful tool to relieve medical practice of
that most feared element known to scientists and regulators: subjectivity. Are most doctors
and regulators who firmly believe in randomized controlled trials as the key to an 'evidence
based medicine' mistaken? Given an ideal world without social, professional and economic
interests affecting judgments of the efficacy and risks of medical therapies one might have
answered 'no'. It is impossible, however, to conceive of such a trial taking place in a human
vacuum. Conducting clinical trials involves establishing links and commitments between many
different individuals and organizations, including clinicians, laboratory researchers, patients and
their families, regulators and last but not the least the drug companies. In being shaped by the
specific context of medical practice, clinical trials—even the most sophisticated randomized
controlled trials—as I already have shown in chapters five and seven, are not value free
measuring devices that objectively evaluate the efficacy of new therapies. Like any other
medical device associated with our daily lives randomized clinical trials incorporate the beliefs
and ideas of the persons and organizations who developed them and then are molded by those
implementing the methodology.'
The euphoria surrounding interferon as a possible cure for cancer appeared short-lived
A preliminary version of chapter 7 was published in rfte ßriVis/i A/«//ra/ Vourmi/: T. Pielers. 'Marketing
Medicines Through Randomised Controlled Trials: the Case of Interferon, BMA 317 (1998), 1231-3.
" See, G. Taubes, Use of Placebo Controls in Clinical Trials is Disputed. Sci'enee. 267 (1995), p. 25.
A number of case studies dealing with post-war therapeutic research and development in medicine, which
were published in the 199()'s. support the view that therapeutic evaluation is an inherently social and cultural
process: See, E. Richards. Wwmm C and Cancer; Mfrf/Vinc or Po/i/ics (New York: St. Martin's Press.
1991); R. Vos, Drugj Looting/or Diseases, /nnovafive Dr«£ /fesearc/i ««</ f/ie Devf/o/wienf o///if ße/a
B/ociert onrf f/ie Ca/Wum Anr<ig<>ni'.s/.f (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1991): A. Clarke and T.
Montini, The Many Faces of RU486: Tales of Situated Knowledges and Technological Contestations,
Sci>n«\ 7V<7ino/o£V «/id Human Va/«e.s, 18 (1993). 42-78; N. Oudshoom. Zfeyo/irf r/ie /Va/ura/ ftxftv
/Ue/ieo/o&v o/ Sev Hon;io«e.s (New York: Routledge. 1994); I. Löwy. ße/ireen ßenc/i und BnfcM'
(Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1996); and. H. M. Marks. Hie Proj?r«.i o/ Etner/men/;
Science <wid 77iera/>eu«c Äe/omi in f/ie fni'fed S/«(es, /9Ö0-/990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
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and faded when it turned out that both interferon's performance in large scale cancer trials had
been disappointing and often produced side-effects in patients. Given intense disappointment
with what by 1983 became dubbed 'the miracle drug looking for a disease', it might come as a
surprise to hear that interferon would ultimately succeed in finding a niche in clinical practice.
This then brings us to the question what gave interferon's biography a different turn from most
other therapeutic promises in the treatment of cancer (which ended up on the laboratory shelf)
and how did it become naturalized as part of medical practice?
In an effort to understand the processes by which new medical therapies are evaluated
and put into practice, this chapter explores the complex events shaping the therapeutic value
and clinical use of interferon as a new type of immunotherapeutic drug. The final part of the
book's narrative provides an exemplary case to illustrate the complexities surrounding the
application of clinical trials. I shall focus on how clinical trials make for a dialectical process of
knowledge production—with the pharmaceutical industry playing center field.
In response to the drastic turn in the nature of reporting, Mathilde Krim and her staff
wrote a letter to the New For/: 7Ym£j, warning against the negative effects such qualified
reporting might have on the public support of a field of research that sooner or later might
provide society with a new immunotherapeutic approach of human cancer. As I will show in
the first part of this chapter the core argument in this letter—emphasizing the unique property
of interferons to enhance the activity of the body's own defense mechanisms—can be
understood as an attempt at developing alternative strategies to legitimate work on interferon:
picturing interferon as part of a promising new but experimental therapeutic approach in the
future treatment of cancer and viral infection.''
7.1 Beyond Interferon
At the first annual International Congress for Interferon Research in Washington, DC, in
December 1980—organized by an American advertising and marketing company on behalf of
the publishers of the Jowraa/ o//nte//<?/wi /tesea/r/i in part to publicize the inauguration of the
journal—the achievements of the molecular biologists aroused most excitement.'' While several
teams of biochemists were working day and night to purify interferon to homogeneity and
produce its chemical formula and structure, they were, as the American biochemist, Pete
Krim and her scientific staffs letter in the Afctv Kortt 7rni« was a direct reply to Harold Schmeck's article of
24 August in the very same newspaper: See, M. Krim. W. E. Stewart U, F. Sanders. L. Lin, 'Interferon
Therapy, New York Times, 17 June 1980. p. C5.
According to a 7/Uf4 reporter the conference had an air of "upstage scientific excitement and backstage
financial intrigue"; R. Johnson, 'Interferon: Cloudy but Intriguing Future', .MAM, 245 (1981), 109-16, p.109.
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Knight, expressed it "run over from behind by the cloners".*
An indirect research strategy to determine the structure of natural proteins commonly
employed by biochemists was to try synthesizing the entity from pure amino acids on the basis
of available structural data. When a substance was synthesized that matched the biological
activity of the purified natural entity the structure of the natural protein might then be matched
(though a tremendously sophisticated series of additional experiments would still be required
to reach final agreement on its chemical structure). However, interferon appeared too complex
a molecule for this approach to be successful.
What the several competing teams of molecular biologists basically had done was to
beat the biochemists by genetically engineering micro-organisms that did the synthesizing job
for them7 In addition, the newly developed laboratory tools to engineer and decode DNA
molecules provided the genetic engineers with the technical means to "read and write in the
language" of the genes." It was a laboratory exercise that helped to reconstruct the protein
structure from the DNA sequence of what was considered the gene coding for human
interferon.
At the Washington meeting there were numerous displays with sequences of interferon
DNA and derived amino acid structures. Together with the presentation by the molecular
biologist Charles Weissmann of a slide with the first photograph ever shown of—what had
always been considered a vain hope—highly purified crystals of alpha interferon, this promoted
interferon to the tangible world of chemical facts (see Fig 55). The prospect of the mass
circulation of unproblematic samples of crystalline interferons was expected to incite a
considerably larger scientific public to use these molecules as a fresh starting point for their
research. However appealing, the excitement was to a greater extent related to the claims of
Biogen and its competitor Genentech that they both had succeeded in creating new, hybrid
interferons by cleaving and rejoining ('recombining') pieces of two different interferon genes.
According to Weissmann this was the first time that proteins had been engineered in this way,
resulting in a new kind of biosynthetic interferons with unique biological properties.
* E. Knight. 'Purification and Characterization of Interferons', in I. Gresser (ed.), /nfei/mm 2 (London:
Academic Press. 1980), 1-12, p. 2.
Having succeeded in this effort by creating interferon-producing bacteria, the cloners began isolating and
sequencing the 'interferon DNA' with its genetic message encoded in permutations of four nucleotides bases
(the bases Adenine, Thyminc. Cytosine. and Guanine). Reconstruction and analysis of the A-T-C-G sequence
of the 'interferon DNA' was thought to allow for the deduction of the sequence of amino acids in the protein
for which it coded and thus interferon's chemical structure—each amino acid was known to be coded for by a
triplet of bases. In practice the interpretation of the sequencing data—deriving the protein structure from the
nucleotide sequences—was far from straightforward. See for the historical reconstruction of the cloning of
interferon; C. Weissmann, 'The Cloning of Interferon and Other Mistakes', in I. Gresser (ed.). //»cr/Vron ^
(London: Academic Press. 1981), pp. 101-34; and S. Hall. ,4 Common'»« in r/i<> S/oorf (New York: Henry
Holt and Company. 1997). pp. 178-208.
Interview with Sidney Pestka.
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Fig. 55. Photomicrograph of inierferon «2 crystals.
Courtesy of Dr. C. Weissmann
Genetic engineering, so he argued, could in this way be used to "create an unending array of
'unnatural' interferon molecules".'*
The claims of the molecular biologists can be understood as an attempt at showing the
drug makers and the public that there was more to interferon than just a demonstration project
of a promising new technology. It should be viewed not only as a test case of a new
production technology but also as a pilot project for a new approach to drug development. In a
similar way as the chemists were routinely involved in engineering an endless array of
pharmacologically active chemicals, the molecular biologists would offer their expertise to
drug makers to synthesize, modify and test new biosynthetic molecules. While the
representatives of biotechnology firms began 'advertising' interferon as a means to establish an
additional method of drug development, other interferon advocates increasingly legitimated
See , R. Johnson, 'Interferon: Cloudy but Intriguing Future', ,MA*4, 2 4 5 (1981) , 109-16 , p. l 15.
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work on interferon as part of a promising new multi-modality approach, in the treatment of
cancer.
Most interferon researchers emphasized that cancer was too complex a disease to allow
for a comparison between the search for a cancer cure and the development of wonder cures
against polio or bacterial disease. In the case of a highly differentiated illness as cancer it would
be better not to think in terms of overall cures, but rather of treatments. The consensus view
was that though as a single agent interferon might turn out to be medically more useful in
treating viral infection, ultimately it might prove most valuable as part of the increasingly
popular multi-modality approach in cancer treatment. They claimed that attaining this end and
learning how to use interferon, would require a further expansion of basic and preclinical
investigations as well as clinical studies.'"
Clinicians and laboratory researchers alike conveyed the impression that with more
questions than answers they were just beginning to explore the potential of interferon, not as a
single substance but as a large family of biologicals. So far more than ten different interferon
molecules were claimed to circulate worldwide. The diversity of interferons with distinct and
complementary biological activities seemed to grow every day." According to the interferon
researcher Frances Balkwill in a 1982 progress report in the popular British science magazine
T/76 Atew Scien/isf': "It is clearly going to be difficult to know which interferon to use for any
particular treatment or what combinations of "cloned" alpha interferons will be most
effective".'*
Interferons were said to make up a new modality of cancer treatment in acting not as
chemical toxins, directly on the tumor cells, but as biologicals through activation or modulation
of key elements of the body's immunology system. They could be used as biological
enhancers—helping to increasing the host's own response against the tumor—in conjunction
S. Krown, 'Prospects for the Treatment of Cancer with Interferon', in J. Burchenal and H. Oettgen (eds.).
Cancer; Mr/iiVvemen/.s, CAa//en«fs. and /Vojperte/or //ie /WWi (New York: Grune & Stratton. 1981). 367-
79; R. Johnson, 'Interferon: Cloudy but Intriguing Future'. MAM, 245 (1981), 109-16; P. Newmark.
Interferon: Decline and Stall, Ata/ur?, 291 (1981), 105-6; M. Sun, Interferon: No Magic Bullet Against
Cancer, SriWirc. 212 (1981), 141-2.
Biological Response Modifiers Program Review during the February 1981 meeting of NCI's Board of
Scientific Counselors, minutes of the Board, dated 12-13 February, NCI Archives; R. Johnson, 'Interferon:
Cloudy but Intriguing Future'. MAM. 245 (1981), 109-16; P. Newmark. 'Interferon: Decline and Stall'.
ATafur<>, 291 (1981). 105-6; M. Sun. 'Interferon: No Magic Bullet Against Cancel". Science. 212 (1981), 141-
2; Due to the high degree of species specificity of interferon. the drug industry depended on monkeys for
preclinical studies of the biosynthetic human interferons (basically aimed at proving that a preparation was
active and non-toxic in vivo). As head of the Dutch Centre for Primate Research, Huub Schellekens played a
central role in the preclinical testing of the first r-DNA produced human interferon preparations; H.
Schellekens et al. 'Comparative Antiviral Efficiency of Leukocyte and Bacterially Produced Human Alpha
Interferon in Rhesus Monkeys', Mtfnr<>, 292 (1981), 775-6.
F. Balkwill. Interferon: A Progress Report', /Ww 5ci>nfuf, 25 March 1982, 783-5, p. 784.
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with the three main cancer therapies: surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation. The NCI publicly
singled out its program on interferon and other biological response modifiers (BRM) as "most
exciting" in terms of benefits to be expected for future cancer treatment."
In the opinion of the immunologist Louis Epstein of the University of California, San
Francisco, the success of interferon therapy ultimately depended on the ability to forge further
links between the laboratory and the clinic. She claimed to have developed a methodology in
her laboratory which, if further elaborated on, could separate out those people whose cancers
had the best chance of responding to a particular interferon. Her approach might make it
possible in the future to individualize cancer treatment. She envisioned clinical oncologists
sending tumor samples to her laboratory in order for her to figure out the susceptibility of a
specific tumor to interferons and other compounds. This would enable the doctors to account
for the problematic individual variations among their cancer patients.'*
The overall message, was as a science reporter of the WosAing/on Posf aptly expressed
it in his headline, "Beyond Interferon"." By creating an image of interferon as a prototype of a
promising, new, but still poorly understood, area of cancer therapy known as
immunotherapy—one that was going to have an important role in future cancer practices—the
promoters of interferon had succeeded in establishing a more permanent base for support.
Despite the growing public scepticism in the light of emerging stories about the
iatrogenic consequences of interferon treatment and the rather disappointing response rates in
the ACS-sponsored trials using Cantell interferon, the interest in interferon as part of a fourth
modality of cancer therapy, known as 'immunotherapy', was on the rise. American cancer
treatment centers that aspired to maintain an image of being at the cutting edge of the field of
clinical oncology could not afford nor to study an experimental therapy that was closely linked
with the latest developments in tumor biology and molecular biology."" In these centers great
pressures were often exerted on practitioners to develop close relationships with the
laboratory, to conduct preclinical and clinical research, and to enrol as many patients as
possible in clinical trials." Clinical oncologists were used to side-effects and overall low
National Cancer Institute Program on Interferon and Other Biological Response Modifiers, dated October
1980, NCI Archives File No. AR-80OO-OO732O; 77w> Cancer /Vewi/ener, 24 April 1981. p. 1.
M. Edelhart. //ifer/eron: 77ie /Vetv Wopf/or Cancer (Reading (MA): Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1981), p. 49; L. Epstein, Interferon as Model Lymphokine, Fed. Proa, 40 (1981). pp. 56-61; B. Feder,
Technology; Complexities Cloud Interferon. 77ie A/etv Kent 7imej. 23 April 1981; Epstein, interview.
" C. Fenyvesi, 'Beyond Interferon', 77ie WWiingron ft«/, 14 June 1981. p.28.
Interview with Ernest Borden.
See, for a detailed account of the development of what liana Löwy dubbed the 'trialist ethos' in clinical
oncology; liana Löwy, 'ßenveen Benr/i and Bedside' (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1996),
pp. 36-83.
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response rates in their day-to-day therapeutic practices. The mere knowledge that interferon as
a scientifically endorsed experimental therapy reportedly produced clinically significant
antitumor activity in a limited number of patients suffering from a variety of highly problematic
tumors, sufficed to give it the benefit of the doubt. Stephen Sherwin, an American clinical
oncologist, put his colleagues feelings aptly by stating: "Interferon may not be the wonder drug
it was expected to be, but it may reduce tumors in specific cases. We have to give it a try"."
Only the relative scarcity and impurity of interferon preparations withheld them from
pursuing interferon research more actively. However, as soon as the more pure and homogene-
ous rDNA produced interferons became more widely available in the course of 1982 (see Fig.
56 a,b,c), a growing number of American and European clinical oncologists got themselves
involved in preclinical and clinical testing." Their testing 'zealotry' was hardly affected by the
news in November 1982 that four cancer patients out of eleven in a Paris Hospital had died
from a heart attack while being treated with French alpha-interferon."" Following the French in
their decision to stop only the trial in question, Robert Oldham, head of NCI's BRM Program,
played down the significance of the tragic event. Thus far in American studies there was no
evidence that interferon had ill effects on the heart. Most likely the fatal-incident was due to a
problem with the manufacture of the French interferon or it might also be possible that the
patients involved already had serious heart conditions before the trials began.''
At the January 1983 meeting of NCI's Board of Scientific Counselors Oldham did issue
a warning that although biologicals like interferon were natural products this did not
necessarily mean that they were non-toxic. In the same breath he called interferon one of the
more active new agents tested in the last several years, perhaps just below the level of the most
successful chemotherapeutic agents and recommended further clinical testing. Even if
interferon treatment had been officially associated with cardiac toxicity it is unlikely that the
clinical testing would have stopped. Going by the reaction to cardio-toxicity problems
involving experimental cancer drugs in the early 1980's, the NCI would have confined itself to
sending letters to doctors across the country warning of the heart toxicities of interferon and
'* C. Fenyvesi, 'Beyond Interferon', 77u? Wa.s/im f^on Pa«, 14 June 1981. p.28.
" Minutes of American Society of Clinical Oncology, 18th Annual Meeting. St.Louis, Missouri. April 25-27,
1982, NCI Archives No. 8204-001971: K. Sikora and H. Smedley, 'Interferon and Cancer'. Bn'fw/i Atafica/
7ou/7ia/, 286(1983). 739-40.
* R. Walgate, 'Side Effect Scare Hits French Trials. Wow«. 300 (1982), 97-8; According toa February 1983
ACS press release interferon was one of the most studied natural substances in medicine, "as researchers
explore its benefits, potentials and limitations"; Interferon Update ACS, dated 11 february 1983. NCI
Archives DC-8301-006691; See. on overzealous treatment practices;'Cancer a Progress Report', Newsweek, 2
November. 1981.
*' France Halts Interferon Study, 77* Afew J*w* Tim«, 4 November 1982.
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Fig. 56a. A piloi plant for the 'mass production" of interferon by
genetically-modified bacteria (1982).
Reproduced with permission from the publisher.
Fig. 56b. Interferon is routinely harvested from
genetically-modified bacleria in vast tanks (1984). Re-
produced with permission from the publisher.
Fig. 56c. The production-line for clinical trial inter -
feron at Biogen. Reproduced with permission from
the publisher.
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advising limited use in patients with a history of heart problems.*"
High risk:benefit ratios were and still are part and parcel of the culture of cancer
treatment. Severe side-effects from experimental drugs had become an accepted part of life in
most American and European cancer treatment centers. The treatment-related mortality rates
ran from as high as 10 percent for experimental regimens combining for instance radiation and
aggressive chemotherapy to between 2 and 5 percent in established, non-experimental
chemotherapy regimens."' To fully understand the situation, we should take a glimpse at the
world of cancer patients and doctors. According to the 1979 ACS' statistics only 33 percent of
Americans who got cancer would be alive five years after diagnosis and treatment."'' This
meant that for the majority of cancer patients death was inevitable. In this world, doctors,
trained to healing and frustrated by the frequent experience of being unable to deliver a cure,
were prepared to go to any extreme if patients, for whom no other hope seemed to exist,
allowed them to. At the same time most patients, in a desperate effort to avert their 'death
sentence', were willing to try almost anything in the hope of a cure or at least a postponement
of their death. In this context it is hardly surprising that institutes for cancer research like the
NCI or cancer treatment canters placed treatment side-effects second to potential benefits.
Potential for beneficial effect was considered as sufficient basis by NCI's Board of
Scientific Counselors to agree to an expansion of clinical studies and to pursuing the combined
modality therapeutic approach in September 1983."' The apparently unremitting optimism
within NCI quarters contrasted with the growing scepticism about interferon's potential among
senior executives in pharmaceutical companies. Of the twenty or more firms which had
announced their intention of investing in interferon development back in 1979, a growing
number ceased work on interferon over the period of one year, namely during 1983. They had
either lost out in the 'cloning race' or management had negatively assessed interferon's potential
both as a therapeutic drug and as a means to attract capital investment from the stock
markets."' Apart from the disappointing cancer trial data there were also growing doubts about
interferon's potential as an antiviral agent. The expectations—fueled by the latest reports from
the Common Cold Unit at Salisbury that nasal sprays of alpha interferons markedly reduced
the occurrence of colds in volunteers—about opening up the commercially interesting niche
T. Gup und J. Neumann, 'Experimental Drugs Cause Pain, Deaths', 77if &M/on Sunday G/ofee, 18 October
1981.
"' See, S. Rosenberg, 77ie 7Va/ts/onn«/ CW/ (London: Phoenix, 1992), pp. 236-7.
"•* See. R. W. Moss, 77w Cancer Wuj/ry (New York: Paragon House. 1991). p. 22.
"' Minutes of NCI's Board of Scientific Counsellors meeting, dated 27-28 January 1983, NCI Archives.
"*" T. Powledge. 'Interferon on Trial', Bio/TecnHo/ogv, 2 (1984), 214-28.
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market of common cold prevention were dashed with the latest news about its side-effects."
Even at low-dosage levels interferon appeared to induce side-effects similar to the symptoms
responsible for most of the miseries of the very same cold that it was supposed to prevent. "A
single high dose of zinc may do just as good a job at substantially lower cost", was the scathing
judgment of the science correspondent, Joseph Alper, in 77»e New Kor* 77/ne.y.**
In the boardrooms of the three 'interferon champions' that had most heavily invested in
the therapeutic substance—Wellcome and, most notably, Roche and Schering-Plough,
interferon's lackluster clinical performance in treating tumors as well as virus infections was
reason for growing concern."' The company officials responsible for investment in interferon
had a hard time defending the costly interferon research and development (R&D) programs.
However, they succeeded in convincing the sceptics in the managements that although
interferon might not be a 'magic bullet' in itself, it had enormous potential as a prototype of a
new generation of custom designed biosynthetic drugs that was expected to generate a
therapeutic revolution. They presented it in terms of the unique possibility of learning to tap an
entire medicine chest of new drugs from natural substances within the human body. Unlike
most chemical drugs these genetically engineered biologicals could be viewed in their 'natural'
(physiological) role as regulators or modifiers of a variety of pharmacologically interesting
biological mechanisms. They argued that in order to develop these biosynthetic molecules as
therapeutics, new testing methods and procedures would be needed to effectively bring them
to the clinic. For instance, since human interferons were only active in humans and monkeys
researchers were forced to do the unusual and skip most of the preclinical animal testing and
go straight into humans to determine a toxicological and pharmacological profile.
However different, work on biologicals at the same time was argued to be easily
integrated into the current system for drug development based on tinkering with molecules as a
means to create variants with most optimal pharmacological characteristics in terms of
risk:benefit ratios. The promise of scientific and therapeutic innovation appealed most to senior
drug company executives who were less worried about today's profits than about tomorrow's
prospects. With patents on most of the top prescription pills expiring by 1990 and with an
unprecedented small range of chemical compounds in various stages of development in their
laboratories, ready to take over as money-making Cblockbuster') products, drug companies had
come to recognize that a new wave of innovation was needed to position themselves for long-
'Million Dollar Cold Cure', 77if 5u/i</a> 7I»IM, 3 October 1982, pp. 22-30; and, G. Scott et al, 'Prevention of
Rhinovirus Colds by Human Interferon Alpha-2 from Escherichia Coli'. Lan«T ii (1982), 186-7.
"* J. Alper, 'First there was Interferon', 77if M>iv y«r* 7mi«, 18 November 1984, F. 13.
In 1983 Hoffmann-La Roche and Schering-Plough reportedly allocated 15 percent of their research
budgets—more than 40 million dollars each—to interferon; T. Powledge, 'Interferon on Trial',
Bio/7>c7ino/o&y, March 1984, 214-28; and inteviews with Norman Finter and Leon Gauci.
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term survival."
However, those responsible for the interferon related R&D programs were not able to
get round the iron business rule of profit generation. The pressure for return on investments in
interferon research and in production facilities for the first genetically engineered interferon
products (Schering-Plough's homogeneous interferon alpha-2 and differing by only one single
amino-acid, Roche's homogeneous interferon alpha-A preparation) and Wellcome's 'natural'
interferon product—containing the full spectrum of alpha interferons produced by cultured
human cells—did force the interferon advocates within the companies to adapt their R&D
strategies. In line with government supported research programs, the pharmaceutical industry
focused on interferon as part of a new kind of disease management: immunotherapy within a
muhi-modality treatment framework. Apparently the drug companies recognized the strategic
and commercial importance of taking advantage of the more general move across medicine
towards combination therapy."
7.2 Naturalizing interferons as biological response modifiers and cytokines.
However, the drug regulatory authorities found the combined-modality approach difficult to
assess as their evaluative practice and standards were still governed by a single-agent therapeu-
tic philosophy. For interferon to be considered legally as a new therapeutic drug, it had to be
officially evaluated as a single agent. This implied that before licensing procedures could be
taken into consideration, the companies had to look for a disease, rare though it might be, that
justified a need for interferon. Moreover, under FDA regulations each interferon variant was
considered a new therapeutic drug and should be independently evaluated.'"
In search of suitable diseases as candidates for interferon as a treatment, the drug
companies actively supported clinical trials to evaluate the effects of interferon on as wide a
variety of diseases as possible (see Fig. 57). They offered clinical investigators world-
wide—free of charge—large quantities of their interferon products. Interferons were tested
T. Powledge, interferon on Trial', BI<J/7VC7IHO/<>£.V. March 1984. 214-28; A. Wycke,'Molecules and
Markets', The Economist, 7 February 1987.; and interviews with Leon Gauci and J. P. Warbeer.
Interviews with John Petricciani and Leon Gauci.
Interviews with John Petricciani, and Leon Gauci; See, for a similar cases of drugs looking for diseases: R.
Vos, Dru^s ZxK>Jti>i#/or D U A M « . /nnoranV« Drug rejearcA and r/w DevWopmen/ o/fftc /tera fi/orifrs and
rhf Ca/r/um •A/i/aflom'jtt (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991); N. Oudshoom. /tevond fA<"
Mirura/ fiot/v: <4rWi?fl/o#v o/Sf.t //oraion« (New York: Routledge. 1994).
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Fig. 38. Record from clinical trial with Hoffmann-La Roche's
recombinanl alpha-A Interferon, showing a
patients blood levels of inlerferon Reproduced with permission
from the Publisher.
for hepatitis B, various lymphomas, colds, breast cancer, prostatic cancer, multiple sclerosis,
herpes keratitis, malaria, AIDS (as soon as the epidemic began to manifest itself around 1982)
and many other diseases related to cancer and viruses. The drug companies mounted one of
the most intensive clinical trial programs ever set up to evaluate a new pharmaceutical agent.
In the first three years (1982-1984) the recombinant interferons alone were tested in over 4000
patients."
By the end of 1983 the large-scale testing efforts finally showed signs of paying off.
Spurred by Strander's chance observations at the Karolinska Hospital in Stockholm, alpha
interferons were also tested on patients suffering from papilloma virus associated non-
cancerous tumors ('warts'). The warts ranged from being a cosmetic problem or undergoing
spontaneous regression to being life-threatening. The greatest interest in the use of interferon
had been in connection with genital warts ('Condomyloma Acuminata') and a less common but
'Interferon May Help AIDS Victims', A/fw Sr;>n/;j/, 3 November 1983; 'Interferon Tested on Sclerosis', 77ie-
M-M' Kor* 77me\s, 21 November, 1981; and. N. Finter and R. K. Oldham (eds.). Interferon (vol4); In Vivo and
Clinical Studies (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1985); 'Update on Interferon', News Service American Cancer
Society, dated 11 February 1983, NCI Archives File No. DC8301-006691; and, 'Intron A', press information
video tape produced by Schering-Plough in 1986 on the occasion of the market introduction of their interferon
product.
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potentially life-threatening form of wart named 'laryngeal papillomatosis', located in the
respiratory tract, particularly of children. This represented a serious clinical problem due to the
tendency of the wart to recur and obstruct breathing. Some patients required surgery as often
as every 2 months. Responses to interferon treatment were claimed to be of long duration in at
least fifty percent of the patients suffering from these warts and so far the risk:benefit ratio
looked promising. None of the studies was controlled yet but large controlled trials were
underway.-" However encouraging for the patients and the doctors involved, the drug
companies paid initially more attention to the research news coming from the field of clinical
oncology. As this was more likely to open a window into a commercially interesting family of
disorders and medical specialty."
Drug company officials swung into action as soon as the news broke in the autumn of
1983 that Gutterman's research group had achieved a higher than 80 percent trial response to
'natural' alpha interferon therapy (with Finnish Red Cross material produced by Cantell) in
patients with a rare form of chronic leukemia known as 'hairy-cell leukemia' (so-called because
of the 'hairy' appearance of the malignant cells).'* The knowledge that there was hardly any
viable treatment for this form of cancer with estimated mortality rates of about 15 percent per
year, sufficed for those looking for a suitable disease indication." They seemed to take for
granted the fact that among clinical oncologists scepticism prevailed about the overwhelming
efficacy claim by Gutterman and his team, who had earned themselves a name for over-
optimistic interpretation of their interferon trial data." Since the successful hairy cell leukemia
trial was performed with the relatively impure (less than 1 % pure) and therefore pharmaceuti-
cally problematic Finnish alpha interferon product, the companies's first priority was to
demonstrate that the dramatic clinical effect could be reproduced with their own 'pure'
interferon products. Following extensive clinical testing they ultimately succeeded in their
efforts. Consequently licence applications for what both Schering-Plough and Roche dubbed
"the world's first anticancer interferon" were sent for evaluation to among other drug regula-
B. G. Leventhal. Treatment of Virus-associated Tumors and Papillomas with Interferons', in N. Finter and R.
Oldham (eds.), /n/fi/eron (voMj; /n Vivo and C/iniraf 5ru</i>s (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1985). 326-35; and
interviews with Kari Cantell and Hans Strander.
" S. Hall, /t Commorion m //w fi/cux/ (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 203-5.
" J. Quesada, E. Hersh and J. Gutterman, 'Hairy Cell Leukemia: Induction of Remission with Alpha interferon'.
B/ood, 62 (1983), 207a.
" J. Quesada. J. Reuben, J. Manning. E. Hersh and J. Gutterman. 'Alpha Interferon for Induction of Remission
in Hairy Cell Leukemia, Af. En«/. 7. Mfd., 310 (1984). 15-8; and interviews with Leon Gauci. and. John
Petricciani.
" T. Powledge, 'Interferon on Trial', Bio/TVcnno/ogy. March 1984, 214-28, p. 227.
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tory agencies the FDA."
In having closely monitored and guided the proceeding of interferon trials throughout
the years the FDA's Office of Biologies Research and Review (OBRR) had built up conside-
rable expertise in evaluating both 'natural' and biosynthetic interferons. The questions of
identity, purity, potency and safety featured very prominently in the frequent interactions and
negotiations between the OBRR and all those interested in obtaining the license "Notice of
Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug" (IND) that allowed for clinical trials with
a particular interferon. First, the question of identity was related to the taken for granted
concept of interferon as a family of proteins and corresponding genes. Interferon was made up
of at least three different types, each being made up of multiple subtypes, each of which might
have different effects on the body. Every interferon product made by a different method,
manufacturer, organism or interferon clone could in principle be different from one another.
Each biosynthetic variant, even if it differed from another interferon by only one amino acid
was considered a distinct protein and likewise had to be evaluated independently under FDA
regulations. There were more questions than answers to this complicated issue. Second, the
question of purity was hardly less problematic. For instance, genetically engineered interferon
products which were claimed to come close to 100 percent purity presented additional
purification concerns such as the presence of unwanted bacterial contaminants or of altered or
aggregated interferon species (due to gene mutations) which may be either non-functional or
antigenic. Compared to this, the third question of interferon potency was a relatively
unproblematic matter which was dealt with on a consensual basis during the successive
standardization conferences in the late 1970's. Finally, the safety question was coped with in
terms of a benefit:risk ratio assessment on a case-by-case basis. Since, as OBRR senior staff
member Petricciani argued there was nothing absolute to say about safety of experimental
drugs in the clinical research setting.'"'
The test procedures required by the OBRR before any experimental clinical use had
evolved in parallel with the development of new interferons and new production methods.
Changes in the procedures represented the emergence of a new consensus on what was
39
'Anticancer Interferon Available Soon', Hospital Doctor. 22 September, 1983; In contrast to interferon
products which were still in the investigational stage and limited in their clinical use (phase I.II,III testing),
licensed products which would be available for general commercial distribution and use by the medical
profession must meet a variety of extra regulatory requirements, at least in the United States, as prescribed by
the Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) provisions and the General Provisions for Licensed Biologicals
(GPLB) Code of Federal Regulations; J. Petricciani, E. Esber, H. Hopps and A. Attallah, 'Manufacture and
Safety of Interferons in Clinical Research', in P. Came and W. Carter (eds.), /nter/ijro/ir a/u/ f/iWr j4p/>/ica/i-
onj (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1984), 357-70. p. 359.
A. Hecht, 'Interferon: Trying to Live Up to its Press', FD<4 Conju/ner, June 1981; and, H. Hopps, K. Zoon, J.
Djeu and J. Petricciani, 'Interferons for Clinical Use: Purity, Potency and Safety'. In N. Finter and R. Oldham
(eds.), /n/erfcron fvo/4>; /n Vivo am/ C/im'ra/ Sfm/i« (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1985), 121-33.
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acceptable and counted as "state-of-the-art testing"."" To facilitate the learning process and
secure the interferon researchers's cooperation, Kathy Zoon who had an important part in the
work that led to purification of the human interferons was assigned as interferon expert to the
OBRR and subsequently to the interferon licensing committees. She played a key role in
evaluating the preclinical and clinical volumes of data on the various alpha interferon
preparations presented by the respective companies and in reaching a judgment on whether
each individual product reached an acceptable level of safety, quality and efficacy. The FDA
was able to secure approval for the company's product licence applications for hairy cell
leukaemia within only one year of their initial submissions in the spring of 1985. According to
FDA Commissioner Frank Young the direct involvement of "bench scientists" like Zoon had
proven to shorten the official review and approval process by at least half a year." However,
there is more to say to the relatively short review time then only crediting the close involve-
ment of expert scientists for this achievement.
By the time the interferon applications were filed the unconditional support of FDA's
mandate on drug regulation legislatively set by the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962
following the thalidomide tragedy, was eroding. The FDA was confronted with an increasingly
intense lobby for relaxation and fastening of its drug approval procedures by a novel coalition
of the pharmaceutical industry and consumer groups. Historically the organized consumer
movement in America had always played an important role in the further tightening of
regulatory requirements and product liability laws as a means to safeguard the public from
injudicious trial and marketing of new pharmaceutical products. However, in the context of the
American AIDS epidemic consumers showed that their support of stringent regulatory
arrangements was not unconditional. In particular, if they perceived the regulations as slowing
down the availability of promising experimental treatments for urgent disease conditions such
as AIDS. The industry in turn had always sought to protect its position by politically
highlighting the problem of stifling innovation through what they considered as an over-
rigorous bureaucratic system of controls.'" In an effort to silence the critics reduction of the
average review time—which in 1977 still averaged more than two years—was given priority
status within FDA quarters.'" Thus, interferon came to serve as a high visibility show-case of
Interviews with John Petricciani, and Kathy Zoon. and, H. Hopps. K. Zoon. J. Djeu and J. Petricciani,
'Interferons for Clinical Use: Purity. Potency and Safety'. In N. Finter and R. Oldham (eds.), //i«r/i?ron
fvo/4);/n ViVo and C/mi'ca/ S/u<ftrc (Amsterdam; Elsevier, 1985), 121-33.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, news announcement, dated 4 June 1986. NCI Archive No.
8606-001949; Editorial. Interferon Drugs Join Cancer Fight'. C/ini'ca/ /Viarmarv. 15-3-1986.
See, P. Temin, 7a*ins ft>ur Ma/irinr (Cambridge (MS); Harvard University Press, 1980); E. Richards,
Vitamin C ana" Cancer: Jtfafü-ine or ffo/jfict (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), pp. 58-9 and 224-5.
See. P. Temin. raii'n« four Wfrficmf (Cambridge (MS): Harvard University Press. 1980). p. 143.
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the FDA's increased efficiency and its decisiveness to act in the case of a medical 'urgency'.
On June 4, 1986, the FDA and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
staged a joint press-conference to announce the swift licensing of biologically engineered alpha
interferons to treat a rare leukemia for which there had been no effective therapy. The event
showed that the FDA too had learned to capitalize on the power of the media. The FDA's
spokesperson Young hailed the development and approval of interferon as "a milestone, a
promise of what will be coming in the future"/' Thus Young showed that interferon had also
become a priority test-case of what he subsequently referred to as "a second revolution of
pharmaceutical innovation, akin to the discovery of antibiotics in the 1940's".''* By investing
heavily in establishing state-of-the-art testing procedures for biosynthetic biologicals like
interferon, FDA officials tried to anticipate on an expected explosion of biosynthetic
therapeutic agents emanating from the rapidly expanding bioengineering R&D programs in the
international drug industry.'"
It is interesting to see that Wellcome with its non-recombinant 'natural' IFN product fell
by the wayside. In most western countries like the USA Wellcome's natural alpha IFN 'cocktail'
(with the brand name Wellferon) met with difficulties from the regulatory authorities except for
Britain, the home market for Wellcome products. Asiatic countries—which historically do not
oppose heterogenous pharmaceutical preparations because of a different therapeutic drug
culture—had hardly any problem accepting the IFN cocktail. By the time the FDA put aside its
doubts about Wellferon, Wellcome decided that with the market already flooded with Roche's
and Schering-Plough's rDNA produced IFNs it was no longer commercially interesting to
apply for a product license.**
In the meantime the therapeutic development of interferon had helped to spawn a
spectacular investigative enterprise. This included numerous academic, federal and industrial
research programs, the Jouraa/ o/ /rttez/eron /tesea/r/j and the formation of the International
Society of Interferon Research. Going by the growth in the number of papers published each
year with the word 'interferon' in their titles from about 800 in 1980 to more than 3000 in the
year 1987, the field experienced an information explosion—in terms of new knowledge of
cellular mechanisms of immunity and of new immunological explanations of the biological
*' 'Interferon Licensed to Treat Hairy Cell Leukaemia', Atew SciVn/itf, 12 June 1986.
F. Young. The Reality Behind the Headlines', In FDA Anonymous, New Drug Deve/opmenr in »he (/rufet/
Sta/e* (Rockville (MD), 1990).
Interview with John Petricciani.
** Interview with a Dutch Glaxo-Wellcome worker who prefers not to be identified; Kari Cantell's Finnish
leucocyte interferon 'cocktail' met with the same difficulties from the drug regularity authorities: H. Hage,
'Controlerende Instaties Moeten Soepeler Worden met Interferon', roege/xu/e HWenn'nap 77VO, Oktober
1986.
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effects of interferon.""
The fact that the accumulation of knowledge based on laboratory data was of relatively
little practical help to clinicians using interferon treatment at the bed side was not regarded as a
failure but instead was used to advertise interferon's unwieldy and complex nature as part of an
intricate system of checks and balances. This so-called cytokine network, was said to
constitute a key part of the body's natural defenses. The complexity of the cytokine
interactions was argued to complicate interferon's study in the test tube as well as its clinical
application. Researchers maintained that additional knowledge of these interactions was
needed to improve or optimize the use of biological response modifiers or cytokines like
interferon. The questions piled up but there were few satisfactory answers. Did all interferons
have the same or different functions within this network? Which interferons should be tested
first clinically, on what diseases and how? Was it justified to start from maximum tolerated
dosage regimens knowing that more not always appeared to be better with these substances?
Would combination treatment indeed add up to more than the sum of its parts? Interferon
advocates called them difficult substances to work with, far more complex than traditional
therapeutic drugs. As a justification for their research efforts they kept emphasizing that
interferon generated intriguing research horizons. It was claimed that work on interferon
provided a window both onto biological processes at the molecular level and new approaches
to the treatment of disease.'*
Laboratory and clinical researchers alike stressed that the clinical potential of
interferons would be enhanced by further investigation and understanding of the molecular
mechanisms underlying the effects of interferon in patients. The solidarity implicit in both their
emphasis on the importance of linking biomedical research at the cellular and molecular levels
to clinical interventions as part of what became known as 'molecular medicine', stemmed from
shared interests in the maintenance of credibility and funding." Disappointing as well as
successful clinical results could be used by bench scientists to claim that further basic research
was mandated. At the same time clinical researchers were able to defend their poor results by
referring to the slow progress in the understanding of the underlying mechanisms by which
interferons exerted their biological effects both in vi/ro and in vivo. Achieving occasionally
high response rates at the bedside, however rare the disease condition, seemed to justify the
•* See. for the annual number and titles of interferon-related publications the Dindi data base. Cologne.
'" S. Baron, F. Dianzani, G. Stanton and W. Fleischmann (eds.). 77ie /n/er/iron System: A Currtn» Äf view ro
/9S7 (Austin. TX: The University of Texas Press, 1987); S. Baron et al. /n/f//<?ron: Pr/nap/« and Mfdira/
App/irarion.9 (Austin. TX: The University of Texas Press. 1992); C. Wallis, 'What's become of Interferon'.
7i'me, I June 1985; F. Balkwill, Interferons: From Common Colds to Cancer, Afeiv SciVnritf. 14 March 1985.
pp. 26-8; F. Balkwill. Cvrofcines in Cancer 7forapy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
"' See, for a focus on what constitutes today's molecular medicine the website
http://www.isinet.com/prodserv/focus_on/fo_mmfrm.html.
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further expansion of both preclinical and clinical research. Nonetheless the actual expansion of
interferon related activities was largely dependent on the support and coordination of the
pharmaceutical industry.
During the transition to the large-scale production of genetically engineered interferons
laboratory scientists and clinicians had become increasingly dependent on the industrial
infrastructure. By possessing the key to the material resources and research materials the
companies began to play a central role in structuring the development of interferon."
Laboratory scientists were encouraged to deploy the new techniques of molecular biology,
cellular physiology and biochemistry in the search for additional natural occurring molecules
that might provide genetic blueprints for the development of these future therapeutic drugs."
Moreover, by providing a new powerful research tool, unlimited quantities of pure crystalline
interferon, the research community was stimulated in efforts to investigate the underlying
molecular mechanisms of interferon's actions.** At the same time clinical investigators were
encouraged to start experimenting in humans with this first representative of a rapidly growing
family of clinically active biologicals, the so-called 'biological response modifiers' or 'cytokines'.
The impression was conveyed that participating clinicians would stand out as pioneers of a
new era of disease treatment."
In 1986, once the FDA, swiftly followed by other regulatory agencies, licensed Roche's
and Schering-Plough's recombinant alpha IFN products for the treatment of hairy cell
leukemia, the marketing branches of the companies worked hard to create a need for
interferon."' In order to interest health care professionals in the new area of interferon therapy
and to convince them of its scientific character, Hoffmann-La Roche and Schering-Plough
established freely accessible electronic data bases (e.g. Schering-Plough's /CCW), specific
journals (e.g. Roche's Progress ;'n Orcco/og)', Progress in V/'ro/ogy and /n/er/i?rons 7b</ay awJ
Tomorrow), and financed medical book publications (e.g. Schering-Plough sponsored the
Interview with Leon Gauci; and, L. Gauci, 'Interferon Drug Development: A History Truely Consistent with
the Discovery Process', paper presentation at the International Meeting From Clone to Clinic, March 1990,
Amsterdam; R. K. Oldham, 'Interferon: A Model', in I. Gresser (ed.), /n/er/eron 6 (London: Academic Press,
1985), pp. 127-41; D. Barnes, 'Biologies Gain Influence in Expanding NCI Program', SciVnc*, 237 (1987),
848-50.
" A. Foerstner, 'How We Make Our Own Wonder Drugs'. CVi/'cago 7>ifcu/w, 20 January 1985.
** H. Johnson et al, How Interferons Fight Disease, 5c/«in/ir American, May 1994,40-7.
'Interferon in Prospect', A three-part film series from Schering Corporation, USA, that was made available in
1983 to clinical investigators all over the world.
' Interview with Leon Gauci.
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publication of /wter/e/w« in Cancer 7>e-a/men/)" The way in which the companies presented
interferon by means of a combination of visuals and narrative to doctors, decision-makers and
journalists in the specialist-press drew upon the same range of images that had influenced the
public perception of interferon through the mass electronic and print media; framing interferon
both as a natural occurring substance in the body and as a state-of-the-art product of modem
science and technology.
Optimizing response rates seemed to be the explicit aim of virtually any clinical
research project dealing with interferon.'''' Except for hairy cell leukemia (response rate higher
than 80 percent), clinical researchers involved in testing interferons claimed response rates
anywhere between 10 and 50 percent. The problem and advantage of using percentages was
that success appeared to be a highly ambiguous term. Overall response rates ('efficacy')
resulting from clinical studies under controlled circumstances might look promising, even when
it remained unclear what this actually meant for individual chances of success and how well a
treatment might perform in everyday clinical practice ('effectiveness').'" Regardless of interpre-
tation, however, response rates remained invariably low in most diseases, suggesting that it
could help only some of the patients some of the time.
Under normal disease conditions this kind of negative scientific assessment would
dissuade doctors from applying a therapeutic drug. But, as I mentioned before, in
circumstances where there is no hope for a cure, the rules of the game appear to be different
for doctors and patients alike. In diseases in which successful treatment is rare, seeking
treatment through medical intervention is a gamble which can have few winners. Gambling is
an alluring analogy for all parties as it turns poor clinical results into acceptable chances,
H.C. Thomas, F. Cavalli. and M. Talpaz (eds.) Thirty Years of Interferon', /n/fr/frons 7bdav an</ 7bmo/rovr.
5 (1987) (This journal is published by Mediscript. London): H. Kirchner ( ed.). 'Update on Interferons',
Pro^/ros in Onfo/ogv, 2 (1986) (Abstracting journal published by Mediscript. London); H. Kirchner (ed.),
'Update on Interferons', /Vogrejs in Vi'ro/ogy, 1987; 1 (Abstracting journal published by Mediscript,
London): H. K. Silver (ed.), /nrfz/eronj in Canrer 7>«jfmenf (Mississauga: Medical Education Services
(Canada) INC, 1986); ICON or Interferon Communication Network was established in 1980 by Schering-
Plough. In 1988 Icon contained about 15000 items related to interferon which had been selected by a group of
5 physicians payed for by Schering. The Schering team produced their own abstracts of the papers and on
special request customers could obtain the original publications; and interview with C. v. Helsen.
P. E. Came and W.A. Carter (ed.). /nrei/mms am/ rn«'r App/icafions (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1984); C.
Pinsky (ed.), 'Biological Response Modifiers', Srmi/iars in Onco/oj;v. 13 (1986), pp. 131-227; D. Parkinson
(ed.). The Expanding Role of Interferon-Alfa in the Treatment of Cancer', Seminars in Onco/ogv, 21 (1994),
1-37.
My distinction between effectiveness and efficacy is derived from clinical epidemiology; See, S. Pocock,
C/inic-a/ 7nab (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1983).
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Fig. 59. The following subscript was added lo this picture in the Scientific
American (May 1994): "Lela Rector of Marion, was a winner in an
unusual lottery last year. After a form of interferon-beta gained approval
for treating multiple sclerosis in July 1993. demand far exceeded supply.
So the distributor. Bcrlex Laboratories, held a lottery for some 67.0(K)
qualified patients. Rector, who drew number 109. was among some 30.000
pepole reportedly in treatment by March 1. 1994. The other registrants are
expected to have access to the drug by the end of this year".
allotting responsibility for failure to bad luck rather than medical or other capacities (see Fig.
59)«'
In 1986 the Dutch interferon researcher Huub Schellekens predicted that interferon
would be used more widely in ten years time than might be expected on the basis of the
approved list of indications because of the psychology of interferon as a potential 'multi-drug'
from common colds to cancer.*"' Schering-Plough and Roche of course fully endorsed this
perceived mechanism and were keen to turn this into a self-fulfilling prophesy. They hoped that
if they were able to show that interferon as a cytokine enhanced—even if marginally—the
efficacy of routine and semi-routine therapies for problematic cancers and chronic virus
diseases, the molecule could become a commercial success as an auxiliary immunotherapeutic
drug. They therefore actively promoted trials and investigator's meetings that would evaluate
the possible synergism between interferons and various conventional therapies. At the same
time they began marketing interferon as part of the comprehensible though open-ended (in
terms of number of factors involved and nature of interactions) cytokine network (see Roche
illustration). In the process the Roche sponsored journal /«/e/fe/ww 7bda.y and 7b/nor/-o»v
See, for a similar kind of phenomenon in the treatment of reproductive disorders in women: J. Van Dyck,
Atoiu/acmrmg BaW« and Pufc/ic Comenr (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 124.
See. for interview with Schellekens; 'Intron A', press information video tape produced by Schering-Plough in
1986 on the occasion of the market introduction of their interferon product.
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changed its name into /nte//<?ron.y a/id Cytofcines, while 77ie /rtfematt'wia/ Sociery /or
/n/^ff(?ro« /terearc/i became 7ite //iter/ian'owa/ Soc/e/y/or /nter/<?ro« am/ Cyfo&z/ie
and the official journal of this society became the 7oMma/ o/Znter/eron am/ Cyto&j/ie
by 1995."
With the relentless support of the drug industry and patients in desperate need for a
cure, and through the combination of scientific drive and professional ambition, most notably
clinical oncologists and infectious disease specialists continued to work on the trial design.
They tried different combinations (e.g. in combination with cytotoxics or a combination of
various biological response modifiers) and different routes and durations of administration." In
doing so, they ultimately tinkered toward success in terms of establishing new therapeutic drug
practices for interferon and actively working on the treatment's effectiveness. Although
superior treatments for the treatment of hairy cell leukemia became available—and have largely
replaced the use of interferon for this indication—interferon as an adjunct to other therapeutic
modalities became part of the routine treatments of a growing number of major malignancies
such as non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, multiple myeloma and kidney cancer. In the 1997 Cancer
C7iemo//ierap_y //a/idboo/: interferon can be found under the separate heading 'Biological
Response Modifiers' (though in actual clinical oncology practice the term 'cytokine' prevails)
with emphasis on the differences (in administration, dosage regimens and mechanisms of action
as immunomodulating agents) from other cytotoxic therapeutic drugs in use in clinical
oncology and on combination treatment as the greatest promise for successful therapeutic
application.*** Moreover, by 1997 interferons as therapeutics had been approved in the U.S. for
use against eight different diseases, including genital warts, Kaposi's sarcoma, several forms of
hepatitis, malignant melanoma, and multiple sclerosis. The latest approval, which occurred on
11 June 1997 for use in conjunction with chemotherapy in patients with follicular lymphoma,
shows that over the years the FDA had changed its attitude toward combination therapy.*'
Interferon, almost given up on in terms of having a role to play in medicine by business
analysts, the press, the public, scientists and doctors alike in the early 1980s, has become
According to an editorial by Ronald Penny the new journal title reflected the real breadth of focus in this ever
expanding field. In his view the number of factors involved grew "almost at the rate of action of the cytokines
themselves": R. Penny, /n/erfrroiu and Cv/o*i>i«. 15 (1990), 3.
C. Pinsky (ed.), 'Biological Response Modifiers'. 5fmjnan in O/ico/ogv, 13(1986). pp. 131-227; D.
Parkinson (ed.). The Expanding Role of Interferon-Alfa in the Treatment of Cancer". Si/ninar? in O/uo/o&v.
21 (1994), 1-37; R. Stuart Harris and R. Penny. Clinical Applications of the Interferons (London: Chap-
man&Hall Medical. 1997).
D. Fischer et al, 77if Cancer CTirmornerapv //am/fcoot (fifth edition) (St. Louis: Mosby, 1997).
See. for FDA product approval information on biologies the FDA Web site: www.FDA.gov/cber/e-
foi/approve.htm and www.FDA.gov/cber/establish.htm.
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exemplary not only for a new generation of biosynthetic drugs but also for the health benefits
that result from advances in molecular medicine. Fueled by a potent combination of scientific
drive, professional ambition, marketing efforts and a lot of hard work between 'clone and
clinic', interferon was transformed from a so-called 'orphan drug' for a rare terminal disease
into a billion-dollar molecule that was used in the treatment of a wide-variety of ailments. The
world-wide market for interferons—the whole spectrum of alpha, beta and gamma type
interferon products—expanded from $13.6 million in 1986, to $751 million in 1992, to $1.57
billion in 1993, down to $928 million in 1995 and up to an estimated $1.2 billion in 1998 (see
Fig. 60) ."
The widespread application of interferon as an effective medical commodity seems
almost beyond dispute; the need for it appears to be a premise, rather than a contestable
assumption. As a consequence, opposition to interferon therapy currently revolves less around
questions of need than around questions of cost or economic feasibility, which increasingly
dominate the political agenda of 'marketplace' medicine. As the chapter on economic aspects of
interferon in the 1997 book 77ie C/in/ca/ App/icaf/o/tf o/f/je //tfer/e/w« shows, economic
Fig. 60. Reproduced with permission from the publisher.
According to December 1997 /Viarma SiMi'npjj Signa/s (Competitive Intelligence and Strategic Issu-
es/Trends).
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and commercial considerations, are easily linked with medical discourse and therefore are
difficult to separate from medical arguments showing the necessity for interferon treatment."
7.3 Conclusion
The last paragraph on economics nicely illustrates that shaping therapeutic drug practices is
not exclusively a medical or scientific affair. To think so would deny the multiple links between
science, medicine and society which have been made manifest in my description of the
development and dissemination of interferon as part of a new therapeutic approach in the
treatment of cancer and viral disease. Of course, in order to become part of the therapeutic
armament of doctors, interferon had to meet scientific standards of what constituted legitimate
evidence for efficacy. But does meeting those standards suffice to explain the exponential
growth in the clinical use of a variety of interferons?
As far as the spokespersons of the pharmaceutical companies are concerned it does.
The growing market for interferon treatment is claimed to be a 'natural consequence' of a
growing need of doctors and patients ('consumers') who apparently regard the new drug as a
valuable asset. The growing range of therapeutic effects, so they argue, reflect the need for
interferon. However, if there is one thing the interferon crusade can teach us, it is that the
equation of need and the widening of the pharmacological spectrum, is a logical fallacy. The
need for interferon was never 'simply' there. Likewise, the development and dissemination of
interferon, was never a self-evident, inevitable process.
This brings us to the question how did interferon become naturalized and legitimized as
part of medical practice? First of all, confronted with the erosion of public support for the
interferon crusade, attempts were made to develop alternative strategies to legitimate work on
interferon. Instead of the presumed non-toxic nature of interferon, its perceived unique
capacity as a biological to act through the immune system was used to attract attention.
Moreover, interferon was presented as having an important advantage over conventional
therapies: it linked the clinics to advanced laboratory research in tumor biology, molecular
biology and immunology. I dubbed the rhetorical strategy that proved effective in establishing
a more permanent base for support 'beyond interferon': picturing interferon as a first step in the
development of immunotherapy—a promising new therapeutic approach in the treatment of
cancer, that was going to constitute a medicine of tomorrow.
Second, regardless of whether optimism or the opposite extreme prevailed, the media
paid homage to the perceived mysterious polypractic healing power of this natural body
A. Shiell and G. Salkeld. The Economic Aspects of Interferon'. In R. Stuart-Harris and R. Penny (eds.),
C/iniai/<4p/>/it-a/ion! o/rfo /nf<?r/<?ro7u (London: Chapman&Hall, 1997). pp. 376-90.
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substance. The panacea image that was attached to interferon continued to appeal equally to
defenders of medical orthodoxy and advocates of unorthodox cancer remedies. However alien
to a medical practice that was dominated by the theory of specific etiology and the notion of
specific therapy, interferon had an irresistible appeal to laboratory researchers and clinicians
alike. It was the promise of a new flexible immunological approach to disease which might
make it possible in the future to individualize disease treatment through forging further links
between the bench and the bedside. I argued that speaking about interferon as a prototype of a
new class of hormone-like cell regulatory proteins with the unique property to enhance the
body's own defense mechanism, the so-called 'biological response modifiers', provided a fruitful
scientific rationale not only for interferon's versatile actions but also for NCI's decision to set
up a special Biological Response Modifier (BRM) research program.
Third, by 1980 strong links had formed between interferon research, the booming field
of molecular biology and private industry. Powerful commercial, institutional and professional
interests had become aligned with what was considered a major show case of the newly
developing biotechnology industry and its revolutionary rDNA technology. During the
subsequent successful transition to large-scale production of interferon, the international
pharmaceutical industry, which was seeking to position itself for long-term survival through
scientific and therapeutic innovation, became the most dynamic and strategic actor of all those
involved in work on interferon. In achieving a key-position in the distribution of research
resources and materials, the pharmaceutical industry increasingly dictated the development of
interferon. However dominant there role in structuring interferon's biography, for the profiling
and marketing of interferon the drug companies were largely dependent on their ability to enter
into cross-fertilizing relationships with laboratory scientists, clinicians and regulatory bodies.
By picking up and refining the broadly based cytokine network concept in such a way
that it served the needs of all those involved, the drug makers anticipated the successful
integration of interferon into medical practice. However promising in scientific and commercial
terms, the combined-modality therapeutic approach of interferon as a cytokine met with
resistance from drug regulatory authorities. As I pointed out, the official international drug
regulation practice was still largely governed by a substance thinking dominated therapeutic
philosophy.
In order to legally consider a pharmacologically active compound as a new therapeutic
drug it had to be officially evaluated as a single agent. This implied that before licensing
procedures could be taken into consideration the companies had to look for a disease that
justified a need for interferon. With most trial responses to single-agent interferon therapy
comparing unfavourably with drugs already available in the clinic, the industrial interferon
program managers faced the seemingly Herculean task of establishing an unambiguous
justification for clinical use.
As a final point, I will analyze how the search for suitable disease candidates through
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clinical trials became a growth industry in its own right, which played a central role in
transforming the interferons into the therapeutics as we know them today. In the previous
chapter I showed that by being simultaneously sites of scientific research and medical care
clinical trials do more than just evaluating the safety and benefit of new drugs. In serving as
bridges between bench and bedside they connect a diverse assortment of actors: biomedical
researchers, physicians, cancer foundations, pharmaceutical companies, patients and
regulators. These diverse parties face the difficult task of participating in scientific research and
at the same time making decisions in an environment where the most basic actions are
intertwined with matters of sickness and health and where no one is able to draw sharp
boundaries among scientific, clinical, political and economic questions.**
In the case of interferon setting up trials as a scientifically endorsed experimental
therapy linking the laboratory and the clinic was compatible with professional interests in the
field of clinical oncology. In addition, the conspicuous lack of efficacy in clinical studies did
not stop the pharmaceutical industry from investing additional money and resources in the
clinical testing of interferon. Too many resources had already been invested to reconcile them
to the situation and accept an untimely failure. In my view the industrial persistence in
providing interferon free of charge to all those who were willing to test interferon in the
laboratory and the clinic also illustrates the high strategic value attached to interferon within
the companies involved, as a protected demonstration project of a new drug development
technology.
In functioning as 'hinge joints' between the laboratory, the clinic and the society at
large, the clinical trials made for a dialectical process of knowledge production that tightened
the links between, among others, the pharmaceutical industry and the regulators. Through
many years' monitoring of the interferon trials, the drug regulatory authorities not only built up
expertise in evaluating interferons, but became also increasingly committed to their develop-
ment. In the U.S. the attachment of social and political significance to interferon as a high
visibility show-case of the FDA's ability to combine the dual role of regulator—containing
safety and efficacy—and of innovation manager—encouraging product innovation—eventually
resulted in its swift licensing. The licensing of interferon as a therapeutic drug, however limited
its FDA-approved indication range, provided a further incentive for the companies to expand
the clinical testing.
In achieving a key position in the distribution of research resources and materials
needed to set up clinical trials the pharmaceutical industry increasingly dictated development
and clinical use of interferon. Highlighting success instead of failure in industry-sponsored
See, for a detailed account of the increasingly important social and cognitive role of clinical trials in twentieth
century scientific medicine; H. M. Marks, 77K" Progress o/ Et/>er/m«if; Science am/ 77iera/>eufic /?e/orm in
rfie [/mW S/a/es. /900-/990 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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research publications, without denying current limitations, came to form the implicit justifica-
tion for the further growth of the clinical trial 'enterprise'. By using the 'logic' of medical
evidence presented in the form of value-free results of randomized clinical trials and the power
of metaphors in combination with the almost unlimited provision of research materials, the
pharmaceutical companies secured the medical profession's cooperation. The drug industry
was well aware that it was highly dependent on the cooperation of clinicians, foremost the
clinical oncologists—who were highly skilled in the art of bringing laboratory compounds to
the clinic and shaping drug profiles—to define additional clinical situations in which the
interferons might be applied. In line with the culture of experimentation in clinical oncology the
message was optimizing response rates through modulating the maximum tolerated dosage
regimens, varying modes of administration and trying different combinations of therapies.
As the most dynamic and strategic actor involved the pharmaceutical companies were
able to profit most from the very dialectical nature of the clinical trial enterprise. In positioning
interferon as a /j^ /p/w/ we/gAfoor, compatible with and supportive of existing treatment
practices, they succeeded in having interferon relatively quickly absorbed by the medical infra-
structure, requiring increasingly large amounts of money for its use.
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Chapter 8
Interferons in Retrospect and Prospect
Let us assume that a worldwide survey of science journalists was conducted. If asked to name
the most newsworthy medical substances of the past forty years, a majority of respondents
would most likely list 'interferon'. This book's narrative shows how and why. Every so often
between the 1960's and 1990's, substances that go by the proprietary name of 'interferon'
entered the headlines of our newspapers. As one might expect each surge of media interest
whetted the public's appetite for information on interferon. Among others, the editors of
Sc/Vn/i/ic Amer/cwi capitalized on each successive rise in public interest by inviting prominent
interferon researchers to provide their readers with a state-of-the-art account of interferon.' All
these papers have historical sections in which the authors portray the origin of interferon
research. They agree on several important points: time and place of the events, persons and
name of the substance under examination. However similar in their efforts to legitimate work
on interferon by reference to the origin of interferon research, in each case the discovery
account turns out to be different. In dealing with different research horizons, every consecutive
historical account of the discovery of interferon takes on a new and different form and
meaning. These different ways of framing 'the story' could earn scientists easily the label "bad
history'.
Should scientists worry about earning this label? I think not. On the contrary, "bad
history' helps them to relate the work of others to one's own research problems; to tune in to
actual scientific debates that ought to interest them. It is an important part of the repertoire of
resources which scientists use to argue their case. Whereas historians of science focus on
developmental processes and on vv/zo/ i7 w that the various workplaces and scientific events
connect, surround and situate in time and in place, working scientists are primarily interested in
publicly justifying their own scientific achievements or current and future scientific endeavors.
The phenomenon of "good science as bad history" proves very helpful in capturing
historical development and change in a particular field of research." Throughout the book we
A. Isaacs, interferon', Scirnri/ic Ammt-an. 204 (1961), 51-7, p. 51; D. Burke, The Status of Interferon',
Sci'cn/i/ic- /tmpriVan, 236 (1977), 42-50, p. 42; and. H. Johnson, F. Bazer, B. Szente and M. Jarpe. 'How
Interferons Fight Disease', Srie/i/i/ir American, May (1994), 40-7.
With all due respect, Thomas Nickles's phrase "good science as bad history" also applies to Jean Linden-
mann's critical response 'On Toine Pieters' 'Shaping a New Biological Factor'. In accordance with fellow-
scientists the microbiologist and interferon researcher Lindenmann finds it difficult to escape from the fallacy
of framing his historical analysis in such a way as to write an implicit teleology into the evolution of the field
of interferon research. Lindenmann's retrospective comments show us once again that working scientists and
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can see that in building on earlier work, later research transforms these foregoing products of
science. The biomedical researchers under survey continuously reshaped problems, questions
and practices they regarded as exemplary so as to energize their current work at the frontier of
science. Communicating these changes resulted in a continuous but rather creeping process of
reevaluating and revision that brought about changes in the currency of the products of the
research practices. • • •:••" . - • -> . ' -'' « •'' - 5 • • • y . ; - • • •
The widespread application and availability of biological expertise and technologies in
the pharmaceutical industry are at the end of the 1990's assumed matter-of-factly and
especially investments in the area of genetics are regarded as of paramount importance to the
development of successful therapeutic innovations in the 21st-century.' However, as the
interferon story shows the situation in the 1960's and 1970's was rather different. Except for a
small number of companies specialized in the production of biologicals (e.g. vaccines and
blood products), biological research played a subordinate role in the postwar pharmaceutical
industry.
Within a research environment oriented toward medical chemistry and pharmacology, it
appeared rather difficult to follow up a biological research object that continued to resist
existing industrial research practices. As a chemically undefined biological substance that was
part of a poorly understood natural mechanism of resistance to virus infections, it was
regarded as alien to the overly successful Ehrlichean chemotherapeutic industrial program. In
failing to extend the work conditions of the biological laboratory into the world of commercial
drug development, the early efforts to develop interferon as a drug remained fruitless. As a
result the greater part of work on interferon in the 1960's and 1970's did not take place in the
research departments of the commercially motivated drug companies but in academic research
settings.
My aim in the first section of this concluding chapter is to analyze the material, social
and cognitive characteristics of these research practices. What gets studied and why?; and what
does not get studied and why not? What makes scientists discriminate between specific
experimental features, ideas, methods or claims? What meanings are given to a research object
like interferon and how do these change over time? How do biomedical scientists over time
succeed (or fail) in expanding the private space of their workplaces to universalize the product-
s of their scientific work? In an effort to capture the nuances of material culture and way of life
historians of science differ in their study and analysis of laboratory work, whether in the past or in the
present: J. Lindenmann, 'On Toine Pieters' 'Shaping a New Biological Factor', 5fut/. Wis/. P/ii7. Sri., 29
(1998), 113-6; and. T. Nickles, 'Good Science as Bad History: From order of Knowing to Order of Being', in
E. McMullin (ed.). 77i<? Socia/ Dimensions o/Science (Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press. 1992),
p. 85.
See. for an social-economic assessment of the biological turn in the pharmaceutical industry: G. Carr, The
Pharmaceutical Industry, 77ie Eronomirr (21-2-1998).
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between bench and bedside, I will relate work on interferon to the aims, choices and interests
of its practitioners as well as to the constraints and resources within which they operated and
on which they thrived. Subsequently, I will analyze how the laboratory scientists and clinicians
involved tried to align their research activities with broader elements of society, such as
scientific institutions, governments, the public, pharmaceutical companies and regulatory
bodies. This will be done by comparing the successive cycles of promise and disappointment in
Britain and the USA. Finally, attention will be paid to the process of therapeutic evaluation of
interferon within the context of the molecularization of medicine.
Crafting interferon(-s)
The book's narrative has led us deep into the particulars of science as practice and culture in a
particular field of biomedicine in the second half of the twentieth century. To conceive of
laboratory science as mere experimentation to test hypotheses and work on theoretically
relevant problems appears to be as one-sided as picturing 'laboratory life' as the opportunistic
management of interests and investments that allow researchers to do experiments. Neither
description alone is sufficient to describe the full scope of scientific activity within the
emerging field of interferon research—in other words to capture the notion of co-production
of heterogeneous sets of conceptual, material and social elements which most appropriately
exemplify the dynamics of researching interferon(-s)."
Basically the work at the bench can be understood as acts of:
a. learning through active experiment and intervention, engineering experimental systems with
the aim of generating data of some sort and ultimately bring under surveillance new biological
phenomena;
b. accounting for the sheer endless production of experimental data in a culturally meaningful
way which makes them serve specific purposes—with control of the molecular processes of
life at the heart of the enterprise.
A major part of the work went into fine-tuning the experimental systems so that experi-
ments yielded results that were reproducibly usable—in other words either bear directly on the
questions in hand or could be used to generate new questions. The range and priority of
hypotheses and research questions with which the experiments were associated were
continuously subject to changes in response to various constraints. On one occasion research
questions might be adjusted because of practical limitations in the ability to manipulate the
The notion of 'co-production' is borrowed from Andrew Pickering, who in turn borrowed it from Bruno
Latour. Finally the latter is said to be inspired by Marx; See, Pickering. 'From Science as Knowledge to
Science as Practice', in A. Pickering (ed.) Science as Pracficf and C«//ure (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1992) p. 14; and I. Hacking, The Self-vindication of the Laboratory Sciences', Ibid. p. 31.
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experimental set-up or because of the occurrence of unexpectedly interesting experimental
events at the bench. On another, a change in research policy or a change in the status of a
research approach forced researchers to reconsider their research questions. For instance,
when a specific theoretical idea or concept acquired paradigmatic status in the field of
interferon research, the flexible behavior at the bench changed dramatically. In those cases, the
experimental events came to play a subsidiary role in the interpretation of the experimental
data. Quite some perseverance was required on the part of those researchers willing to
challenge specific dogmas. r - ' ;
Just as cognitive conditions shaped scientific work, the organization of research
materials and the development of instrumentation and techniques had consequences for
research practices. For instance, in chapter two I showed how the move in virus research from
experimental animals to novel experimental models based on tissue culture techniques went
together with a move towards describing phenomena at the levels of cells and molecules. In
this sense techniques and research materials in the biomedical sciences can be understood as
important means for projecting meaning on the world by acting upon it. When the biomedical
researchers studied a virus sample or a viral inhibitory factor, they gave the object under study
qualities that it did not have before. It gained an identity because of these qualitative and
quantitative laboratory manipulations and measures.
On a more general level, at each point in time, interferon's properties were defined
through the complete set of treatments and trials which interferon had undergone. By being
dependent on trials—which in principle are open-ended events—for its qualifications,
interferon's identity was necessarily unstable. In principle interferon changed with every new
trial. Over time the scientific notion of interferon underwent a gradual transformation. First, as
a vira/ mteT/ering /actor it was provisionally considered a <fev/anf vira/ en/ity. By the mid-
1960's 'interferon' came to refer to acr/ve anm'/'ra/ swfo/artces in particular culture fluids—as a
generic term—which complied with a specific set of experimental criteria and which were
considered ewew/za/ prodnc/s o/f/ie c?// that played a part in resistance to viral infection. More
than thirty years later interferon is still regarded a generic term, but of yet a different kind; It
refers to a specific part of the body's natural defenses consisting of a group of closely related
regu/afory pr
Managing differences in a 'gift culture'
An important window onto the nature of development and change in work on interferon is
provided by cross-local and cross-national comparison. I showed that laboratories as
workplaces had each their own characteristics, infrastructure and resources. The local
distribution of and access to, as well as the familiarity with, particular materials and techniques
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did much to shape the pace, direction and hence content of the laboratory work. Seemingly
small details of experimental techniques and small differences in experimental protocols, purity
of reagents, and source or nature of biological organisms, could make major differences to the
outcome of experiments. It might not come as a surprise, therefore, that a central issue for
those involved in work on interferon was the uncertainty resulting from the idiosyncrasies of
experimental systems and the noncompliant character of research materials and organisms.
Some major sources of contingencies were and still are biological organisms. When
different organisms were used to investigate the very same question, they yielded systemati-
cally different results. Even when using the same organism in different laboratories the results
hardly ever matched. Small differences in the features of the organism employed in the same
laboratory already altered the nature of experimental results.
I agree with the science historian Richard Burian that an important problem of doing
research with biological organisms is that at every level of biological organization it is an open
question how general the findings are.' This makes application of the basic biological sciences
to clinical practice such an extraordinarily difficult and unpredictable endeavor. New
knowledge of disease processes at the cellular and molecular level does not necessarily yield
medical applications and simultaneously effective treatments are developed without
appropriate understanding of the underlying pathological processes. In principle all laboratory
systems for identifying and testing new therapeutic agents are faulty, as there is no way to
mimic exactly the way the human body works—neither laboratory animals carrying human
tumors nor human cells in culture seem to be faring any better in this respect.'' Yet as the
interferon case shows the problem of biological contingencies and differences hardly seems to
discourage the everyday practice in biomedicine of extrapolating in vitro and animal
experiments and producing bold therapeutic claims based on that work.
To what extent and how did researchers in the field of interferon research cope with
intra- and cross-local differences in research? I showed how initially the researchers involved
managed differences by informally agreeing on exchange mechanisms, without rigorously
defining common units of measurement. Through circulating, comparing and combining
research materials, techniques and skills in a relatively small and flexible network of personal
contacts, researchers managed to reduce extreme variations of experimental results. This
enabled them to narrow down the margins of interpretation to workable levels.
Not until the informal exchange mechanism within this 'gift culture' began to show
See. R. M. Burian. 'How the Choice of Experimental Organism Matters: Epistemologiocal Reflections on an
Aspect of Biological Practice', ./ounuj/ o/rt* ///.story o/Bi'o/o&y, 26 (1993), 351-67, p. 365.
As recently as 1997 the executive director for cancer research at Merck Research Laboratories. Alan Oliff.
had to admit that "the fundamental problem in drug discovery for cancer is that the model systems are not
predictive at all": See, Trisha Gura, 'Systems for Identifying New Drugs Are Often Faulty', Seien«, 278
(1997), 1041-2.
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flaws—with expansion of the field of research, the shift away from a qualitative to quantitative
research and the intrusion of the pharmaceutical industry into the relatively private domain of
'laboratory life'—did a need for formal standardization began to manifest itself. As I showed in
chapter six, national centers for biological standardization played a central role in coordinating
subsequent efforts to establish national and international interferon standards. T
At least until the early 1980's the gift culture remained largely intact. But in the late
1970's the emerging profit potential in molecular biology, in OWM the commercial prospect of
mass-producing interferon with the help of genetic engineering technology, began to strain and
rupture the informal traditions of scientific exchange. In the 1990's the once relatively open
exchange of biological materials has become more and more formalized and selective.
Increasingly research materials and techniques are regarded as commodities and therefore no
longer freely exchanged as part of a gift culture but rather formally acquired for money.
Seeking 'magic bullets'
Throughout the history of the development of interferon as a therapeutic drug we have seen
how claims and judgments regarding laboratory and clinical data were presented, contested,
translated and negotiated by a variety of groups with competing interests and diverging back-
grounds. Earlier on in the British context, and subsequently in America in the seventies,
interferon came to be perceived as a potential medical breakthrough. Yet, in both cases
interferon faced quite different circumstances.
This book shows that there is no simple, one-dimensional explanation of the subsequent
rise and fall of interferon in Britain in the early 1960's and in the USA in the late 1970's.
Neither technical arguments nor the interest of a specific social group can explain the cycle of
public euphoria and disappointment in each period and country. Laboratory scientists,
clinicians, industrialists and government bureaucrats operated in a complex social world with
historical depth that cannot be assumed to be passive. They pursued their interests with respect
to developing interferon as a therapeutic drug under social and cultural conditions that were
not theirs to choose. This does not mean that these conditions were permanent fixtures in the
global landscape or that the interests and policies are determined by them. Nevertheless they
were experienced as important constraints or incentives and are therefore worth examining. To
begin with I shall examine the initial success in mobilizing the British government and the drug
industry for interferon.
The scientist fundamental to the early development of interferon Alick Isaacs
exemplified a culture of and identity for biomedical research that is not conventionally
associated with biomedical scientists in Britain in this epoch. Isaacs was a public man: the
champion of persuasive public demonstrations, the strong competitor for public credibility, the
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self-proclaimed leader of a new field of research and the scientist-entrepreneur who boldly
risks everything on what he believes is a promising phenomenon, hypothesis or potential
medicine. As a public scientist Isaacs, unlike most of his British academic colleagues in
biomedicine and despite his fragile state of health, made his work into a resource for scientific,
political and industrial action. Isaacs was an example of a scientific way of life that came into
prominence most visibly in the United States in the 1950's.'
In analyzing Isaacs's success at connecting his private science with public issues of
disease and cure I located in chapter four a public desire for and belief in emulating the success
of penicillin, streptomycin and cortisone. These so-called 'miracle drugs' had raised hopes
regarding scientific medicine's ability to come up with yet another cure. Of course this belief,
far from being unique to the British, was shared by Americans and others alike. Especially the
conjunction in the British context between the firm belief in breakthroughs as a dominant
feature of a scientific medicine and the post-war 'penicillin trauma' (which nourished the
British-American rivalry) resulted in interferon being touted publicly. This placed interferon
high on the public policy agenda in Britain.
In carrying the greater part of the blame for the failure to develop penicillin in Britain,
the Medical Research Council (MRC) in particular took an interest in interferon. The MRC
chose interferon as a high-visibility showcase to convince the British public of their prepared-
ness to invest in and pursue potential 'homegrown' medical innovations from the very first
moment. Since the MRC lacked the expertise and resources to develop interferon as a
therapeutic drug, they sought collaboration with the drug industry. Setting up a collaborative
program with British pharmaceutical companies provided an additional opportunity for the
MRC to present itself as a public policy stronghold in the defense of national interests.
However promising as a potential 'antiviral penicillin', British drug companies initially
showed restraint with regard to interferon. This was due to the dominance of the Ehrlichean
chemotherapeutic research approach in the pharmaceutical industry. Within this framework
biological substances were perceived as troublesome and high-risk commodities with uncertain
manufacturing prospects. MRC's offer to join forces made a difference though. From industry's
point of view, risk-sharing with the MRC, which offered their unique expertise in interferon
research and the eventual rights in the developed product, made work on interferon a far more
attractive option. Moreover, they shared the determination of the MRC to prevent British
research products with penicillin-like commercial potential from ending up with the label
"made in the USA". The combination of these historically and culturally specific conditions led
The American researchers Jonas Salk and Maurice Hilleman serve as most notable examples of this new
generation of scientific entrepreneurs in biomedicine: See. L. Galambos and J. E. Sewell, AVrtvorfo 0/
innovari'on: Vaccine D<>v<7o/>m<>m /If Were*. S/wrp <$ Do/ime. am/ Mu//or</ /S95-/995 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995); and. J. S. Smith, Atfenfing fm> Sun; Po/10 am/ fne 5a/* Vaccine (New York:
William Morrow and Company. 1990).
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to the first successful postwar initiative to secure a collaboration between the British
government and the drug industry.
In chapter five I showed how Ehrlich's 'magic bullet' concept of chemotherapy (which
is intimately linked with scientific medicine's dominant theory of specific aetiology), as well as
the closely related issue of chemical purity played a central role in the subsequent collaborative
efforts to develop interferon as a therapeutic drug. Initially the association of interferon with
Paul Ehrlich's ideal of generating therapeutic molecules which like 'magic bullets', seek out and
destroy the enemy and injure nothing else, was helpful in keeping the pharmaceutical
companies interested. The promise of a specific (that is truly curative) and an innocuous agent
that would knock out viral disease made senior drug company executives believe that
interferon, despite its problematic status as an unruly biological, would fit into their
unprecedented successful Ehrlichean chemotherapeutic drug development program. Within this
chemotherapeutic product development framework, though, the purification and chemical
identification of the pharmacologically active part—conceptualized as a single and pure
chemical compound—was considered a prerequisite for successful drug development.
So when attempts at purifying and characterizing interferon as well as efforts to
translate the experimental laboratory methods into practical technologies for large-scale
industrial production continued to fail, the evaluation of interferon's product potential in the
light of the Ehrlichean chemotherapeutic program changed dramatically. In resisting all efforts
to make it fit into conventional drug development practices, interferon rapidly lost its status as
a most promising lead toward antiviral drug therapy. Without additional demonstrations of
dramatic therapeutic results, industrial and public interest in interferon was granted only a
short life.
'Doctoring' the media as part of modern medicine's expectations trap
The assessment and evaluation of the therapeutic potential of interferon as an antitumor agent
in America in the seventies was for the greater part a different story, reflecting the preoccu-
pations of a different society in a different epoch. The theme of the 1960's had been the firm
and unconditional belief in therapeutic breakthroughs as a hallmark of scientific
medicine—most vividly exemplified by American efforts to establish a National Program for the
Conquest of Cancer. In the 1970's, however, with unprecedented public criticism of the
technological-interventionist and reductionist orientation of scientific medicine, the search was
on for the natural and organic. Cancer therapy, in particular, became the focus of the
increasingly political powerful critical health movement in America, highlighting the failures and
severe side effects of the conventional cancer treatments, surgery, radiation and chemotherapy.
As a result the American cancer establishment was seriously under attack and needed a
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scientific promise which suited the growing public demands for effective and less toxic cancer
remedies. i ,
In achieving a high degree of compatibility between interferon as an innovative
approach to cancer therapy and the specific medical culture of the 1970's in America, the
interferon promoters succeeded in building support for interferon. Mathilde Krim and her
fellow 'interferon crusaders' were able to capitalize on the public dissatisfaction with
conventional cancer treatments, in placing a great deal of emphasis on the natural and presumed
nontoxic qualities of interferon as an unorthodox but an evidence-based product of scientific
medicine. As a result interferon became absorbed in the accelerating politics and economics of
the American cancer scene.
To the public woman, Mathilde Krim, interferon represented as much marketing as
science. She was well aware of the ever-growing importance of the mass media in generating
public support and was very skillful at 'doctoring' the media in ways that would fulfil the public
desire for miracle cures. She helped to create a media image of interferon as a somewhat
mysterious and scarce, nontoxic natural body substance that offered a unique scientific
approach to cancer, but was long ignored by a conservative cancer establishment.
In successfully mobilizing the popular media, Krim and her allies managed to reshape
the agenda-setting forum dramatically from a relative private, scientific experts dominated,
affair into a public policy arena—with the press blooming into the most important institutional
link in the network of relationships which developed around interferon. The cancer experts in
the bureaucracy and academia were forced into the open, allowing other interested parties to
participate in the judgment and definition of work on interferon. Through the dual framing of
interferon as a natural solution to a dread disease and the latest product of 'cutting-edge'
biomedical research that promised to radically alter the expectations of life, interferon acquired
'miracle drug' status.
The expectations' boom was fueled in an interesting way by a new 'breed' of
entrepreneurial molecular biologists who jumped on the interferon bandwagon—choosing
interferon as a demonstration project for the industrial potential of the revolutionary genetic
engineering technology. In bringing together in their claims what were widely perceived as two
wondrous products of modern science and technology, the genetic engineers with the help of
the media triggered an international interferon mania.
My claim is that the recurrent hailing of wonder drugs in the western world symbolizes
the religious faith in a scientific medicine that promises to fulfil the quest for immortality. It is
part of what Roy Porter calls the 'rising expectations trap' of modern medicine." However, in
being intimately linked on the one hand with the almost sacrosanct belief that disease as we
See. R. Porter. 77«' Gre«/«/ ße;i<>//r ro Afan&iW; /I Merfica/ tfis/orv o/Humaniry/roni/4mig!<i7y
fVesrn/ (London: HarperCollins Publishers. 1997). p. 718.
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know it can be eliminated by medical technology and on the other hand with the disappointing
everyday experience of incurable disease and failing remedies, the label 'wonder drug' is
transitory.
As long as the public enthusiasm interferon elicited was not associated with the term
'uncontrollable', the dramatic portrayal of interferon was widely accepted as necessary for the
advancement of a most promising area of biomedical research. However, confronted with a
public enthusiasm for interferon which could not be met and threatened to get out of hand, the
biomedical establishment began to regard the hype as problematic. Once defined as a threat to
the authority over the medical realm, an international coalition of doctors, researchers and
administrators resorted to a deliberate creation of public disillusionment. In a similar fashion as
the interferon alliance had been overly successful in seeking a favorable press, the biomedical
establishment managed to reshape the nature of the media coverage of interferon—from
forceful promotion of interferons benefits to disappointment about a failed promise.'
Biology meets drug development: toward molecular medicine
The growing interference, however, between interferon research and the field of molecular
biology, played a major role in bringing about a redefinition of interferon's prospects as an
object of research for the pharmaceutical industry in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In
particular, implementing the newly developed genetic engineering technology made an
important difference. Originally deployed with the aim to make available in large quantities, at
modest cost, highly purified interferon preparations, the molecular biologists, closely linked
with the emerging genetic engineering industry, helped to redraw the interferon landscape
beyond recognition.
In efforts to clone the interferon gene, produce the corresponding interferon protein
product and reach agreement on interferon's chemical structure, the 'genetic engineers'
succeeded in promoting interferon not only to the world of 'big science' and industry, but also
In an interesting way this interventionist scenario has a repetitious quality. In the case of other post-Second-
World war therapeutic drugs which achieved 'miracle drug' status like cortisone and streptomycin a similar
kind of deliberate creation of disillusionment occurred as a means to dampen public enthusiasm and to stem
the tide of public requests which could not be met. Apparently as long as the public enthusiasm it elicits can
not be associated with the term 'uncontrollable', an element of optimism in advertising a new remedy is
widely regarded and even promoted as necessary for the advancement of medicine. In my view the limit of
acceptable, controllable enthusiasm depended in each case on the extent to which the biomedical establish-
ment feared a loss of authority over the medical domain. See. D. Cantor. 'Cortisone and the Politics of Drama.
1949-1955', in J. Pickstone, Ato/iVd/ /nnova/iwi* m W/jfonco/ Persp«7ire (London: MacMillan. 1992); A.
Yoshioka, 'Streptomycin: Notes Toward a Cultural History of a Miracle Drug', unpublished paper presented
during the Anglo-Dutch workshop on Remedies and Healing Cultures in Britain and the Netherlands in the
Twentieth Century in Amsterdam, June, 1998.
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to the tangible world of chemical facts. By making attainable the 'Holy Grail' of interferon
research—pure interferon—cloning put an end to the important role of chemical purity as an
arbiter in disputes concerning work on interferon both in industry and academia.
However, with the intention of achieving homogeneity and progress as well as unity in
the understanding of the interferon system, the molecular biologists had paradoxically created
heterogeneity and new complexity by reinforcing the idea that 'interferon' represented a
dynamic family of genes and corresponding proteins. In an attempt to manage the unwieldy
complexity, they fell back on the concepts of 'command', 'control' and 'communication
networks' which had proved successful explanatory tools in molecular biology. In doing so the
molecular biologists promoted the conceptualization of interferon as part of a complex host
defense system of cellular messengers, so-called 'biological response modifiers', held together
by communication and feedback. This was part of a much broader shift in the biomedical realm
from 'substance thinking', looking at the biochemical 'nuts and bolts' in the machinery of the
body, to 'information thinking', picturing the body as a complex regulatory-communications
network.'"
The cloning efforts not only strengthened the idea of interferon as one of the body's
regulatory defense systems, but also opened the door to an alternative approach to drug
development. The genetic engineers promised to create a new horizon in pharmaceutical
research. In concentrating on molecular biology (e.g. proteins and DNA) rather than on
traditional chemistry, they would provide the drug companies with an entire apothecary of new
biosynthetic drugs from natural substances within the body. As promoters of this new
approach, they stressed novelty but at the same time they presented genetic engineering as
fitting in well with the classic chemistry-based therapeutic drug development practice. With a
steady decline in commercially viable and innovative therapeutic compounds from their
chemistry-dependent 'pipelines', the promise of a new approach to drug development kept the
pharmaceutical industry interested when the news about interferon's less-than-spectacular
performance in clinical trials began to spread in the early 1980's.
In chapter eight I have shown that in order to become legitimized as part of medical
practice against all odds, interferon needed a therapeutic profile and treatment concept that
could be integrated or combined with existing therapeutic routines. This required that the drug
makers in collaboration with laboratory researchers and clinicians actively created and made
available a sort of rough-and-ready 'therapeutic rationale'. Clinicians and laboratory scientists
alike increasingly perceived cancer as a family of diseases in which complex cellular and
molecular regulatory functions have gone awry, instead of a unitary disease characterized by
the uncontrolled growth of malignant cells that spread out aggressively and destroy the body.
See, for a similar shift in the way immunity was dealt with in American culture: E. Martin. ffcri
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 61.
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In line with this shift, the framework in which to consider patients, cancer and its treatments
could no longer be effectively and acceptably be linked with the therapeutic ideal of generating
and using universal cancer medications which like 'magic bullets' seek out and destroy the
enemy. In other words what used to be a socially and scientifically influential metaphor in the
1960's and 1970's as part of the 'biochemical' paradigm in medicine, ceased to be so by the
1990's, though without medicine becoming less target-focused." My claim is that magic bullets
make for meaningless and potentially destructive talk in a dynamic, information thinking domi-
nated, 'molecular medicine'.'* >
Talking about the "Big C" as a multi-factorial molecular disease was consistent with the
emergence of immunotherapy as part of a combined-modality, laboratory-supported therapeutic
framework in clinical oncology. This linked up perfectly with the efforts in the field of
interferon research to redefine interferon as a means to develop a new complementary modality
of cancer treatment that might be used in conjunction with conventional therapies. Redefining
interferons as biological response modifiers or cytokines which could be used therapeutically to
strengthen the body's self-defence as part of a laboratory-guided multi-modality therapy frame-
work, legitimated and reinforced the new molecular perception and treatable nature of cancer.
And this allowed all parties to see interferon therapy as therapeutic. To put it differently, as
advertised products of molecular biology the interferons fitted in well with the
'molecularization' of medicine and this helped to make them 'work' at the bedside. I pointed to
the solidarity implicit in the emphasis of both laboratory researchers and clinicians on the
importance of linking through interferon bench and bedside as part of a new kind of molecular
medicine. In always being able to justify that either further laboratory or clinical research was
mandated, it made all parties involved relative immune to disappointing research news.
The story of how interferon managed to become part of the 'doctor's bag' clearly shows
how the conduct, organization and evaluation of clinical trials and what they are capable of is
dependent on the specific context of use. It reveals that the use and interpretation of clinical
trials are significantly different for experimental drugs for the desperately ill than they are for
research into less serious diseases like the common cold. Furthermore, in achieving a key
position in the distribution of research materials and resources needed to set up preclinical and
clinical studies, the pharmaceutical industry increasingly dictated the development and use of
interferon. It was the industry itself that profited most from the very dialectical nature of the
clinical trial "enterprise". I have shown that the 'industry' of clinical trials proved effective not
See. for an exemplary study of the use of methaphors in Biology: E. F. Keller, /te/iffun'ng Zi/i»; AfefapAon 0/
7"H£-n»i>//i-Cenrur>' fii'o/ogv (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). pp. 94-114.
'* See, for a detailed historical description and analysis of the rise of the molecular culture in biomedicine in the
Twentieth Century: S. de Chadarevian and H. Kamminga (eds), Mo/ecutorizmg fto/o^y am/ A/a/ici'n«
(Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers, 1998).
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only in widening interferon's therapeutic profile but also in marketing the combined modality
therapeutic concept that turned the interferons from orphan drugs into top-selling
Pharmaceuticals. -5 •^..> vi': :) .•;
As such, this biography of a family of therapeutic drugs suggests that, rather than the
therapeutic evaluation and use of pharmaceutical substances being a straightforward and strictly
evidence-based process, it is a thoroughly practice-based activity which cannot be separated
from the values and commitments of those involved. This is at odds with the conventional view
that given sufficient methodological rigor—e.g. in the form of randomized clinical
trials—'social bias' can be eliminated from medical knowledge. However, if as I have argued,
social and cultural factors play a significant part in shaping the clinical profile of a drug, then it
follows that the application of the interferons should continue to be scrutinized, without
maintaining the illusion that 'social bias' can be eliminated. Hence, as a product of the history
here described, the current practice of maximum tolerated dosage regimens for the application
of interferons in cancer therapy, might perfectly fit in with the culture of oncology, but the
therapeutic potential of these intriguing substances might thereby be limited.
In carefully avoiding labeling this chapter 'conclusion' I want to emphasize that the
biography of the interferons is still in process. As an inseparable element of the culture of
molecular medicine the interferons help to shape the goals, methods and organization of this
very same culture. The final section confirms this idea. It is meant as a speculative assessment
of and hint to current and future developments in the biomedical realm, although as a historian I
am well aware of the risks involved in trying to interrogate the past as a means to help direct
current and future policies. The unpredictable and dynamic nature of the practices, contexts and
relations described makes it hazardous to predict the shape that this part of the 'marketplace'
medicine will take in the future let alone suggesting new life forms. However, knowing that the
application of historical knowledge to cope with current and future situations is a problematic
endeavor, should not withhold us from doing so. As Thomas Nickles puts it succinctly: "the
only resources available to a generation, besides its own ingenuity, are those bequeathed by its
past"."
Patients at risk
So far we have seen a wide range of factors and pressures that shaped the clinical profile and
use of the interferons: the disputes among scientists, the cycles of promise and disappointment,
the biological turn in drug development, the 'industry' of clinical trials, the religious faith in the
healing potential of scientific medicine, the marketing efforts of the pharmaceutical companies,
'"' See, Thomas Nickles. 'Philosophy of Science and History of Science', d i m . 10(1995), 139-63, p. 154.
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the politics of regulation, the molecularization of medicine and so on. Given the complex
environment in which the safety and effectiveness of this family of therapeutic molecules had to
be assessed, is it any wonder that changes in this context can have unintended effects?
My report of 'patients at work' in the preface is exemplary for the profound changes the
context of therapeutic evaluation has undergone since the official licensing of interferon-alpha
for the treatment of a rare form of leukemia in 1986. In the traditional, that is pre-AIDS
therapeutic framework, the testing and use of new therapies basically hinged on their evaluation
by professionally-endorsed evaluators and professionally-endorsed methods. In the late 1980's,
however, the Aids-crisis and the associated patient-activist interventions in biomedicine—which
led to new liberalized drug regulatory and testing practices for the desperately
ill—demonstrated compellingly the potential for change. Ever since, patient grass-root
organizations have been increasingly successful in actively participating in the biomedical realm.
In funding disease-related research and services, and establishing strategic alliances with
academic research, industry and government, they have managed to exert a growing influence
on the review and decision-making process of science and medicine.
At the end of the 1990's world-wide associations of patients like the Dutch or American
Multiple Sclerosis Societies permanently monitor research and policy issues and try to convert
these into information that is meaningful for individual consumers' health. Through magazines,
newsletters and other publications and Internet Web-sites they keep people living with the
disease, their families and healthcare providers informed about the latest disease-related news
items. However, the consumer organizations in medicine make for more than clearing houses of
information. In establishing and supporting counseling groups, public meetings, training
workshops for healthcare professionals, scientific conferences and most lately internet news
groups, they have come to serve as national and international platforms for the exchange and
critical appraisal of information on medical research, care and policy.
The rapid developments in internet technology—with personal computers evolving into
powerful communication tools—have played a most important role in changing the rules of the
game in the market-place medicine. Through the Web, patients can freely exchange experiences
with fellow-sufferers, ask treatment advise from doctors who are not theirs and may obtain the
latest biomedical updates before health-care professionals.''' In principle, having unprecedented
access to the world of science and medicine, should put them in an equal position of knowledge
with the other parties involved.
However it remains to be seen whether patients are indeed the ones to profit most of
the combination of liberalized regulatory and drug testing practices, and a freely accessible
medical 'cyberworld'. The sociologist, Steven Epstein, rightly indicates that however vigilant
See, for MS-related sides and newsgroups: wwwnmss.org; www.mssociety.org.uk; www.mssoc.ca; and
alt.support.mult-sclerosis.
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the fast growing consumer movement may seem, they underestimate the capability of science
and industry to influence and redirect the consumer's interventions to their own advantage."
The rise, fall and subsequent rise of interferon certainly reflects the considerable power of the
coalition between laboratory medicine and the drug industry to monopolize the information on
the safety and efficacy of therapeutic drugs. This makes it hard for consumers and certainly the
desperately ill, who are dedicated to try anything that enables them to feel less than totally
impotent in the face of a wasting disease, to seriously challenge knowledge claims.
Paradoxically, the efforts to open up the biomedical stronghold and push medical research in
directions that serve patient interests more directly, reinforce the dependence on the very same
academic and industrial producers of medical products and services.
See, S. Epstein, 'Activism Drug Regulation, and the Politics of Therapeutic Evaluation in the Aids Era: A
Case Study of ddc and the 'Surrogate Markers' Debate'. Soda/ M i « o/Science. 27 (1997), 691-726.
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All persons who have been interviewed in the course of the research reported on in this
thesis are listed below. Apart from Dr. all other titles (professor, etc.) are omitted. Aster-
isks indicate that the interview was tape-recorded.
Pharmaceutical Industry:
Dr. L. Adami*
Dr. John Beale*
Dr. M. Fernex*
Dr. Karl Fames*
Mr. G. Farmer*
Dr. Norman Finter*
Dr. Leon Gauci*
Dr. G. Garotta*
Mrs. C. v. Helsen
Dr. P. Herman
(Roche)
(Wellcome)
(Roche)
(Wellcome)
(Roche)
(Wellcome)
(Roche)
(Roche)
(Schering-Plough)
(Schering-Plough)
Dr. Maurice Hilleman* (MSD)
Dr. P. Hunold*
Dr. E. Hochuli*
Dr. A. Keller*
Dr. H. Leuenberger*
Dr. M. Placchi*
Mr. P. de Pourq
Dr. J. Ryff*
Dr. David Secher*
Dr. F. Schenker*
Dr. T. Staehlin*
Dr. J. P. Warbeer
Academic Research
Dr. Frances BalkwilP
Dr. Samuel Baron*
Dr. Alfons Billiau*
Dr. Derek Burke*
Dr. Werner Boll*
Dr. Ernest Borden*
Dr. Derek Bangham*
Dr. Kari Cantell*
Dr. Charles Chany*
Dr. Lois Epstein*
Dr. Ernesto Falcoff*
(Roche)
(Roche)
(Roche)
(Roche)
(Roche)
(Schering-Plough)
(Roche)
(Cell-Tech)
(Roche)
(Ciba-Geigy)
(Schering-Plough)
and Medicine:
Dr. Emil J. Freireich*
Dr. Robert Friedman*
Basel
London
Basel
Beckenham, U.K.
Basel
Seven Oaks. U.K.
Basel
Basel
Brussels
Brussels
West Point, PA
Basel
Basel
Basel
Basel
Basel
Brussels
Basel
London
Basel
Basel
Brussels
London
Galveston. TX
Leuven, B.
Norwich
Zurich
Milwaukee, WI
London
Helsinki
Paris
San Francisco
Paris
Houston
Bethesda, MD
June 19. 1990
May 24.1990
June 18. 1990
May 25. 1990
June 20, 1990
May 25. 1990
June 18. 1990
June 19. 1990
June 23. 1988
June 23. 1988
Oct. 10. 1992
June 18, 1990
June 21, 1990
June 20. 1990
June 20. 1990
June 19. 1990
June 23. 1988
June 18. 1990
May 23. 1990
June 18, 1990
June 18. 1990
June 23, 1988
May 31. 1990
Sept. 24. 1992
Aug. 4. 1992
May 15, 1990
June 21. 1990
Oct. 12, 1992
March 3. 1992
May 5. 1992
Sept. 2, 1992
Oct. 8. 1992
Sept. 3, 1992
Sept. 23. 1992
Oct. 22. 1992
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Dr. Jordan Gutterman*
Dr. Ion Gresser*
Dr. Susanna Isaacs Elmhirst*
Dr. Monto Ho* .., ,,._
Dr. Pete Knight*
Dr. Mathilde Krim*
Dr. Hilton Levy*
Dr. Jean Lindenmann*
Dr. Edward de Maeyer*
Dr. Jacqueline de Maeyer*
Dr. Thomas Merigan*
Dr. Sidney Pestka*
Dr. M. Playfair*
Dr. James Porterfield
Dr. Huub Schellekens*
Dr. Gerald Sonnenfeld*
Dr. Joseph Sonnabend*
Dr. Hans Strander*
Dr. Michael Streuli*
Dr. Joyce Taylor*
Dr. David Tyrrell*
Dr. Jan Vilcek*
Dr. Charles Weissman*
Dr. Robert Wagner*
Dr. Frederick Wheelock*
Houston
Paris
London
Pittsburgh, PA
West Chester, PA
New York
Frederick, MD
Zurich
Paris
Paris
Stanford, CA
Piscataway, NJ
London
(tel. interview)
Delft. NL
Louisville, KY
New York
Stockholm
Zurich
London
Salisbury, U.K.
New York
Zurich
Charlottesville, VA
Philadelphia
Sept. 23,
Sept. 1,
May 28,
Oct. 29,
Nov. 4,
Nov. 11,
Oct. 10,
June 16,
Dec. 4,
Dec. 4,
Oct. 7,
Oct. 27,
May 29,
Oct. 11,
July 10,
Oct. 14,
Nov. 12,
April 30,
June 18,
May 30,
May 21,
Nov. 10,
June 15,
Oct. 13.
Nov. 5.
Government Institutions and Regulatory Bodies
(NIAID) Bethesda, MD
(NIAID) Bethesda, MD
(NCI) Bethesda, MD
(FDA) Cambridge, MA
(ACS) Stamford, CT
(FDA) Bethesda, MD
Dr. George Galasso*
Dr. Kathy Laughlin*
Dr. Arthur Levine*
Dr. John Petricciani*
Dr. Frank Rauscher*
Dr. Kathryn Zoon*
1992
1992
1990
1992
1992
1992
1992
1990
1993
1993
1992
1992
1990
1993
1992
1992
1992
1992
1990
1990
1990
1992
1990
1992
1992
Oct. 19, 1992
Oct. 23, 1992
Oct. 22, 1992
Nov. 6, 1992
Oct. 16, 1992
Oct. 23. 1992
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SAMENVATTING
De inzet van deze biografie over interferon—e'e'n van de eerste en meest spraakmakende
therapeutische 'biomoleculen'—is tweeledig. In de eerste plaats beoogt dit proefschrift het
historische ontwikkelingsproces van interferon als onderzoeksobject en als geneesmiddel te
beschrijven en inzichtelijk te maken. Aandacht voor de aard en dynamiek van de wisselwerking
tussen verschillende onderzoekspraktijken in de ontwikkeling van interferon staat voorop.
Hierbij wordt afwisselend ingezoomd op de werkzaamheden van wetenschappers en clinici aan
de laboratoriumtafel en in de behandelkamer en uitgezoomd naar de bredere maatschappelijke
context waarin hun producten een weg vinden. Ten tweede laat dit boek aan de hand van de
ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis van interferon zien hoe in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw de
biomoleculaire wending in geneesmiddelonderzoek en -productie haar beslag krijgt.
Succesvolle geneesmiddelontwikkeling wordt doorgaans geassocieerd met grote farma-
ceutische firma's die in hun laboratoria naarstig op zoek zijn naar nieuwe medicijnen. Industriele
onderzoekscentra zijn in deze optiek de stuwende kracht achter de continue stroom van
innovatieve medicijnen (met een nieuwe of sterk verbeterde klinische werking) naar de
therapeutische praktijk. Bij de bestendiging van dit beeld krijgen de 'marketers' van de
farmaceutische industrie alle medewerking van media en wetenschappers. Deze Studie betoogt
dat in de gebruikelijke voorstelling van zaken weinig recht wordt gedaan aan het belang van de
voortdurende wisselwerking tussen academische, geneeskundige en industriele onder-
zoekspraktijken voor de ontwikkeling van geneesmiddelen. Geheel ten onrechte wordt voorbij
gegaan aan het historisch feit dat de meeste moderne geneesmiddelen hun oorsprong hebben op
het grensvlak van het laboratorium en de kliniek.
Voortgekomen uit microbiologisch onderzoek in de jaren '30 en '40 van deze eeuw
(Hoofdstukl), kan de 'ontdekking' van interferon door de Engelse viroloog Alick Isaacs en de
Zwitserse onderzoeker Jean Lindenmann in 1957 worden gedateerd. De scheppers van
interferon worden in hoofdstuk 2 op de voet gevolgd in hun werkzaamheden bij het National
Institute for Medical Research te Mill Hill (Londen). Kenmerkend voor hun gezamenlijke
onderzoeksactiviteiten is de creatieve manier waarop zij omgaan met het beschikbare geheel
aan technieken, onderzoeksmaterialen en hypothesen. Als onderdeel van dit dynamisch
experimenteel systeem zijn onderzoeksvraag en onderzoeksobject voortdurend aan ver-
andering onderhevig. Hierbij dwingen afwisselend materiele, sociale en cognitieve factoren in
de onderzoeksomgeving aanpassingen af.
Als uitvloeisel van hun pogingen orde aan te brengen in hun onderzoeksresultaten en
hypothesen menen Isaacs en Lindenmann een verklaring te hebben voor het zogenaamde 'virale
interferentie' fenomeen, waarbij een organisme of celweefsel dat met een type virus is besmet,
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niet nog eens door een andere virussoort besmet kan worden. Zij claimen een voorheen
onbekende substantie te hebben ge'isoleerd uit de biologische soep afkomstig van specifieke
weefselkweken waarin sprake is van virale interferentie. Celweefsels die met deze biologische
stof, genaamd interferon, in contact worden gebracht, zijn beschermd tegen bijna alle soorten
virussen.
Interferon wekt begin jaren zestig met name in Engeland hoge verwachtingen. Dat heeft
tot gevolg dat Britse onderzoeksinstellingen en farmaceutische bedrijven gezamenlijke
pogingen ondernemen om interferon te ontwikkelen als geneesmiddel tegen virusziekten.
Terwijl in Engeland interferon enthousiast onthaald wordt als het nieuwe 'antivirale penicilline'
verwerft het binnen de internationale academische context de dubieuze bijnaam 'misinterpreton'.
Aan de hand van historisch archiefonderzoek en 'oral history' volgt in hoofdstuk 3 een
reconstructie van de lotgevallen van interferon als onderzoeksobject en als potentieel
geneesmiddel tegen virusziekten in de jaren zestig. Hierbij ligt de nadruk op de verschillen in
receptie van interferon tussen industrie, overheid en het algemene publiek in Engeland aan de
ene kant en de internationale gemeenschap van virusonderzoekers aan de andere kant.
Uitgebreide aandacht is er voor de transformatie van interferon als dubieus laboratorium-
fenomeen tot nucleus van een nieuw onderzoeksgebied.
Hoofdstuk vier verhaalt in het bijzonder over hoe de Engelse overheid en
farmaceutische industrie komen tot een formele vorm van samenwerking met als doel interferon
te ontwikkelen tot geneesmiddel. Na een voortvarend begin krijgt het samenwerkingsverband te
maken met een breed scala aan problemen. Aanhoudend treden cultuurverschillen tussen
overheid en industrie aan het licht die overbrugd dienen te worden. Veelal is hierbij de precaire
relatie tussen commercieel belang en wetenschappelijke attitude in het geding. Voorts gedraagt
interferon zieh niet conform de verwachtingen 'as just another penicilline or hormone' dat
probleemloos inpasbaar is binnen het conventionele chemotherapeutisch geneesmiddel-
ontwikkelingsmodel. Bij het onderzoek naar de 'grillige' biologische substantie interferon,
bestaat continue spanning tussen het houvast zoeken in bestaande testpraktijken en pogingen
om op ad-hoc basis nieuwe invulling te geven aan testprocedures. Als bij voortduring het
referentiekader te kort schiet en nieuwe technische, organisatorische en logistieke problemen
zieh blijven voordoen, neemt de industriele belangstelling zienderogen af.
Het onderzoek naar interferon concentreert zieh vervolgens in een internationaal vertakt
netwerk van universitäre onderzoeksinstellingen. Na een vliegende start begin jaren zestig
moeten de betrokken onderzoekers genoegen nemen met een marginale rol binnen het inter-
nationale veld van virusonderzoek. De onderzoeksagenda wordt beheerst door een aantal zieh
voortslepende problemen: de onvoldoende beschikbaarheid van interferon, het uitblijven van de
chemische karakterisering en de soortspeeificiteit van interferon. Dit gaat gepaard met een
versnippering van het onderzoek dat gekenmerkt wordt door een brede waaier aan onder-
zoeksbenaderingen en hypothesen.
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Voor interferononderzoekers vormt de contextafhankelijkheid van onderzoeksresultaten
ten gevolge van een grote variatie in experimentele Systemen een voortdurende bron van
conflicten. Deze problematiek wordt versterkt door het uitblijven van de chemische identificatie
van interferon. Hoofdstuk vijf beschrijft in detail hoe onderzoekers en bedrijven de uitwisseling
van kennis en onderzoeksmaterialen proberen te vergemakkelijken door informele en formele
vormen van standaardisatie. Door het genereren van internationaal erkende interferon
standaarden slagen zij er uiteindelijk in om de productie van context-onafhankelijke kennis met
een universeel karakter te waarborgen. Interferon dat voorheen in hoge mate gebonden was aan
een relatief klein netwerk van specifieke lokale laboratoriumpraktijken is nu verplaatsbaar naar
elders.
Midden jaren zeventig krijgt het onderzoeksgebied een belangrijke nieuwe impuls.
Scandinavische onderzoekers claimen niet alleen een veelbelovende methode ontwikkeld te
hebben voor de productie van menselijk interferon maar menen ook een belangrijk nieuw
therapeutisch effect waargenomen te hebben in kankerpatienten. Met steun van de invloedrijke
Amerikaanse lobbyiste Mathilde Krim weten zij met hun claim de aandacht te trekken van de
media en van belangrijke onderzoekers en beleidsmakers op het gebied van kanker in Amerika.
De betekenisverschuiving van interferon als antivirale stof naar interferon als potentieel
middel tegen kanker en virussen in de jaren zeventig, is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 6. De
aandacht gaat met name uit naar de dynamiek van wat retrospectief wordt aangeduid als de
'interferon crusade' in Amerika. Beschreven wordt hoe de claim van de anti-kankerwerking van
interferon buiten het specifieke veld van onderzoek een eigen leven gaat leiden.
Hoewel vraagtekens geplaatst worden bij de wetenschappelijke toetsing van de
geclaimde onderzoeksresultaten, zorgt de 'medialisering' van de belofte van interferon als niet-
toxisch lichaamseigen geneesmiddel tegen kanker voor een ware hausse aan verwachtingen. De
aankondiging eind jaren zeventig van nieuwe biotechnologische bedrijven dat zij instaat zijn om
met behulp van recombinant-DNA-technologie ongelimiteerde hoeveelheden van dit 'magische'
eiwit te produceren, werkt op haar beurt als een vliegwiel. Wereldwijd verwerft interferon een
kortdurende status als 'h6t wondermiddel tegen kanker en virussen'. Echter, als bij voortduring
de resultaten van klinisch onderzoek ver achterblijven bij de eerdere onderzoeksclaims en
ernstige bijwerkingen blijken te kunnen optreden, neemt de belangstelling voor interferon in
snel tempo af.
Opmerkelijk is de wijze waarop de wetenschappelijke en medische wereld opeen-
volgend de hausse aan verwachtingen aanjagen als middel om geld te werven voor onderzoek
en deze bestrijden als hun belangen in het geding komen. De massamedia fungeren hierbij als
dynamisch platform voor de uitwisseling van informatie, verwachtingen en noties tussen
wetenschappers. artsen, patienten, politici, de industrie en het algemene publiek.
Ondanks het feit dat interferon begin jaren tachtig de dubieuze status verwerft van 'the
miracle drug looking for a disease' verdwijnt het niet van het toneel. Voor een aantal van de
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betrokken wetenschappers en bedrijven blijkt 'het point of no return' te zijn bereikt. Zij volhar-
den in hun zoektocht naar toepassingsmogelijkheden voor interferon. Hoofdstuk 7 laat zien hoe
interferon als beloftevol prototype van een nieuwe generatie van therapeutische biomoleculen
onderdeel wordt van de biotechnologisering van geneesmiddelontwikkeling en -productie.
Tegelijkertijd brengt het in kaart de wijze waarop farmaceutische bedrijven interferon
transformeren van een marginaal geneesmiddel tot een 'billion-dollar family of molecules'.
Door strategisch gebruik te maken van "clinical trials' als belangrijke schakel tussen
laboratorium en kliniek, slagen zij erin om een herdefiniering en verbreding van het
therapeutisch profiel van interferon te bewerkstelligen. Als immuno-modulantia gaan
interferonen (alpha, beta en gamma types) een veelgevraagd onderdeel vormen van
combinatietherapie bij maligne en andersoortige aandoeningen in de klinisch therapeutische
praktijk. , ,,...-
Het slothoofdstuk geeft een kritische analyse van de bevindingen en mogelijke
implicaties van deze biografie van een 'wondermiddel'. Het laat zien dat tijdens de ontwikkeling
van interferon sprake is van een verschuiving. Werd in de jaren vijftig nog een gouden
toekomst toegedicht aan chemie bij de ontwikkeling van nieuwe en betere geneesmiddelen, aan
de vooravond van de eenentwintigste eeuw heeft in het denken over medicijnen van de
toekomst chemie plaats gemaakt voor moleculaire biologie. Dit verloopt synchroon met een
overgang van proces- naar systeemdenken in biologie en geneeskunde. Hierbij gaat het om een
verschuiving in het denken over het organisme als een complex geheel van biochemische
processen naar het organisme als complex communicatie regel-systeem. Waar interferon als
grillige therapeutische substantie in eerste instantie faalt bij het ontbreken van een geschikt
wetenschappelijk en klinisch frame, weet het vervolgens met succes nieuwe ankerpunten te
genereren als de biomoleculaire wending binnen geneesmiddelonderzoek en medische
behandelpraktijk haar beslag krijgt.
Ook problematiseert dit proefschrift de verwevenheid van medisch-wetenschappelijke
en medisch-therapeutische praktijken. Op de voorgrond treedt een voortdurend conflict tussen
statistische significantie en klinische relevantie. Zo krijgen binnen de concrete context van
ernstige onbehandelbare ziekten kwaliteiten als 'gering' en 'onzeker' een andere betekenis dan
bij behandelbare aandoeningen. Deze studie maakt duidelijk dat bij de beoordeling van de werk-
zaamheid van een geneesmiddel sprake is van een afwegingsproces waarin industrie,
wetenschappers, artsen en patienten elkaar in een houdgreep van belofte en hoop houden.
Gewekte verwachtingen over wat nieuwe generaties van therapeutische moleculen naar de toe-
komst toe vermögen bij het verlengen en verbeteren van 'het leven' blijken te interfereren met
de beoordeling van de mogelijke gezondheidswinst van deze nieuwe therapieen in de actuele
klinische setting. Hierbij moet het dilemma gezocht worden in de vervlechting van de dagelijkse
praktijk van medische zorg, waarin de patientenstatus het referentiepunt is, met de praktijk van
medisch onderzoek waarin de te verwachten kliniek van de toekomst als ijkpunt dient.
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